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Though I certainly did not realize it at the time, the research which 
eventually culminated in this book was conceived in the summer of 
1993. A year before, I had decided to interrupt (or quit, I was not 
very sure) my studies in public administration at Leiden University. 
By pure chance I ended up working as a tour guide for a low budget 
travel agency in north India and Nepal. These new surroundings 
thrilled and fascinated me and I used all of my spare time to explore 
as many (preferably out of the way) places as I could. One of these 
trips took me to the Himalayan Kumaun hills, in the northern part 
of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, in what is now the newly 
created state of Uttaranchal. 
On the way down from a trek to the locally famous Pindari 
glacier and Nanda Devi lake, I passed through a small village called 
Khaljhuni. Some friendly villagers offered me tea and –on my 
asking- turned out to be willing to let me stay, in exchange for a 
very affordable rent, in a half-built house (with a roof, though) at the 
upper end of the steep slope against which the village was nestled. 
Not quite sure what I was doing there apart from living on a 
shoestring and escaping the monsoon heat and humidity of the 
Gangetic plains, I ended up staying almost two months in the 
village. I did not keep a diary or take any notes. In fact, all I have to 
show for my stay there are six smudgy photographs.  
Khaljhuni turned out to be a small and, I guess, rather typical 
Kumaoni village. On a day-to-day basis most of its inhabitants were 
busy eking out a rather precarious existence by way of farming the 
small and steep plots of land surrounding the village and hearding 
goats. Many villagers also tried to earn some extra cash by hunting, 
dog breeding, tayloring, mat weaving, smithery and selling hand-
Preface ii 
made hashish to local dealers (on rainy days many adults and 
children could be seen rubbing their hands through the cannabis 
flowers to release the resin; the traditional and rather time-
consuming way of producing charas). 
In no time I found myself actively participating in the affairs of 
the village. My “house” quickly developed into the village’s tea 
stall; from around five o’ clock in the morning onwards men from 
the village would flock into my room to drink my (free) tea and 
smoke my cigarettes (“real” and expensive Panamas rather than the 
“local” bidis or hukkaa), chat, exchange gossip and learn about 
“foreign”. I spent innumerable hours playing chess with the local 
Rajput shopkeeper, a retired army man who spoke good English 
and acted as my interpreter. I helped (or, at least, tried to do so) a 
local household with the threshing of grain, assisted in the collective 
efforts of Khaljhuni men to repaire the path leading up to the village 
(which had been swept away by the monsoon rains), accompanied 
my landlord Sher Singh on a tour of neighbouring villages to collect 
debts from reneging customers of the Rajput’s shop and 
accompanied two other Khaljhuni men on a two day trek to some 
high altitude grazing meadows where they had hoped (but 
eventually failed) to buy themselves a new goat. I also came to act as 
Khaljhuni’s inofficial doctor (thanks to my quickly ascertained and 
advertised possession of iodine, band-aids and bandages), 
photographer and courier. Besides, my –as the villagers saw it- vast 
financial means made me into a much sought after buyer and 
consumer of locally expensive goods such as chicken and mountain 
deer meat, curd, rum, whiskey, coconuts, cigarettes and a heavy 
woollen mountain coat. 
Though Khaljhuni was a small village, inhabited by not more 
than forty households (some two or three hundred people), what 
struck me almost immediately was that the small Khaljhuni 
population was nevertheless a rather strictly differentiated one. That 
is to say, each and every villager could easily be seen to belong to 
one, and only one, of three different, clearly distinguishable groups. 
These groups had their own quarters in the village and most of their 
members’ social life took place within the confines of their own 
group: if things -eating, playing, feasting, preparing for a trip, 
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chatting, smoking, washing etc.- were done commonly they would 
tend to be done with fellow groupmembers rather than with 
members of the other groups.  
The Bhotiyas formed the largest group in the village and its 
members inhabited the houses in the centre of the village. It was the 
group to which my landlord Sher Singh belonged (and with which I 
myself, in consequence, was also commonly felt to be “associated”). 
The Khaljhuni Bhotiyas, as they explained to me, were part of a 
much larger group of Bhotiyas, the members of which lived in 
scattered mountain villages near and across the Nepali and Tibetan 
border. Though they had now settled down to become farmers or 
soldiers (in the Indian army’s renowned Gurkha regiments), the 
Bhotiyas were originally traders, specialized in plying their trade –
especially salt- across the Himalayas. Their slant eyes gave the 
Bhotiyas a “Tibetan” rather than an “Indian” appearance and served 
as easy markers of their distinction from the rest of the village 
population.   
The second and smallest group consisted of the Rajput 
households, headed by my friend the shopkeeper. The Rajputs were 
quite obviously much better off than the other villagers. Their 
women wore better and more beautiful clothes than the other 
women, their houses were bigger and better furnished than those of 
the other groups, and, unlike most other villagers, all members of 
the Rajput households, women included, seemed to have received at 
least some education. Besides, the Rajput shopkeeper was obviously 
a much respected man in the village. He was often sent for to sort 
out animosities between villagers and asked for advice in all kinds 
of worldly matters. His self-appointed role as my guardian and 
chain-smoking chess companion, also, seemed somehow very much 
in accordance with the high status he enjoyed in the village. 
The third group consisted of the dozen or so families who 
lived just outside the main village, on a rim on the lower end of the 
slope. It did not take a trained eye to see that most members of these 
households were much poorer than the Rajputs and Bhotiyas. Many 
wore old, even ragged clothes, for instance, lived in smaller and less 
comfortable houses and could not afford, as is customary in India, to 
drink their tea with milk. Puzzlingly enough, the members of this 
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poorer segment of the village population did not seem to have a 
common name to go by, at least not one that was quite as easy to 
pick up as those of Rajput or Bhotiya (which members of these 
groups routinely suffixed to their surnames when introducing 
themselves to some stranger or if they wanted to distinguish the one 
Ram Singh from the other, for instance).  
Also, I could not fail to notice that members of the poor group 
seemed much more shy than the other villagers. Whereas Rajput 
and Bhotiya men would freely enter my house (almost, in fact, as 
they felt like it) or call out to me when I walked through the village, 
most of the poor group’s men would do no such thing. Whenever 
they did enter my room, they would mostly sit quietly, away from 
the stove on which I brew my tea, leaning backwards as it seemed, 
and certainly not taking part in the ongoing conversation as actively 
and enthusiastically as the others did. Members of the poor group 
were also conspicuous by their absence on the occasional and quasi-
secret liquor-drinking and meat-eating sessions that Sher Singh 
Bhotia and the Rajput shopkeeper liked to organise for me (on my 
expense, to be sure).  
I remember being very much intrigued by the rather special 
position the poor group’s members seemed to occupy in Khaljhuni 
society. When I tried to ask Sher Singh about it he was perceptibly 
embarrassed. He reluctantly volunteered (after much prodding on 
my part) that these people were “Aryas” and that it would be best if 
I had as little to do with them as possible. If I so wished I might visit 
their quarters but I should certainly not accept any drinks or food 
from them. Naturally, Sher Singh’s answer only fuelled my desire to 
learn more about these mysterious “Aryas” and I made up my mind 
to take advantage of any opportunity to mingle with them and visit 
their houses. However, after having seen me drinking tea with the 
Arya blacksmith, the Bhotiyas were quick to put a stop to this plan. 
They clearly took strong exception to my blatant disregard of Sher 
Singh’s advice and made it understood that there were limits to 
their hospitality. I saw but little of the Aryas after that. 
As I gradually came to understand, really only after my 
departure from Khaljhuni and some voracious reading, I had quite 
accidently and inadvertently stumbled upon what, to Western eyes 
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at least, must seem one of the most perplexing institutions of Hindu 
caste society, that of untouchability. My initial fascination with this 
social configuration which simultaneously serves to extract the best 
energies and skills of a large category of people while giving them 
hardly anything worthwile in return has stayed with me ever since. 
In fact, it has been this very fascination, unwittingly kindled by the 
Khaljhuni villagers, which both triggered me to undertake this 
research in the first place and pushed me towards, finally, finishing 
it too. I hope it shines through. 
 This book has been a long time in coming. Writing it has also 
been a rather lonely affair. Nevertheless, quite a few people have 
helped me along the way. Of course, this book could not have been 
written without the hundreds of netas, babus, dalaals, dabang and 
small people of Sitapur district who, with widely varying 
enthusiasm, provided me with the raw material for it. Special words 
of thanks must go to shri H.S. Saksena for his kind hospitality and 
much needed advice and encouragement throughout my stay in 
Uttar Pradesh, to Sunil Gupta for his superb research assistance and 
to Sita Ram for his unsurpassed cooking as well as his much 
appreciated companionship.  
Thanks, also, to professor Bhartwal and Dr. S.N. Singh of the 
Department of Public Administration of Lucknow University, 
professor G.P. Mishra and his staff at the Giri Institute for 
Development Studies (Aliganj, Lucknow), Manoj and Sanjay, Dr. 
H.S. Verma, Dr. Vivek Kumar, the staff of the G.B. Pant Institute 
(Allahabad), the archivists in the Pioneer’s Lucknow office, 
professors Kuldeep Mathur, Dipankar Gupta, Sudha Pai and Nandu 
Ram of Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi), professor Jagpal 
Singh of Indira Gandhi Open University (New Delhi), professor D.L. 
Sheth of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (Delhi) 
and to countless others in India whose names I promised not to 
mention or have regrettably forgotten.  
Thanks are also due to my (former) colleagues at Leiden 
University, the University of Antwerp and the Free University of 
Amsterdam who, in their various and sometimes unwitting ways, 
managed to persuade me that my research was worth doing. I am 
also grateful to my aunties for their moral and practical support, 
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Suzie for making sure “the thing” got actually finished, Rosalie and 
Jeff for everything they did or failed to do to allow or prevent me 
from working on the manuscript, and myself for somehow 
completing the task I turned out to have set myself.  
 
B.v.G. 
Antwerpen, December 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Glossary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADO Assistant Development Officer, lowly 
development officer, attached to the block-
staff, subordinate to BDO 
adhikari officer, as opposed to clerical staff (babus) or 
manual staff (drivers, peons, sweepers)  
adhyaksh  president of the zilla panchayat  
Ahir cultivating caste, also referred to as Yadav. 
Ahirs or Yadavs, together with the Kurmis, 
form the bulk of so-called OBCs in the 
Sitapur countryside 
babu clerk; in plural –babus- also used to refer to 
public employees in general, as a social class 
bakri  family/house 
batai  sharecropping 
BDC Block Development Committee, executive 
body of the kshetra panchayat, chaired by the 
pramukh 
BDO Block Development Officer, official in charge 
of a rural development block 
begar forced, unremunerated labour exacted from 
low, often untouchable, castes by upper 
castes  
bhel small, private sugarfactory where gur 
(molasses) is produced 
bigha local land measure, h.l. about 800 square 
meters 
biradari   community; caste 
BPL Below Poverty Line, administrative term for 
the poor 
Glossary viii 
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party, political party 
dominated by the Chamar constituency; 
controlled the Uttar Pradesh government in 
1995, 1997, 2002-3 and 2007 
Brahmins    ritually highest varna in Hindu society 
charpay lit. “four legs”; traditional rope bed used, 
among other things, for sleeping and 
receiving guests 
CDO Chief Development Officer, highest-ranking  
development officer in a district, subordinate 
to the DM 
Chamar untouchable jati of leatherworkers; most 
populous caste in Uttar Pradesh 
chamarbasti hamlet solely (or predominantly) inhabited 
by people of the Chamar caste 
chowkidar   watchman 
chuachut  untouchability 
chula simple stove; to be provided free of cost to all 
IAY beneficiaries 
colony colloquial name for a house (to be) provided 
under IAY 
crore  10,000,000 rupees 
dabang “those who put pressure”; exploiters. Term 
frequently used by “small people” to refer to 
(members of) locally dominant, usually 
landowning, families and castes  
dacoit  robber, criminal 
dalaal  inofficial broker; fixer, middleman 
Dalit lit. “downtrodden” or “ground down” in the 
Marathi language. Name spawned by the 
untouchable writers’ movement Dalit 
Panthers in the 1970s and subsequently 
widely adopted by politically assertive 
untouchables 
daroga  police inspector 
DDO District Development Officer, high-ranking  
development officer, subordinate to the CDO 
Glossary ix
dharna  collective protest, “strike” 
Dhobi   untouchable jati of washermen 
DM District Magistrate, highest district-level 
official. Post filled by a member of IAS in 
mid-career or a very senior PCS officer 
DRDA District Rural Development Agency, 
executive development body, chaired by the 
adhyaksh 
DSP  Deputy Superintendent of Police, junior 
police officer, recruited from the IPS or the 
higher merit ranks of the PCS examinations  
dunlop  bullock cart with rubber inflatable tires 
(rather than with wooden ones) 
fauzdari  bloody feud; case for the criminal courts 
FIR    First Information Report  
gaanjar swampy and backward lowland area in the 
east of Sitapur district 
goonda   thug, criminal; involved in goondagiri 
goondagiri criminal activities, hoodlumism, political 
gangsterism 
Harijan Act colloquial name for legislation enacted by the 
UP government in 1989 to prevent upper caste 
atrocities against untouchables; officially 
known as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989  
hotel  restaurant 
hukkaa waterpipe 
IAS Indian Administrative Service, most 
prestigious cadre in Indian bureaucracy 
IAY Indira Awas Yojna, free housing program, 
implemented in socalled Ambedkar villages 
ICS    Indian Civil Service, predecessor of IAS 
IPS Indian Police Service, very prestigious 
national cadre, at par with the IAS 
IRDP Integrated Rural Development Program, 
rural development program involving the 
Glossary x
distribution of loans and subsidies to people 
below the poverty line 
jaj  official enquiry, inspection 
JRY Jawahar Rojgar Yojna, rural development 
program offering temporary off-season 
employment and social assets 
kam  work  
kanun  lit. law; lawful order, justice 
kanungo  local revenue official: in rank subordinate to 
the tahsildar and superior to the patwari 
Kayasths upper caste community with a strong 
historical presence in bureaucracy  
khula betak monthly open meeting of the gram 
panchayat  
Kori  untouchable jati  
kshetra panchayat elective political body at block level, also 
referred to as BDC (block development 
committee)  
Kurmi cultivating caste, very populous in central 
Uttar Pradesh with relatively strong political 
clout  
lakh    100,000 rupees 
Lala    local name for a Kayasth 
lekhpal  village accountant; also called patwari  
lok sabha  national parliament in New Delhi  
Mahatmaji  Mahatma Gandhi 
man  weight measure, 10 kg.  
mazduri  (rate of) daily wage labour 
mela  fair, market 
mithai  sweets 
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly (vidhan 
sabha) 
MLC Member of Legislative Council, a body of the 
state parliament 
neta  politician 
netagiri what politicians do, politics; often used in a 
peiorative sense, “politicking” 
Glossary xi
nyay(a) panchayat  (1) obsolete geographical unit of justice-
administration; (2) geographical jurisdiction 
of VLOs at the time of fieldwork; comprising 
5 to 8 gram panchayats 
OBC Other Backward Classes, collection of 
government-designated socially and 
educationally backward jatis; beneficiaries of 
reservations since 1991  
pahunch lit. approach; access, influence; deemed 
indispensable to get one’s work (kam) done 
panch  member of the gram panchayat 
panchayat(i) raj three-tiered system of local government, 
operated by democratically elected local 
politicians  
Pandit  Brahmin 
Pasi untouchable jati of village watchmen, thieves 
and swineherds; populous in Sitapur district 
and reputed to have once held a part of Oudh  
patwari   village revenue official 
PCS highest civil service cadre of the state, though 
less prestigious than the IAS. Senior members 
of this cadre may join the IAS as socalled 
“promotees”  
PD Project Director, high-ranking district 
development officer, in rank comparable to 
the DDO 
pradhan village mayor, president of the gram 
panchayat 
pradhani  elective position occupied by the pradhan 
pradhanpati lit. husband of pradhan; term used to denote a 
male person who is de facto performing the 
role of pradhan instead of his de iure elected 
wife 
pramukh  chairman of the kshetra panchayat/BDC 
purva  hamlet 
Raidas synonym for Chamar; sometimes used to refer 
to untouchables in general 
Glossary xii
raja  king 
Rajput dominant landowning upper caste, belonging 
to the Kshatryia varna. In north India 
commonly referred to as Thakur.  
sahab   sir, gentleman (honorific) 
savarna  “twiceborn”; term frequently used by 
villagers to refer to individuals belonging to 
any of the three upper caste varnas (Brahmins, 
Kshatriyas and Vaishyas)   
SC Scheduled Caste, administrative euphemism 
for a (formerly) untouchable caste which 
benefits from reservations 
SDM Sub Divisional Magistrate, official in charge of 
a tahsil, subordinate to the DM. Also called 
tahsildar 
secretary/sakratari term widely used by villagers to refer to the 
VLO   
tahsil/tehsil sub-division: geographical unit of revenue 
and general administration. In size smaller 
than a district and bigger than a block  
tahsildar officer in charge of a tahsil, also called SDM. 
Post often occupied by junior IAS officer, 
otherwise PCS 
taluqdar large estate holder. Term used for members 
of the legally privileged group of zamindars 
in Oudh whom the British had awarded 
sanads, i.e. unfettered proprietary titles, over 
their estates. The some 270 taluqdars in Oudh 
(mostly Thakurs) owned over sixty percent of 
the soil between the late 1850s and the early 
1950s 
tembaku   tobacco 
Thakur   see: Rajput 
thana   local police station  
TRYSEM rural development program, lit. “Training of 
Rural Youth for Self Employment” 
uppradhan  vice mayor 
Glossary xiii
vidhan sabha  state parliament  
VLO  Village Level Officer 
zamindar  landlord 
zamindari  (absentee) landlordism 
zilla panchayat elective political body at district level, 
chaired by the adhyaksh 
 
 
 
 1 Introduction: From Passive to Active 
Representation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The subject 
 
In 1950, the newly independent government of India adopted a 
nationwide policy of preferential hiring of individuals belonging to 
so-called scheduled castes in civil service jobs. Scheduled castes is 
an administrative euphemism for untouchables or outcasts, the 
castes at the bottom of the caste hierarchy whose touch (or 
sometimes sight or presence) old Hindu scriptures held to be 
defiling for caste Hindus. The affirmative action policy has 
continued to this day. It entitles untouchables to percentual quotas 
of civil service jobs at all administrative levels. Although the 
respective state governments in India’s federal system have some 
degree of discretion in establishing reservation quotas on the state 
level, the percentage of public sector jobs reserved for untouchables 
tends to be commensurate with the untouchables’ share in any 
state’s population. Consequently, in India as a whole, approximately 
15 per cent of the vacancies for new recruits and variable 
percentages of promotions in public bureaucracies are reserved for 
untouchable individuals belonging to any of the 1086 recognized 
scheduled castes. In India this preferential policy is simply referred 
to as “reservations”.  
This is a study about these reservations, more specifically, an 
enquiry into one of their intended or expected effects. Reservations 
are an interesting and important subject of enquiry. Though 
increasingly popular and pursued in many plural societies, 
preferential policies, of which reservations are an example, tend to 
be controversial and highly contested. Because they involve the 
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group-wise shifting of resources and opportunities, make use of 
ethnic categories and are often felt to violate the principle of 
equality of all citizens before the law, they generally generate fierce 
opposition (Jenkins 1998; Young 1998: 26). Preferential policies are 
often accompanied by a heavy arsenal of what Albert Hirschman 
calls “rhetoric of reaction”, that stresses the perverse and dangerous 
consequences of preferential policies and/or points out why the 
pursuit of preferential policies will turn out to be a futile exercise 
(Hirschman 1991).  
The preferential treatment of untouchables has been 
safeguarded in the Constitution. Article 46 a, which prescribes that 
the state shall “promote with special care” the educational and 
economic interests of (among others) the Scheduled Castes, lays 
down the general commitment to preferential treatment of 
untouchables. Article 15 (4) exempts the preferential treatment of 
untouchables from the general ban against discrimination, while 
article 16 (4) exempts “the reservation of appointments or posts in 
favour of any class of backward citizens which, in the opinion of the 
State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State” 
from the ban on discrimination in public employment. The Indian 
Constitution thus creates the possibility of preferential treatment of 
untouchables in civil service recruitment by way of reservations, 
apparently to guarantee them adequate representation. But why? The 
constitution remains silent on this point. Nowhere it explains what 
would constitute adequate representation, why “adequate” 
representation would be desirable, why, in particular, the 
untouchables need these constitutional safeguards, nor why the 
state’s intent to “promote with special care” the untouchables’ 
interests should take the form of reservations. 
In India, few people feel the need for answers to these 
questions: they are considered more or less self-evident. Most 
Indians would probably say something to the effect that 
reservations are a compensation for the wrongs historically 
perpetrated against untouchables in the name of Hinduism or 
“casteism”. Most of the literature on the subject concurs with the 
idea that “preferences for scheduled castes are meant to alleviate the 
disadvantages historically associated with low standing in the 
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Hindu sacral order” (Galanter 1989 (1967): 132; cf. also Sheth 1997). 
Hence, reservations for untouchables are a clear-cut example of 
affirmative action, pursued as a remedy for the effects of past and 
continuing group-based disadvantage (cf. Anderson 2002: 10).1 
The group-based disadvantages experienced by India’s 
untouchables have been many and enduring. Untouchables owe 
these disadvantages to their special position in the Hindu caste 
system, a social hierarchy based on ritual impurity. Although every 
Hindu is in an impure state once in a while, so-called caste Hindus 
consider untouchables permanently impure because their traditional 
occupations as cloth washers, gravediggers, leatherworkers, 
cremation ground attendants or pig breeders involve contact with 
bodily excrements and (dead) animals. This ritual impurity made 
them untouchable (or, in some places, even “unshadowable” or 
“unseeable”) to caste Hindus and put them at the bottom or even 
outside the caste system (whence outcasts). Their dismal ritual 
status has been accompanied by the enforcement of numerous social 
disabilities by caste Hindu society. Untouchables’ entrance to 
temples, for example, was severely restricted as was their use of 
public goods and services such as wells, schools and roads. The use 
of certain “luxury” items such as shoes and umbrellas was forbidden 
to them. They suffered residential segregation, performed forced, free 
labour for upper castes and were not allowed to own land. As a result, 
to this day, most of India’s 150 million untouchables are extremely 
poor. 
 As far as government employment is concerned reservations 
for untouchables have made a substantial impact. Over the past six 
decades hundreds of thousands of untouchable individuals have 
benefited from them. In this sense, notwithstanding their alleged 
record of generating an array of unintended and undesirable side-
effects, reservations have undoubtedly been successful: without 
them, the number of untouchable civil servants would probably not 
                                                
1 Apart from reservations, the Indian government uses also other 
instruments to combat the effects of untouchable caste membership. Since 1955 
the practice of untouchability is legally banned. The state government of Uttar 
Pradesh as recently as 1989 adopted its own “prevention of atrocities act” (see 
Saksena 1996). 
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even have been a fraction of what it is now. Untouchable 
beneficiaries of public employment quota constitute only a tiny 
proportion of the total untouchable population, however.2 Because 
of the limited number of reserved jobs as compared to the vast 
numbers of potential beneficiaries, the effectiveness of reservations 
as a compensatory device has been, critics argue, extremely limited. 
Whereas, given the social status, job security and patronage 
opportunities involved in government employment in India, the 
benefits of reservations for the relatively few who have profited 
from them have been real and substantial, reservations have not 
even begun -as they were intended to- to make a dent in solving the 
problems of inequality and mass poverty of the large majority of 
untouchables.  
As the Indian sociologist André Béteille has observed, the 
affirmative action debate in India has been largely conducted in a 
“language of justice” whereby “those who are opposed to it tend to 
dwell more on the rights of individuals, whereas those in favour 
speak more of the rights of groups and communities” (Béteille 1991: 
591). Béteille contrasts the Indian debate’s preoccupation with 
justice with the focus on utility in the United States, where, he says, 
the proponents of preferences have tended to make their case from 
“arguments about policy” (ibid.).  
In the case of preferential public sector hiring, one of these 
arguments has been that the compensatory effects of affirmative 
action need not be limited to those who profit directly from it. 
Group-preferential hiring practices, namely, change the ethnic 
profile of bureaucracy to the benefit of formerly underrepresented 
groups. It is likely, advocates of group-wise redistributive policies 
argue, that bureaucracies affected by such ethnic engineering will 
                                                
 2 Even if the untouchables had attained their statutory 15 per cent of all 
public sector jobs, the total number of public sector employed untouchables 
would still have been less than 2.6 million, or just over two per cent of the whole 
untouchable population (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 138). Other estimates 
propose a higher percentage of beneficiaries because they also count untouchable 
bureaucrats’ family members as beneficiaries. Including Fourth Class 
functionaries, Isaacs and Galanter estimate that around 10 per cent of the 
untouchables may profit from government employment made available under 
reservations (Galanter 1984; Isaacs 1965).  
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consequently produce policy outcomes and outputs that better 
reflect the interests of these groups. Bureaucrats belonging to 
government-designated categories of preferential treatment may be 
more sympathetic towards members of the groups from which they 
have been recruited, and potential clients of bureaucracy may be 
more apt to participate in policies when they identify and are 
comfortable with program administrators (Selden 1997a: 7). 
Affirmative hiring, in other words, may foster more representative 
bureaucracies and thus, indirectly, produce secondary, 
compensatory, redistributive effects. Treated as a testable 
hypothesis, this argument that the increased recruitment of civil 
servants from a certain ethnic group will increase the substantive 
representation of the group when government implements policy is 
the subject of this book. To put it more concretely: does passive 
representation –the presence of untouchable bureaucrats- translate 
into active representation –the promotion of ingroup interests by 
untouchable bureaucrats? 
 
 
2 Bureaucracy and ethnic preferences 
 
The Indian government’s pursuit of preferential policies is not 
exceptional. In many plural societies, governments pursue 
preferential policies for ethnic groups: groups characterized by 
inherited membership based on ascriptive criteria such as race, 
language, caste, or religion, rather than on acquired identities, such 
as socio-economic class. Preferential policies are “policies which 
legally mandate that individuals not all be judged by the same 
criteria or subjected to the same procedures when they originate in 
ethnic groups differentiated by government into preferred and non-
preferred groups” (Sowell 1990). Preferential policies may vary 
widely in scope, formality, explicitness and intent. “Some are 
limited to public-sector opportunities, while others extend to the 
private sector as well. Some reach broadly into business and 
education, in addition to employment. Others are confined to 
particular spheres, such as higher education or civil service 
positions. Some policies are formally stated and openly pursued, 
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whereas many others are adopted sub silentio” (Horowitz 2000: 654). 
“[S]ome preferences may be “compensatory” preferences, intended 
to allow some poorer group to close the economic gap between itself 
and some more fortunate group. Other preferences are intended to 
maintain the existing economic advantages already enjoyed by a 
politically dominant group” (Sowell 1990: 16). 
Typically, it is politically powerful groups who dominate 
government who use their power to enforce preferences that 
transfer resources away from other, less powerful groups. In 
countries as varied as Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, 
Guyana, Trinidad and Sierra Leone, majorities, or politically 
dominant groups, have voted themselves preferences over 
politically less powerful (but economically more successful) 
minorities (Sowell 1990). Government intercession on behalf of less 
powerful groups is far less common (Chiswick 1990: xiv). Indian 
reservations of public service jobs for untouchables are part of a 
more elaborate program of preferential treatment of various 
disadvantaged groups, encompassing other institutions (legislative 
institutions on all political levels, higher education), other groups 
(so-called Other Backward Classes, or OBCs, and their various, 
state-specific sub-categories, Mahar Buddhists, “sons-of-the soil”), 
and other types of benefits (such as scholarships and quotas in 
redistributive rural development programs). What is remarkable 
about India’s preferences, therefore, is the extent of its policies, both 
historically and today, to help the lowest castes and communities 
(Jenkins 1998: 199). “Probably nowhere else in the world was so 
large a lower-class minority granted so much favourable treatment 
by a government as were the depressed classes of India” (Jalali 1993: 
97). 
As in India, also elsewhere preferential policies quite often 
involve government bureaucracies. The Malay government, for 
example, applies Malay quota to recruitment for the elite Malaysian 
Administrative and Diplomatic Service, to the military services and 
the police, as well as recruitment ratios for the professional and non-
professional (technical) services (Means 1986: 104-5). In Pakistan, 
recruitment to most public sector jobs is subject to “ethnoregional” 
quotas. Ninety per cent of the vacancies to the Central Superior 
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Services, for instance, are to be filled on the basis of ethnoregional 
criteria (Kennedy 1986). The government of South Africa preferably 
recruits “black people” into the public service (De Zwart 2001; 
Ncholo 2000).  
The preferential treatment of ethnic groups may be, as in the 
above examples, a matter of government policy, in that it is 
circumscribed by formal rules and explicitly pursued and justified. 
Informal and tacit deployment of ethnic preferences is probably 
even more widespread. Preferences may, furthermore, be operative 
where existing recruitment practices appear ethnically neutral. The 
application of formulas of ethnic proportionality in civil service 
hiring, for example, may also imply preferential treatment. Where 
colonial rule left the bureaucracies of many new states 
overrepresented by members of certain ethnic groups, present-day 
pursuits of ethnic proportionality translate into preferment of those 
ethnic groups that were either disfavoured by colonial recruiters, or 
that developed an interest in civil service employment 
comparatively late (cf. e.g. Brown 1999; Rothchild 1986: 85).3  
Ethnic preferences redistribute valued positions and resources. 
There are, of course, other policy options available to governments 
that want to redress group disparities. They might, for example, 
refrain from group-wise distribution altogether or pursue 
redistributive policies which stipulate non-ethnic attributes (such as 
class or region) as eligibility criteria. For various reasons, however, 
governments in many plural societies increasingly prefer ethnic 
preferment over these alternatives (De Zwart 2005).4  
  Ethnic pluralism is an enduring attribute of most 
contemporary political societies (Young 1998: 3). Ethnic identity is 
particularly strongly felt in the relatively new states of Asia, Africa, 
the Middle East, and the Caribbean. Behaviour based on ethnicity, 
often accompanied by hostility toward outgroups, is normatively 
                                                
3 Colonial regimes often relied in large part on members of specific ethnic 
groups (often early Christianised, English/French-speaking or “martial” ones) to 
fill the ranks of their civil, police and military bureaucracies. Examples of such 
preferred groups include the Ibo in Nigeria, the Baganda in Uganda, Bengalis in 
East India, Ewe in Togo, Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Tutsi in Burundi (Wimmer 
1997: 637). 
4 For examples, see Gurr (2000). 
1 From passive to active representation? 8
sanctioned, and strong ethnic allegiances permeate organizations, 
activities and roles to which they are formally unrelated (Horowitz, 
2000: 7). Where ethnicity is salient, ethnic groups are, in a sense, 
“natural” or obvious policy categories.  
This trend is reinforced by the fact that ethnic diversity often 
involves structural inequality between groups (cf. De Zwart 2005). 
These group inequalities do not necessarily result from 
discrimination. Specific groups may have their own particular sets 
of skills of dealing with life’s necessities and their own particular 
sets of values as to what are the higher and lower purposes of life as 
well as their own specific views on the acceptable and appropriate 
ways in which these purposes might be achieved. Group 
inequalities may, therefore, be the products of voluntary choices, as 
when groups choose to differ in the ways that they value current 
investment, future consumption, traditional life-styles, risk-taking 
and entrepreneurial activity (Chiswick 1990: xiii; Sowell 1994: 1; 
Weiner 1983: 36).  
In plural societies, however, group inequalities are often 
perceived as a product of deliberate bias towards those groups with 
favoured access to the state. Ethnic groups that feel disadvantaged 
by the state thus constitute ready-made constituencies with a strong 
interest in the adoption of preferential policies to offset or 
compensate for this ethnic distributive effect (cf. Wimmer 1997; 
Young 1998: 22). Although such claims may sometimes be 
disregarded because the claimants are too small in numbers, or lack 
the power and organizational capacity to press their claims in the 
relevant political and policy arenas (Rothchild and Olorunsola 1983: 
10), policymakers often find it very hard to construe and pursue 
policies that do not contain rewards for ethnically identified groups.  
In the new states of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, moreover, 
ethnic preferences are often a colonial heritage. Community 
representation and quotas of a direct or veiled nature were 
commonplace arrangements in colonized societies (Krislov 1974: 17). 
In most of these states, as Gordon Means points out, “colonial 
powers attempted to establish an overarching system of European 
law while making some form of accommodation for indigenous 
cultural and legal norms. When the colony also had great cultural 
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and ethnic diversity, the usual strategy of rule was to 
compartmentalize the legal system according to major 
religiocultural communities; thus, in some matters the legal system 
became highly ascriptive and particularistic according to the 
categories recognized by colonial authorities as the relevant cultural 
boundary markers in the colonized society” (Means 1986: 96). For 
pressing reasons of safeguarding national unity and political 
stability, new leaderships often chose to extend the recognition of 
already existing ascriptive group rights as preferred bases for 
societal access to the state’s resources and valued positions.  
 Preferences abound because they are also relatively cheap 
policy options. Since they involve the reallocation of existing 
benefits (parliamentary seats, government jobs, places in 
educational institutions, subsidies) rather than the creation of new 
ones, preferences require no initial outlay in expenditure (Horowitz 
2000: 658). Ethnic preferences are doubly cheap. By retaining the 
ethnic categories of existing social structure in policy design, 
governments avoid the transaction costs involved in the design, 
communication and enforcement of new and unfamiliar, non-ethnic 
policy categories (De Zwart 2005).  
 The popularity of ethnic preferences is also due to changing 
ideas about justice. Since the beginning of the 1990s, advocates of 
multiculturalism and group rights have contested the traditional 
liberal individualist notion that justice can simply be defined in 
terms of difference-blind rules or institutions (Kymlica and Norman, 
2000 cited in De Zwart, 2002: 4). They question the universal notion 
of citizenship and take issue with liberal democracies’ tendency to 
underappreciate the importance of cultural membership as an 
important primary good underlying people’s choices. Non-
recognition of the importance of cultural membership and 
government’s reluctance to allow people to use their cultural 
context, they feel, is unjust, especially to minority groups in 
heterogeneous societies. The latter cannot generally draw on their 
cultural context to the same degree as majority groups and are thus 
prevented from making optimal choices. This context should 
therefore be protected as a distinct source of political rights (Meier 
2000: 66). 
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Advocates of group rights also feel uneasy about the 
traditional liberal conception of representation which encompasses 
the representation of ideas or interests but does not consider their 
interference with the identities of the carriers of these interests or 
ideas. The liberal conception of representation is flawed, they claim, 
because there is no reason to assume, as the liberal conception does, 
that opinions and beliefs, and the ideas and interests shaped by 
them, are given objectively and exist independently of those who 
carry them. If identity, as it clearly does, plays a role in interest 
formation, members of minority groups, particularly, have good 
reasons to believe that outgroup representatives cannot represent 
their interests as adequately as ingroup representatives can. Since it 
evidently matters who, exactly, represents whom governments, 
advocates of group rights argue, should recognize representatives’ 
social or cultural backgrounds and guarantee their presence in 
political institutions (Meier 2000: 67-8). 
This trend toward politics of difference and recognition in 
political philosophy, notes De Zwart, has stimulated contemporary 
governments to overcome their traditional reluctance to 
accommodate ethnic divisions in policy design (De Zwart 2005; cf. 
Jenkins 1998).5 Rather than subscribing to the conventional view of 
ethnic heterogeneity as a likely source of destructive disaffectation, 
multiculturalism pictures cultural and ethnic diversity as “nice”, 
“fascinating”, “enriching” and, therefore, a desirable societal 
condition. It propagates the deployment of ethnic preferences to 
create ethnic diversity, in the belief that it provides “a source of 
quality” and a “surplus value”. In the Netherlands, for example, 
policy makers have been urging organizations to recruit members of 
ethnic minority groups by arguing that “organizations that do not 
use the qualities of ethnic people do not understand their own 
interests very well” (Verhaar 2001: 3-4). 
                                                
5 The term “politics of difference”, which “redefines nondiscrimination 
as requiring that we make [. .] distinctions [between citizens] the basis of 
differential treatment” is Taylor’s, who contrasts it with “the politics of 
universal dignity”, which “fought for forms of non-discrimination that were 
quite ‘blind’ to the ways in which citizens differ” (Taylor 1992: 39). 
1 From passive to active representation? 11
It is easy to see why ethnic preferences often involve 
bureaucracies. Because they are susceptible to direct political 
intervention, bureaucracies are relatively easy targets of ethnic 
preferment. Government employment is also often highly cherished, 
especially so in many developing countries.6 In addition to steady 
incomes, government jobs provide relative security, social prestige, 
the prospects of a dignified retirement as well as, in some cases, 
opportunities to exercise power over fellow citizens, or to enhance 
one’s income through official corruption (Esman 1999: 354). In many 
of these countries, the public bureaucracy has thus managed to 
establish itself as a high-status occupation offering high symbolic 
satisfaction.7  
In addition, bureaucracies are the principal channels through 
which the state’s redistributive policies are designed and 
implemented. Access to wealth and cherished goods such as land, 
capital, credit, foreign exchange, business licenses, government 
contracts, private sector jobs, housing, agricultural inputs, health 
facilities, development projects, and local public works such as 
roads, water supply, and electricity are often regulated by rules or 
informal practices enforced by the state and its officials (Esman 
1990: 59). In ex-colonial societies, moreover, government 
employment has been a major source of ethnic rivalries because it 
provided “the authorities with a means both to reward the sons of 
the collaborationist aristocracy and to create new collaborationist 
groups by distributing opportunities unevenly, whether intentionally 
or unintentionally” (Brass 1991: 33). 
Because government policies, by design or effect, tend to 
distribute benefits and costs unequally, they generate gainers and 
                                                
6 Research, discussed by Horowitz, has shown that at least three-quarters 
of all secondary school students in countries as varied as Trinidad, Sri Lanka, 
Malaysia and the Ivory Coast strive towards positions in the civil service 
(Horowitz 2000: 114). 
7 According to Guy Peters “this status may be in part related to the 
relatively brief separation in time from the period in which recruitment to these 
governmental positions –the authorities- was determined almost entirely by 
ascriptive criteria, and in fact the best families frequently chose to send their 
sons into public service . . . ‘social exclusiveness and supreme confidence’ of 
colonial administrators tended to reinforce the impression that administrative 
positions were to be equated with superior social position” (Peters 1989). 
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losers. “In ethnically divided polities these gainers and losers may 
be identified, in reality or by perception, as ethnic communities” 
(Esman 1997: 528). Because groups in ethnically plural societies tend 
to view the state as a partial state, access to bureaucratic office is 
often considered a precondition for securing policy benefits. 
Kennedy’s assessment of the importance of public employment in 
Pakistan, where, he says, “denial of civilian bureaucratic office is 
functionally equivalent to the denial of political representation” is 
typically shared by most people in plural societies (Kennedy 1986: 
68). Given the importance accorded to government employment it is 
not surprising that there is, in fact, scarcely an ethnically divided 
state without its “civil service issue” (Horowitz, 2000: 224) and that, 
as a rule, as Samuel Krislov has put it, “public office makes for 
public fuss” (Krislov 1974: 4). 
 
 
3 The case against ethnic preferences  
 
Policies of ethnic preference are popular. Governments in many 
plural societies make use of them. Wherever contemplated or 
adopted, preferential policies tend to be controversial and highly 
contested, however. Because they involve the group-wise shifting of 
resources and opportunities and make use of ethnic categories they 
usually generate fierce opposition (Jenkins 1998; Young 1998: 26). 
The rationales used by public authorities to justify preferential 
policies have tended to vary widely, ranging from “innate 
superiority” of racial groups –as in South Africa’s apartheid-regime, 
Nazi Germany, and many colonial regimes-, “indigenousness” –as 
used by the Malaysian government to justify its preferment of 
“indigenous” Malays over “foreign” Chinese-, “historical 
compensation” –used, for example, in the United States to justify 
“affirmative action” for Afro-Americans- and “under 
representation” –used as the rationale for the official 
“encouragement” of so-called “allochtonen” in Dutch public sector 
hiring (cf. Sowell 1990: 144-156). Affirmative action programs such 
as reservations for untouchables in India are a specific species of 
preferential policies in that they are typically associated with the 
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rationale of historical compensation and pursued as a remedy or 
compensation for the effects of past and continuing group-based 
disadvantage (cf. Anderson 2002: 10).  
 Policies of ethnic preference and affirmative action usually 
attract fierce criticism. Apart from claiming that preferences violate 
certain elementary moral principles (such as the right of all citizens 
to equal protection of the laws and the merit principle (cf. e.g. 
Newton 1973)) critics and opponents typically also oppose ethnic 
preferences and affirmative action on grounds of their bad 
consequences. Policies which legally mandate that individuals not 
all be judged by the same criteria or subjected to the same 
procedures when they originate in ethnic groups differentiated by 
government into preferred and non-preferred groups, critics argue, 
are self-defeating, harmful, dangerous, inefficient and ineffective. 
 Preferences require governments to identify and officially 
classify ethnic groups, without which it would be impossible to 
make reserved opportunities available to preferred groups. Ethnic 
preferences are thus based on the premise that official recognition of 
group distinctions is necessary to subvert those distinctions (cf. 
Jenkins 2003: 1). Critics argue that this grouping of individuals into 
ethnicities tends to be a hopelessly arbitrary exercise. Group 
boundaries are often ambiguous and contested. Rather than being 
fixed and unequivocal, group identities are the objects of constant 
definition and redefinition (ibid.), by ethno-political entrepreneurs, 
government agencies and by group members themselves. No matter 
how wide-ranging government efforts to monitor, patrol, and 
enforce the classifications used for preferential policies, the 
difficulties involved in defining pertinent groups based on elusive 
concepts such as race, caste and indigenousness always remain. The 
official categories used for group preferential treatment will 
inevitably turn out to be what Scott refers to as “state 
simplifications”, moulding complex and fluid identities into an 
official grid which is likely to “misrecognize” people (multiracial 
individuals, for example) (Jenkins, 1998: 192) but –once established 
and put to use- will be hard to adapt or abolish.  
Where ethnic preferences are intended as affirmative action a 
persistent criticism has been that they are deeply contradictory and 
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perhaps even harmful to their intended beneficiaries. By tying the 
membership of disparaged and stigmatized group identities to the 
eligibility for highly valued public resources, affirmative action 
policies tend to create vested interests in the retention, activation 
and survival of these identities and therefore reinforce -rather than 
lessen- the salience of the very categories they are meant to 
undermine (Dushkin 1972; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1999). 
Affirmative action stigmatizes its beneficiaries by implying that they 
are less competent and cannot compete with others on an equal 
footing. By forcing recruiters to lower their standards, affirmative 
action is likely to reinforce the very prejudices deemed instrumental 
in causing (or having caused) group-based disadvantages in the first 
place (cf. Coate and Loury 1993). 
 Preferential policies are widely criticized because they are 
divisive and encourage ethnic particularism. Once a government 
chooses to accommodate redistributive claims from one ethnic 
category, it will not take long before other, latent ethnic groupings 
will realize the benefits of defining themselves as a collectivity, 
politicizing their –separate- identity and start bargaining for their 
own preferential treatment (De Zwart 2000; Weiner 1983: 46). Once 
this logic is set in motion it becomes difficult to ward off such claims 
and to prevent them from taking up a prominent place on the policy 
agenda. Politicians, in fact, have little incentive to limit or curb the 
use of ethnic categories. On the contrary, the fact (or perception) of 
ethnic preference being meted out to one group tends to act as a 
strong incentive for political entrepreneurs of other groupings to get 
actively involved in the identification of instances of neglect or 
injustice, in impressing their particular group’s needs on the public 
agenda, and in combating the unjust and threatening action of 
ethnic enemies of the state apparatus (Esman 1990: 60). Nearly every 
important decision thus comes to be interpreted through “the prism 
of ethnicity” and has to “reaffirm the faith of ethnic equity if 
legitimacy and democracy are to be preserved” (Premdas 1986: 155).  
 Because preferences encourage individuals to identify 
primarily with the interests of their group rather than with the 
public interest, they fuel group insularity and threaten the already 
weak bonds of citizenship in plural societies (cf. Williams: 11). 
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Where countervailing, affirmative action policies redistribute highly 
valued employment and educational opportunities, they tend to 
invite harsh backlashes from disadvantaged, dominant groups who 
see the sources of their dominance endangered by reverse 
discrimination (Sowell 1990: 15; Weiner 1983: 47). Given the state’s 
limited capacities for redistribution of wealth in many plural 
societies, it is only a matter of time before spiralling ethnic claim 
making will produce more demands on the political system than it 
can bear.  
 As a result, politics comes to be perceived as a zero-sum game, 
in which political gains can only be won at the expense of ethnic 
rivals (cf. Premdas: 2). According to Atul Kohli, it is this very logic 
which explains what he describes as “the growing caste conflict 
between the ‘backward’ and the ‘forward’ castes” in India: “Leaders 
in state after state have utilized ‘reservations’ [. .] as means to gain 
electoral support of numerically significant backward castes. Higher 
castes, feeling that their interests are threatened, have resisted these 
moves. Once set in motion, however, those who have been mobi-
lized have been difficult to satisfy or control. Conflict has often been 
the result” (Kohli 1991: 18). 
 The logical result of cumulative claims for the recognition of 
ethnic attachments as preferred bases for public policy will be the 
persistence and steady expansion of preferential policies. In an 
influential comparative study of preferential policies in the United 
States, South Africa, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, India and Malaysia, Sowell 
found that such persistence and expansion occurred even where 
preferences had been established with legally mandated cut-off 
dates (Sowell 1990: 16-7). Because they are so difficult to control or 
curb preferential policies tend to outlive the transitional and 
temporary utility invariably agreed upon at the time of their 
adoption (Galanter 1984; Weiner 1983). 
 Ethnic preferences, critics point out, also imperil the well-
being of the institutions and organizations that are made to serve as 
the arenas for ethnic engineering. Ethnic preferences are systems of 
partially ascriptive recruitment. Even if ethnicity may, in special 
circumstances, be a bona fide qualification for a job (Walzer, 
paraphrased by Andersen (2002); also see Peters (1989)), ascriptive 
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recruitment can generally be expected to select less talented, skilled, 
and competent individuals than fully “rational” selection on the 
basis of “objective” measures such as educational achievement and 
technical expertise (Klitgaard 1986). The tendency of preferential 
programs to produce incentives for individuals to identify more 
with their group may, moreover, have detrimental effects on the 
functioning of the organizations and institutions to which they are 
made to apply. Preferences, some critics fear, stimulate and 
legitimize “the preponderance of parochial loyalties” (Shils 1970: 
385) and therefore jeopardize what Kaufman has called “neutral 
competence”: the “ability to do the work of the government 
expertly, and to do it according to explicit, objective standards 
rather than to personal or party or other obligations and loyalties” 
(Kaufman (1956), cited in Selden et al. 1998: 725). Hence, it is only 
logical to expect that the intrusion of ascriptive criteria into 
institutions that value performance and achievement will vitiate 
their efficiency and effectiveness (cf. Béteille, 1991: 596; Shah, 1996). 
Affirmative action, finally, is also claimed to be simply 
ineffective even in reaching its avowed aims. Affirmative action 
programs tend to disproportionally benefit relatively well-off sub-
strata within target groups, fostering the growth of “new” middle 
classes or elites which reap most of the available preferential 
benefits (Sowell 1990). Other reasons why even the most stringent 
affirmative action policies tend to result in far more modest 
representational effects than they set out to achieve, is that available 
places in educational and public bureaucracies are sometimes not 
being filled up due to slack implementation or a (purported) lack of 
qualified candidates. The official documents certifying an 
individual’s ethnic identity (which are typically required as proof of 
a candidate’s eligibility) may be remarkably easy to forge or falsify, 
opening up reserved places to ineligible candidates.  
  To sum up, preferences are argued to be morally unjust, to 
rigidify group-boundaries and fuel ethnic conflict, social 
fragmentation and political instability, to disproportionally benefit 
relatively well-off, “undeserving” members of target groups, to 
undermine organizational efficiency, to create vested interests in the 
survival of stigmatized identities, to stimulate the creation, 
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mobilization and politicization of new ethnicities, to be liable to 
fraudulent use, and to slip out of government control through their 
tendency of unplanned for persistence, expansion and outliving 
legally mandated cut-off dates.  
 
 
4 From passive to active representation? 
  
In view of the fact that preferences and affirmative action tend to be 
highly controversial policies and many books written about it have 
had political agendas (Skrentny 1996), one might be tempted to 
qualify the above arguments as an illustrative example of what 
Hirschman has dubbed the “rhetoric of reaction”.8 And indeed, 
when one weighs the arguments against the facts on which they are 
apparently based, arguments about the unintended side-effects 
sometimes do appear largely “rhetoric-driven”, shaped by the 
imperatives and logic of argument, rather than by the careful 
analysis and interpretation of facts. “Writings on preferential 
programs”, as Thomas Sowell has said, have tended to be “heavily 
biased to discussing the programs’ rationales, mechanics and 
resource-inputs, at the expense of providing data on their actual 
outcomes” (Sowell 1990: 16-7).  
 A cursory review of available evidence appears to bear out 
that the worries about the unintended and unwanted side-effects of 
reservations are not without empirical substance, however. The 
                                                
8 Hirschman studied the anti-rhetoric that over the past three hundred 
years has been unleashed against the successive laws, programs, policies and 
events that resulted in the welfare state. His study suggests that any reactionary 
or conservative group that wants to oppose or criticize a “progressive” policy has 
three options in terms of argumentative strategies. The group may either argue 
that (1) any purposive action to improve some feature of the political, social, or 
economic order is bound to exacerbate the condition one wishes to remedy; (2) the 
attempt at social transformation will be unavailing, that it will simply fail to 
“make a dent”; or (3) the cost of the policy is too high as it endangers some 
previous, precious accomplishment (Hirschman, 1991: 7). Hirschman dubs these 
strategies the perversity thesis, futility thesis, and jeopardy thesis, respectively, 
and claims that they are a standard repertoire of reactionary thought. It would, 
indeed, not be difficult to categorize the various arguments about the unintended 
side-effects of ethnic preferences into Hirschman’s triad. 
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increased representativeness of India’s public institutions with 
regard to disadvantaged groups has come at a price. Reservations 
have indeed turned out to be difficult to control or curb. Since the 
introduction of reservations for untouchables the Indian 
government has witnessed a chain reaction of claims from other 
groups –usually (collections of) castes- claiming “backwardness” 
and preferential eligibility (cf. e.g. Jaffrelot 2000a; Weiner et al. 
1981). Politicians have become adept practitioners of “the politics of 
backwardness”, routinely using the promise and extension of 
reservations for electoral purposes and thus contributing to what 
some have called the ethnitization of Indian politics (Chandra 1999; 
Mahajan 2005).9 That caste and ethnicity have steadily become more 
important in Indian electioneering and voting as a result of 
reservation politics is beyond dispute (cf. e.g. Chandra 2000; 
Chandra and Parmar 1996; Duncan 2000; Singh 1996). The resulting 
spiralling claims and widening access of public institutions to 
hitherto unrepresented groups have, according to Atul Kohli, 
contributed to a “crisis of governability”.  
Electoral mobilization through quota politics has not come 
without violence. Opponents and proponents of yet another piece of 
reservation legislation have violently clashed. The death toll 
incurred in such caste-reservation related riots numbers many 
thousands. Apart from the violence directly associated with political 
mobilization using the extension of reservations as a political plank, 
there is also the violence that follows indirectly from state efforts to 
emancipate certain sections, be it through preferential programs or 
less discriminatory forms of public policies.  
Some scholars have observed that caste relations in rural India 
have started to change since reservations. Traditional, hierarchically 
determined interdependence of castes is on the wane and gradually 
being replaced by horizontal caste relations, in which the various 
                                                
9 According to some observers the promise or granting of reservations has 
almost become a standard response of Indian central and state governments in 
dealing with distributive problems: “[G]overnments in power”, writes Gurpreet 
Mahajan, have “used the available constitutional clause to bracket all issues of 
social and distributive justice into that of reservations [while] politically assertive 
groups also translated their demands into claims for reservations” (Mahajan 2005: 
1, my emphasis). 
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castes become competitors for jobs and other social benefits (Deliège 
1997).10 Crimes against scheduled castes have, arguably, become 
much more patent since the scheduled castes have “become aware” 
through educational and other programs and have started asserting 
their civil rights, rights against exploitation and a demand for better 
implementation of protective laws (Saksena 1996: 14; Sheth 1997: 
235).  
 The benefits of reservations appear to have largely benefited 
those who need it least. As early as 1972, a study on the effects of 
reservations for untouchables, for example, concluded that benefits 
favoured those already more fortunate and seemed to have fostered 
the growth of a “new class” among the untouchables (Dushkin 
1972). Marc Galanter, in a massive study, reported “a severe 
clustering” of “some of the larger and more advanced groups” of 
untouchables in the jobs reserved for scheduled caste members. 
Reservations for other groups have had similar effects, while efforts 
to remove these “creamy layers” from eligibility seem to have been 
largely to no avail (Chaudhury 2004; Galanter 1984).11 Also, in 
several states sizeable numbers of members of non-untouchable 
castes, taking advantage of the resemblance of their caste names to 
untouchable caste names, have been managing to secure scheduled 
caste certificates and, hence, eligibility for reservational benefits 
(Saksena et al. 1988).12  
                                                
10 Deliège uses the term substantialisation to describe this effect. Louis 
Dumont once coined this term to describe “the transition from a fluid, 
structural universe in which the emphasis is on interdependence [. .] to a 
universe of impenetrable blocks, self sufficient, essentially identical and in 
competition with one another” (1972: 269). Other anthropologists use the term 
ethnitization (of caste) to describe this process (Fuller 1997a). 
11 “Reservations”, claims Pradipta Chaudhury, “serve essentially as tools 
for the absorption of the privileged sections of the lower castes in the ruling 
classes” (Chaudhury 2004: 1991).  
12 In the state of Uttar Pradesh, for instance, members of the upper caste 
Agrahari caste have been claiming caste certificates by presenting themselves to 
the authorities as –untouchable- Agariyas. Members of non-untouchable castes 
such as the Gonrs, Goals, Majhis and Baiswar Kurmis have done the same thing by 
passing as untouchable Gonds, Guals, Majhwars and Baiswars respectively (Saksena 
et al. 1988: 27). 
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 The above effects seem a high price to pay for policies that –
purely by design- can only be expected to benefit very small 
proportions of disadvantaged target groups. Or can they? In India, 
claimants for caste quotas in public employment have occasionally 
argued that it is only through them that the interests of backward 
communities can be protected in public institutions (Béteille 1991). 
Echoing the multiculturalist argument about the need for political 
representation of marginalized groups, quota-seekers assert that, if 
government subsidies or services are to reach them at all, they must 
themselves be bureaucrats, if only because they themselves will 
“naturally” understand their own needs better than Brahmins (high 
caste traditionally dominant in Indian bureaucracy, bvg) (Kumar 
1992: 300, 302). 
 What quota-seekers imply with this argument is that 
bureaucracy is the locus of the representation of group interests. 
They assume and expect bureaucrats to favour members of their 
own community or to discriminate against others when they are in a 
position from which favours may be dispensed (Esman 1999: 354-5). 
This assumed and expected tendency of ethnic loyalties to translate 
into group-specific, differential administrative treatment and 
outcomes might constitute a forceful argument for affirmative action 
in public service recruitment. If bureaucrats belonging to 
government-designated categories of affirmative action were to be 
more sympathetic to members of their own group in the 
implementation of public policies, affirmative action need not be 
purely or particularly a symbolical policy-pursuit. Rather, by 
changing the ethnic composition of bureaucracy, the allocation of 
public goods itself would be changed; a desirable effect wherever 
preferences are meant, as they are in India, to dismantle systems of 
ascriptive group-based disadvantage and the inequalities 
historically resulting from them. The question, of course, is whether 
affirmative action, in fact, produces this effect.  
Indian quota-seeking groups are not alone in arguing that 
being represented by people of their own in the bureaucracy is 
going to benefit their groups as a whole. Doubts as to the inherent 
limited effectiveness of preferential policies that can, by design, only 
benefit limited segments of target populations are also raised by a 
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body of scholarship known as representative bureaucracy theory. 
This theory’s central claim is that passive representation –the physical 
presence of group-identified bureaucrats- is, indeed, likely to 
translate into active representation, that is, the pursuit of broader 
ingroup interests on the part of these group-identified bureaucrats.  
The logic producing this effect, representative bureaucracy 
theorists argue, is quite straightforward. Bureaucrats, whether 
positioned at the top or at the bottom of administrative hierarchies, 
invariably possess some degree of discretion, that is, the 
opportunity to choose from a range of options that one which they 
perceive as best suited for the particular situation at hand. Because 
the orders that administrative subordinates receive from their –
political or bureaucratic- superiors are often, and by necessity, 
vague and unintelligible, bureaucrats may exercise considerable 
discretion in interpreting and translating the meaning of superiors’ 
orders and in deciding on their particular course of action. Even if 
superiors try to structure the exercise of subordinate discretion -
usually by a combination of rules and socialization- some 
subordinate discretion is bound to remain. Rules, after all, cannot 
possibly cover every contingency and organizational socialization is 
rarely total. Superiors also tend to lack the knowledge, time, 
manpower, or perseverance to detect, monitor and sanction all 
discretionary abuse by subordinates. Most bureaucrats thus have –
to a lesser or greater extent- the power to make choices as they see 
fit. 
While using this power, bureaucrats are bound to be 
susceptible, representative bureaucracy theorists claim, to the 
values, preferences and biases instilled and acquired during 
socialization experiences. Socialization experiences associated with 
ethnic group membership are particularly important, since they 
tend to be the source of a person’s enduring values, preferences and 
biases. What makes the occurrence of active representation 
especially likely in the case of ethnic groups is their proclivity 
towards high “groupness”. They tend to command strong 
interpersonal loyalties and engender a great willingness on the part 
of groupmembers to sacrifice for collective welfare. Ethnic groups, 
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in short, often demonstrate a high capability to make their members 
act in the group’s interest.  
If representative bureaucracy theorists are right, this bodes 
well for the members of ethnic groups in the plural societies of the 
developing world. Since ethnic identity is particularly strongly felt 
there, active representation would seem to be the expected role 
behaviour of bureaucrats. Bureaucrats in these societies may not 
only be socialized to a strong sense of preferential obligation to 
ingroup members, they may also fear group sanctions if they fail to 
provide the sympathetic treatment that group members tend to 
expect as a matter of right from “one of their own” who has 
succeeded in achieving a position from which favours may be 
dispensed (Esman 1999).  
 If passive representation were to translate into active 
representation in the ethnically plural context of Indian 
bureaucracy, the prospects and scope for affirmative action as a 
social engineering tool might be almost limitless. In India, as 
Kanchan Chandra points out, “[t]he state . . . controls the ‘life 
chances’ of individuals from birth to death. Nowhere is this more 
obvious than at the district level in rural areas, where the majority of 
the population [. .] resides: births, if they take in a hospital at all, 
take place in a government hospital, where access to a bed is a 
prized commodity; primary education is only available through 
government schools; chances for higher education depend upon 
obtaining a highly contested seat in government-funded universities 
in the state capital; and [. .] the bulk of employment opportunities 
are controlled by the state” (Chandra 1999: 96). 
This book has culminated as a result of my attempt to test 
representative bureaucracy theory’s central passive-to-active claim 
for India’s untouchable bureaucracy. My case for choosing and 
limiting myself to the untouchable bureaucracy rested upon several 
considerations. First, the untouchables are, without doubt, the 
world’s paradigm pariah people, whose condition has long been 
defined by multiple and enduring disadvantages. Finding out if and 
how untouchables are affected by government efforts to “uplift” 
them seemed intrinsically interesting and important to me; all the 
more so because we are dealing here with a huge population of 
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around 150 million people, around two per cent of the world’s 
population.  
Secondly, reservations for untouchables were explicitly 
intended to encourage active representation. Several participants in 
the debates in the late 1940s and early 1950s which preceded their 
adoption justified reservations with the argument that untouchable 
officers would act as watchdogs over untouchable interests, 
something which, it was argued, could not be expected from the 
“machinery of the old pattern” dominated by upper castes 
(Chanchreek 1991: 127-8; Saksena 1981: 373). Thirdly, the choice of 
India’s untouchable bureaucracy as the object of my study was also 
inspired by a desire to find out about the potential scope of 
representative bureaucracy theory. When I started my project ten 
years ago, all empirical enquiries into the linkage between passive 
and active representation, barring a single exception, had been 
confined to bureaucracies in the United States.13 Representative 
bureaucracy theory was thus very largely a parochially American 
affair, building upon evidence and scholarly thought about 
American bureaucracies and advanced by American scholars 
preoccupied with and sensitized to American problems and issues. 
My hunch was that much might be learned, both substantively and 
theoretically, by drawing the study of representative bureaucracy 
away from its restricted American confines. I dare say my hunch 
proved right. 
 Much of the empirical substance for this book was collected 
during two stints of field research –six weeks in the autumn of 1998, 
and fifteen months between February 1999 and May 2000- in the 
north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. With a population of 139 
million, Uttar Pradesh is India’s most populous state. Its social 
structure continues to reflect the dominant features of an 
idealtypical caste system. “High” castes tend to enjoy combined 
privileges of land ownership and ritual status and, by and large, 
occupy the dominant positions in the agrarian social structure, 
politics, administration, and commercial sector of the state. Uttar 
Pradesh lags behind much of the rest of India in terms of a number 
                                                
13 The exception is Dennis Dresang’s article-length study on Zambian 
bureaucracy dating from 1974 (Dresang 1974). 
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of important aspects of well-being and social progress. It has 
exceptionally high levels of mortality, fertility, morbidity, 
undernutrition, illiteracy, social inequality and a slow pace of 
poverty decline (Drèze and Gazdar 1996: 33). Within Uttar Pradesh 
(or UP), I spent most of my time in the central UP-district of Sitapur, 
where I conducted intensive qualitative fieldwork on the district’s 
“dust-level” rural development bureaucracy. In Sitapur I 
interviewed and observed a large number of rural development 
bureaucrats and untouchable villagers as well as many local 
politicians, social workers and other occupants of semi-political 
roles who in India tend to fill the gap between state and society. The 
central argument developed in this book directly stems from the 
insights and experiences gained in this district. 
 
 
5 A grounded theory of unrepresentative bureaucracy 
 
If anything, Indian bureaucracy is reputed for its vast and wide-
ranging powers and discretion, both in routine administrative 
decision-making and in the policy-making process. Indian 
bureaucrats typically enjoy high social status and constitute a 
considerable segment of Indian society’s “elite”. When I set out to 
study the untouchable bureaucracy there was therefore no reason to 
assume that a lack of discretion might prevent untouchable 
bureaucrats from engaging in active representation. The potential 
implications of untouchable identity for untouchable groupness 
and, hence, for untouchable bureaucrats’ propensity towards active 
representation were, however, far less clear. 
Indian castes resemble most ethnic groups in that both are 
extended kin groups. Castes, however, represent a special type of 
ethnic group. What sets Indian caste society apart from most other 
ethnically plural societies is that it is not merely divided into different 
castes but that the relations between the various castes –the caste 
system- are furthermore governed by hierarchy. Indian castes are 
thus, idealtypically at least, ranked as relatively superior or inferior 
to one another. What makes the untouchables a special kind of caste 
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is that they occupy the bottommost rank in this caste ranking and 
have, therefore, traditionally been considered untouchable.  
 Detailed ethnographic studies of untouchable groups or 
communities are few and far between and tell us little if anything 
about the interpersonal loyalties, or groupness, of untouchables. 
Since most studies deal with rural, poor untouchables they teach us 
even less about the salience of untouchable identity to untouchable 
bureaucrats who, almost by definition, are upwardly mobile and 
find themselves in the highest class strata of Indian society. There is 
no agreement among representative bureaucracy theorists or the 
broader social science literature as to the likely effects of elite status 
on the salience of ethnic minority identity.  
 What may be called the optimistic view holds that class 
differentials are unimportant, if not irrelevant, to ethnic minority 
identity salience and, hence, to a bureaucrat’s proclivities towards 
active representation. The pessimistic view, on the other hand, 
expects such salience to be inversely related to individuals’ class: the 
higher one’s class, the lower the salience of ethnic minority 
membership and, hence, the propensity for actively representative 
behaviour. The evidence on elite untouchables’ inclinations for 
(dis)identification which was available when I started my study was 
largely indirect and circumstantial. In addition, it revealed a rather 
mixed picture, neither fully endorsing nor fully disproving either of 
the two views. Some new and fresh research, explicitly addressing 
the issues at hand, was thus called for.  
 My research took the form of an intensive case study of the 
dust-level rural development bureaucracy in Sitapur, a rather 
typical UP district. The rural development bureaucracy was created 
in the 1950s to implement and monitor the Indian government’s 
newly adopted strategy of planned development in rural areas. 
What I will call the “dust-level” rural development bureaucracy 
comprises of the two lowest echelons of this bureaucracy: the rural 
development blocks and the village development officers. The 
bureaucrats manning these echelons are entrusted with carrying out 
a wide-ranging package of centrally- and state funded poverty 
alleviation programs. In the process, dust-level bureaucrats (DLBs) 
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select beneficiaries and allocate and distribute money, material 
resources and information.  
 The dust-level rural development bureaucracy presented itself 
as a suitable case for an empirical enquiry into untouchable 
representative bureaucracy because it possessed four features that 
representative bureaucracy theorists associate with a high likelihood 
of active representation: a sympathetic mission, a high salience of its 
policies to poor untouchable villagers, the presence of a substantial 
mass of untouchable DLBs, and street-level discretion. To avoid the 
drawbacks of earlier empirical representative bureaucracy studies 
(which, by design, had not been able to prove the occurrence of 
active representation, nor to illuminate and explain its practice) I 
chose to rely on qualitative fieldwork. Through a combination of 
participant observation, personal interviews and the consultation of 
official documents I set out to develop a grounded theory which 
was to clarify the if, how, why and when of active representation in 
Sitapur and, in so doing, to provide new insights and clues for 
elaborating, specifying and modifying existing representative 
bureaucracy theory. 
 As favourable a recipe for active representation as conditions 
in Sitapur might have seemed in theory, in practice they turned out 
to count for little. Even though the rules informing rural 
development policy implementation accord substantial powers to 
DLBs, very few DLBs use this power. In order to prevent political 
punishment, to keep their jobs and successfully survive in turbulent 
faction political environments, they lease out their discretionary 
freedoms to political brokers in return for a fixed fraction of 
development rents. As a result, dust level untouchable bureaucrats 
turn out to be largely “untouchable” to their potential clienteles.  
Few untouchable dust level bureaucrats perceive their role to 
include safeguarding the policy interests of untouchable villagers in 
their jurisdiction. They are no particularly diligent deliverers of 
policy outputs to untouchable clients, nor facilitators of untouchable 
access to bureaucratic decision-making. The few who do try to be 
actively representative take a big risk, as they are not likely to find 
administrative or political support for their actions. Non-
untouchable colleagues and superiors may, and often do, take 
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exception to this kind of “casteist” behaviour and will not easily 
defend a colleague who has been found to indulge in such practices.  
Moreover, untouchable superiors find themselves in exactly 
the same situation as their untouchable subordinates. It may be 
harmful for them to come to the rescue of a casteist subordinate, 
because this itself would be considered a casteist act. The 
consequence of the fact that untouchable dust-level bureaucrats may 
have but do not use the discretion invested in their roles for the 
likelihood of the occurrence of active representation is self-evident: 
If administrators do not make decisions, it does not matter to what 
ethnic, social or caste group these administrators belong.  
Untouchable DLBs can often get away with leasing out as a 
coping mechanism because they are seldom asked or pressurized by 
untouchable clients to exercise their discretion to the latter’s benefit. 
One of the reasons is that untouchable clients often have difficulties 
in recognizing and locating untouchable representatives in the 
bureaucracy. While climbing the social ladder, many untouchable 
bureaucrats have come to perceive their identity as a stigma, that is, 
as something deeply discrediting that disqualifies them from full 
social acceptance. Many therefore tend to escape identification with 
untouchability through a number of passing strategies such as 
changing their names, dissociating from members of their own 
caste, and by establishing close association with other, “higher” 
castes. Successful passing on the part of untouchable bureaucrats 
prevents clients from knowing whether they are in fact represented 
by “one of their own” in the bureaucracy and, thus, from effectively 
claiming preferential treatment on the basis of primordial affinity.  
Even if untouchable clients manage to identify and locate “one 
of their own” in the bureaucracy, they are not likely to get in touch 
with him, since dust-level bureaucrats are not in the habit of visiting 
the villages in their jurisdiction. Consequently, to bridge the gap 
between themselves and the development bureaucracy, villagers 
must typically rely on the services of a broker or dalaal, as the 
occupant of this role is generally referred to in north India. 
Establishing direct access to bureaucracy is also complicated by the 
fact that it implies bypassing dominant village factions and elected 
village politicians. The latter, however, have a strong interest in 
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preventing poor and untouchable villagers from doing so, since 
control over access to bureaucracy is vital to the supply of patronage 
on which they rely for votes and group support.  
In theory, untouchables might counter such monopolizing 
efforts on the part of dominant individuals and groups by engaging 
in collective action and forming grass-roots policy-pressure groups. 
In practice, however, they typically lack the necessary power, 
homogeneity, expertise, organizational capacity and leadership 
skills for such endeavours. Untouchability, contrary to what one 
might have expected, plays, at the most, a very limited role as an 
organizing principle within Indian dust level politics and 
bureaucracy. The category of “untouchables” does what Charles 
Tilly calls “boundary work” or the work of distinction: it defines ties 
and locates distinctions between members of different categories 
more reliably than it creates internal solidarity, homogeneity, or 
connectedness (Tilly 1999: 72).  
Two theoretical implications of these findings stand out. First, 
these findings force us to rethink the central -though often implicit- 
assumption of most theories of bureaucracy that securing and 
exercising discretion are a leading motive in bureaucratic behaviour. 
What my study shows is that bureaucrats, rather than wishing to 
maximize their power through the exercise of discretion in a 
monotonic fashion, choose to exercise discretion depending on 
whether they believe it is to their advantage or not to do so (cf. 
Krause 2003).  
Secondly, the observed general lack of a linkage between 
passive and active bureaucratic representation in the case of India’s 
untouchables, reaffirms the wisdom –typically unheeded by 
multiculturalists and advocates of group rights- of steering clear of 
what Brubaker calls groupism: “the tendency to take discrete, sharply 
differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded 
groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social 
conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis . . . the tendency 
to treat ethnic groups . . . as substantial entities to which interests 
and agency can be attributed” (Brubaker 2002: 164). The extent to 
which group membership exerts influence upon individuals and 
manages to subject them to a variety of obligations to act loyally and 
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solidarily in the corporate interest, certainly varies across groups. 
“Groupness” –that is, groups’ capacity to affect their members’ 
behaviour- is itself a variable rather than a given (cf. Hechter 1987: 
8). 
 
This study is further organized as follows. Chapter 2 lays the 
theoretical and conceptual groundwork for the rest of the book’s 
argument. I outline a theory of representative bureaucracy which 
spells out in some detail the logic through which the mere presence 
of group-identified bureaucrats might result in administrative 
decisions that benefit bureaucrats’ ingroup members. Though its 
main purpose is introductory, this chapter is also intended as a 
contribution to representative bureaucracy theory. Even if the twin 
concepts of passive and active representation have structured the 
theory’s discourse since Mosher introduced them in the 1960s, just 
why the one might translate into the other has so far received 
surprisingly little detailed attention. 
 In chapter 3, I problematize the issue of untouchable 
groupness. The theory of representative bureaucracy spelled out in 
the preceding chapter singles out two factors as preconditions for 
active representation: bureaucratic discretion and high groupness. 
Groupness pertains to the solidarity of groups, or the extent to 
which groups are capable of making their individual members act in 
the group’s interests. Since the groupness of ethnic groups is usually 
high, ethnically identified bureaucrats –assuming they have 
discretion- are relatively likely to display actively representative 
behaviour.  
 Untouchables, however, are a special kind of ethnic group, a 
caste (or, according to another classificatory scheme, a collection of 
castes) and, since they occupy the bottommost rank in the caste 
system, quite a special caste at that. Drawing from the literature on 
caste and untouchability and from the wider social science 
literature, I discuss some potential implications of untouchable 
identity for untouchable groupness and, hence, for untouchable 
bureaucrats’ propensity for active representation. The available 
evidence on untouchable groupness, it turns out, is quite 
inconclusive and thus calls for new empirical research. This chapter 
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also serves as an informative treatment of continuity and change in 
Indian caste society pertinent to the argument developed later on. 
 Though essential, discretion and high groupness are no 
guarantee for a linkage between passive and active representation. 
There are many factors that could subvert this linkage. Likewise, 
there may also be influences and circumstances that facilitate active 
representation. Most representative bureaucracy theorists agree on 
at least four of such facilitative characteristics of bureaucratic 
organizations: a sympathetic mission, salience of the bureaucracy’s 
policies to passively represented groups, a critical mass of group-
identified bureaucrats and street-level discretion. The dust level 
rural development bureaucracy possesses all four features and thus 
suggested itself as an obvious case for enquiry. In chapter 4, I will 
discuss these features in some detail. In doing so, I provide the 
necessary backdrop for my substantive treatment of active 
(non)representation in the chapters that follow. This chapter ends 
with a justification for and description of my fieldwork procedures. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 form the substantive heart of this study. In 
chapter 5, I adopt the perspective of Sitapur’s untouchable DLBs 
and analyze their apparent lack of supply of active representation. I 
observe DLBs’ –both untouchable and non-untouchable- 
widespread inclination to abandon the frontline and try to account 
for this inclination by pointing out the internal and environmental 
pressures under which they must operate. Frontline abandonment, 
as I will argue, is best (and almost literally) understood as a survival 
strategy which, if successfully pursued, provides DLBs with relative 
ease of mind, an attractive posting and a steady additional income 
in the form of development rents. In the second part of this chapter, 
I illustrate and explain untouchable DLBs’ tendency to pass, that is 
to make themselves invisible as untouchables to outsiders, in their 
efforts to cope with the problem of stigmatized identity. Frontline 
abandonment and passing, I conclude, are so pervasive as to make 
active representation by untouchable DLBs highly unlikely, if not 
non-existent.  
 In chapter 6, the perspective shifts from the DLBs to their 
intended clients, the untouchable villagers. Whereas DLBs see little 
reason to supply active representation, untouchable clients rarely, if 
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ever, demand them to do so, even if they could. I explain this aborted 
subscription by way of clients’ lack of practice in approaching 
bureaucrats directly, their fear of going behind the backs of locally 
powerful elements and by a prevalent narcissism of minor 
differences, which keeps untouchable villagers from unitedly 
claiming the benefits to which they are formally entitled. 
 In the concluding chapter 7 I briefly wrap up my main 
findings. I then discuss some of the implications of these findings 
for representative bureaucracy theory.  By specifying some of the 
conditions under which active representation seems unlikely to 
occur, I seek to contribute to the problem of how to account for 
unrepresentative bureaucracies such as India’s untouchable 
bureaucracy. I conclude this study with two pleas; one for 
appreciably widening up the currently dominant operational 
definition of active representation, another for more ethnographic 
studies of (un)representative bureaucracies. 
 
 2 A Theory of Representative Bureaucracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Birth of a theory 
 
The term representative bureaucracy is commonly attributed to J. 
Donald Kingsley.14 In his book with that title, which appeared in 
1944, Kingsley argued that Britain was “only superficially a 
democracy” because British social structure had remained 
“essentially plutocratic”. Plutocratic tendencies, Kingsley argued, 
were particularly prevalent in the civil service. Despite the string of 
administrative reforms which -from the mid 19th century onwards- 
had served to gradually brake up the aristocratic monopoly over 
bureaucracy, the British civil service continued to reflect “the basic 
inequalities of the social structure and the prevailing temper of the 
nation” (Kingsley 1944: 141).15 “The opportunity to compete for 
                                                
14 Alvin Gouldner also uses the term in his Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. 
In his sense of the term “representative bureaucracy” refers to a bureaucracy 
which is “based on rules established by agreement, rules which are technically 
justified and administered by specially qualified personnel, and to which consent 
is given voluntarily” (Gouldner 1954: 24). Whereas Gouldner’s representative 
bureaucracy may be seen as representative in that its rules are representative of 
what bureaucratic agents, specially subordinates, want or consider to be in their 
interests, representation in Kingsley’s representative bureaucracy concerns the 
representation of interests or values of (groups or categories of) people outside 
bureaucracy. I use the term representative bureaucracy in Kingsley’s sense(s), not 
in Gouldner’s. 
15 Kingsley dedicated the largest part of his book to a historical 
adstruction of “the slow and sometimes painful evolution of a representative 
middle class bureaucracy in England, out of the splendid ruins of government 
by gentlemen” (Kingsley 1944: preface). The reforms that were instrumental in 
breaking up the aristocratic civil service monopoly were set in motion by the 
publication of the famous Northcote-Trevelyan Report on the Organization of the 
Permanent Civil Service in 1854. By way of this report, Northcote and Trevelyan 
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appointment even to the Clerical Class”, Kingsley calculated, “is 
restricted to about ten per cent of the youth of the nation, while the 
Administrative Class is drawn from a reservoir of considerably less 
than one per cent” (ibid.: 143). Moreover, “the fact that the service 
classes are linked to various rungs of the educational ladder means 
that each is drawn pretty largely from a distinct stratum of society . . 
. to a remarkable degree each Service class is also a social class –a 
caste- and the Service hierarchy pretty accurately mirrors the 
economic and social hierarchies outside” (ibid.: 148). 
This mirroring effect did not surprise Kingsley. On the 
contrary, Kingsley -drawing from Marxian analysis- was convinced 
that administrative arrangements always tend to reflect the character 
of the social structure of a nation; that bureaucracy always tends to 
represent the dominant class in society in terms of social derivation 
and social philosophy (cf. Bendix 1945-6; Meier 1975). Since British 
society was dominated by what Kingsley called “the middle class”, 
it was “inevitable” that –likewise- the British civil service would also 
be dominated by this very class and that –hence- the composition of 
the bureaucracy resulted in a power structure which mirrored, or 
represented, the power structure of society (cf. Hindera 1993a: 416).  
The mirroring effect, Kingsley argued, was not only inevitable 
but also, obviously, quite useful to the English governing classes. It 
made sure that they did not have to bother too much about 
bureaucracy’s inevitable “tendency towards autonomy and self-
control”.16 By way of being a mirror image of society British 
                                                                                                                                          
set out to create a largely self sufficient, merit-based career civil service that 
would train its own administrators (instead of filling positions from outside its 
ranks) and recruit its direct entrants by open competitive examinations (not by 
patronage). The underlying idea was that these measures would create a civil 
service that “could be realistically seen as being politically anonymous” (Fry 
1997). The ensuing reforms, interpreted by Kingsley as the middle class’s 
“move on the civil service”, included the establishment of a Civil Service 
Commission to hold entry examinations (1855) and the Civil Service Order in 
Council (1870), which introduced open competitive entry examinations for most 
departments.  
16 “Bureaucracies”, claimed Kingsley, “contain the seed-pops of 
autonomy”: “The course of their development is marked by the regular 
substitution of internal for external controls over Service affairs . . . they become 
states within states, perfecting elaborate machinery for their governance and 
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bureaucracy was, namely, “so constituted” that it could “be trusted 
to function within the framework of the common desires of the 
governing classes” (Kingsley 1944: 186, 187). The reason why the 
bureaucracy had not been known to use the “exceptional 
opportunities for sabotage” offered by its administrative system, the 
political impartiality of the civil service had remained “practically 
unquestioned”, and no great cry for reform had emerged in spite of 
the apparent insufficiency of political controls to restrict a 
malevolent bureaucracy, was because bureaucracy was representative 
of the powerful in society (Kingsley 1944: 16; Meier 1975: 526-7).17 
“In England today”, Kingsley argued, “the bureaucracy is 
responsible because it is concerned with being so; and that concern is 
a reflection of its representative character” (Kingsley 1944: 274, 
emphasis mine).18 Representative bureaucracy in terms of the 
                                                                                                                                          
reducing to a minimum the area of detailed supervision by the political organs . . . 
[and] develop a corporate character and an independent institutional existence” 
(Kingsley 1944: 186, 187). 
17 With the “exceptional opportunities for sabotage” Kingsley referred to 
the shift in “the political center of gravity” from Parliament to the ministers 
and, increasingly and specifically, their civil servants: “[U]nder ordinary 
circumstances”, Kingsley summarized the received wisdom at the time, “it is 
the Government which controls the House of Commons and not the House 
which controls the Government. Power centers today in the hands of ministers, 
but its use is to a large extent conditioned by the advice and assistance, even the 
direction of permanent officials . . . with that shift the power of the permanent 
officials has enormously increased . . . [T]he complexity of present-day 
government makes it nearly impossible either for Ministers or Parliament to 
exercise effective control over the Service without its consent, or even without 
its active assistance . . . [the power of officials, bvg] extends in many instances 
not only to the execution of policy but to its initiation and formulation as well. 
Even in the matter of control through criticism the tendency is to rely more and 
more heavily upon the findings of departmental committees - devices through 
which the permanent officials examine themselves (Kingsley 1944: 5, 6, 274). 
18 Kingsley thus put the famed impartiality of the British civil service in a 
new perspective. Administrative impartiality refers to the doctrine that civil 
servants faithfully execute any policy, regardless of whether they personally 
approve of it. Kingsley argued that such impartiality was not an inherent trait 
or virtue of the people who manned the British civil service but, rather, a 
conditional favour, in that it presupposed a “harmony of outlook” between civil 
servants and political executives. Without this basic agreement administrative 
discretion would, Kingsley expected, surely result in sabotage, rather than in 
impartiality (see Bendix 1945-6: 76): “[T]he essence of bureaucratic 
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dominant class served as an effective instrument of political control 
and, thus, ensured social harmony.19  
Kingsley’s book also allows for another interpretation. 
Kingsley could not help but showing his apprehension of a British 
bureaucracy selectively catering to middle class interests and values. 
He considered the caste-like character of the civil service 
“antipathetic to political democracy” and “potentially of grave 
danger to the State”. A cast-like civil service, he felt, hampers the 
occurrence of the “superior insight and wisdom” typically produced 
by “the pooling of diverse streams of experience”, while it is this 
very pooling of diverse streams of experience which, as he saw it, 
defines “the superiority of the democratic Civil Service over its 
totalitarian rivals”.  
Kingsley deplored the far-reaching and disastrous 
consequences of the linkage between civil service recruitment and 
education for “civil service mentality” and its “outlook and 
orientation”. “Snobbish” public school education, he felt, inculcated 
values such as conformity, valuation of good form and gentlemanly 
behaviour over intelligence, conservatism, thirst for power (fanatique 
du pouvoir), formal and specialized education particularly in subjects 
comprising “the medieval curriculum” (ancient languages, theology, 
                                                                                                                                          
responsibility in the modern State is to be sought, not in the presumed and 
largely fictitious impartiality of the officials, but in the strength of their 
commitment to the purposes that the State is undertaking to serve . . . . The 
view of the Civil Servant as a disinterested assembler of facts simply will not 
stand examination” (Kingsley 1944: 274-5). The essence of administrative 
partiality, according to Kingsley, was therefore loyalty –engendered by a 
common (or “identical”) background, outlook and shared values-, rather than 
civil service professionalism (see MacMahon 1946: 130). British bureaucracy 
could thus seem neutral, because its neutrality served the interests of the 
powerful classes (Moulin 1971: 168). The Labour party, were it to come to 
power, would surely experience, predicted Kingsley, the tangible limits of the 
vaunted neutrality of the British civil service (Kingsley 1944: 278-9;  see also 
Krislov 1974). 
19 Kingsley, in fact, assumed that -more generally- representative 
bureaucracy is the only effective instrument of political control. “By no other 
means”, he claimed, “can an elaborate administrative machine be operated. By 
no other devices can the bureaucracy be controlled. Neither parliaments nor 
cabinets are adapted to the requirements of detailed or pervasive supervision” 
(Kingsley 1944: 186). 
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pure mathematics). Public school education thus produced an 
“aristocratic contempt for useful knowledge”, “amazing ignorance” 
of “the most elementary social conditions and problems”, “a failure 
to penetrate the problems of those in other strata of society” and “a 
failure to see the world as a whole” (Kingsley 1944: 152-7). “An 
English gentleman”, Kingsley quipped, “is a bundle of specifically 
qualified reactions, a creature who for all the emergencies of life has 
his behaviour marked out for him in advance” (ibid.: 157). 
All this led Kingsley to conclude that “the democratic State 
cannot afford to exclude any considerable body of its citizens from 
full participation in its affairs”. “In a democracy”, he said, 
“competence alone is not enough. The public service must also be 
representative if the State is to liberate rather than to enslave” (ibid: 
185). Thus summarized, Kingsley’s book reads as a normative call 
for a bureaucracy more representative of all social classes, rather 
than as an empirical description and explanation of the middle class 
representativeness of British bureaucracy.20 
Though the latter interpretation is probably more accurate, the 
interpretation which holds that Kingsley stressed a group approach 
and the notion that all groups were to be represented (cf. Kelly 1998: 
203) has attracted most subsequent scholarly attention. Over the 
years it has gradually evolved into a normative theory of 
representative bureaucracy which contends that a bureaucracy 
recruited from all segments of society –not necessarily or exclusively 
social classes- will produce policies that are democratic in the sense 
that they are generally responsive to the desires of the public (Meier 
1993b). Just why this might be so, is a question that has received little 
systematic scholarly treatment, however. In this chapter, I will 
therefore outline a theory of representative bureaucracy which 
spells out in some detail the logic through which the mere presence 
of group-identified bureaucrats might result in administrative 
decisions that benefit bureaucrats’ ingroup members.  
                                                
20 If his argument must be read as a plea for a bureaucracy more 
representative of all societal groups, Kingsley himself, to be sure, wavered 
between high hopes and few illusions regarding the practical possibility for 
effective reform. The caste-like British bureaucracy, he feared, could not be 
“readily disposed” because “the conditioning factors are embedded deeply in 
the social structure of the nation” (Kingsley 1944: 163). 
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2 Bureaucratic discretion 
 
A comfortable view of bureaucracies is that they are permanent, 
hierarchically structured, goal-oriented organizations, designed for 
getting centralized decisions –“policies”- carried out through lower-
level personnel. Bureaucracies are based on a clearly defined 
division of labour whereby each job in the organizational chart is 
spelled out in detail. The chains of command and responsibility -the 
hierarchy of authority- are carefully specified, and people are, 
ideally, assigned their particular jobs on the basis of their objective 
qualifications to fulfil them. Bureaucracies typically deploy staffing 
and structure as means of handling clients and disposing of cases. 
They establish rules for categories of activity, categorize cases or 
clients, and then motivate proper performance by providing salaries 
and patterns of career advancement. Bureaucracies seek to divorce 
the individual’s private life and interests from his life as an 
officeholder through the use of rules, salary and career, and nullify 
outsider influences by depersonalizing and categorizing clients 
(Dunsire 1978a: x; Egeberg 1998; Katz and Danet 1973: 4; Meier 1997; 
Simon 1997 (1945); Thompson 1967: 5-6; Tullock 1987: 182).  
Since bureaucracies are not generally designed to serve a 
representative function for a particular clientele group (Keiser et al. 
2002: 555), they may seem unlikely vehicles for the pursuit of social 
group interests. Their reliance on rules, clearly defined task 
descriptions and roles, strict and extensive monitoring and control 
of employees’ behaviour, and on job and office socialization and 
indoctrination all would seem to work against opportunities for 
individual bureaucrats to pursue identity related interests in the 
formulation and implementation of public policies. Hemmed in by 
all these formal and structural constraints, it is perhaps hard to see 
how bureaucrats might let themselves be guided and informed in 
their choices and activities by considerations, sentiments, interests 
and values associated with their upbringing, background and social 
group membership.  
Opportunities for the active representation of group interests 
by bureaucrats, nevertheless, frequently arise. They do so in the 
form of discretion. Bureaucratic discretion pertains to a range of 
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choice within a set of parameters that circumscribes the behaviour of 
the individual (Scott 1997: 37). An official possesses discretion when 
he can choose from a range of options that one which he perceives 
as best suited for the particular situation at hand (cf. Boin 1998: 16). 
Bureaucratic discretion is, essentially, a logical corollary of the 
necessity –existing in all political systems of a certain scale- to 
delegate power to bureaucrats; more specifically, discretion is the 
product (or side-effect) of problems with which superiors in any 
bureaucracy are confronted as a result of the necessity of delegation. 
The first problem is that of communicating their desires –their 
policies- to their subordinates, the second that of seeing that these 
are actually carried out (Tullock 1987: 180). How these problems 
translate into discretion, and what exactly this discretion may entail 
is the subject of this section. 
 
The communication problem 
 
In any political democracy, legislators cannot anticipate all of the 
possible circumstances that may arise in the design and 
implementation of public policies. They cannot issue commands -
orders, rules, directives, laws or statutes- that can speak 
authoritatively and comprehensively to all of the circumstances 
likely to arise in the administration of a program throughout its 
future history. This may be due to the rush of events, which 
continuously brings up new problems and issues and leaves 
legislators with too little time to grapple with and reflect on the 
many aspects, implications and details of issues on the policy-
agenda. Sometimes politicians cannot agree on what exactly the 
problem is that needs legislation. Or they can agree on the problem 
but not on its solution. Or, as frequently happens, politicians know 
what the problem is, have a fairly good idea as to how they would 
want to solve it, but realize that their preferred course of action 
might create enemies they can ill-afford to make, given the structure 
of self-interest and opportunity built into the electoral process 
(Morgan and Rohr 1982: 2). As a result, “commands” from the top –
legislators as well as bureaucratic superiors- are often and 
necessarily vague. Such vague commands effectively delegate –
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intentionally or by default- decision-making authority to those 
lower down the line (Horn 1995; Morgan and Rohr 1982; Tullock 
1987). Consequently, lawmakers usually rely on bureaucratic agents 
who deploy their expertise, judgment and intuition to make 
administrative decisions (Long 1952; Pendleton Herring 1936; 
Selden et al. 1998). Whenever bureaucrats make such decisions, they 
exercise discretion and thus co-determine the content and direction 
of programs and policies and the nature, amount, and quality of 
benefits and sanctions provided by their agencies (Selden 1997a: 13).  
Higher level bureaucrats exercise discretion to influence 
public policies. They provide detail to legislative statutes or 
executive orders, translate vague legislative mandates into 
organizational procedures, and influence the content of legislation 
through lobbying, drafting proposed legislation, and by setting 
bureaucratic issues on the policy agenda (Meier 1993b; Page 2001; 
Sowa and Selden 2003: 700). Bureaucrats are often well placed to 
engage in such policy-making activities. The knowledge they 
possess about a problem, issue or policy is often superior to that of 
any other political actor. The continuity and permanence of 
bureaucracy allow bureaucrats extensive scope for specialization 
and the accumulation of expertise. Political institutions such as 
legislatures, on the other hand, can normally address issues only 
serially, depending on whichever issue gains political salience at a 
particular point in time. The sheer manpower available in 
bureaucracies, furthermore, enables bureaucrats to divide complex 
problems and issues into smaller and more manageable tasks 
(Selden 1997a: 19). 
Since most bureaus are no monoliths in which control over 
nearly all activities is concentrated in the hands of their topmost 
officials, not only higher level bureaucrats exercise discretion. 
Because they have to consider a great many policies and can only 
deal with them in general terms, top-level administrators cannot 
avoid delegating some of their power to subordinates (Downs 1967: 
133-4). Superiors at any level of the bureaucratic hierarchy thus 
must let their subordinates know what they want them to do; what 
the policy (or policies) of the organization is (are). Due to people’s 
“almost infinite ability to misunderstand”, as Gordon Tullock puts 
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it, giving such instructions is not an easy task. However skilfully 
superiors manipulate the various means to get a message across -
clarity of expression, repetition, apt similes- there is always “some 
maximum order of complexity in a task beyond which it becomes 
impossible for the subordinate to form a clear idea of the desires of 
his superiors with respect to that task” (Tullock 1987: 182-3). 
These communication problems are compounded by the 
hierarchical structuring of bureaucracies. Bureaucracies, says Adrian 
Dunsire, may be thought of as constituting “cognitive hierarchies” 
consisting of a (variable) number of “orders of comprehension”, 
moving from the order of legislative work -the consideration of 
broad aims and political consequences of law making- through the 
order of organisational and financial management at headquarters 
and in field offices, down to the supervision and deployment of 
skilled operations which produce actions that alter the world in 
some concrete and particular way. Each order of comprehension has 
its own characteristic universe of discourse, sphere of interests, 
concepts, working vocabulary and style of going about things. 
Bureaucrats in one particular order therefore recognise that they 
“talk the same language” -even when they disagree- while those on 
other levels –even when they are dealing with the same subject-
matter- do not (Dunsire 1978a: 2-3). The facts that members of each 
order speak their own particular tongues and, resultantly, perceive 
the world and their work in terms of the particular concepts of that 
tongue (cf. March and Simon 1958: 165), obviously complicates 
effective cross-order communication.21  
Superiors may thus easily find themselves having difficulties 
in finding “the right wavelength” of people who speak the language 
of a subordinate order of comprehension. A subordinate bureaucrat 
who receives an order from his superior must therefore often 
interpret this order and translate its meaning to the world of his own 
order of comprehension. This necessity to interpret and translate 
may involve substantial individual discretion. Such interpretive 
                                                
21 Miscommunication may, of course, remain limited when 
communication involves members of adjacent orders of comprehension but 
evidently becomes more consequential when the interchange of messages 
involves distant orders with widely differing tongues. 
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discretion, moreover, adds up every time an order passes from one 
order of comprehension to another.22 Often, the bureaucrat who 
receives a command must not only try to understand what the 
instruction received from higher up means for his level, he may also 
have “to specify for the next lower level what the instruction means 
for them” (Dunsire 1978b: 35). 
Bureaucratic discretion does not remain limited to the 
interpretation and translation of the meaning of superiors’ orders. 
Once a subordinate has figured out what the order he has been 
given means, he still does not necessarily know what to do in order 
to comply with it. Subordinates frequently receive conflicting or 
contradictory signals from above. Bureaucracies are seldom perfect 
organisational pyramids in which each subordinate receives 
directives from one particular superior, his boss so to speak. 
Whenever various superiors issue orders without regard to those 
from other sources, a subordinate will have to decide for himself 
what his situation seems to require, “picking and choosing among 
the directives for justification” (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 2).23  
Even if a subordinate has decided which of the various 
available instructions applies, he may, moreover, still have to select 
among various concrete activities and particular behavioural 
strategies to comply with his superior’s instruction. Since it is 
impossible for organisations to specify all of the prescriptions and 
proscriptions associated with any given role or task, bureaucrats are 
often confronted with the difficult task of turning the partial 
descriptions of complex and detailed decision situations, as 
exemplified in instructions, formal rules and procedures, into 
                                                
22 Higher level orders often trigger a train of more detailed, 
operationalized orders further down the line. Delegation in administrative 
hierarchies usually involves, as Kingsley observed, “minutes and memoranda 
[passing] up and down the line until by selective process they reach their 
proper level and are disposed of” (Kingsley 1944: 14). 
23 Such situations occur much more frequently than one might at first 
thought anticipate. In bureaucracies, orders often stay on the books indefinitely in 
the form of statutes and regulations. A subordinate will regularly find that in 
many of the concrete circumstances in which he is supposed to make a decision or 
to take action, several of such provisions apply simultaneously. Picking the right 
one among the various theoretically applicable, recorded provisions of sometimes 
uncertain origin and intent may be far from easy (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 3). 
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concrete practical activities. Selecting such an appropriate “script” 
can be a highly pragmatic and improvisational exercise involving 
substantial discretion (Lipsky 1980: 14; Stone-Romero et al. 2003: 
331; Wagenaar 2004: 646, 650-1). 
 Given the problems involved in communicating orders from 
the top to the bottom it is clear that an individual in an 
administrative hierarchy is often “pretty much the judge of the 
matters within his competence”, as Kingsley put it (Kingsley 1944: 
15). The result of this recurring “discretionary gap” is that 
organizational policies are not defined only at the top of the 
pyramid but all along the line down to the street-level (Downs 1967: 
133-4). 
 
The enforcement problem 
 
Though bureaucratic discretion is inherent to bureaucratic 
organization, the extent to which bureaucrats or bureaucratic 
agencies have room for making discretionary choices obviously 
varies. Various factors such as the task at hand, the decisional 
context, personality of the official, the superior’s span of control, 
workload pressures, type of clientele, an organization’s culture, 
rules and constraints, and an organization’s wider external 
environment may all influence how and to what extent discretion is 
exercised in particular situations (Meier and Bohte 2001; Scott 1997: 
37). 
 The extent of discretion is, in large part, a function of how well 
superiors succeed in solving the second problem associated with 
delegation, the problem of seeing that their orders are actually 
carried out. Even if a superior succeeded in overcoming the 
problems involved in effectively communicating his directives to his 
subordinates, he would still be left with the problem of ensuring the 
latters’ compliance. Securing such compliance is, however, far less 
obvious than it might seem. “Subordinates may know precisely 
what is expected of them, be perfectly capable of doing it, and still 
not do it” (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 3). Though a superior, by 
definition, has the authority to command his subordinate, this is no 
guarantee that a subordinate will effectively accept his command as 
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authoritative and carry it out (Dunsire 1978a: 22). “Bureaucracies”, 
says Dunsire, “by their very nature . . . do not and cannot operate by 
commands from the top” (Dunsire 1978a: x). Though authority 
usually ensures that subordinates pay attention to what their 
superiors are saying, it does not guarantee their compliance with it 
(Dunsire 1978a: 49). 
Politicians and top-level policymakers are normally well 
aware that individual bureaucrats down the line exercise discretion 
in the design and implementation of public policies. To increase the 
likelihood that subordinate bureaucrats’ decisions add up to 
outcomes favoured by them they seek to structure this discretion 
(Balla 1998; Meier 1993b; West 1984). And since there is always the 
risk that they will be held accountable for deficient or undesirable 
policy outcomes, they usually have good reasons for trying to do so 
(cf. Boin 1998: 28). Superiors try to structure subordinate discretion 
in various ways. Perhaps most popular is the tried-and-tested 
bureaucratic method of specifying rules and procedures that 
bureaus must follow when crafting and implementing policy.24 
Reporting requirements and other monitoring devices such as 
personal inspections, internal studies, clearance procedures, and 
face-to-face gatherings are, essentially, attempts to control the 
behaviour of subordinates and to force them to exercise their 
discretion in an –from the superior’s viewpoint- appropriate or 
desired manner. Much of the red-tape associated with bureaucracy 
thus results from the efforts of superiors or individuals outside the 
bureaucracy to structure the discretion at subordinate levels (Meier 
1993b: 3-4). But the structuring of discretion need not solely or 
primarily take the form of organizational rules and procedures. 
                                                
 24 The popularity of rules as structuring devices is in part explained by 
their efficiency –once specified they may applied indefinitely- and in part by the 
fact that a rule constitutes a comparatively unambiguous way of giving an 
instruction or command. Though rules –like, for example, direct orders- specify 
obligations and enjoin those bound by them to do particular things in particular 
ways, they have usually been given more thought and deliberation –or are 
believed to have been- than more hastily worded personal commands. Rules 
also usually embody a relatively clear statement of superiors’ expectations of 
their subordinates. By carefully specifying what subordinates may or may not 
do, rules delimit –it is hoped or expected- the areas of personal discretion to the 
benefit of the (usually growing) area of obligation (Gouldner 1954: 162-3). 
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Superiors also often expect professional norms, codes and standards 
or the doctrine of political neutrality to provide the parameters for 
the exercise of discretion. Some organizations rely heavily on 
socialization and indoctrination, or on loyalty-based controls such as 
nepotism or tribalism (Downs 1967: 156-7; Meier and Bohte 2001: 
457-58; Scott 1997; Van Riper 1958). 
External actors and administrative superiors can never 
completely structure the exercise of discretion by individuals lower 
down the hierarchy, however. Rules and prescribed routines cannot 
possibly cover every contingency, organizational socialization is 
rarely total (Meier et al. 1999: 1026).25 The loyalty of relatives or 
fellow group-members may prove illusory. The basic problem 
associated with said structuring devices is that they, in themselves, 
cannot enforce compliance. Subordinates may feel that what they 
are asked to do offends their personal principles or their 
interpretation of professional ethics or their extra-organizational 
loyalties and commitments or their self-interest (Kaufman and 
Couzens 1973: 3). They must therefore somehow be motivated or 
induced to follow organizational rules, respect professional codes, 
swallow organizational myths, or act as loyal and obedient sons 
towards their superiors. 
In order to make this happen superiors’ ultimate recourse is to 
rewards and punishments: appointments and dismissals, increases 
and decreases in salary or wages, promotions and demotions, 
strategic replacements, allocation of interesting and boring work, 
comprehensive consultation of good subordinates and conspicuous 
disregard of the bad ones, etcetera (Dunsire 1978a: 23; Gouldner 
1954).26 To distribute such sanctions effectively the superior must 
                                                
25 Though organizational socialization, professionalism and neutrality may 
keep administrative discretion within bounds more severe than a legislature could 
prescribe or enforce, they do not, claimed Van Riper, form “much protection 
against the wide range of administrative decisions which lie largely outside the 
domains of science, the professions, and a narrow sort of administrative expertise 
concerned mainly with means . . . they are frail reeds in times of crisis and only 
modestly helpful during the ordinary course of events” (Van Riper 1958: 550-1). 
26 Sanctions also include the promise of rewards and the threat of 
punishments, which may –from the superior’s point of view- be quite as 
effective as the actual sanctions themselves. Though the distribution of 
sanctions seems to be the ultimate device to bring non-compliant subordinates 
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know what his subordinates are doing (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 
4-5).27 Reliable feedback about subordinate behaviour is often very 
difficult to obtain, however, because feedback in bureaucratic 
organizations consists predominantly of data provided by the very 
subordinates whose behaviour is being monitored.28  
Most subordinates dislike being the objects of scrutiny. Active 
monitoring is often experienced as carrying a stigma of punishment 
(cf. Meier and Krause 2003: 9). Subjected subordinates may become 
secretive, hostile, fidgety, excessively cautious, a little untruthful or 
a combination of these (cf. Bacal 2001: 117; Kaufman and Couzens 
1973: 71).29 The information provided by subordinates is not only 
often rather unwillingly provided, it also tends to be biased. Since 
subordinates can never be sure as to the use to which the 
information about their behaviour and performance will be put (cf. 
McKevitt and Lawton 1996: 50), they are normally quite aware of 
                                                                                                                                          
into line, it is not the only possibility. Reasoning and pleading may also help. 
“The problem of securing employees’ compliance”, says Simon, “is not very 
different from the problem of securing a customer’s acceptance of a particular 
brand of soap. In some cases formal authority may be a sufficient inducement 
for the subordinate to comply; but usually the communication must reason, 
plead, persuade, as well as order, if it is to be effective” (Simon 1997 (1945): 216-
7). 
27 Apart from its use for distributing sanctions, knowledge about 
subordinate behaviour may also empower superiors to structure or curb 
subordinate discretion in other ways. Such knowledge may teach them how to 
clarify their instructions, for example, or how to improve the training of 
subordinates (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 5). 
28 In bureaucratic organizations most of the information about 
subordinate activities tends to be passed along upwards through standard 
forms filled out routinely at lower levels and assembled and tabulated at higher 
levels (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 6). 
29 Max Weber was particularly impressed by bureaucrats’ “natural” 
tendency to favour secrecy and avoid scrutiny by their –political- superiors. 
“Bureaucratic administration”, he claimed, “always tends to exclude the public, 
to hide its knowledge and action from criticism as well as it can . . . The concept 
of the “office secret” is the specific invention of bureaucracy, and few things it 
defends so fanatically as this attitude . . . . Bureaucracy naturally prefers a 
poorly informed, and hence powerless, parliament -at least insofar as this 
ignorance is compatible with the bureaucracy’s own interests” (Weber 1978: 
992-3).  
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the consequences which the information they are transmitting 
upwards may (or will) have for them.  
As a general rule, subordinates prefer to transmit the kind of 
information that they expect will not have unpleasant consequences 
for them.30 They will tend to tell their superiors what –they assume- 
the latter will want to hear; to cover up problems and mistakes 
which may reflect adversely on themselves, and to accentuate the 
success of their decisions and activities. As a result, reports flowing 
upward in the organization are often “sugar-coated” (Simon et al. 
1964 (1950): 240). Apart from pleasant and pleasing matters, 
subordinates will also tend to transmit information that the superior 
will hear of anyway from other channels –in which case it is better 
to tell him first- or that the superior needs in his dealings with his 
own superiors (Carzo Jr. and Yanouzas 1969: 179; Simon 1997 
(1945)).31  
Most superiors will soon enough notice subordinates’ 
proneness to exaggerate achievements and to understate or conceal 
deficiencies. (After all, most of them tend to have been subordinates 
themselves, and –given the near-endless replications of superior-
subordinate relationships in administrative hierarchies- most of 
them still are.) But there are no easy solutions to the resulting 
problems of incomplete and distorted feedback. Intensifying 
surveillance, for example, may do more harm than good since 
greater efforts put in by superiors to monitor the behaviour of their 
subordinates are often easily matched by greater efforts on the part 
of the latter to evade or counteract such control (Downs 1967: 147; 
Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 71).  
                                                
30 They tend to have ample opportunity to present a selective picture of 
their own activities. “Reports can be organized and presented to emphasize 
what the reporting officer wants stressed and to mute what he would rather 
conceal. Records can be manipulated” (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 28). 
31 Information going downward, as Simon cum suis point out, is equally 
suspect, for quite the same reason: superiors also find it difficult to release 
information that they believe would reflect adversely on their ability and 
judgment. In their downward communication they will thus take care to stress 
the wisdom of their decisions and to show their benevolence towards 
subordinates (Simon et al. 1964 (1950): 240; see also Carzo Jr. and Yanouzas 
1969: 179).  
2 A theory of representative bureaucracy 47
In theory, superiors might drastically increase the quality of the 
feedback they are getting if they could rely more on data generated 
through close, face-to-face supervision or personal inspections, 
rather than on the information contained in the progress reports 
routinely produced by subordinates themselves. Personal 
inspections, however, are notoriously time-consuming. Superiors 
who invest heavily in such “activist” monitoring devices incur 
relatively substantial transaction costs -costs incurred in carrying 
out such oversight activity- as well as opportunity costs -time and 
resources that could be spent on activities that would yield greater 
marginal net benefits to the administration’s policy agenda (Meier 
and Krause 2003: 8-9).32  
Though there certainly are other viable sources and ways of 
generating accurate administrative feedback -personal contacts, 
professional colleagues, investigations, clients, the media, and 
zealous or disaffected employees (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 39-
40)- it seems unavoidable that superiors -even if they are 
extraordinarily alert- will generally not be provided with all the 
information needed to establish how their subordinates exercise 
discretion. “No feedback system”, say Kaufman and Couzens, 
“picks up everything” (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 53; see also 
Dunsire 1978a: 69). As a result, superiors may often not be able to 
distinguish compliance from defection (Brehm and Gates 1994: 325; 
Thompson 1980: 905) which, of course, complicates the effective use 
of sanctions as a means to structure or curb subordinate discretion.  
 The availability of accurate information, moreover, is no 
guarantee that it will be actually utilized as a basis for distributing 
organizational rewards and punishments. The use of feedback is 
                                                
32 Another drawback of personal inspections is that they make very 
evident exactly “who is the boss”. In egalitarian cultures, as Alvin Gouldner 
points out, such “visible differences in power and privilege readily become 
sources of tension, particularly so if status differences do not correspond with 
traditionally prized attributes such as skill, experience, or seniority” (Gouldner 
1954: 161). By way of a cheaper and less laborious alternative superiors might 
try to find out what is happening down below by using or urging subordinates 
to report about the behaviour of other subordinates. But this type of monitoring 
often fails to generate useful information because of organization members’ 
general disinclination to disclose revealing information about their colleagues 
and friends (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 60).  
2 A theory of representative bureaucracy 48
namely constrained by the capacity to absorb the information 
(Lipsky 1980: 29). This capacity, in turn, is constrained by the 
capacity of superiors to interpret the meaning of feedback-
information and by the fact that superiors –apart from tracking 
subordinate behaviour- have to deal with other types of information 
as well. Some superiors tend to shun details of the kind 
encompassed by administrative feedback. They may prefer or be 
compelled to pay attention to strategic policy problems, to be 
engaged in introducing innovation, expanding jurisdiction, winning 
greater authority and appropriations, standing off challenges by 
other interests and agencies, performing ritual and ceremonial 
functions, and representing the organization to higher headquarters 
and representative institutions, rather than to attend to the nitty-
gritty of internal operations and subordinate compliance (Kaufman 
and Couzens 1973: 49-66). Superiors may thus not be so much 
interested in maximizing real control, as well as in seeking apparent 
control (Tullock 1987: 193).33  
Even if superiors would succeed in detecting undesired or 
inappropriate exercises of discretion by their subordinates, and be 
capable, willing and in the position to utilize it as a basis for 
sanctioning, they still face the problem of correcting this behaviour. 
In theory, superiors have plenty of options in this regard but, in 
actual practice, their possibilities for effective sanctioning are rather 
limited. Bureaucrats often have job security and cannot be easily 
fired, replaced, disciplined or transferred. Civil service rules often 
greatly reduce superiors’ ability to manipulate benefits and 
sanctions to induce centrally desired performance. The costs of 
firing or demoting workers may be so great that retaining a deviant 
subordinate may still seem the better option when compared to its 
alternatives of having to endure a prolonged period of arbitration 
while the post in dispute remains unfilled or, worse, remains filled 
by the accused deviant (Lipsky 1980: 24-5). Possibilities for effective 
                                                
33 There are also situations in which superiors would rather not want to 
know about feedback suggesting or demonstrating subordinate non-
compliance. This may be so in the case of lazy or indifferent superiors, for 
example, or when superiors privately approve of the discretionary offences of 
their subordinates (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 65; Tullock 1987: 181). 
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control of subordinates are further constrained by the clientele 
support characteristic of many government bureaucracies (Kingdon 
2003: 152; Selden et al. 1998: 718).34 
Manipulating sticks and carrots to enforce subordinate 
compliance is not easy. Too many rewards and too little 
punishments may stimulate laziness, carelessness and indulgence, 
while an overreliance on punishment-centered controls may 
provoke a variety of perverse responses ranging from shirking, 
subversion and sabotage, to open resistance and defection (Brehm 
and Gates 1994; Gouldner 1954). Since most people have to be 
pushed quite far before they resort to overt disobedience, 
subordinates’ resistance against inappropriate or unjustified 
punishments is usually surreptitious, making it all the more difficult 
to detect (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 3-4). Because of the many 
difficulties involved in correcting non-compliance in bureaucracies, 
superiors sometimes become resigned to the limits of their ability to 
alter the behaviour of their subordinates (Kaufman and Couzens 
1973: 66-7). 
To conclude, given the communication and enforcement 
problems associated with delegation in administrative hierarchies, 
bureaucratic discretion and -hence- subordinate non-compliance in 
large bureaucratic organizations are virtually inevitable. Orders 
from above are regularly unintelligible to those who are supposed 
to carry them out while superiors typically lack the knowledge, 
time, manpower, financial and legal resources, will or perseverance 
to detect, monitor and sanction all inappropriate exercise of 
discretion (cf. Meier 1975: 542). As a result, bureaucrats widely 
exercise discretion, in interpreting and translating the meaning of 
superiors’ orders; in deciding with which orders to comply; in 
deciding how to comply with a given order; as well as in deciding 
whether to comply at all with central directives. 
                                                
34 Clients, employees and suppliers may have good reasons to support 
bureaucratic agencies and defend them against political intervention. Since 
bureaucrats often have much to offer –they manage large budgets, buildings, 
and other supplies, have access to computers and other high-tech equipment, 
and allocate services, goods, money, prestige, privileges, and other perks- a 
belief among or promise to their clients that some of these benefits will come 
their way may entice clients to support certain agencies (Selden 1997a). 
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3 Controlling bureaucracy through representation  
 
The fact that administrative discretion cannot be fully structured 
means that most bureaucrats have –to some extent- the power to 
make choices as they see fit. Obviously, their exercise of discretion 
makes bureaucrats powerful. It enables them to authoritatively 
allocate scarce societal resources with their decisions and to 
decisively participate in rule (Meier 1993b: 5; Morgan and Rohr 1982: 
8). Bureaucratic discretion may thus readily conflict with the 
democratic principle that the authority to make policy should be 
exercised by institutions directly responsible to the people. While 
bureaucrats may be legitimately involved in proposing policies, it is 
not democratic for them to actually set and decide on them. 
Bureaucrats lack accountability at the ballot box, nor can they 
otherwise be removed from office or disciplined if citizens disagree 
with their decisions (Meier 1975: 528; Meier 1993b: 5; Meier 1997: 
195; Morgan and Rohr 1982: 2; West 1984: 340-1).  
 Also, the existence of discretion allows for the possibility that 
officials will abuse their discretionary power. They might engage in 
nonfeasance -not doing what they are supposed to do-, malfeasance 
–essentially doing what they are expected to, but in a wasteful, slack 
and inefficient manner-, or in overfeasance -zealously undertaking 
duties beyond those specified by superiors and rules. Another 
possibility, encompassing the above, is that bureaucrats will exercise 
their discretion in an arbitrary or selective manner and become 
biased towards serving the special interests of narrowly defined 
clientele groups, including and notably their own (Downs 1967; 
Finer 1941: 337-8; Krislov 1974; Morgan and Rohr 1982: 4; Tullock 
1987; Weber 1978; West 1984: 341).35 
                                                
 35 Bureaucratic discretion may, of course, be quite harmless or functional. 
“Such satisfactions as socialization and small talk, improving personal comfort, 
and resisting orders that disrupt pleasant habits”, says Downs, “form a 
significant part of every official’s incentives for staying in the bureau and 
performing his tasks effectively” (Downs 1967: 136-7). Discretion may also 
grant public administrators the flexibility needed to adequately adapt to 
unexpected or changing circumstances. Moreover, superiors who aggressively 
seek to curb all discretion risk creating organizational chaos. By divesting them 
of their discretion, superiors signal to their subordinates that they are not 
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Over the years a large array of controls against bureaucrats’ 
abuse of discretionary power has been proposed and advocated: 
strengthening legislative and judicial oversight and review; 
reinvigorating political leadership; limiting the span of control36; 
defining clear and unambiguous policy objectives; installing loyalty-
based controls37; creating administrative pluralism38; increasing 
public access to bureaucratic decision-making; stimulating thorough 
scrutiny of bureaucratic policy-suggestions through the “fellowship 
                                                                                                                                          
trusted. The latter’s likely response will be to avoid “mistakes” and penalties by 
keeping ever more strictly to narrowly literal and “safe” interpretations of 
superiors’ orders and by referring even routine cases and decisions to higher 
levels for action, review and clearance (Kaufman and Couzens 1973: 71). As a 
result, superiors will soon find their agency’s middle and higher levels 
“swamped with decisions that had to be made” (Jones 2003: 406; Meier 1993b: 
4). Bureaucracies, in short, would seem to need some measure of discretion and 
freedom from political micromanagement, if they are to perform at all (cf. Meier 
1997: 195, 198). 
36 This solution to the threat of abusive exercise of administrative 
discretion follows from the idea –popular in early 20th century scholarship- that 
the structural attributes –particularly hierarchy- of bureaucratic organizations 
play a major role in conditioning organizational performance. Management 
scholars such as Henri Fayol, Lydal Urwick, and Luther Gulick believed that 
adherence to a core set of management “principles” such as the division of 
labour and unity of command would best help organizations achieve their 
goals. Span of control, another such principle, dictates that superiors should 
oversee a limited rather than a large number of subordinates, thus making the 
superior’s job of monitoring and controlling the work of their subordinates a 
less daunting task. Urwick, in fact, claimed that six was the maximum number 
of subordinates that any superior could realistically control (see Hammond 
1990; Meier and Bohte 2000). 
37 Loyalty-based controls seek to prevent discretionary bureaucratic 
abuse by relying on the personal loyalties of those occupying administrative 
positions towards their political executive and/or his political party. The 
practice in the USA of filling high-level agency posts with so-called appointees 
and Belgian ministers’ reliance on personally appointed advisory boards (the 
so-called ministerial cabinets) are both real-life examples of this type of control. 
38 Administrative pluralism, as discussed by Mosher, involves the 
deliberate creation of controversy, competition, and negotiation among 
different factions and sections within the bureaucracy on the assumption that 
from the resulting “melee . . . will emerge a degree of order and balance 
roughly responsive to the people expressing themselves through organized 
groups (Mosher 1968: 89-90).  
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of science”39; inculcating in administrators a desirable set of 
substantive moral and ethical values; introducing managerialist, 
“thermostatic” controls40; or, simply, eliminating public bureaucracy 
to the greatest possible extent.41  
 Representative bureaucracy is another such proposed control. 
Its proponents –like the quota seekers and advocates of a politics of 
recognition and presence discussed in chapter 1- assert that the 
potential of bureaucracy to subvert democratic ends need not be 
problematic as long as bureaucracies are representative of the 
population (Long 1952: 817). The more the demographic origins of 
bureaucrats, collectively, mirror those of society as a whole, the 
                                                
39 The idea of mitigating the bureaucracy problem by counting on the 
“fellowship of science” was originally proposed by Carl Friedrich (1935, 1940). 
Observing the influx of scientists in government, he argued that establishing 
political control over bureaucracy was difficult due to the latter’s possession of 
technical knowledge. Bureaucrats, he feared, might easily dress their policy 
preferences in the guise of expertise. Friedrich’s solution entailed competing 
sets of scientists who would serve as a check on each other and thus provide 
multiple viewpoints for politicians (Meier and Krause 2003). Norton Long’s 
suggestion of building into the upper levels of the bureaucracy a “loyal 
opposition”, comparable to that found in the legislature, to ensure “true 
expression to all major policy alternatives” is based on a similar trust in the 
“inner check” of bureaucratic policy makers (see Dahl 2000 (1947): 63; Mosher 
1968: 94). 
40 Thermostatic controls involve the specification of policy output targets 
in advance and holding public “managers” to account for their performances 
relative to these targets later. The underlying idea is that the implied threat of 
negative feedback serves as an incentive to bureaucrats to “deliver”. 
Christopher Hood calls such controls “thermostatic” because, like the control of 
heating systems, they involve a standard-setting process linked to negative 
feedback mechanisms (Hood 2002: 11-12). 
41 Note that these proposed controls vary according to who should be 
doing the controlling (parliament, the courts, other bureaucrats, the public), at 
what point in time bureaucrats should be controlled (prior to administrative 
action or after policies have been implemented), the -explicit or implicit- 
assumptions as to what makes bureaucrats comply with superiors’ preferences 
and directives (fear of punishment, personal loyalty, professional standards, 
sense of duty) or, conversely, what makes them liable to abuse their discretion 
(opportunity, temptation, self-interest, poor morals, amateurism), and whose 
directives and preferences should ultimately be complied with (those of elected 
politicians, or those of the people). Typologies of various control types abound. 
For a brief but informative discussion and references to relevant literatures, see 
Hood (Hood 2004). 
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more likely it is, they claim, that bureaucracy will produce policy 
outcomes and outputs that reflect the interests and needs of all 
groups (Selden 1997a: xiii). The logic producing this effect, they 
argue, is straightforward. Persons of different backgrounds undergo 
different socialization experiences. Socialization experiences are 
important because they are the source of a person’s enduring values, 
preferences and biases. Bureaucrats are susceptible to these biases 
and preferences when they are exercising discretion (Hindera 1993a: 
422; Kingsley 1944; Meier 1993b: 8-9; Selden 1997a: 5; Van Riper 
1958: 558). Bureaucrats recruited from a particular group will 
therefore tend to make administrative decisions that reflect the 
interests, needs and desires of that group (Meier 1993b: 7-8; Selden 
1997a: 42). Prospective clients of bureaucracy, furthermore, may be 
more inclined to participate in policies intended to benefit them 
when they identify and are comfortable with program 
administrators (Riccucci and Saidel 1997: 423; Selden 1997a: 7).  
 Consequently, passive representation –that is, the physical 
presence of group-identified bureaucrats- is likely to be linked to 
active representation -that is, the pursuit of broader ingroup interests 
on the part of these group-identified bureaucrats: They might create 
or help shape policies that address ingroup-problems, facilitate the 
allocation of public goods to ingroup members, provide access to 
decision makers, reactively check or otherwise express disapproval 
of excesses or discriminatory behaviour by outgroup-bureaucrats, 
or, more generally, make the process of governing more congenial to 
ingroup members (Hindera 1993a: 417; Lim 2006: 196; Meier 1993b: 
8; Selden et al. 1998: 727). In other words, bureaucrats do not only 
passively represent the members of their group outside the 
bureaucracy -simply by resembling them-, they are also likely to 
become their active representatives, by pursuing their interests (cf. 
Meier 1993b; Pitkin 1967) (see appendix I for an elaborate and 
precise definition of active representation). Lest selective 
recruitment biases decisions, programs and policies at the expense 
of un(der)represented groups, democracy requires that 
bureaucracy’s choice of personnel considers employee attributes or 
membership and pays attention to ethnic balancing (Krislov 1974: 
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76; Peters 1989: 79).42 The result, advocates expect, will be a 
representative bureaucracy which produces outcomes similar to 
those produced if the entire public participated and which thus 
reconciles the need for bureaucracy with the requirements of 
democracy (Meier 1975: 528).43 
 
 
4 The groupness requirement  
 
Like most theorists of bureaucracy, theorists of representative 
bureaucracy assume that man -when submerged in an 
administrative hierarchy- does not automatically become a machine 
that faithfully carries out orders of its superiors who act for the 
whole organization in reaching policy decisions. Rather than ceasing 
                                                
42 Advocates of representative bureaucracy usually accept that 
recruitment of bureaucrats on the basis of their demonstrated ability or 
achievement –so-called merit recruitment- will not be adequate to create 
representative bureaucracies and that –therefore- special measures such as 
affirmative action are likely to be needed. Riccucci and Saidel, for example, 
consider representative bureaucracy a “justification for social policies such as 
affirmative action” (Riccucci and Saidel 1997: 423). The “merit issue” is often a 
key issue in debates over affirmative action, and the Indian reservation debate 
is no exception. In response to the anti-reservationist claim that reservations 
jeopardize merit, Indian low-caste quota seekers typically argue that invoking 
merit is “Aryan bluff”, a mere “slogan”, a “unilaterally defined” tool in the 
hands of ruling upper castes and classes who fear to lose their “hold” over 
bureaucracy. “Merit, as it is understood today in India”, writes the untouchable 
activist Talukder, “is nothing but political power”. Echoing J. Donald Kingsley, 
quota seekers also criticize Indian merit recruitment –which largely takes the 
form of written examinations- for privileging bookish knowledge and 
command of the English language over qualities such as “commitment, 
experience, and ability to co-ordinate things” which are –they feel- needed to 
bring about the required changes in the living conditions of Indian low castes 
(see e.g. Ilaiah 1990; Talukder 1997, 1998). 
43 Representative bureaucracy, to be sure, is proposed for numerous other 
reasons than as a control device meant to restrain bureaucracy from harming 
democracy. Representative bureaucracies, advocates argue, may also prevent or 
mitigate ethnic strife, imply a symbolic commitment to equal access to power, 
increase the credibility and legitimacy of the political system, or serve as 
psychological boosts to marginalized social groups (Esman 1999; Naff 1995; 
Riccucci and Saidel 1997; Selden 1997a: 43). In this book I will be strictly 
concerned with the control function of representative bureaucracy, however.  
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to exist, an individual –even when placed in an administrative 
hierarchy- remains an individual, with individual motives, impulses 
and desires (cf. Buchanan 1987: 2). Again like many other theorists, 
representative bureaucracy theorists also assume that bureaucrats 
will try and use their inevitable discretion to pursue goals of their 
own, their self-interest. What distinguishes representative 
bureaucracy theorists from other bureaucracy theorists is their 
expectation that bureaucrats’ pursuit of self-interest is likely to 
simultaneously further the interests of the social groups of which they 
are members.  
The commonality in outlook and interests purportedly 
produced by group-related socialization experiences, so it is 
assumed, cannot but impose on the individual bureaucrat some 
form of solidarity or loyalty to the group, a self-evident sympathy 
for other ingroup members and an inclination to further their (and, 
in so doing, his) interests.44 Kingsley’s empirical claim of 
representative bureaucracy in terms of the governing classes, for 
instance, hinged upon his assumption that the shared class-
membership of British politicians and bureaucrats (“the unity of the 
middle class state”) was bound to translate in bureaucrats’ tendency 
to act corporately in support of wider middle class interests and to 
oppose and sabotage any proletarian-based program (Krislov 1974: 
12): “There are obviously points”, so Kingsley believed, “beyond 
which a man cannot go in carrying out the will of another” 
(Kingsley 1944: 278). 
Even if most representative bureaucracy theorists agree on the 
importance of “social background” or group membership to 
individual bureaucrats’ interests, preferences and behaviour, they 
have also come to recognize that active representation cannot be 
                                                
44 The notion that groups of individuals with common interests usually 
attempt to further those interests can, of course, scarcely be considered a novel 
or farfetched idea. It is, in fact, a widely popular one, both in scholarship and 
popular debate. Just as single individuals are usually expected to act on behalf 
of their personal interests, so are groups of individuals with common interests 
often expected to act on behalf of their common interests (cf. Olson 1973: 1). The 
idea is almost a conventional insight and has been an important causal element 
in theories of labour unions, class action, pressure group politics and ethnic 
conflict, for example (Brubaker 2002; Olson 1973). 
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expected to occur for any group or aggregate of individuals with 
common characteristics. Put differently, that a group can command 
the loyalties of its members to the extent that bureaucrats will 
pursue ingroup members’ interests is not a given. Though there has 
been little direct and explicit theorizing of this point of group-
related variability in the probability of active representation, most 
authors would seem to agree that active representation requires 
strong group ties or, in the vocabulary of social psychology, high 
salience of a particular social identity (see e.g. Meier 1993a; 
Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh 2003; Thompson 1976), and is 
facilitated when the group in question is relatively powerful. 
At any point in time an individual belongs to a multitude of 
larger and smaller groups and categories, all of which can make 
demands and claims upon his consideration, loyalties and 
sympathies: his family, friends, neighbours, recreational clubs, the 
agency or company which employs him, the colleagues he works 
with, professional peers, the voluntary organizations he may have 
joined. The membership in such groupings constitute what social 
psychologists refer to as an individual’s social identity, “that part of 
an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of 
his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the 
value and emotional significance attached to that membership” 
(Tajfel 1981: 255). Social identity is, in short, one’s self-conception as 
a group member (Abrams and Hogg 1990a: 2). 
Also usually contributing to this identity are larger groupings, 
such as those circumscribed by common nationality, race, cultural 
practices, religion, region, and language. Even if an individual does 
not typically engage in direct, face-to-face interaction with all other 
members of such “cognitive” groupings, membership in them can 
carry a strong emotional significance. Furthermore, individuals 
belong to many other social categories that may scarcely be 
conceived of as groups but that can, nevertheless, have a strong 
impact on an individual’s sense of self: categories defined by 
commonality of gender, sexual orientation, class or occupation, for 
example.45  
                                                
45 Individuals may also identify with groups or collectivities of which they 
are not members: teachers may identify with their pupils, rich people with the 
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All these group memberships or social identities compete for 
an individual’s attention, sympathy and loyalty. As social 
psychologist Henri Tajfel put it: “In an infinite variety of situations 
throughout his life, an individual feels, thinks and behaves in terms 
of his social identity created by the various groups of which he is a 
member (Tajfel 1981: 31, emphasis mine). Every individual is thus 
furnished with a repertoire of more or less discrete group 
memberships or social identities (Hogg 1992: 90). The relative 
significance of any one of these identities varies with time and 
context: “Social identity is not fixed; different ones come to the fore 
in different contexts and stages of the life course” (Hechter 2004: 
419). Put differently, the self is made up of an ever-changing, 
collection of social identities, the relative salience of each of which is 
variable (cf. Abrams and Hogg 1990a: 3; McAdam and Paulsen 1993: 
647). “The psychological existence of a group for its members is a 
complex sequence of appearances and disappearances, of looming 
large and vanishing into thin air” (Tajfel 1982a: 485). 
Whenever faced with a discretionary decision situation, a 
bureaucrat may thus simultaneously feel the contradictory pulls and 
pressures emanating from various group memberships, all fighting 
for preferential consideration. What representative bureaucracy 
theorists tend to variously refer to as a bureaucrat’s social 
background, social origins or social class may be one of the “groups” 
struggling for a bureaucrat’s discretionary attention. But there 
seems to be no good reason to assume, as Kingsley appeared to do, 
that class membership is always and of necessity particularly salient 
anywhere.46  
                                                                                                                                          
poor, bureaucrats with their clienteles.  
46 American representative bureaucracy scholars, for example, have 
consistently belaboured the point of low class (not: low-class) salience in the 
United States. They point out that the sort of distinct, mutually opposed classes 
that featured in Kingsley’s analysis never really existed in American society. 
Though American society might perhaps be thought of as consisting of various 
“economic” classes -that is, groupings of individuals in more or less randomly 
identified income brackets or occupational aggregates-, Americans –unlike 
“Europeans”- do not tend to think as members of the classes to which they 
might be presumed to belong. “From a psychological standpoint”, claimed Van 
Riper, “most of them belong to the middle class” (Van Riper 1958: 4). Kingsley’s 
emphasis on bureaucrats’ class has thus appeared quite “artificial” to American 
2 A theory of representative bureaucracy 58
Neither is it necessarily obvious to assume that social groups, 
that is, groups external to the bureaucrat’s organization, will 
generally be more salient than the various groups internal to it. By 
instilling in them the norms of specificity, universalism and affective 
neutrality, bureaucracies typically seek to divorce bureaucrats’ 
external, private lives, ties, associations and interests from their lives 
as officeholders.47 Besides, many bureaucrats spend their entire 
working life in the public service, often in the same occupational 
field, or even in the same agency. If only for this reason, it is quite 
likely that task-, professional-, client- and other subgroups in and 
around the organization become important targets for identification 
for individual bureaucrats (cf. March and Simon 1958: 59, 65; Meier 
and Nigro 1976: 466-7). Given this range of possible group 
identifications and the differential pressures these can bring to bear 
on individual bureaucrats in discretionary situations, it is quite 
imaginable that bureaucrats may not even want to shape their 
bureau behaviour in accordance with the values they share with the 
population (Downs 1967: 232). “Officials”, claimed Anthony Downs, 
“have no strong incentives to employ representative values in 
making decisions because the pressure on them to seek 
representative goals will generally be much weaker than the 
pressure of their own personal goals or those of their bureaus” 
(Downs 1967: 233).  
Long bureaucratic careers not only provide incumbents with 
new social networks and group affiliations, they are almost 
inevitably also sculptors of new viewpoints, attitudes and values (cf. 
                                                                                                                                          
scholars (Krislov 1974: 14). “A man’s origins, his birthmarks”, Krislov argued, 
“have little to do with his adult abilities. They tell very little about how he will 
approach his task, and are inadequate even as evidence of how others will 
regard his actions” (Krislov 1974: 15, 16).  
47 Specificity means that person-to-person communications are strictly 
limited to those things which are officially defined as relevant to the matter at 
hand. It is the opposite of diffuseness; “the kind of intimate, reveal-your-whole 
self relationship characteristic of families and friends”. Universalism refers to the 
norm that people with similar attributes –provided that those attributes are 
defined as relevant to the organization- must be treated equally, on a first-come 
first-served basis. The norm of affective neutrality requires that bureaucratic 
communications and decisions be informed by calm and reason, rather than by 
passion (Katz and Danet 1973: 4-5). 
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Mosher 1968: 154). As the group identifications they acquired 
during childhood become more remote and appear less relevant as 
their careers progress, it is quite likely that bureaucrats, at some 
point, will ultimately stop to represent, and respond to, the kind of 
external, social group interests and points of view that 
representative bureaucracy theorists have in mind (Mosher 1968: 
95).48 
Given the multi-group membership of bureaucrats, there is no 
reason why they would, as a matter of course, have a predilection for 
the active representation of some particular, external, social group’s 
interests. Such a predilection would require that a bureaucrat 
experiences a strong tie with this group, a tie so strong that he may 
allow it to take precedence over –or, at least will not allow it to be 
cancelled out by- the demands placed upon him by other group ties 
or categorical interests. If a bureaucrat is to display active 
representative behaviour, his social identity as a member of a 
particular external, social group must induce him to act as a group 
member. It must, in other words, be salient (Abrams and Hogg 1990a: 
4). 
Social identity salience is no guarantee for the occurrence of 
active representation, however. The relative power of groups is also 
important. The various groups that make up a bureaucrat’s social 
identity may differ in endless respects, an important one of which is 
power. Power differentials may play havoc with a bureaucrat’s 
possibilities for displaying active representative behaviour, assuming 
that he should want to do so. Active representatives may encounter 
fierce resistance from within the organization. Superiors may 
readily interpret bureaucrats’ active representation of external 
group interests as a failure “to do as ordered”. Agencies, to avoid 
                                                
48 John Rehfuss’s study of the role perspectives of high ranking 
bureaucrats in the Californian CEA (Career Executive Assignment system) 
aptly illustrates this point. As Rehfuss noticed, all the bureaucrats he studied -
regardless of their ethnicity or sex- shared the same management ideology and 
the same drive: “Minority and female CEAs, like their nonminority male 
counterparts, hold management positions because they want to influence 
policy, they want to have their opinions heard, they want more money, and 
they want to get on the top. CEAs, regardless of race or sex, seem to be a self-
selecting group of ambitious, aggressive managers” (Rehfuss 1986: 458). 
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the appearance of partiality, may expressly forbid bureaucrats to 
actively represent their group’s interests and can invoke intensive 
pressures and vigorous sanctions if bureaucrats disregard this 
prohibition (Herbert 1974: 560; Mosher 1968: 13).49 
Outgroup representatives -that is, members of other external, 
social groups- within or around the organization may, moreover, 
take exception to a bureaucrat’s efforts to promote his ingroup’s 
interests (cf. e.g. Thompson 1976). If their outgroup is more 
powerful than the bureaucrat’s ingroup, they may have few 
difficulties in checking the designs of the parochially orientated 
administrator, or even make him cater to their group’s interests. 
(Such a scenario seems especially likely in vertically stratified systems 
of group relations. I will get back to this point in the following 
chapter). For an individual bureaucrat, as a member of a relatively 
powerless social group, to persevere in active representative 
behaviour in the face of strong outgroup cross-pressures, would 
seem to require unusually strong attachment to his group’s welfare 
or unusually strong support and pressures from other ingroup 
members towards active representation, or both. 
To conclude, bureaucrats may, but are not bound to, represent 
the interests of any social group they are, feel, or may be presumed 
to be, members of. Due to differences in social identity salience and 
group power, bureaucrats may stand for but, nevertheless, not act 
for other ingroup members. As Frederick Mosher put it: “A man 
brought up in Ohio who takes a job in Washington is not bound to 
represent the interests of Ohioans . . . The same might be said of a 
farmer’s son or a farmer representing the interests of farmers; or of a 
business man, or a college graduate, or a poor man . . . (Mosher 
1968: 13, emphasis mine). Active representation thus requires 
groups to have high “groupness”, that is, a high capability of 
commanding the loyalties of their individual members to promote 
and act in the groups’ interests (cf. Hechter 1987; Hogg 1992).  
 
                                                
49 The fear of such sanctions, Adam Herbert claimed in a 1974 article, led 
some minority public administrators in the United States to place “job security 
over program content or impact”, to the extent that they became “impediments 
to efforts to address the needs of their communities” (Herbert 1974: 560). 
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5 Ethnic groupness and active representation 
 
The groupness requirement implies that, even if a bureaucracy 
included members of all possible societal groups, this in itself would 
not ensure that, therefore, all their different interests would be 
articulated and brought to bear upon the decisions taken and 
policies formulated by it (cf. Subramaniam 1967: 1013). Some groups 
may simply lack the groupness required for passive representation 
to translate into active representation. Representative bureaucracy 
theorists’ acknowledgement of the phenomenon of differential 
groupness has been most evident with regard to class-based 
“groups”. Echoing the persistent argument in class analysis that 
Klassen an sich only very rarely seem to change in Klassen für sich, 
most theorists have failed to see how a “mere commonality” in 
social class origins might tempt or trick bureaucrats into becoming 
specially sympathetic to co-class members (Krislov 1974; Meier 1975; 
Mosher 1968; Subramaniam 1967).50  
By attributing low groupness to classes, representative 
bureaucracy theorists implicitly recognize that groupness is likely to 
vary with the kinds of groups that are bureaucratically represented. 
Though there has been little if no explicit theorizing on the matter, 
the largely implicit communis opinio seems to be that the groupness 
of groups and, hence, the likelihood of active representation, may be 
expected to vary with the groups’ membership criteria: more 
                                                
50 The fact that classes, especially “working” classes, are usually not able 
to trick their members into displaying corporate solidarity is widely 
acknowledged (Béteille 1977: 91-2; Brubaker 2002: 165; Hechter 1987: 6; Leach 
1968: 7). Representative bureaucracy theorists have generally been content to 
accept this general fact as prima facie evidence for the falsification of 
representative bureaucracy theory for class. As far as I am aware, only Samuel 
Krislov has tried to cement this position with empirical evidence. He cites three-
time Labour minister Herbert Morrison, who contradicts Kingsley’s prophesy 
that the Labour party, if it were to come to power, was bound to see its 
proletariat-friendly programs sabotaged by British middle class bureaucracy: 
“The belief among the public and even some Members of Parliament that civil 
servants do not work in harmony with Ministers I have hardly ever found to be 
justified . . . the British Civil Service is loyal to the Government of the day. The 
worst that can be said of them is that sometimes they are not quick enough in 
accustoming themselves to new ideas” (Herbert Morrison (1954), cited in 
Krislov 1974: 14).  
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specifically with whether their members are recruited on the basis of 
ascribed or acquired criteria. The translation of passive 
representation into active representation, so many theorists claim, 
may be particularly expected to occur in the case of ascribed, that is 
ethnic, groups (cf. e.g. Meier 1993b: 10-11).  
The idea that ethnic groups may be highly solidary, can 
command strong interpersonal loyalties and engender a great 
willingness on the part of groupmembers to sacrifice for collective 
welfare, is a familiar one (see Horowitz 1998: 2). Anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz, for example, once described ethnic ties as 
“primordial attachments” that possess a particular kind of “effable, 
and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves” 
(Geertz 1973). Ethnic loyalty, as Stinchcombe has argued, consists 
“in large measure of an unreflective tendency” to promote the 
group’s interests (Stinchcombe 1986: 123). Ethnic groups have, in 
short, often, if not typically, been associated in much social science 
theorizing with strong “groupness”, that is, a high capability to 
make their members act in the group’s interest. 
 Several reasons for this tendency towards high groupness of 
ethnic groups may be cited. According to Donald Horowitz -
drawing from social identity theory- the special power of ethnic 
loyalty derives from ethnic groups’ strong sense of similarity. A 
strong sense of similarity among group members is an important 
determinant of high groupness because people tend to like others 
whom they believe to be similar in tastes, attitudes, and values. 
Since they are characterized by inherited membership and (purport 
to be) founded on descent, ethnic groups offer a greater sense of 
similarity than groups founded on other premises. Shared genetic 
origins and early socialization, namely, are unusually potent sources 
of similarity and of cues that signal similarity, such as appearance, 
customs, gestures, language, clothing, tastes, and habits” (Cohen 
1978: 386-7; see also Ferdman 1992: 343-4; Horowitz 1998: 16-7; 
Schryer 2001: 207).  
 What makes their sense of similarity all the more powerful is 
that (real or perceived) common ancestry makes members of ethnic 
groups inclined to think about this similarity in terms of kinship and 
family resemblances. The language of ethnicity, for example, is 
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usually the language of kinship: group members often address each 
other as “brothers” or “cousins”. Often, ethnicity can also in fact be 
viewed as a form of greatly extended, segmented kinship. “As an 
ascriptive affiliation”, Horowitz explains, “ethnicity is defined by 
congeries of family relationships, and ethnic ties are therefore 
pyramided on family ties . . . Some small ethnic groups are nothing 
more than agglomerations of kinship clusters, and many larger 
groups are aptly described as composites of subgroups . . . which 
consist in turn of networks of extended families” (Horowitz 2000: 
59). 
 Their close association with kinship ties makes ethnic ties 
suffused with overtones of familial duty (Horowitz 2000: 59-60). 
From the viewpoint of individuals in ethnically plural societies, 
there may even be no meaningful boundaries between the bonds 
and duties associated with kinship and those with ethnicity. The 
virtual equation of both kinds of ties, explains why ingroup 
members tend to regard ethnic group membership as implying both 
the right to presume upon other ingroup members as well as the 
duty to help them in times of need or distress: “The supplicant who 
runs out of cousins to help him would seem likely to turn, as a 
matter of course, to persons of the same ethnic background. 
Ethnicity and kinship thus overlap in a quite direct, operational 
way: the former builds on the latter, the one is often confused with 
the other, and behaviour in one sphere is extended into the other” 
(Horowitz 2000: 61). 
 The groupness of ethnic groups is further stimulated by the 
“stickiness” of ethnic characteristics. That is, the characteristics or 
markers with which ethnic groupmembers signal their membership 
to others –e.g. skin colour, hair type, height, name, language, accent, 
place of birth and origin, gestures, clothing, habits- are often 
difficult or even impossible to change due to their high visibility: 
they can often be easily ascertained through such superficial data 
sources as the name, speech, features or dress of individuals and 
seldom require more careful observation and background research 
(Chandra 2006: 18-9). By complicating and constraining identity 
obfuscation or identity change, the stickiness of ethnic 
characteristics contributes to the groupness of ethnic groups: it 
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forces group members to identify with their particular ethnic group, 
even if they would rather not do so.  
The expectation that passive representation might translate 
into active representation in the case of ethnic groups finds support 
in some empirical evidence.51 Selden found that African American, 
Hispanic and Asian American officials of the Farmers Home 
Administration in the US were significantly more likely than 
outgroup colleagues to award rural housing loans to ethnic ingroup 
clients (Selden 1997a; Selden 1997b). Similarly, Hindera found Black 
and Hispanic investigators in the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to be more likely to file formal charges of 
employment discrimination for complainants of their own racial 
groups than outgroup investigators (Hindera 1993a: 421-2). And 
Meier and Stewart found a higher number of African-American 
teachers to be associated with fewer African-American students in 
EMR (educable mentally retarded) classes and more African 
American students in gifted classes. African-American teachers 
were also positively associated with higher test scores of African-
American students (Meier and Stewart 1992). These studies thus 
suggest that ethnically identified bureaucrats may act in the interest 
of ethnic ingroup members and that passive representation has 
more than symbolic value: ethnic representatives in the bureaucracy 
may indeed turn out to be more trustworthy deliverers of public 
policy outputs to ethnic ingroup members than outgroup 
bureaucrats (cf. Lim 2006: 198; Selden 1997a: 136).  
If representative bureaucracy works in the ethnically plural 
contexts of American bureaucracies, this would seem to bode well 
for the likelihood of the occurrence of active bureaucratic 
representation in the plural societies of the developing world, where 
                                                
51 The studies cited here have all been premised on the idea that active 
representation may be believed to be occurring when decision-making 
behaviour on the part of ingroup bureaucrats is statistically associated, and thus 
“systematically affects”, resource allocation to ingroup clients (Selden 1997b: 
29). Consequently, the theory of representative bureaucracy is regarded as 
verified if bureaucracies with different levels of representation produce 
different policy outputs (ibid.: 22). I discuss the design and conceptualization of 
active representation in these studies, as well as some problems associated with 
them, in more detail in chapter 4.  
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ethnic identity is particularly strongly felt and strong ethnic 
allegiances tend to permeate organizations, activities and roles to 
which they are formally unrelated (Horowitz 2000: 7). Differently 
put, active representation would seem to be the expected role 
behaviour of bureaucrats in the new states of Asia, Africa, the 
Middle East, and the Caribbean.  
Indeed, students of third world bureaucracies have tended to 
depict ethnicity as a rich source of particularistic pressures acting on 
civil servants in these countries. The literature, in fact, abounds with 
observations of the pressures placed on ethnically identified 
bureaucrats to act as agents –“uncles”, “brothers”, “fathers”- for 
their extended kin and ethnic group within the administrative 
system (cf. e.g. Hyden 1983: 79; Riggs 1978; Wertheim 1978). 
Bureaucrats confronted with requests from ingroup members 
appealing to kinship bonds are conventionally described as finding 
such requests very difficult to refuse. Not only are bureaucrats often 
socialized to a sense of preferential obligation to ingroup members, 
they also fear group sanctions if they fail to provide the sympathetic 
treatment that group members tend to expect as a matter of right 
from “one of their own” who has succeeded in achieving a position 
from which favours may be dispensed (Esman 1999).  
“In such a context”, as Donald Price puts it, “particularistic 
behavior on the part of the bureaucrat is, from a personal point of 
view, highly rational, since to violate social expectations in a society 
where social relations are centrally valued and in which individual 
existence outside of group membership is practically unthinkable, 
would be to court social, psychological, and even material disaster” 
(also see Bates 1983: 162-3; Price (1975), cited in Cohen 1980: 78-9).52 
Clients of bureaucracy may not to be very sympathetic to fellow 
ingroup bureaucrats who “hide” behind administrative rules or the 
norms of specificity, universalism and affective neutrality that 
idealtypically govern the relations between bureaucrats and their 
                                                
52 Kennedy cites a black American (not, incidentally, identified as a 
bureaucrat) who aptly describes how fellow ethnics tend to perceive group 
members inclined to downplaying or shedding ethnic advocacy roles: “[M]any . 
. . maintain that something would be wrong with me if I did not sense and 
express racial pride, racial kinship, racial patriotism, racial loyalty, racial 
solidarity” (Kennedy 1997, emphasis mine). 
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clients (cf. e.g. De Zwart 1994). They might readily perceive this as 
opportunistic defection, an attempt to duck ethnic duties and, thus, 
as deserving of punishment (cf. Bates 2005: 9). 
Bearing in mind that it is very restricted in geographical scope, 
the evidence collected by representative bureaucracy scholars seems 
generally supportive of the assumption that ethnic groups possess 
relatively high groupness. The fact that studies have commonly found 
evidence for a linkage between passive and active representation for 
ethnic groups while typically failing to do so in the case of female 
bureaucrats, for instance, suggests that the groupness of ethnic 
groups tends to be higher than that of sex-based groups.53 Meier and 
Nigro -in a 1976 study which, incidentally, measured the 
representativeness of American federal bureaucrats’ attitudes rather 
than their behaviour- found that, even if “demographic variables” 
generally fared poorly as predictors of the attitudes of higher civil 
servants, race was still the “most important trait” (Meier and Nigro 
1976: 465).54  
However, the accumulated evidence also suggests that high 
ethnic groupness cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, it 
indicates that the salience of ethnic identity to bureaucrats and, 
hence, the groupness of ethnic groups may vary substantially across 
                                                
53 Initial tests of representative bureaucracy theory for “sex” (that is, 
women) failed to find any evidence for a linkage between passive and active 
representation (Hindera 1993b; Selden 1997a). A few recent studies, however, 
claim to have established active representation by female bureaucrats: by 
female supervisors in child support agencies; by female teachers and 
administrators in Texas high schools; and by female police officers in the 60 
largest metropolitan counties in the United States (Keiser et al. 2002: 559-60; 
Wilkins and Keiser 2006). 
54 Meier and Nigro’s data came from an original survey conducted in July 
1974. The “higher civil servants” whom they discuss are a ten per cent random 
sample of so-called “federal supergrades” (GS 16 to GS 18). Meier and Nigro’s 
usage of the term “race” is rather implicit, referring to either “minority” or non-
minority membership. The “demographic variables” other than “race” included 
“urbanism”, “occupation father”, “first occupation”, “education”, “age”, “sex” 
and “region”. The issues for which they scrutinized said bureaucrats’ attitudinal 
representativeness were space explorations, environmental protection, health 
care, urban problems, crime control, drug abuse, education, improving the 
condition of minorities, national defence, foreign aid and welfare (Meier and 
Nigro 1976).  
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groups, political realms, and policy issues, as well as over time. Sally 
Selden, in her study of the U.S. Farmers Home Administration, 
reported differing levels of active representation for various ethnic 
groups. While finding statistically significant linkages between 
passive and active representation for African Americans, Hispanics, 
and Asian Americans, she found the linkage to be strongest for 
African Americans (Selden 1997a: 32-36; Selden 1997b: 103-7). 
Students have also come across ethnic groups for which active 
representation simply failed to occur. Selden, for instance, while 
finding ethnic distributive effects for the ethnic groups mentioned 
above, did not find a linkage between passive and active 
representation for Native Americans. Likewise, Hindera, in his 
study of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, did 
find linkages for African Americans and Hispanics but not for 
“Whites” (Hindera 1993a: 426). And Dennis Dresang, in a 
noteworthy study of Bemba (a large tribal group) bureaucrats in 
Zambia, also could not establish a linkage between bureaucrats’ 
ethnic identities and development expenditures.  
Dresang’s study also highlights the apparent possibility that 
ethnic groupness may fluctuate across what might be called 
“realms” of political activity. Dresang seems to have been rather 
puzzled on finding no linkage between passive and active 
representation for Bemba bureaucrats. After all, as he observed, in 
Zambia at the time, ethnicity was generally observed and 
recognized as being the politically most salient attribute: the 
country’s leaders routinely appealed to geographic constituencies 
and tended to politicize “ethnic orientations” rather than, for 
instance, class differences. Zambian political parties were also 
organized along ethnic lines. But, as Dresang observed, this high, 
presumably all-pervading salience of ethnicity in electoral politics 
turned out, quite unexpectedly, to be a poor predictor of ethnicity’s 
salience in bureaucratic decisionmaking. On the contrary, 
development expenditures did not flow disproportionately to 
provinces where the Bemba thrived but, rather, revealed a strategy 
of striving for rapid and balanced growth regardless of ethnoregional 
factors (Dresang 1974;  cf. also Thompson 1976: 220-1, n. 13).55  
                                                
55 What makes Dresang’s finding all the more intriguing is that the Bemba 
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The salience of ethnic identity may also vary across issues and 
over time. Meier and Nigro’s statistical analysis of American federal 
civil servants’ attitudes towards twelve policy areas showed that 
“race” had a “direct impact” on eight of them, implying that ethnic 
identity did not affect bureaucrats’ attitudes towards the remaining 
four (Meier and Nigro 1976). And Meier, Pennington and Eller, in a 
recent partial re-examination of active representation in the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission studied earlier by Hindera 
(Hindera 1993a; Hindera 1993b), claim that the level of 
“representational effectiveness” by black employees in the 1980s as 
documented by Hindera had “declined significantly” by the late 
1990s (Meier et al. 2005: 175-6).  
Taken together, the evidence from representative bureaucracy 
scholarship suggests that the groupness of ethnic groups, their 
ability to make their members act in the group’s interest, is not fixed 
but, rather, that it is itself a variable (cf. Hechter 1987: 8). Or, as 
Dresang summed up his Zambian findings: “Classifying people 
according to their circumstances of birth or language is [. .] not 
grouping them according to any criteria necessarily related to 
administrative behaviour or attitudes . . . . an ethnic group cannot 
rely on representation in the bureaucracy as a resource for effectively 
pursuing group interests” (Dresang 1974: 1613, 1617, emphases 
mine). 
                                                                                                                                          
effectively dominated the upper echelons of Zambian bureaucracy, that is, the very 
echelons where decisions on development expenditures were being made. The 
Bemba, constituting 31 per cent of Zambia’s population, supplied no less than 50 
per cent of the Heads of Departments, and 38 per cent of Superscale positions 
(supervisory posts, including the Heads of Departments, the equivalent and 
above) (Dresang 1974: 1611). 
 3 The Question of Untouchable 
Groupness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Problematizing untouchable groupness 
 
The theory of representative bureaucracy developed in chapter 2 
essentially postulates that two necessary conditions must be met if 
passive representation is to translate into active representation: (1) 
bureaucrats must have discretion, and (2) the groupness of 
represented groups must be high. Since discretion, as I have argued, 
is virtually inherent to bureaucratic organization, a lack of discretion 
will not usually prevent the occurrence of active representation. 
Lack of discretion also seems quite unlikely in the case of India’s 
bureaucracy. In fact, ever since the self-styled “guardians” of the 
colonial Indian Civil Service provided the “steel frame” of colonized 
India, Indian bureaucracy has almost been synonymous with 
discretion. After independence, the Indian government’s pursuit of 
planned economic development stimulated the emergence of many 
new developmental, administrative hierarchies with vast and wide-
ranging regulatory powers and discretion (Frankel 1978; Frankel 
1997; Mathur 1991: 639). “In a ‘license’ Raj [government, bvg] in 
which permits and permissions are required for virtually 
everything”, writes Rajeev Dhavan, “government servants soon 
became possessed of the kind of absolute power that corrupts 
absolutely” (Dhavan 1997: 276).  
 Bureaucratic discretion is involved both in routine 
administrative decision-making and in the policy-making process. 
From the mid-1960s onwards, politicians in Delhi and the states 
have come to heavily rely on their own “secretariats” staffed by 
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trusted bureaucrats. Placed in between the political executive and 
the regular administrative hierarchy of ministries and departments, 
these secretariats have come to function as parallel administrations, 
making them into major power centres and interest groups in their 
own right (Brecher 1966: 118; Frankel 1997: 371-2). Indian 
bureaucrats are thus powerful, enjoy high status and form, as Paul 
Brass has put it, “the leading elements of a vast dominant class” 
(Brass 1995 (1990): 57).  
 The considerable discretion invested in India’s bureaucratic 
apparatus indicates that many untouchable bureaucrats have the 
opportunity to display actively representative behaviour. Whether 
they will actually utilize their discretion to promote the interests of 
untouchable ingroup members will thus primarily depend upon the 
groupness of untouchables; upon the extent to which untouchable 
group membership is capable of commanding their loyalties and of 
making them act in fellow untouchables’ interest. 
By indicating or revealing the variable groupness of ethnic 
groups, the findings from representative bureaucracy scholarship 
discussed in the previous chapter chime in with so-called 
constructivist approaches to ethnic identity. Constructivist 
approaches, which have gained wide prominence across the 
disciplines of anthropology, sociology, political science, history and 
literature, contest primordial conceptions of ethnic groups as 
inevitably “real, substantial things-in-the-world” (Brubaker 2002: 
164). Rather than adopting a primordialist, “hard” view of ethnic 
groups as ascriptive, persisting, affective, clearly identifiable, 
immutable, firmly bounded entities inherently commanding 
considerable loyalty from their members, constructivists adopt a 
“soft” perspective (Horowitz 1998: 2). They prefer to see ethnic 
groups as constructed, contingent, malleable, unstable and 
fluctuating (Brubaker 2002; Chandra 2001a; Chandra 2001b; 
Horowitz 1998).56  
                                                
56 Note that I, following Chandra, use the label constructivist to group 
together an array of perspectives on ethnic identity alternatively also referred to 
as “situational”, “instrumentalist”, “institutionalist” or “postmodernist” 
(Chandra 2001b: 358-9, n. 1). Though their agreement on the proposition that 
groups are constructed and their ensuing challenge of primordial, “stable group 
being” conceptions of ethnicity warrants the use of a common label, 
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 Group identification and groupmaking, according to 
constructivists, are purposive activities involving the exercise of 
choice on the part of its presumed or aspiring members. Ethnic 
group identities are not necessarily transhistorical essences “thrown 
upon” group members but may equally be far more temporary 
consequences of individuals’ conscious, purposive choices to belong 
to and identify with certain groups. Rather than by a diffuse, hardly 
escapable, primordial affection, group identification may, at least to 
a considerable extent, be informed by instrumental or strategic 
considerations based on expectations or calculations of material, 
symbolic or psychic rewards.  
Constructivist accounts often emphasize the important role 
that, as Brubaker calls them, “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” may 
play in ethnic group construction. Paul Brass, for instance, views 
ethnic groups as “creations of elites, who draw upon, distort, and 
sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they 
wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or 
to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as 
for themselves” (Brass 1991: 8). By thus invoking ethnic groups, as 
Brubaker puts it, ethnopolitical entrepreneurs “seek to evoke them, 
summon them, call them into being” (Brubaker 2002: 166). 
Another insight developed by constructivists is that ethnic 
group construction not only involves self-identification, or 
“inscription”, by ingroup members but also “ascription”, that is, the 
ethnic categorization of individuals by others. A popular 
constructivist argument is, for instance, that many of the ethnic 
groups in postcolonial societies that are commonsensically assumed 
to have “traditionally” populated these societies, are actually not 
                                                                                                                                          
constructivists are otherwise a highly diverse bunch. Developed in sharply 
differing traditions of social analysis -ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, 
social network theory, cognitive theory, feminist theory, rational choice and 
game theory- constructivist work shows a wide variety of, even contradictory, 
analytical styles, methodological orientations and epistemological commitments 
(Brubaker 2002: 164-5). Also note that the constructivists’ scapegoat, 
primordialism, is not a very explicit, elaborate perspective on ethnic identity. It 
is, as again Chandra explains, “found more often as a commonsensical 
assumption informing arguments about other questions than as an explicit 
argument in itself” (Chandra 2001a: 7). 
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very traditional at all: they are often better understood as 
constructions of colonial officials who, by stimulating ethnic 
heterogeneity and interethnic animosity among colonized people, 
sought to create favourable conditions for the continuation of their 
rule (cf. e.g. Pandey 1990).  
More cognitive strands of constructivism explain ethnic 
ascription as a result of individuals’ need to make sense out of a 
complex world. Ethnic ascription is useful in this regard since ethnic 
identities are “easy to think” (Pierik 2004: 526). Ethnic ascription 
may also result from group members’ efforts at achieving “positive 
identity”. By identifying “other” ethnic groups in their environment 
and attributing unfavourable traits or lower qualities to outgroup 
members, ingroup members may try and boost or reaffirm their self-
esteem (see e.g. Abrams and Hogg 1990b; Hogg 1992: 91-2; Pérez 
and Mugny 1990: 153; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel 1982b; Tsui et al. 1992: 550). 
To constructivists, then, “ethnic identities are neither ascribed nor 
achieved: they are both. They are wedged between situational 
selection and imperatives imposed from without”(Eriksen 1997: 57).  
Constructivists, to be sure, do not rule out that ethnic groups 
may in fact display “hard” qualities and high groupness; what they 
do argue, however, is that high ethnic groupness is not an inevitable, 
natural, primordial, essentialist given. Put differently, high ethnic 
groupness, according to constructivists, is merely a potential, 
perhaps unlikely, probably temporary outcome of people’s 
identification choices.57 Just as ethnic groups may have homogenous 
preferences and fixed boundaries, they may also have heterogeneous 
                                                
57 On the basis of a close reading of constructivist approaches, Chandra 
concludes that constructivists differ considerably as to the likely stability of 
ethnic identifications. She contrasts those who argue that ethnic identities are 
constructed and reconstructed mainly through “major historical and 
institutional transformations” and who thus expect ethnic identifications to be 
stable in the short run to those “who argue that ethnic groups occupy a ‘zone of 
occult instability’ even in the short term” (Chandra 2001b: 345). She cites Nelson 
Kasfir (1979) as a representative of the latter view: “Identifying someone as a 
member of an ethnic category at a particular time and in a particular place does 
not mean that, for political purposes, he will continue to hold that identity in 
other times and at other places and other times [sic] . . . if categories are fluid, 
identity may shift dramatically not only from one category to another, but from 
ethnicity to class to religion” (ibid.).  
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preferences and porous or malleable boundaries (cf. Chandra 2001b: 
337). Whereas primordialists, to paraphrase Horowitz, tend to see 
ethnic affiliations as made of stone, constructivists prefer to see 
them as potentially made of putty (cf. Horowitz 1998: 2).58 Their 
claim of uncertain ethnic groupness also has repercussions for the 
way constructivists view “ethnic demographies”, or systems of 
ethnic group relations (Chandra 2001a: 7). Like ethnic groups, such 
systems may also be far more contingent, malleable, unstable and 
fluctuating and less immutable and rigid than commonly assumed 
in primordially inspired analyses. 
Constructivism, as a scholarly approach to ethnic identity, is 
not a peripheral or marginal enterprise. On the contrary, its central 
notion that ethnic groups are in fact constructions enjoys wide 
scholarly consensus and has now virtually become conventional 
wisdom. Very few social scientists continue to defend explicitly 
primordialist positions.59 At the same time, however, the 
constructivist consensus is, to a considerable extent, a seeming, 
cosmetic consensus. Even if theories of ethnogenesis, or the origins 
of ethnic groups, are now thoroughly infused with constructivist 
insights, most theories of the effects of ethnic group membership 
continue to assume ethnic groups as homogenous and stable entities 
and ethnic groupness as self-evidently high. “While primordialist 
assumptions have been exorcised from one part of the literature”, 
notes Chandra, “they reign unchallenged in another (Chandra 
2001b: 337-8).  
Despite its usual lip-service to constructivism much recent 
work on ethnic violence, the effects of ethnic heterogeneity and 
multiculturalism, for instance, continues to assume discrete, sharply 
differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded 
ethnic groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of 
social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis (Brubaker 
2002: 164; Chandra 2001a: 8-10).60 In theories that seek to link ethnic 
                                                
58 Brubaker suggests that ethnicity, or ethnic consciousness, may even be 
viable in the absence of actual ethnic groups, see Brubaker (2002).  
59 For a scarce exception, see for example Van Evera (2001).  
60 To illustrate the non-incorporation of constructivist findings, Chandra 
discusses recent work by Posen (1993), Fearon (1998), Kaufmann (1996) and Van 
Evera (1994) on ethnic violence, by Shvetsova (1994), Cox (1997), Easterly and 
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groups to outcomes, then, ethnic groups continue to be cast and 
treated as unitary collective actors with common purposes to which 
interests and agency can be attributed. Likewise, plural societies 
often continue to be routinely, rather than deliberately, represented 
as a “multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial or cultural 
blocs” (Brubaker 2002: 164; Chandra 2001a: 8).61 
 Representative bureaucracy scholarship, another theory of 
effects of ethnic group membership, is no exception in this regard. 
Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, representative 
bureaucracy theorists have largely continued to assume 
primordially high ethnic groupness. Though findings in line with 
the constructivist argument of variable groupness have occasionally 
been reported, these subsequently tend to be ignored. 
Representative bureaucracy scholars, like their colleagues in other 
substantive fields, have shown remarkably little enthusiasm to pick 
up on constructivist insights in subsequent empirical research or to 
incorporate them in the theory’s core. Nor have they allowed these 
insights to affect their proposed cures and policy prescriptions.  
Selden’s plausible hypothesis that Native Americans’ apparent 
low groupness might be caused by crosscutting tribal loyalties 
within the broader category of Native Americans, for instance, 
seems to have gone wholly unnoticed.62 It has not stimulated fresh 
and potentially very fruitful research, as suggested by Selden, on the 
effects of “intraminority group differences” for active representation 
(Selden 1997b: 37). Dresang’s proposition, following his observation 
                                                                                                                                          
Levine (1997), Collier (1998) and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) on the effects 
of ethnic heterogeneity, and by Kymlicka (1995) on multiculturalism (Chandra 
2001a: 8-10). 
61 The tendency to see ethnicity and ethnic demography in such 
“groupist” terms is, as Brubaker notes, not restricted to scholarship on ethnicity. 
Though specially prevalent in the study of ethnicity, race and nationalism, 
groupism also continues to pervade the study of “gender, sexuality, age, class, 
abledness, religion, minority status, and any kind of ‘culture’, as well as 
putative groups based on combinations of these categorical attributes” 
(Brubaker 2002: 164). The exception proving the rule is probably the study of 
the working class, “a term”, says Brubaker, “that is hard to use today without 
quotation marks or some other distancing device” (Brubaker 2002: 165). 
62 Specifically, she wonders whether “Cherokee civil servants actively 
represent the interests of Comanche tribal members?” (Selden 1997b: 37). 
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of non-occurrence of active representation for Zambia’s Bemba, that 
careerist ambitions may play havoc with ethnically identified 
bureaucrats’ inclinations for active representation in otherwise very 
ethnitized contexts has met with a similar fate (Dresang 1974: 1615). 
Apparently undisturbed by constructivist-type findings of variable 
and low groupness, representative bureaucracy scholars (including, 
intriguingly, Selden) continue to indiscriminately defend and 
advocate ethnic group recognition and affirmative action measures 
on the grounds that they “may lead to different allocations of 
resources to minorities”, even if their own research indicates that 
they may full well not due to apparently low groupness of 
bureaucratically represented groups (Selden 1997b: 36).63 
 Evidently, the non-incorporation of constructivist insights –
whether unwitting or deliberate- can do great harm: it is bound to 
negatively affect the predictive power of our theories and the 
effectiveness of the cures and prescriptions distilled from them.64 
                                                
63 There are probably a number of reasons why the incorporation of 
constructivist insights in various substantive fields has not progressed at the 
fast rate that the scholarly constructivist consensus would lead one to expect. 
Incorporation, first of all, is made difficult by the fact that constructivist insights 
and findings have not so far been codified. There are no authoritative, 
paradigmatic texts spelling out “the” cumulative constructivist findings. “In the 
absence of such a codification, new entrants in this subfield are required each 
time to reinvent the wheel, and it is not surprising that many have ended up 
resorting to more primitive modes of transport” (Chandra 2001a: 11). Secondly, 
scholars employing quantitative methods may be less than enthusiastic about 
incorporating constructivist insights because of the modelling-difficulties they 
create. Group stability, after all, is easier to model than group instability 
(Chandra 2001b: 345). Thirdly, constructivist insights may not be welcomed by 
scholars who have made careers out of studies that take ethnic groups as their 
basic units of analyses. Welcoming constructivism, so they may fear, might 
imply saying goodbye to their basic units. Finally, constructivism may be 
construed by some as incompatible with their political beliefs. Some 
representative bureaucracy scholars, for instance, testify to a concern for the 
plight of minority –racial, ethnic and gender- groups and, accordingly, openly 
advocate special measures such as affirmative action for them. Constructivist 
findings of low minority groupness are probably not very popular among them, 
since these may be felt to question the validity, that is, the expected 
effectiveness, of such measures. 
64 I concur with Nelson Kasfir that “imposing false concreteness on the 
boundaries of ethnic solidarity” may produce “a generous measure of 
unreality” (cited in Chandra 2001b: 345). 
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Therefore, to avoid such dangers, in this chapter I will make an 
explicit attempt to problematize the groupness of the group under 
study, India’s untouchables. Drawing from the literature on caste 
and untouchability and from the wider social science literature, in 
this chapter I will discuss some potential implications of 
untouchability, or untouchable group membership, for the 
groupness of untouchables.  
In doing so, I will steer a middle course between narrowly 
primordialist and extreme constructivist positions. Thus, I will 
assume that ethnic groups such as India’s untouchables may indeed 
be fruitfully seen as groups, not -as the extreme constructivist 
position would have it- as merely cognitive figments of people’s 
constructive imaginations. In line with the findings from the 
literature on representative bureaucracy discussed in the previous 
chapter, I will also assume that ethnic groups, as compared to other 
kinds of groups, may command relatively strong loyalties from their 
members, that is, generally tend towards high groupness. At the 
same time, I explicitly allow for the possibility that untouchable 
groupness may vary over time and according to context. In line with 
constructivist insights and with the largely implicit evidence 
supplied by some representative bureaucracy scholars, I also make a 
deliberate effort to conceptualize ethnic and untouchable group 
identification as a purposive activity involving the exercise of 
choice.  
 
 
2 Caste and untouchability 
 
Until now I have treated caste as if it were simply one of the various 
criteria –like language or race- that ethnic groups may use to 
determine whether or not some individual qualifies as a member. 
Castes, however, represent a special type of ethnic group since they 
both resemble and differ from most ethnic groups in potentially 
important respects. Untouchables, in turn, are a very special kind of 
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caste since they possess an attribute –untouchability- typically 
lacking in other castes and ethnic groups.65 
 The word “caste” is derived from the Portuguese word castas, 
used by Portuguese seafarers trading on India’s west coast in the 
16th and 17th centuries to describe the various groups of Indians they 
encountered. Caste is a translation of two quite different indigenous 
concepts, varna and jati. When caste is used as a translation of jati, it 
refers to endogamous kin groups with a traditional occupation, their 
own particular name, and a hereditary membership. Indian 
individuals thus cannot choose their jati; they are born into it and 
remain a member of their named jati throughout life. The basic 
sense of jati is that of a group of people who are in some 
fundamental way alike because of their common origins, and 
fundamentally different from people who do not share these origins 
and therefore must belong to another jati (Quigley 1993: 4).  
Beyond this basic sense, jati is an extremely relative and elastic 
concept. Depending on context, jati may refer to a more or less 
inclusive group. While in one context it refers to people’s lineage, in 
another it may refer to all the lineages with whom they can 
intermarry (Quigley 1993: 5). Jati identity thus follows the 
segmentary principle. In its most localized sense, people use jati to 
refer to small endogamous groups of people, seldom numbering 
more than a few thousand, with the same name, spread over a few 
adjacent villages. On a regional scale, jatis are clusters of local jatis, 
while in the context of a state or the nation, jatis are clusters of 
regional clusters of local jatis (De Zwart 2000: 236). The 1086 
untouchable “castes” that the Indian government has singled out for 
preferential treatment, for instance, are mostly regional jati clusters, 
while a few are state-wide caste clusters. Though to outside 
observers the boundaries of jatis may seem fluid, for insiders they 
                                                
65 Untouchability, as a code of restrictive and prescriptive behaviour 
pertaining to contact with or presence of polluted outcastes or things associated 
with them is not unique to Indian castes, however. Untouchable pariah groups 
associated with dirt, death, and blood can also be found elsewhere in Asia. 
Examples are the Eta or Burakumin in Japan, the Ragyappa in Tibet, and the 
Paekchong in Korea (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1966). What sets Indian 
untouchability apart from these other manifestations are its scale, complexity 
and the elaborateness of its protective codes. 
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are clearly defined; from the context in which the term is used, 
anyone can usually infer who is, in fact, an ingroup member and 
who is not. This contextual variability of group boundaries is far 
from typical for castes. Ethnic group identity also frequently 
follows, as I pointed out in chapter 2, the segmentary principle.  
What castes and ethnic groups also have in common is that 
both are extended kin groups. Kinship ties extend from one’s family 
to localized lineages (families close to one in patrilineal descent and 
in residence), through to wider groupings such as the clan (or gotra) 
and the members of one’s jati (Mandelbaum 1995: 134-5). 
Idealtypically, in the world of caste all of life’s major and minor 
decisions –whom to marry, what one does for a living, where one 
lives, what one eats and who with, which forms of address one 
employs for different categories of people- are regulated by kin 
(Quigley 1993: 87). Since a person’s jati encompasses all his kin –“its 
limits are the limits of his kinship relations”- kinship ties both 
characterize and bound the jati (Mandelbaum 1995: 158). 
In India’s villages -where almost three-quarters of Indians 
live- jati-members typically form one’s set of actual or potential kin. 
They are instrumental in melding one’s career and define the range 
of one’s kinsmen and closest companions. Though villagers also 
interact with people from other jatis and even develop friendships 
and close relations with them, these relations are very seldom so 
close, deep, and unquestioned as the ones entertained with fellow 
jati members (Mandelbaum 1995: 43). A person’s closest ties -those 
of marriage and kinship- are restricted to members of his jati, so that 
“his life and aspirations are intertwined with theirs” (Mandelbaum 
1995: 15). 
Like other ethnically plural societies, Indian society is thus 
divided into different kin groups, called castes. This similarity of 
ethnicity and caste suggests that caste-identified bureaucrats –like 
other ethnically identified bureaucrats- may also experience strong 
group-ties and will feel inclined to become their castes’ active 
representatives. Castes, however, also differ from most other ethnic 
groups in a possibly significant respect. What sets Indian caste 
society apart from most other ethnically plural societies is that it is 
not merely divided into different castes but that the relations between 
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the various castes –that is, the caste system- are furthermore 
governed by hierarchy. While separated, Indian castes at the same 
time constitute a hierarchy of groups, ranked as relatively superior or 
inferior to one another.  
The most influential theory to account for these twin features 
of the caste system is Louis Dumont’s who has claimed that there is 
one “single true principle” which informs both separation and 
hierarchy and provides its invariable structuring basis. This 
principle is “the opposition of the pure and the impure”. It is the 
application of this principle, says Dumont, which both legitimizes the 
hierarchy of castes, “which is the superiority of the pure to the 
impure”, as well as explains their separation –since “the pure and the 
impure must be kept separate” (Dumont 1998 (1970): 43; Quigley 
1993).  
 The relative purity and impurity of castes arises from their 
traditional occupations and stick to castes as a whole. All members 
of a jati thus share its rank in the hierarchy, regardless of whether 
they perform its traditional occupation (De Zwart 2000: 236). Most 
impure and polluting are those castes whose traditional occupations 
involve specialization in tasks connected with death and bodily 
emissions. Traditional occupations such as skinning animal 
carcasses, tanning leather, making shoes, playing in musical bands 
(especially on leather drums), butchery of animals, removal of 
human waste, attendance at cremation grounds, and washing 
clothes, result in the attribution of “a massive and permanent 
impurity” (Dumont 1998 (1970): 47; Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998). 
Since their traditional occupations are associated with such 
permanent impurity, the untouchable castes rank lowest in the 
hierarchy.  
 In order to justify the grading of jatis in terms of ritual purity, 
Indians often refer to a model developed in the ancient Hindu 
scriptures of the subcontinent such as the Vedas (1500-1000 BC) and 
the Manavadharmashastra (first century AD). This model provides the 
second indigenous concept, varna (which literally means colour), 
that the term caste may refer to. The classical varna model is a 
binary scheme based on the following principles. “Human beings 
are either within the society or outside it; if they are within society 
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they are either superior persons (twice-born)66 or ordinary persons; 
if they are twice-born they are either holy men (Brahmins) or secular 
men; if they are twice-born secular men they are either princes or 
merchants” (Leach 1968: 10-11).  
This ancient varna model thus provides the familiar five-
layered idealized hierarchy of Brahmins (priests and scholars), 
Kshatriya (rulers and soldiers), Vaishya (traders and merchants), 
Shudra (agriculturalists and artisans) and polluted outsiders, or 
avarna (castes outside the varna system; the untouchables). It is from 
this varna model, that the distinction between outcaste (avarna) 
untouchables and caste (savarna) Hindus is derived.67 Since the 
varna model represents an ideological, idealized hierarchy, the 
model’s five categories are not groups in the way birth-ascribed jatis 
are. Nevertheless, many Hindus accept the varna categories as the 
primordial makeup of their society and the idea that “the world is 
actually made up of units called jati any one of which can, in theory, 
be slotted into one of the more embracing varna categories, or into 
the residual category of untouchables” (Quigley 1993: 7). As a result, 
the varna scheme is still widely used to explain a particular jati’s 
structural position in the hierarchy of intrinsic purity and as a 
handy gross classification of others (De Zwart 2000: 236; Leach 1968: 
11; Mandelbaum 1995: 22). 
Untouchables are assigned the lowest positions in the caste 
hierarchy. Over the centuries Hindu society devised an elaborate 
system of prohibitions, prescriptions and sanctions to ensure that 
they stayed there, were kept at a proper distance and constantly 
reminded of their lowness. Practically everywhere in “traditional” 
Hindu society untouchables were not allowed to draw water from 
                                                
 66 Twice-born persons are persons who, according to Hindu precepts, are 
entitled to a second birth at the end of their lives. 
67 Interestingly, the original varna model represented by the Vedas had 
only four varnas; the untouchables had no place in it at all. The initial absence of 
the untouchables from the varna scheme may have been due to the later 
emergence of untouchability as a social condition: untouchability is sometimes 
thought to have sprung into existence in the second century AD, a thousand years 
after the establishment of the varna principle (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 5-
6). The traditional literature, in any case, discusses the untouchables in far less 
detail than the Brahmins, unsurprisingly perhaps, since it was Brahmins who 
authored it (cf. Béteille 1977: 38).  
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the main village wells, nor to enter high-caste temples.68 Their use of 
various other public facilities such as roads, marketplaces, schools 
and tea shops was prohibited or, at any rate, severely limited.69 In 
some areas, the distances that untouchables had to keep between 
themselves and higher castes were precisely laid down. In rural 
India, untouchables lived in their own quarters –most of them still 
do-, ideally situated at some distance from the other castes in the 
main settlement.  
In certain places untouchables could not own land, at least not 
permanently, and it was very common for artisans and other 
specialists, such as barbers, washermen, carpenters and blacksmiths, 
to refuse their services to them. Caste Hindus could not accept 
cooked food and water from untouchables, nor share meals with 
them.70 Untouchables publicly emphasized their lowliness by 
submissive acts and deferential behaviour: lowering of eyes and 
voices, touching the feet of high castes, asking questions beggingly, 
using disproportionally honorific forms of address to high castes 
                                                
 68 Scholars -misguidedly taking, perhaps, Brahmin informants’ normative 
accounts for empirical manifestations- for a long time assumed that the caste 
system as a rigid hierarchy based on ritual purity had existed almost since time 
immemorial in India, hence the term “traditional” to describe it. Contemporary 
historians, however, tend to dismiss the notion of the caste system as “something 
ancient” surviving in “traditional” villages. Some argue that the traditional caste 
system as we know it may only have started taking on its familiar shape from the 
early nineteenth century onwards. “Traditional” caste society may not be so very 
traditional, that is very old, after all (Fuller 1997b: 4-6).  
69 Untouchable road use was a particularly disabled affair. Sometimes it 
was simply forbidden. In some places untouchables could only use the road if 
no one else was in sight. Elsewhere, high caste people would warn 
untouchables of their approach by shouting, so as to enable them to disappear 
out of sight. In other places it was the untouchables who had to do the 
shouting. In some areas in west India untouchables, to avoid polluting the road, 
had to carry brooms or thorny bushes to brush away their footprints in the dirt 
behind them as they passed. There were also places where untouchables were 
made to carry little pots around their necks to keep the ground reserved for 
pure, caste Hindu spittle only (Deliège 1999; Isaacs 1965). 
70 The caste hierarchy is also a dietary hierarchy: notions of purity also 
apply to food which, therefore, too is ranked: vegetarianism ranks highest, 
followed by eggs, fish, chicken, mutton, pork, beef and, last of all, carrion. 
Untouchables eat beef and carrion and, if only for this reason, higher castes 
could not share meals with them (cf. Deliège 1999: 104). 
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and of contemptuous forms for self-reference (“my monkeys”, for 
instance, for one’s children). Untouchable women sometimes could 
not wear ornaments or finery. Untouchables often could not use or 
enjoy status symbols such as umbrellas, shoes, sunglasses, or horse-
rides and music at weddings (Deliège 1999: 89-115; Isaacs 1965: 27-
8).71  
If compliance with these prescriptions and proscriptions was 
not voluntarily forthcoming, there was no shortage of sanctions. The 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) 
Act contains a catalogue of such sanctions -called “atrocities” in the 
Act: forcing untouchables to drink or eat inedible or obnoxious 
substances; dumping excreta, waste matter, or carcasses in their 
premises or neighbourhood; forcibly removing their clothes, 
parading them naked or with painted face or body; occupying or 
cultivating land owned by untouchables or dispossessing them from 
it; exacting begar (unpaid labour); sexual abuse of untouchable 
women; and fouling untouchables’ drinking water (Government of 
India 1989: 3-4). Torture and house-burning were also popular 
(Deliège 1999: 113).72 
                                                
 71 It is obvious that high castes’ concern for maintaining ritual purity 
cannot explain all of the above disabilities: some of them were patently secular 
(the prohibition to wear sunglasses, for instance), intended, as it seems, more to 
remind untouchables of their inferior, rather than their impure, status (cf. Deliège 
1999). 
 72 Since its adoption in 1989, the Prevention of Atrocities Act, has 
attracted steady litigation. These figures, collected by the Commission for 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, suggest that atrocities like murder, 
grievous hurt, rape and arson, have far from disappeared. Besides, in 1996 more 
than 83.000 court cases under the Act were still pending. 
 
Offences Committed under the Untouchability (Prevention of Atrocities) 
Act (1989), 1992-96 
Type of offence 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Murder 343 293 391 380 409 
Grievous hurt 760 796 965 1011 887 
Rape 264 288 406 348 363 
Arson 274 307 412 380 351 
Other cases 6167 3276 4357 5075 3929 
Source: Fourth Report of the Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes, 1996-1997 and 1998-1999, Volume II, 24: Uttar Pradesh 
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Unsurprisingly, extreme poverty and powerlessness were an 
integral part of the untouchable condition. Differential ritual status 
translated into differential access to the good and valued things in 
life such as land, well-paid jobs, political and administrative office, 
good and enough food, shelter, medical care, education, justice, 
esteem, and pleasure (Berreman 1979: 75). To this day, Indian caste –
both “high” and “low”- still has a profound effect on individuals’ 
opportunities in terms of education, occupation, residence, and 
social interaction (Jenkins 2003: 13). Consequently, untouchability, 
as a group attribute, continues to be powerfully associated with 
cumulative deprivation.73 
 
 
3 From untouchable to ethnic minority 
 
Whereas the above, rather formal, account of caste and 
untouchability may illustrate where the untouchables have tended 
to find themselves in the larger scheme of things –the bottom, that 
is-, it tells us nothing about untouchables as a group: about how they 
tend to relate to each other, for instance, or how they try to cope 
with their peculiar situation. As a consequence, we learn little about 
the groupness of untouchables.  
 Though illuminating, the ethnographic literature on Indian 
untouchability does not provide a clear-cut picture or agreed upon 
model of untouchables as a group. Based on a close reading of the 
untouchability literature Michael Moffatt, in an influential 
contribution, identified three such models (Moffatt 1979: 9-31). The 
three models are all preoccupied with the question of cultural and 
ideological differences between high and untouchable castes. 
Knowledge of such differences is important because real or 
perceived outgroup differences are the flip side of ingroup 
similarities which, as we have seen, produce groupness. Put 
differently, ingroup favouritism, solidarity and interpersonal 
                                                
73 The term is T.K. Oommen’s (quoted in Deliège 1999: 7). 
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loyalties will only develop when ingroup members perceive other 
groups as present in their environment (cf. Tajfel 1978: 10).74  
What Moffatt calls the outcast model portrays the untouchables 
as a people with a distinct culture. This culture primarily 
distinguishes itself from that of higher castes by its looser and freer 
approach to life. Unlike high castes, untouchables do not favour 
“ascetic control” of sexuality in marital relationships and, again 
unlike high castes, they put little emphasis on “otherworldliness” 
and on the fate of the soul after death. Engaged, as most of them are, 
in the practical business of earning a living through manual labour, 
untouchables care more for health and prosperity in this life. 
Untouchables are not only different from caste Hindus, they also 
fundamentally disagree with them. They do not rise to the bait of 
high caste religious mystifications and purity notions that purport to 
legitimize the caste system. Untouchables, in fact, plainly take the 
caste system for what it, essentially and actually, is -a system of 
oppression- and actively resent finding themselves at its bottom. If 
they, nevertheless, act in accordance with its codes and etiquette, it 
is only because they are forced to so act. 
The diversity model also stresses the contrasts between 
untouchables and high castes but does not picture the untouchables 
as outrightly rejecting high-caste culture. Instead, it discerns a 
tendency on the part of untouchables to selectively adapt that high 
caste culture to suit their own needs or interests. A good example is 
the refusal of some untouchables to apply the Hindu doctrine of 
karma to their own lowly status.75 Such refusal is useful to them 
since it enables them to avoid the psychological anxiety of having to 
admit that they deserve their untouchable status as a consequence of 
unusually wicked acts in past rebirths. 
                                                
74 The socio-psychological connection between inter-group comparisons 
and ingroup favouritism receives detailed elaboration in the work of social 
identity theorists like Tajfel, Abrams and Hogg (see e.g. Abrams and Hogg 
1990b; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel 1982b). 
75 The karma doctrine is closely linked with two other doctrines; those of 
dharma and transmigration. Taken together, these doctrines postulate that one’s 
caste status in a given birth is the result of the total score of one’s good or bad 
karma, or “action”, in accord with one’s dharma, or “duty”, as circumscribed by 
one’s membership in a given caste (Moffatt 1979: 15-6). 
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Moffatt’s unity model draws substantially from Dumont’s 
theory of caste which, as I wrote earlier, sees the caste system as a 
continuously graded status order expressed in a cultural code of 
relative purity and impurity. According to Dumont, the extremes of 
this order -the pure Brahmins at its top and the permanently 
polluted untouchables at its bottom- constitute a complementarity: 
both unequally ranked parts are equally necessary to complete the 
“whole”, or unity, of the caste system, since it is only because the 
untouchables take care of executing the impure tasks that the 
Brahmins can maintain their purity. Given the vital role played by 
them, untouchables are at the very core of the Hindu caste system, 
rather than –as the outcaste, varna model has it- outside it.  
The unity model thus posits that the untouchables are a 
regular and essential part of the caste system and share in its 
common culture and ideology. They do not, as the outcaste and 
diversity models stress, constitute a category of their own: they are 
not “outcastes” with a separate subculture or their own particular 
“view from the bottom”. On the contrary, even though they appear 
to benefit the least from it, untouchables are in fundamental 
consensus with the caste system and “possess and act upon a thickly 
textured culture whose fundamental definitions and values are 
identical to those of more global Indian village culture” (Moffatt 
1979: 3).76 
Evidently, the three models suggest different levels of 
untouchable groupness, decreasing progressively from the first to 
the third model. The untouchables of the outcast model –bearers of a 
                                                
 76 Moffatt’s own ethnography of untouchables in a village in the South 
Indian state Tamil Nadu is an impressive, systematic empirical adstruction of this 
unity model. For Moffatt, however, the “fundamental cultural consensus” of 
untouchables is not so much borne out by their complementarity, as well as by 
their tendency to replicate “the entire set of institutions and of ranked relations 
from which they have been excluded by the higher castes by reason of their 
extreme lowness”. Such “replication is a stronger indicator of cultural consensus 
than complementarity”, explains Moffatt, “since it operates within the 
Untouchable subset of castes, where the power of the higher castes does not 
directly operate” (Moffatt 1979: 5). In other words, if untouchables replicate or 
mimic the caste system among themselves, even when they are not forced to do so 
by those higher up, they must be agreeing with the ideology and practices of the 
latter.  
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culture of their own (albeit a repressed one) which sharply differs 
from and is opposed to the culture of other, higher castes- almost 
sound like an ethnic group, with the ensuing expectations of high 
groupness. The untouchables of the unity model, on the other hand, 
are culturally and ideologically indistinguishable from other castes. 
Even if they are rather unluckily fated to occupy the bottom of 
society, they hardly, if at all, constitute a group. The question of 
their groupness therefore does not even arise.  
When it comes to groupness, difference is not everything, 
however. For their groupness to be high, groups also need to be 
relatively powerful, that is, capable of inducing their members to 
promote the group’s interests in the face of outgroup efforts to 
prevent them from doing so. Though Moffatt’s three models differ 
in the way they depict untouchables’ valuation of group power, they 
do agree on the fact that untouchables, more than any other 
category of castes, lack the power to act as a group and to pursue 
their own interests, if they wanted to.77 Even if they actively resent 
their lowly status they cannot usually act accordingly because more 
powerful high castes can rather easily force them to act in their 
interests, if need be through the deployment of the symbolic, 
economic and physical sanctions discussed above. 
Moffatt’s models, however suggestive, probably have a rather 
limited utility in predicting the groupness of untouchables in 
contemporary India. In spite of their substantive differences, these 
models suffer from a rather static, timeless and abstract –
idealtypical- conception of caste and untouchability; a conception 
hardly warranted by the changes in caste and untouchability that 
have reportedly occurred since the ethnographic studies from which 
Moffatt drew were carried out in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  
Perhaps most conspicuous has been the rapid severing of the 
link between caste and hereditary, traditional occupation (Karanth 
1996: 91-2). That occupation is no longer a reliable indicator of a 
                                                
77 Note that to unity model-untouchables, the question of group power is 
irrelevant: they accept their low status as justified, see themselves as regular, 
though specific, parts of the wider unitary culture of Hinduism. They feel no 
need to accentuate their fundamental difference from other, higher castes and, 
therefore, do not require power to be able to do so.  
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person’s caste is conveniently illustrated by the subject of this book -
the untouchable bureaucracy- which used to be a contradictio in 
terminis. Students of Indian society also report a distinctive waning 
of the importance of the purity principle in regulating caste and 
inter-caste behaviour. Commensality rules, for example, seem to 
have lost quite a bit of their prescriptive power, even in the rural 
villages, where they were, until a few decades ago, rather strictly 
respected. Upper castes are becoming less and less particular about 
from whom they accept food and water, and with whom they 
consume it, especially so in contexts and places where interdining is 
difficult to avoid, such as in restaurants and at public functions (see 
e.g. Mayer 1997). Also, traditionally vegetarian castes have now 
begun to eat non-vegetarian food and consume alcoholic beverages -
culinary practices traditionally associated with low caste or 
untouchable status- even if they do not want to be seen doing so 
(Karanth 1996: 97-8). 
This ongoing relaxation of purity notions has drastically 
affected the untouchables. The enforcement of ritual barriers to the 
use of public facilities and goods such as roads, schools, temples, 
restaurants, buses, trains and proper clothing has considerably 
slackened to the extent that today, as Deliège claims, ritual 
untouchability is largely a problem of the past: untouchables can no 
longer be considered as “untouchable” in the strict sense of the 
term. Though caste discrimination and the stigma associated with 
untouchable status have far from fully disappeared, notions of ritual 
pollution do no longer play a major, or decisive, role in keeping 
untouchables at the bottom of society (Deliège 2002).  
The decreasing importance of notions of purity and pollution 
in regulating social life and keeping every caste at its proper level in 
the hierarchy is also reflected in the apparent delegitimization of 
caste inequality -the purity principle’s inevitable concomitant- in 
public and political discourse. “Today”, says Béteille, “anyone who 
speaks against equality in public is bound to lose his audience” 
(Béteille (1991: 206), cited in Fuller 1997b: 13). The very use of the 
terms caste or jati, with their inherent reference to caste inequalities, 
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is increasingly avoided to the benefit of terms as “community” or 
samaj that suggest equality of castes (Fuller 1997b: 13-14).78 
 The waning of the purity principle as a practical guideline for 
day-to-day behaviour and as a normative principle for the 
hierarchical ordering of society and its constituent groups has not 
necessarily lessened the importance of caste, however. While purity-
driven hierarchy is becoming less important as a characteristic 
attribute of contemporary Indian caste, caste division, quite 
prominently in the form of endogamy, continues. Caste members no 
longer tend to justify such division by their need to comply with the 
purity principle, but, increasingly, by claiming that the dietary 
customs and ways of life of their caste are distinctive and expressive 
of cultural differences, differences that should not be mismatched by 
mixing them up with those of other, quite different castes. 
Membership in a particular caste is, thus, increasingly functioning 
as a marker of separation, rather than as an index of hierarchical rank 
(Fuller 1997b: 12). 
 Louis Dumont predicted this tendency of the substance of 
caste-membership to become gradually more important than its 
rank in the ritual hierarchy. He referred to this yielding of structure 
to substance, whereby each caste becomes like a collective 
individual with its own distinctive culture and way of life, as 
substantialisation. The logical outcome of such a process, thought 
Dumont, would be “a universe of impenetrable blocks, self 
sufficient, essentially identical and in competition with one another” 
(Dumont 1998 (1970)). 
 As far as caste competition is concerned, Dumont’s prediction 
has certainly been proven right. In the past fifteen years such 
competition between divided, opposed castes has received a 
particularly strong impetus from central and state governments’ 
recurrent granting of reservations to a swelling collection of castes. 
                                                
 78 This weakening concern for maintaining ritual purity is not absolute, 
however. Residential segregation of untouchables in rural and, to a lesser 
extent, urban India is, for example, still the norm (Mallick 1998). And the use of 
a casteless idiom in the public sphere may sometimes be taken as a euphemistic, 
coded way of justifying caste inequality rather than as a condemnation of it 
(Fuller 1997b: 13-14). Not being able to say what you mean does not mean that 
you don’t mean what you cannot say.  
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This caste competition is most easily described as involving three 
caste “blocks”: the “high” castes -comprising of the upper three, 
“twice-born” varnas-, the “backward” castes –roughly 
encompassing the jatis in the lower, but touchable, shudra varna-, 
and the untouchables.79 Reservations have not only pitted high 
castes -typically not among reservations’ beneficiaries- against 
beneficiary lower castes, but also, and increasingly, backward castes 
against untouchables. Untouchables, who enjoy a relatively 
generous package of reservations in comparison to other preferred 
categories, have not escaped the jealous resentment and, at times, 
violent antagonism of backward –but often equally poor- backward 
castes (Deliège 2002). 
 Besides, quota competition has sponsored the accentuation of 
intra-block distinctions. In Uttar Pradesh, for instance, subsections 
of backward castes have successfully claimed official recognition -as 
most backward classes (MBCs)- and separate quotas. In a number of 
states –Andhra Pradesh, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh- such ingroup 
differentiation is also evident within the untouchable category, 
where it typically involves relatively small, newly organized, 
untouchable castes mobilizing their members against one or a few 
numerous and leading untouchable castes who, they claim, swallow 
all or disproportionate shares of reserved benefits (Charsley 1996). 
 The implications of the above changes in inter- and intra-caste 
relations for the groupness of untouchables seem rather ambiguous. 
On the one hand, the disappearing link between caste and 
(polluting) occupation and the waning of purity notions are eroding 
the very attribute –untouchability- that traditionally distinguished 
the untouchables from other castes and set them apart from the rest 
of the population. The competition for valued resources and a share 
in political power, and the need to safeguard existing reserved 
benefits from quota-hungry outgroups, on the other hand, continue 
to provide untouchables with strong incentives to –publicly and 
                                                
 79 Note that Indian politicians, government agencies and media do not, as I 
do here, refer to these blocks in terms of their caste membership; they use official 
euphemisms such as “general category” (upper castes), “other backward classes” 
(shudras), “most backward classe” (lower shudra castes) and the familiar SC 
(scheduled castes; untouchables).  
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politically- cultivate their separateness, difference, and identification 
with untouchability. On the other hand, these tendencies toward 
“varna-level” salience of untouchability are, again, counteracted by 
intra-varna, inter-jati differentiation. Traditional, and persisting, 
endogamous divisions between untouchable jatis, are reinforced or 
supplemented by new divisions as a result of the competition for 
valued resources and preferential benefits (cf. Charsley 1996: 16-17).  
What does seem clear, however, is that, irrespective of the 
precise level of untouchable group salience –jati or varna-, 
untouchables are increasingly able to pursue their own interests. As 
testified by their involvement in “horizontal” caste competition, 
untouchables have stopped being, as a matter of course, the 
subordinated and powerless category they used to be. Though they 
remain overwhelmingly poor, untouchables are succeeding in 
carving out more than a modicum of political power for themselves. 
This new reality of untouchable power is, perhaps, best illustrated 
by the ascendancy of the “untouchable” party BSP. In the 1990s, this 
party, even if for two brief periods, effectively controlled the state 
government and provided the Chief Minister in Uttar Pradesh -my 
fieldwork state- where upper caste Brahmins and Thakurs have 
traditionally dominated politics and the bureaucracy.80 
 One might argue that castes are gradually beginning to 
resemble ethnic groups in, what Horowitz refers to as, unranked 
systems of group relations: they are separate –because different- 
while, unlike before, the question of group superiority is no longer 
settled, neither ideologically, nor empirically. Hence, to refer to 
caste as a ranked, interdependent “system” of group relations 
characterized by fixed and rigid rules and roles and by inevitably 
                                                
 80 Though the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party, or “party of the common people”) 
has been most influential in Uttar Pradesh –where it controlled the state 
government in 1995, 1997, 2002-3 and is also  currently (2007) in control- it has also 
gained influence in other states, like Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab, Rajasthan, 
Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka. The 
BSP is now, avowedly, India’s third-biggest national party. Initially casting itself 
as an exclusively “dalit”, or untouchable, party, its leadership is now increasingly 
targeting all Indian minorities –Muslims, tribals and backward castes- even 
fielding upper caste candidates. The party’s two charismatic leaders Mayawati 
and Kanshi Ram († 2006), however, are untouchables.  
3 The question of untouchable groupness 91
differential distributions of power, status, mobility opportunities, 
and access to valued resources is increasingly inappropriate (see 
Karanth 1996: 106). One consequence of this system-conversion is 
that untouchables can no longer realistically be seen as an actively 
rejected pariah group (cf. Barth 1996 (1969)); their present status has 
begun to become akin to that of a “normal” minority group: 
comparatively backward, subordinated and held in rather low 
esteem by other castes, but no longer so by definition or principle. 
 
 
4 Active representation and ethnic minority elites  
 
Horowitz’s distinction between ranked and unranked systems 
suggests a last complex of potential implications of untouchable 
identity for contemporary untouchable groupness. Horowitz’s 
distinction rests upon the coincidence or noncoincidence of social 
class with ethnic origins. “Where the two coincide, it is possible to 
speak of ranked ethnic groups; where groups are cross-class, it is 
possible to speak of unranked ethnic groups” (Horowitz 2000: 22). In 
other words, whereas in ranked systems stratification is 
synonymous with ethnic membership and mobility opportunities 
are restricted by group identity, in unranked systems parallel ethnic 
groups coexist, each group internally stratified (ibid.: 23).81 One of 
the accompaniments of the ongoing, gradual shift in Indian caste 
society from a traditional, almost perfectly idealtypical, ranked caste 
system to a substantialized, unranked system composed of different, 
mutually opposed blocks of sociologically close jatis is that, today, 
the traditional ritual rank of castes no longer fully predicts the class 
of its members.82 Put differently, class stratification is becoming 
increasingly evident among the untouchables. 
                                                
 81 Needless to say that Horowitz intends these systems as idealtypes: in 
the real world, boundaries between them are often blurred. Apart from the 
traditional caste system, other examples of ranked systems are relations 
between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, between Burakumin and other members of 
Japanese society, between Rodiya and other Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, and 
between the Osu and other Ibo in Nigeria (cf. Horowitz 2000: 22-3). Most 
systems of group relations, however, are unranked.  
 82 Even in its “traditional” guise, the caste system did allow for mobility 
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 In India, government jobs are relatively scarce, secure, well-
paid and often involve substantial perks and privileges (Hasan 1998: 
50). Since, at the same time, the availability of well-paid 
employment in the private sector has historically been extremely 
restricted, Indian bureaucrats, almost by definition, find themselves 
in the highest class strata.83 Untouchable bureaucrats are, therefore, 
not simply upwardly mobile, they, in fact, form the most significant 
segment of a tiny but growing untouchable elite. Since it is these 
very elite, untouchable bureaucrats who representative bureaucracy 
theory expects to become active representatives, the question of 
untouchable identity’s salience to them becomes a pre-eminent one. 
Put more abstractly, are there reasons to expect that ingroup class 
stratification might differentially affect the salience of ethnic 
minority identity to its members? 
 As far as I am aware, this question is seldom or never 
approached head-on in the literature. Nevertheless, two broad but 
                                                                                                                                          
and there are historical examples of low castes who attempted (and managed) to 
escape their ritually determined rank and, hence, class. Such attempts often 
involved what the Indian sociologist M.N. Srinivas has called “sanskritization”, or 
the adoption of ritually informed high caste practices, such as the observance of 
pollution for a certain number of days at birth, death, menstruation, the birth of a 
calf, the death of a cow; seeking the services of high caste priests to perform 
purificatory rites; the adoption of vegetarianism; wearing of the sacred threat 
(common among twice-born Hindus) and abstention from widow remarriage. For 
untouchables, the first step towards social mobility through sankritization, was 
usually the refusal to continue carrying out their traditional polluting duties –
moving dead cattle, playing funeral drums, clearing away night soil- and to give 
up on other marks of pollution, such as eating carrion (Srinivas 1959: 3-4). 
Colonialism presented low castes with alternative routes to improve their status 
and position. The decennial colonial census, introduced in the late nineteenth 
century, recurrently offered opportunities to low castes for officially claiming and, 
sometimes, getting higher status. Some untouchables became domestic servants of 
European families, others –though their numbers were few- secured employment 
in the colonial police force or the army (Deliège 2002: 8). It was also the British 
who first introduced reservations for low castes, including untouchables (then 
referred to as “depressed classes”), in political institutions and in the civil service. 
83 This explains why Indians are, as Mendelsohn and Vicziany put it, 
“obsessed” with government employment -hundreds of thousands of Indians 
participate in the annual competitive examinations to enter the civil service 
(Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 133)- and why reservations in the public 
service are so eagerly sought after.  
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distinct views of the relationship between ingroup class 
stratification and ethnic minority identity salience can be distilled 
from it. These might respectively be called the “optimistic” and the 
“pessimistic” view. The optimistic view, exemplified by theorists of 
multiculturalism and many representative bureaucracy theorists, 
holds that class differentials are unimportant, if not irrelevant, to 
ethnic minority identity salience and, hence, to a person’s 
proclivities towards ingroup-sympathy and favouritism. The 
pessimistic view, on the other hand, holds that class stratification is 
associated with variable salience of ethnic minority identity. It 
expects, in fact, such salience to be inversely related to individuals’ 
class: the higher one’s class, the lower the salience of ethnic minority 
membership. 
 Multiculturalists, as we have seen, stress the importance of 
cultural group membership –that is, cultural background and 
culture-bound experiences- as primary bases of individuals’ group 
identification. They assume that, since ethnicity is a highly potent 
source of shared culture, ethnic minority members, irrespective of 
class, will readily identify with their ethnic group, if given the 
opportunity to do so (hence multiculturalists’ advocacy of 
guaranteed representation for minority groups in political 
institutions) (cf. Meier 2000). Multiculturalists thus subscribe to 
what Michael Hechter has called a normativist account of group 
salience: people act as -ethnic minority- group members because 
they approve of, or have internalized, their group’s distinctive set of 
rules, norms, preferences and ways of doing things. It is this very 
fact of a shared culture, rather than its specific content, which 
explains and guarantees identity salience (Hechter 1987: 8).  
 Most representative bureaucracy theorists, too, accept that 
identity salience comes about as a result of shared background and 
socialization experiences and is cemented by the similarity of 
values, attitudes, and beliefs produced and passed on in the process. 
Some go one step further, however, and argue that the “linkages 
[between passive and active representation, bvg] should be much 
firmer for members of minority groups” (Selden 1997a: 116). Though 
no further explanation is usually provided, the assumption 
underlying this expectation seems to be that minority status –and 
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the subordination and low esteem these typically bestow- provides 
group members with an additional similarity: a common interest in 
pushing their group higher up the social hierarchy. Hechter refers to 
this idea -that people who are in the same boat, that is, share group-
determined social status, will tend to act as group members and 
display corporate solidarity- as the structuralist account of group 
salience. Individuals, according to this account, coalesce into 
solidary groups not because they, as the normativist account has it, 
carry group norms within them, but because they share common 
individual interests (Hechter 1987: 4-5, 9).84  
Whereas the optimistic view stresses cultural or structural 
similarity as all-important, or ultimate, bases of ethnic minority 
identity salience, the pessimistic view emphasizes choice 
opportunities. This view, associated with the social identity theory of 
Henri Tajfel and associates and with some critical representative 
bureaucracy theorists, regards ethnic minority identity first and 
foremost as a negative identity. The negativeness of ethnic minority 
identity is well illustrated by the habitual use of denigrating 
stereotypes by outgroup members to describe, and deny prestige to, 
minority members.85 Negative identity, the pessimistic view holds, 
                                                
84 Since structuralist accounts infer common interests from the structural 
positions of groups, this means that they impute common interests and, hence, 
corporate solidarity to all similarly structured groups, not only to lowly ranked 
minorities. Marxist theory, a notable example of structuralist theorizing, for 
example, not only expects the proletariat to mount a struggle against the 
bourgeoisie –its exploiters-, but also expects the bourgeoisie –united by a 
common, structurally induced common interest- to defend the status quo which, 
by definition, serves it well. 
85 Sometimes the very names by which ethnic minority groups are 
known by dominant outgroups constitute such negative stereotypes. Japan’s 
Burakumin, for example, were formerly known as Eta, meaning “full of filth” 
and are still sometimes referred to as Yottsu, meaning four and connoting four-
legged beasts. Similarly, the Tausag of Sulu, in the Southern Philippines, refer 
to a neighbouring group as Samal Luwaan, luwaan meaning “that which was 
spat out” (that is, rejected by God). Stereotypes often take the form of “contrast 
conceptions”, or embodiments of all the vices disdained by superordinate 
groups. The substantive content of stereotypes, furthermore, is usually a good 
indicator of the extent of minoritization of particular groups. “Parallel” groups in 
unranked systems often use stereotypes that allow for the simultaneous 
affirmation of ingroup superiority and acceptance of limited spheres of 
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is highly problematic to those so identified: it invites (and legitimizes) 
discrimination by outgroup members and creates acute self-image 
and self-respect problems among minority individuals (Tajfel 1978: 
9).86 Consequently, minority group members usually have good 
reasons for ingroup disidentification, for trying to diminish or drive 
off the salience of minority group membership to themselves, 
especially so in stringently ranked systems. 
Pursuing disidentification may be far from easy or obvious, 
however. Whether minority members can or will pursue it is to a 
large extent a matter of opportunities and constraints. More 
powerful and resourceful majority groups, for example, may 
actively seek to discourage or prevent minority disidentification. 
Since the status quo of skewed group-relations bestows them with 
high status and “positive identity”, majority groups have, of course, 
good reasons for trying to maintain it. The shedding of minority 
identities may also be complicated by the stickiness of attributes that 
signal minority status. It is, for example, usually hard to disidentify 
from skin colour. Apart from such objective constraints, cognitive 
factors may also thwart disidentification. Minority members, 
regardless of the actual opportunities for it, may simply believe 
disidentification, whether individually or collectively, to be 
impossible and, therefore, not even worth trying (Abrams and Hogg 
1990a: 4-5; Tajfel 1978).87 In systems of total subordination or 
dependence the idea of disidentification may not even crop up.88  
                                                                                                                                          
outgroup superiority. Sri Lankan Sinhalese, for example, regard Tamils as both 
poor and dirty, as well as thrifty and diligent (Horowitz 2000: 26-7).  
86 Tajfel, for instance, discusses experiments which show that minority 
children “at ages from six or so to eleven” have already developed “outgroup 
preferences” (cf. Tajfel 1978: 10-11). 
87 Such a belief may be premised on the –tested or untested- assumption 
that one will continue to be treated as a minority member as long as one shares 
the defining criterion of the minority, regardless of eventual individual mobility 
(e.g. becoming a teacher, a lawyer, a doctor, a factory manager, or a foreman) 
(Tajfel 1978: 5). In case of tested assumptions it would, of course, be more 
appropriate to speak of knowledge rather than belief. 
88 Children, for example, will usually find it impossible to sustain 
cognitive alternatives to the status quo of parent superiority. In extreme cases, 
minority members might not even want to contemplate disidentification 
because of their belief that existing status-distributions correspond to some 
principle of justice that they happen to subscribe to, even if obeyance to it does 
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 Depending on the concrete mix of real and perceived 
opportunities for disidentification, as well as on such personal 
characteristics as abilities, temperament and luck, minority group 
members may choose to cope with their negative identity in various 
ways. If they have or perceive no possibilities to influence or change 
the status quo of their group’s negative identity, they cannot but 
accept (or, identify with) their unenviable minority status.89 Minority 
members with a modicum of room to manoeuvre, in turn, may try 
to withdraw as far as possible from wider society and restrict their 
stereotype-driven interaction with members of superordinate 
outgroups.  
 If superordinate groups do not impose constraints to 
individual mobility and allow minority members to freely interact 
with them, this will give minority members a good chance to 
attempt assimilation into majority society (which, if successful, might 
eventually result in the de facto disappearance of the minority group 
in question). When superordinate groups allow individual mobility 
but, at the same time, continue to regard successful, upwardly 
mobile minority members “as typifying in some important ways the 
unpleasant characteristics attributed to their group and at the same 
time as ‘exceptions to the rule’”, minority members may have to 
settle for partial assimilation, that is being considered as equal by 
outgroup members in some respects and as inferior in others (Tajfel 
                                                                                                                                          
not seem to benefit them. This is how the unity-model of untouchables 
discussed above accounts for the non-occurrence of outcaste-type 
disidentification among rural village untouchables. 
89 Minority members may, nevertheless, sometimes choose to accept 
minority status even if they might theoretically avoid doing so. The reason is 
that, in some ranked systems, benefits may accrue to minority members who 
accept their lowly status. Such systems often contain elements of reciprocity 
and clientage that underpin the systemic premise of inequality: minority 
members who accept this premise can typically expect some protection in 
exchange for services rendered to members of superordinate groups. In the 
“traditional” Indian caste system, for instance, untouchables often maintained 
regular exchange relationships with other castes from whom they received a 
measure of protection (e.g. assistance in times of famine) as well as specified 
material benefits (food, clothing) in exchange for their performance of polluting 
menial tasks. This system of prestations and counterprestations is usually 
referred to as the jajmani system. See e.g. Gould (1977) and Berreman (1979) for 
informative descriptions.  
3 The question of untouchable groupness 97
1978: 14-15). A special variant of partial assimilation is passing, or 
hiding the fact that one is, in fact, a minority member. This option is, 
of course, not available to members of minority groups with sticky 
attributes. It is only when individual mobility and full or partial 
assimilation is (perceived to be) largely impossible, that minority 
members might resort to the adversarial, common interest-based 
collective action (Tajfel calls it social competition) to achieve a 
separate-but-equal-status which structuralist exponents of the 
optimist view expect to occur as a matter of course.  
 The pessimistic view of the relation between ingroup class 
stratification and ethnic minority identity salience is pessimistic in 
that it expects such salience to be inversely related to individuals’ 
class. This expectation follows from its twin assumptions that 1) 
ethnic minority identity is a negative identity which stimulates 
disidentification, and 2) that such disidentification is primarily a 
function of choice opportunities. Evidently, because they have more 
power, money, and friends in high places minority elites have more 
choice opportunities than less fortunate minority members. Not 
only can they be less easily pushed around or kept in their proper 
place by majority members, they also have less reason than ordinary 
minority members to believe that one cannot change one’s destiny: 
they themselves are living proof that presumed minority destinies 
can be defied. Ethnic minority elites, thus, have more opportunities 
to disidentify with their group and will -given the negativeness of 
their identity- not hesitate to avail of them. As a result, other things 
being equal, ethnic minority identity will be least salient to its best-
placed members.  
 Some critical representative bureaucracy theorists expect this 
very logic to dampen, if not foreclose, the likelihood of active 
representation. They argue that individuals who move into 
privileged administrative positions from relatively disadvantaged 
background will, at some point in their careers, find they have few 
good reasons to continue their identification with the group into 
which they were born. In order to be able to adjust more effectively 
to the demands of their new ambitions, many will want to escape 
their past: they will make deliberate efforts to adopt and support the 
interests and values of superordinate groups to which they now, at 
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least in part, belong, rather than those of their “original”, ethnic 
minority group. Bureaucratic employment’s association with 
individual upward mobility, these theorists expect, may thus 
produce “something of a paradox”: bureaucracies inhabited by 
officials from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds may, 
nevertheless, represent a striking homogeneity of interests and 
values (Béteille 1991: 596; Mosher 1968: 95; Peters 1989). It is this 
paradox, they argue, which “shakes to the foundations the basic 
arguments for representative bureaucracy” (Subramaniam 1967: 
1014). 
 The available evidence on elite untouchables’ inclinations for 
(dis)identification is largely indirect and circumstantial and, almost 
without exception, does not pertain directly to untouchable 
bureaucrats.90 It adds up to a rather mixed picture, neither fully 
endorsing nor fully disproving either of the two –optimistic and 
pessimistic- views. Since their emergence in the mid-nineteenth 
century, untouchable elites all over India have, with varying degrees 
of success, inspired, led and cooperated in a bewildering array of 
efforts to improve the social status, self-view and material 
conditions of the untouchables and to cope with, critique and attack 
“Brahminical” ideology, oppression and discrimination.91 These 
have included organized boycotts and abandonments of 
stigmatizing activities, habits and occupations; advocacy of the 
emulation of upper caste religious, cultural and dietary practices92; 
untouchable leaders’ strong emphasis on behavioural self-
                                                
90 The exception is Nandu Ram’s study The Mobile Scheduled Castes:: Rise of a 
New Middle Class (Ram 1988), to be discussed shortly. 
91 The tiny, local untouchable “elites” which emerged in the mid 1900s 
consisted largely of those who had taken advantage of the new employment 
opportunities offered by colonial rule, such as soldiers or policemen in the 
colonial armies and constabularies, and domestic servants in the households of 
European families. Their numbers quickly swelled after the Indian national 
government’s granting of reservations in higher education, the civil services and 
political assemblies in the 1950s.  
92 Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, for instance, describes the efforts, in the 1870s, 
of the headmen of the Namasudra caste in Bengal to have the members of their 
caste adopt such upper caste practices as the observation of eleven days 
mournings, child marriage and widow celibacy (Bandyopadhyay 1994: 24-5, 
26). 
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improvement and the importance of education, refined and 
“cultured” speech and manners, and of modern dress and 
cleanliness; the shedding of stigmatizing surnames and the adoption 
of new, “pure”, “untouched” positive ones93; collective conversions 
to other religions such as Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and 
Sikhism94; the joining of (seemingly) egalitarian Hindu sects95; the 
creation of various untouchable “religions”96; public burnings of the 
Manusmriti (an ancient document considered the basis of Hindu 
                                                
93 Examples of such (attempted) name changes are many. They include the 
adoption of the name Balmiki (after the author of the Hindu epic Ramayana) by 
members of the Chuhra caste in the Punjab (Judge 2003: 2990), of Raidas (after a 
medieval Chamar saint) by Chamars in Uttar Pradesh (Cohn 1987 (1955): 262) and 
of Chokmela (after their own fourteenth century poet-saint) by Mahars in 
Maharastra (Zelliot 1992: 91). 
94 Large scale conversions to Christianity occurred, for example, in south 
India from the 1870s onwards (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 78), but also in 
north western Punjab where, in the 1880s, the Churhas started going over to the 
United Presbyterian Church in such large numbers that “missionaries did not 
have time to deal with every request” (Deliège 1999: 162). Less common mass 
conversions to Islam have, among others, involved (sections of) the Mappillas 
in what is now Kerala (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 87), the Namasudras in 
Bengal (Bandyopadhyay 1994) and Churhas and Chamars in the Punjab (Judge 
2003: 2990). Sizeable sections of the latter two castes have also converted to 
Sikhism. Conversion to Buddhism is primarily associated with the 
Maharastrian Mahar caste. Having repudiated Hinduism as irredeemable 
shortly before his death in 1956, Dr. Ambedkar –the famous untouchable leader 
and himself a Mahar- led hundreds of thousands of Maharastrian untouchables 
in a mass conversion to Buddhism (roughly 75 per cent of the Mahar 
population became Buddhists within a period of a few years) (Gokhale 1986; 
Jaffrelot 2003). The Buddhist conversion movement also caught hold (and is still 
alive) elsewhere; among some scattered untouchable groups in Uttar Pradesh, 
for instance (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 116-7).  
95 Most notably of the so-called Arya Samaj, a Hindu organization 
specializing in the reconversion (shuddhi) of low castes. 
96 A well-known example was the so-called Ad Dharm (“original 
religion”), founded in the 1920s by the Chamar university graduate and 
schoolteacher Mangu Ram in the Punjab. Around the same period also 
elsewhere (in some UP towns, for instance, as well as in south India) 
untouchable leaders crafted similar religious systems, all based on the 
proposition that the untouchables were the original (i.e. ad(i)) inhabitants of 
India and, hence, were in need of a creed of their own to resurrect their original 
identity (Deliège 1999: 167; Gooptu 1993; Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 79, 
102; Rawat 2006).  
3 The question of untouchable groupness 100
law) and other classic Hindu texts; temple entry movements; the 
invention of glorious caste histories; the circulation of subversive 
fables, folklore, songs and untouchable myths of origin that blame 
untouchables’ untouchability to some original wicked or deceitful 
act by others; literary and poetic attacks on the varna system and 
assertion of acchut or dalit (untouchable) pride, anger, hate and 
pain97; the formation of untouchable caste federations, employees’ 
unions, welfare organizations, schools and political parties; 
claimmaking for an independent untouchable state (to be called 
Achutistan, a country for untouchables); the celebration and 
deification of (historical) untouchable heroes; the electoral targeting 
of untouchable constituencies; the crafting of political and cultural 
alliances with other low castes, and policy advocacy (most notably 
of the introduction, extension and continuation of reservations) (cf. 
e.g. Bandyopadhyay 1994; Deliège 1993; Deliège 1999; Deliège 2002; 
Gokhale 1986; Gooptu 1993; Gupta 2001b; Jaffrelot 2003; Jeffrey et al. 
2004; Kutty 2006; Lynch 1969; Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998; 
Narayan 2001; Narayan and Misra 2004; Nigam 2000; Omvedt 1995; 
Pai 2000; Pai 2002; Pandey 2006; Rawat 2006; Zelliot 1992). 
The fact that untouchable elites are and have been known to 
identify with their caste’s cause and to pursue its interests, does not 
mean that they -as the optimistic view suggests- do or have done so 
as a matter of course. Many instances of untouchable assertion have 
been episodic, short-lived and quite restricted, both geographically 
and in terms of the scope of untouchable jatis involved. Besides, as 
Harold Isaacs’ perceptive study of untouchable elites (politicians, 
scientists, bureaucrats and teachers) carried out in the 1960s 
suggests, elite identification may be the exception rather than the 
rule. Isaacs found many of his informants to be passing, that is, they 
hid their caste identities in public whenever they safely could, and 
                                                
97 Probably the best-known anti-establishment literary movement to have 
sprung up among the untouchables were the Dalit Panthers (after the Black 
Panthers in the United States), a rather short-lived (though much-studied) 
movement in Bombay in the early 1970s. Dalit Panthers came from among the 
first generation of untouchable youth to have received educational benefits and 
most of them were Mahar Buddhists (cf. e.g. Contursi 1993: 325-7). Since the late 
1980s, Dalit literary expression has shown a dramatic increase in the Hindi-
speaking North (Wilkerson: 1). 
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identified as untouchables only in private or whenever else they 
could not avoid doing so (Isaacs 1965).  
Subsequent and recent studies have largely corroborated 
Isaac’s findings. G.G. Wankhede, for example, in a study of 150 
upwardly mobile untouchables in Delhi, found less than half of them 
open about their caste identity (five of his respondents were, in fact 
so furious of being approached as untouchables that Wankhede 
“was asked to get out and doors were banged”) (Wankhede 1999: 
38-9). Saavala found lying about their jati or giving the impression 
of belonging to some higher group to be “common for middle class 
Malas” in the south Indian city of Hyderabad. (She even heard of 
Malas who had managed to form marriage alliances without 
revealing their untouchable identity) (Saavala 2000: 9). Less than 10 
per cent of Nandu Ram’s sample of 240 untouchable bureaucrats of 
various jatis in the central UP city of Kanpur “were not hesitant to 
identify themselves with their caste”. More than a third said they 
were not willing to disclose their background “to any one on any 
occasion”, while more than half of them did not carry any surname 
after their first name to avoid identification as untouchables (Ram 
1988: 95, 97, 100). Most of Ram’s respondents passed whenever 
possible, identified (in the sense of acknowledging, not emotionally 
committing) whenever useful (e.g. in order to benefit from 
reservations) or obvious (e.g. among family members).  
Nowadays, if Robert Deliège is to be believed, such laborious 
disidentification strategies are no longer imperative. Since power 
and wealth take away a great deal of their social stigmas, present-
day, rich and powerful untouchables, he argues, are simply “no 
longer really” untouchables (Deliège 2002: 6). This suggests that, to 
elite untouchables, the identification dilemma itself has become 
obsolete: they can routinely and effectively escape untouchable 
group membership through the porous group boundaries at the top. 
  
In sum, the literature discussed here does not amount to a 
consistent, unequivocal expectation of untouchable groupness and, 
hence, active representation by untouchable bureaucrats. Though 
the untouchables may readily be considered a distinctive category of 
castes and individuals bound, as they are, by a common history and 
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experience of untouchability, the question of their groupness 
remains largely unanswered. Whereas some insights, trends, models 
and findings discussed above point to increasing or high groupness, 
others suggest it to be low or decreasing. High time, therefore, to 
take a look in the real world. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Even if bureaucrats have discretion and the groupness of 
represented groups is high, active representation may still not occur 
because of “an impressive array of influences [that] can debilitate 
linkage between passive and active representation” (Thompson 
1976: 217-8): bureaucrats may occupy organizational positions that 
provide little leverage to influence agency outcomes, for instance, or 
work in agencies with jurisdictions that have little salience to 
ingroup members (Meier 1993a: 397-8). Likewise, there may also be 
influences and circumstances that facilitate active representation. 
Most representative bureaucracy theorists agree on at least four of 
such facilitative characteristics of bureaucratic organizations: a 
sympathetic mission, salience of a bureaucracy’s policies to 
passively represented groups, a critical mass of group-identified 
bureaucrats and street-level discretion. The dust-level rural 
development bureaucracy presented itself as a suitable case for 
enquiring into the linkage between passive and active 
representation because it possesses all four of these features and 
thus constituted a case where active representation was most likely to 
occur (cf. Keiser et al. 2002: 556).  
 The Indian rural development bureaucracy was created after 
independence, in the 1950s, to implement and monitor the central 
government’s newly adopted strategy of planned development in 
rural areas. Since then, it has developed into an intricate and 
elaborate hierarchy of offices and posts, extending all the way from 
“the center” -the federal government in New Delhi-, down to India’s 
innumerable rural villages. What I call the “dust-level” rural 
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development bureaucracy comprises of the two lowest echelons of 
the Indian rural development bureaucracy: the rural development 
blocks and the village development officers. The bureaucrats 
manning these echelons have been entrusted with carrying out a 
wide-ranging and varying package of centrally- and state funded 
rural development and poverty alleviation programs, ranging from 
the introduction and promotion of agricultural innovations (e.g. 
new seeds and fertilizers), the provision of elementary needs 
(drinking water, housing), the improvement of local infrastructure 
(roads, village assembly halls), to the creation of employment and 
educational opportunities. In the process, dust-level bureaucrats 
(DLBs) select beneficiaries and allocate and distribute money, 
material resources, attention, knowledge and information. 
Nowadays, the programs of the rural development bureaucracy are 
specially targeted towards improving the living conditions and life-
chances of the rural poor.  
 In this chapter I will discuss the active representation-friendly 
features of the dust level development bureaucracy in some detail. 
In doing so, I will provide the backdrop for my substantive 
treatment of this study’s central question in the chapters that follow. 
I conclude this chapter with a brief description of the fieldwork area 
in the central UP district of Sitapur and a justification for and 
description of my fieldwork procedures. 
 
 
2 Sympathetic mission  
 
One factor that representative bureaucracy scholars accept as 
facilitating the transfer of passive into active representation is a 
sympathetic organizational mission.98 In keeping with their 
                                                
 98 A sympathetic mission may be formally defined or informally given. 
Sometimes bureaucracies are created with the explicit mission to assist some 
particular group. The Indian Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes is a good example. A bureaucracy has an informal 
sympathetic mission when, through its structures and cultures, it conveys 
messages about the value and importance of membership in particular groups. 
Bureaucracies that prominently embrace affirmative action measures or 
organize diversity trainings, for example, communicate to their employees that 
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missions, bureaucracies create advocacy roles for the bureaucrats 
they employ. Bureaucrats working in bureaucracies with missions to 
assist the groups of which they are members, should therefore 
almost automatically become active representatives (Selden 1997a).99 
India’s rural development bureaucracy has such a sympathetic 
mission. It implements a large number of programs and schemes to 
assist the rural poor including most untouchables. Most of these 
programs, in fact, contain explicit preferential measures for rural 
untouchables. 
 The present day rural development bureaucracy grew out of 
the Community Development Programme (CDP). This program, a 
brainchild of the American Albert Mayer, was designed and partly 
financed by the US government under its technical cooperation 
plan. Officially launched in 1952, it entailed the training and sending 
into rural India of a “huge army of new-style government men” 
who were to “awaken village India by encouragement, by 
demonstration, by offers of material help to those who will stir to 
help themselves” (Lieten and Srivastava 1999: 20).100 The program’s 
aim was “to initiate a process of transformation of the social and 
economic life of the villages” and to “bring about an all-round 
improvement of the villages and those who inhabit them” (Planning 
Commission, cited in Lieten and Srivastava 1999: 20;  president 
Rajendra Prasad, cited in Maheswari 1995: 41). Each project under 
the program covered three hundred villages or a population of 
300,000 and had a budget of Rs. 650,000 spread over three years.101  
                                                                                                                                          
ethnic or other group differences are to be recognized, valued and, even, 
highlighted (Keiser et al. 2002).  
 99 The same goes, of course, for bureaucrats who do not share 
membership with the mission-defined clientele group though they may be, as 
Keiser cum suis suggest, more difficult “to incorporate into the agency’s goals” 
(Keiser et al. 2002: 557).  
 100 The official adoption of the community development programme as 
an all-India programme, was preceded by a few pilot projects in Etawah, 
Nilokheri and Faridabad (Maheswari 1995: 39).  
 101 A year after launching the community development programme, the 
government initiated another programme of rural development, the National 
Extension Service blocks, which had identical aims and channelled Rs. 750,000 
to selected blocks for a similar period of three years (Maheswari 1995: 42). 
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 What eventually emerged all over India was a large scale 
development structure which simultaneously built upon the existing 
administrative structure inherited from the British and added new 
innovations to it. One of these was the creation of a new type of 
functionary, the village-level worker. In colonial times, each 
government department had had its own representatives in the 
village, with little incentives to coordinate their respective programs 
or activities and often working at cross-purposes. The new village-
level worker was to replace these village-level functionaries and to 
become the joint agent of all departments. Better equipped, trained 
and paid than his predecessors, the village level officer was to be 
able to do a better job at inspiring and gaining the confidence of 
villagers and at solving their day-to-day problems (Maheswari 1995: 
207-8).  
 Another innovation was the creation of a new geographical 
unit of administration, the development block. Until the early 1950s, 
the district (an area of in between 1,500 to 7,000 square miles with an 
average population of around 1.5 million) and the tahsil (or sub-
division, encompassing around one-fifth to one-eight of a district’s 
area) were the lowest units of administration in India. In 1953, the 
Indian government decided to introduce, nationwide, a new layer of 
geographical administrative units below the district and tahsil 
levels, the blocks. These blocks, headed by a block development 
officer (BDO), were much smaller and territorially compact than the 
districts. Usually comprising of nearly a hundred villages with a 
population of 50,000 to 60,000 they were to bring government closer 
to the people and, thus, to facilitate its developmental interventions 
and “intensive rural work” (Maheswari 1995: 205). The BDO and his 
staff were envisaged to “function as a team, constantly consulting 
one another and exchanging experience and [to] establish the closest 
contacts with agriculturalists and be their friend and guide” (Grow-
More-Food Enquiry Committee, cited in Maheswari 1995: 206-7). By 
1963 almost all of India had been covered by development blocks 
(Kothari 1970: 133, n. 39), causing Jawaharlal Nehru to claim that 
“nothing has happened in any country in the world during the last 
few years so big in content and so revolutionary in design as the 
community projects in India” (Maheswari 1995: 42).  
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 In the first years of its existence, the programs executed by the 
rural development bureaucracy were designed to be comprehensive 
in nature, that is, to cover as many areas as were deemed relevant 
and of concern to rural people. “Economic betterment through the 
improvement of agriculture and expansion of cottage industries was 
to be pursued side by side with an educational campaign among 
people of all ages, provision of speedy means of transport and 
communication, measures for better health, sanitation and medical 
aid, [and] construction of reasonably comfortable dwellings” 
(Maheswari 1995: 43). The improvement of agriculture, on which the 
large majority of villagers depended (and still depend) for their 
livelihood, received priority attention, however, and was accorded a 
pivotal position in the CDP (Maheswari 1995: 43). 
 The programmatic stress on agriculture as a way to promote 
rural development and tackle rural poverty intensified in the 1960s. 
Agricultural production was not increasing as quickly as hoped and 
the Indian government -again with the help of American experts- 
adopted two new programs to deal with this problem: the Intensive 
Agricultural District Programme (IADP) in 1960 and, in 1967, the so-
called New Agricultural Strategy (NAS). Both programs were 
premised on the idea that food production might be increased 
through the introduction of new technologies and modern 
management methods in agriculture. Under the IADP local 
cooperatives were to supply farm credit, fertilisers, pesticides, 
improved seeds and farm implements, while the rural development 
bureaucracy was entrusted with the supply of intensive educational, 
technical and farm management assistance (ibid.: 87-90).  
 The NAS further elaborated on this idea by stressing the 
streamlining and mobilisation of agricultural research organisations, 
the introduction of new seeds, the setting up of a National Seed 
Corporation and State Farm Corporation, the carrying out of a soil 
survey program to match the fertilisers (needed for growing high-
yielding varieties of wheat) with the soil of particular areas, and 
increasing attention for water management. Also under the NAS, 
village level workers received training in the use of the newly 
introduced technologies and agricultural practices, so that they 
could disseminate them among the farmers in their jurisdictions 
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(Maheswari 1995: 87-93). These agricultural policies were quite 
successful in meeting their avowed aim. Agricultural productivity, 
in fact, rose so quickly that, by 1969, the Indian government 
declared the occurrence of a “green revolution”.102  
 Though effective in combating the problem they had been 
designed to address, the agricultural policies of the 1960s were not a 
comprehensive success. First, the policies had been intensive policies, 
in that, by design, they had been implemented almost exclusively in 
so-called “well-endowed” districts or areas with a steady water 
supply, a minimal risk of natural hazards such as floods, few 
drainage and soil conservation problems, and well-developed 
village institutions like cooperatives and panchayats (elected village 
councils). This concentrated pooling of financial, technical, extension 
and administrative resources and development activities led, of 
course, to a highly differentiated impact of the agricultural policies 
in various rural areas.  
 Second, in order to benefit from the new ideas, technologies 
and practices sponsored by the new programs farmers not only 
needed knowledge of sophisticated agronomic practices but, also, 
access to such essential inputs as fertilisers, water and pesticides. 
Many farmers, however, could not cough up the cash requirements 
–as much as eleven times higher than the cash required for 
traditional agriculture- needed for availing of these inputs. As a 
result, large segments of the rural population could not enjoy the 
benefits made available under the IADP and the NAS. While many 
rich farmers and cultivators of large landholdings greatly benefited 
form the programs –sponsoring the growth of a class of “bullock 
capitalists”- the position of small and marginal farmers, agricultural 
labourers and rural artisans remained largely unaffected or even got 
worse (Maheswari 1995: 101, 127-28).103  
                                                
 102 The NAS, especially, has come to be popularly associated with this 
revolution (Maheswari 1995: 93). 
103 The more they profited from the green revolution, the less inclined 
richer farmers became –as they had commonly done in the past- to lease their land 
to sharecroppers. In fact, rich farmers increasingly started to buy the plots of land 
of smaller farmers, thus taking away the major source of the latter’s livelihoods 
(Maheswari 1995: 127-8). As Elizabeth Whitcombe has summarized the main 
effect of the green revolution: “Government made ex-zamindari [landlording] 
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 From the early 1970s onwards, then, the Indian government’s 
rhetoric and policies increasingly came to reflect a concern for the 
rural poor who had been largely bypassed by the earlier rural 
development interventions. Also in response to Indira Gandhi’s 
garibi hatao (abolish poverty) campaign and a shift in World Bank 
lending policies, the federal government rapidly expanded its rural 
development budgets and introduced a plethora of policies aimed at 
alleviating rural poverty and improving the life chances of the large 
masses of rural poor.104 Apart from reflecting a general shift in 
policy emphasis from stimulating agricultural growth to combating 
rural poverty, post-1970 rural development policies also 
increasingly came to testify to a growing concern for specific segments 
of rural poor. Most policies, reiterating the constitutional directive to 
state policy “to promote with special care the educational and 
economic interests of weaker sections of the people and in particular 
                                                                                                                                          
viable in practice. Within a year or two of [its] inception, virtually every district 
could find a crop of demonstration –the Rai Sahibs with their thirty, forty and 
hundred acre holdings, their multiplication farms of the latest Mexican wheat and 
Philippines paddy, their tubewells gushing out 16,000 gallons of water an hour, 
much of it on highly profitable hire, their tractors, their godowns stacked with 
fertiliser, their cold-stores, and their groves, their rights over fairs and bazars, their 
brothers and sons in the civil service and industry, the army and the police 
sending regular remittances to swell the family accounts in premutiny fashion; in 
short, a tenth of the zamindari, but ten times the income (cited in Ahmad and 
Saxena 1994: 203). By contrast, the green revolution largely bypassed the small-
holders. In Uttar Pradesh, for instance, the resources allocated to the SFDA 
amounted to no more than just 2 rupees per family of five, far too little to make 
any discernible positive impact (Kohli 1987: 217). Besides, as Atul Kohli has noted, 
“co-operatives remained entrenched in the corruption-patronage network linking 
political leaders to local notables. The lower classes got nothing out of them. 
Commercial banks followed their straightforward policy of land as collateral for 
loans and were generally accessible only to relatively large landowners. And 
sharecroppers, by definition, did not qualify because they did not own land” 
(ibid.: 218-90).  
 104 In 1973, the World Bank, quickly followed by other international 
organisations and donor agencies, announced a shift in its lending policy in 
favour of schemes to eliminate rural poverty. This sponsored a large scale 
retuning of rural development programmes into poverty alleviation schemes in 
many developing countries, including –apart from India- Pakistan and 
Bangladesh (Maheswari 1995: 131-2). 
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of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes105”- came to contain special 
measures favouring these historically disadvantaged groups, 
including comparatively attractive subsidies, lenient credit regimes, 
and quotas reserving fixed proportions of policy benefits for 
untouchable individuals meeting a given policy’s eligibility 
requirements. Assisting the rural poor, and especially the untouchable 
poor, thus became, in effect, the mission of India’s rural development 
apparatus in the ensuing decades and has remained so to this day. 
The following discussion of some of the important centrally 
sponsored poverty alleviation schemes adopted since the early 
1970s illustrates this point.  
 In its Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969-74), the central government 
allocated Rs. 115 crore as direct financial support for the 
amelioration of the economic situation of “small farmers” and 
agricultural labourers.106 It launched new programs to improve the 
supply of machines, farm implements, improved seeds, fertilisers 
and pesticides, arrange for irrigation from the most practicable 
sources; improve credit facilities; provide facilities for storing, 
transporting, processing and marketing agricultural produce; and 
                                                
 105 The scheduled tribes, or adivasis, are India’s original inhabitants and 
roughly constitute 8 per cent of its population, numbering 84 million according 
to the 2001 census. Tribal peoples are to be found all over India but are most 
numerous in central India. Though often grouped together with the scheduled 
castes, or untouchables, for administrative purposes, they differ from them in a 
number of respects. Unlike the untouchables who live quite evenly dispersed 
over the sub-continent among the rest of the population, scheduled tribes 
typically live in hilly regions somewhat remote from caste settlements. Unlike 
the untouchables, tribals often, but not always, speak their own recognized 
language. And unlike the untouchables, who have traditionally been an 
essential part of local caste and economic systems, tribes have tended to form 
self-sufficient economic units, engaging in swidden farming rather than the 
intensive farming typical of most of rural India. In practice, the differences 
between India’s castes and tribes may be quite subtle, complex or even non-
existent, however. Over time, many tribes have converted to Christianity or 
moved in the direction of becoming recognized as castes, though their 
preferential treatment by the government since independence seems to have 
slowed down this process. In this study, I will be strictly concerned with the 
scheduled castes, not with the scheduled tribes, who deserve separate treatment 
altogether.  
 106 A crore equals 10,000,000 rupees. “Small farmers” were defined as those 
possessing landholdings of under two hectares 
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stimulate diversification into areas like dairying, poultry farming, 
piggery and goat and sheep rearing (Maheswari 1995: 108-9). Two 
new agencies, the Small Farmers’ Development Agency (SFDA) and 
the Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers Agency (MFAL) 
were set up to administer these new policies.107 Untouchables 
received preferential treatment under these programs. The 
maximum subsidies doled out by SFDA amounted to Rs. 3,000 for 
“ordinary” beneficiaries, as compared to Rs. 5,000 for scheduled 
caste beneficiaries (Maheswari 1995: 109). The government also 
encouraged the SFDA to identify small and marginal farmers and 
agricultural labourers belonging to the scheduled castes in 
proportion to their population shares in the project areas 
(Maheswari 1995: 110).  
 In 1980 the SFDA was superseded by the ambitious Integrated 
Rural Development Programme (IRDP) which, even more than its 
predecessors, was targeted explicitly and exclusively at all the rural 
poor (those below an officially designated “poverty line”), not 
primarily those engaged in agriculture. Implemented in all the 5,011 
development blocks in the country, IRDP covered a wide set of 
activities, ranging from traditional rural development concerns like 
agriculture and animal husbandry to minor irrigation, sericulture, 
horticulture, fisheries, cottage industries, and business activities 
(Maheswari 1995: 114-5, 128, 134). The decreased attention to 
agriculture followed from the basic idea behind the IRDP, which 
was, in fact, to release the rural poor from direct dependence on 
agriculture by providing them with assets –e.g. a buffalo or a small 
shop- from which they would subsequently be able to derive their 
livelihood without government assistance. Rural poor, in short, 
were to be made into small business people (Mendelsohn and 
Vicziany 1998: 161-2). The rural development bureaucracy’s role 
was to coordinate the selection of beneficiaries, provide the money –
structured as part subsidy, part loan- needed for procuring the 
assets and to facilitate the supply of relevant skills and vocational 
training. Scheduled castes and tribes received substantial 
preferential treatment under the IRDP: at least half of the assisted 
families were to be recruited from these categories (Gaiha 1995: 869). 
                                                
 107 These agencies were merged in 1974. 
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IRDP’s shift of attention away from agriculture as a 
springboard out of poverty was mirrored by an administrative 
reform of the central rural development structure. Before 1979, the 
central rural development authority had been the Department of 
Rural Development, a part of the central Ministry of Agriculture and 
Irrigation. In 1979, this embeddedness of the rural development 
administrative machinery in the agricultural bureaucracy came to an 
end. A separate, full-fledged Ministry of Rural Development was set 
up to become the nodal ministry in the area of rural poverty, 
particularly among scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, landless 
labourers, and rural artisans. The new ministry was given a wide-
ranging jurisdiction covering land reforms, village and cottage 
industries, rural roads, town and country planning in rural areas, 
elementary and adult education, rural electrification, rural water-
supply, housing for the landless rural people, nutrition programs 
and panchayati raj (local self-government). Besides, it became the 
coordinating authority of the various components of rural 
development programs for the rural poor, including untouchables, 
tribals, women and freed bonded labourers (Maheswari 1995: 209-
10). 108 
 IRDP was accompanied by two subsidiary schemes, Training 
of Rural Youth for Self-Employment (TRYSEM) and Development of 
Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWACRA), started in 1979 
and 1982 respectively. The aim of TRYSEM –still implemented at the 
time of my field research- was to help poor rural youngsters start 
their own independent business by providing them with practical 
training, basic technical and managerial skills, a tool-kit, and a 
scholarship during the time of training. After completing their 
                                                
108 Bonded labour is a slavery-like condition which arises when a 
labourer accepts “bondage” in exchange for a loan in cash or kind, usually for 
purposes of subsistence or covering marriage expenses. An individual 
accepting bondage pledges to labour as a farm servant for a landowner until he 
has paid off his debt. In India, a bonded labourer often remained bonded for the 
rest of his life, as the compensation he received for his services would not 
enable him to discharge of his debt. Over time, in fact, this debt often increased, 
as a result of which bondage tended to spill over to his offspring, making 
bondage a permanent and hereditary affliction of entire generations of families 
(Breman 1993: 8). Freed bonded labourers are, thus, by definition poor, since 
they have never been able to make savings or create assets for private use. 
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training they would become automatically eligible for IRDP loans 
and subsidies (Maheswari 1995: 139-40). In the plains districts of 
Uttar Pradesh, 52 per cent of the beneficiaries were to be recruited 
from among scheduled caste youths (Government of Uttar Pradesh 
1998).109 The operational goal of the DWACRA scheme was the 
formation of groups of 15-20 women from poor families, again 
preferably from scheduled castes and tribes, for delivery of services 
like credit, skill training, cash and infrastructural support for self-
employment (Maheswari 1995: 140).110  
 Another important program, the Jawahar Rojgar Yojna (JRY), 
was first implemented in 1989. It replaced a number of other 
existing employment creation programs such as the Rural Landless 
Employment Programme (RLEP) and the National Rural 
Employment Programme (NREP), but not the IRDP. JRY, which 
soon became India’s largest rural development program, absorbing 
half of all funds spent on this sector by 1994–5, had a dual aim. The 
first was to alleviate poverty through creating supplementary 
employment opportunities against officially stipulated minimum 
daily wages for the rural poor. More concretely, it set out to provide 
employment to at least one member in every family of the rural poor 
during the troughs in the agricultural cycle. JRY’s second aim was 
to, en passant, create rural infrastructure such as roads, village 
ponds, school buildings, drainage systems, play grounds and rural 
markets (Gaiha et al. 1998: 928; Gupta 2005a: 10; Maheswari 1995: 
142). As in the programs discussed above, untouchables (and tribals) 
were JRY’s preferred beneficiaries. In Uttar Pradesh, in the 
administrative year 1998-1999, for example, no less than 60 per cent 
of the program’s total benefits were reserved exclusively for 
untouchable beneficiaries (with specific sub-quota for untouchable 
                                                
 109 Until the Himalayan hill districts in the north-western part of the state 
were formed into the separate state of Uttaranchal in November 2000, the 
implementation guidelines used by rural development agencies in Uttar Pradesh 
sometimes had separate rules for “plains” and “hills” districts. I give the 
percentage for the plains districts because my fieldwork district of Sitapur is 
situated there. 
 110 The IRDP and its allied self-employment schemes were restructured 
into one single, new program known as the Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojna 
(SGSY) in April 1999 (Pradhan et al. 2002: 4). 
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women) (Government of Uttar Pradesh 1998). Another characteristic 
feature of JRY, to which I will return later, is that it, unlike other 
programs, largely outskirted the block-level bureaucracy and was 
directly executed by popularly elected village councils (Maheswari 
1995: 143).111  
 Two other relatively recently adopted centrally sponsored 
schemes, the Indira Awas Yojna –or Indira housing scheme, named 
after former prime minister Indira Gandhi- (IAY), and the Million 
Wells Scheme (MWS) are aimed at providing essential infrastructure 
to the rural poor. IAY –which, as we will see, turned out to be a very 
popular program in Sitapur district- provides people below the 
poverty line (BPLs) with a substantial subsidy of Rs. 20,000, 
allowing them to construct their own houses. Along with the 
subsidy, beneficiaries receive a stove. IAY is specially targeted at 
untouchables, reserving at least 60 per cent of the available subsidies 
for them. IAY’s primary focus on assisting untouchable beneficiaries 
is further reflected by the fact that central authorities allocate 
resources for this scheme to implementing agencies on the basis of 
the untouchables’ percentual share in the population. Under the 
MWS, disadvantaged categories among the rural poor are provided 
with free irrigation wells. In terms of financial outlay, this has been 
one of the more important centrally sponsored schemes, at one point 
in time amounting to two-thirds of Ministry of Rural Development’s 
budget (Maheswari 1995: 144). 
 The poverty alleviation schemes discussed above are or have 
been centrally sponsored schemes, wholly or partly funded by the 
federal government in New Delhi. The various state governments 
may also run their own pro-untouchable, rural development 
programs, however. Starting in 1991, the state government of Uttar 
Pradesh, for example, has been implementing its Ambedkar Villages 
Programme (AVP). The scheme was named after the untouchable 
                                                
 111 In April 1999, JRY was renamed the Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojna 
(JGSY). Another employment-generation scheme, the Employment Assurance 
Scheme (EAS) is continuing alongside JGSY and aims to provide at least two 
members of poor families with unskilled construction work in lean agricultural 
season for a minimum of 100 days. It is one of the rare centrally sponsored 
programmes that do not seem to have special provisions for untouchables and 
tribals.  
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leader Dr. Bimrao Ambedkar -the architect of India’s reservations 
for untouchables- and adopted in the year of his 100th birth 
anniversary. Purpose of this scheme is not so much to provide its 
own separate benefits to the rural poor but, rather, to intensify the 
flow of benefits under already existing schemes and programs -
including literacy drives, electrification, handpumps, pensions, and 
housing subsidies- to villages with a high proportion of 
untouchables. By its very name and symbolically charged year of 
introduction as well as its programmatic content, a state-run scheme 
like the AVP accentuates the extent to which India’s rural 
development administrative machinery has been charged with a 
mission to specially assist the poor, rural, untouchable population, 
thus promising to be a likely arena for the occurrence of active 
representation.  
 
 
3 Policy salience 
 
Not all policy decisions are equally likely candidates for influence 
by a representative bureaucracy. Even if bureaucrats have lots of 
discretion, they may be exercising it in making decisions about 
issues that are not likely to affect the interests of passively 
represented groups.112 For decisions to become the focus for active 
representation they must concern issues that are likely to be salient 
to represented groups, by directly affecting their interests and/or 
having patent ramifications for their well-being (Cohen 1978; Meier 
et al. 1999: 1026; Thompson 1976: 215). It is hard to see how many of 
the decisions made by dust-level rural development bureaucrats 
might not be salient to rural untouchables. Many of the benefits 
allocated by or through these officials –subsidies, loans, training, 
and infrastructure- would seem to be of great value to poor 
untouchables and must thus be in high demand.  
                                                
 112 Meier discusses, by way of an example, the position of black employees 
in the agriculture programs of the United States’ Department of Agriculture. They 
would be hard pressed, Meier argues, to find many decisions that might affect the 
interests of black farmers, simply because there are hardly any black farmers 
(Meier 1993b: 19). 
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 If Indian poverty were to be defined as the sum of low 
standards of nutrition, health, housing, general material 
consumption and formal education, Indian untouchables are 
overwhelmingly poor. They form disproportionate shares of the 
landless, of the unskilled labour force, of (seasonal) agricultural 
labourers, of Indians living below the official poverty line, and of 
Indians with low calorie intake. And their literacy rate is 
significantly lower than that of the rest of the population 
(Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998). In 1977-1978 -apparently the last 
year for which such figures are available- about 70 per cent of the 
untouchable population was rated “poor”, relative to some 56 per 
cent of the overall population.  
 The poverty of untouchables is closely associated with their 
predominant dependence on agriculture. Though most rural 
untouchables are not, strictly speaking, landless, the plots they do 
own tend to amount to little more than dwarf holdings that generate 
far too little produce to feed the families owning them (Béteille 1977: 
93).113 More than three out of four untouchables thus try to eke out a 
livelihood from wage labour and sharecropping, leaving most of 
them with very little room for discretionary spending and future 
social advancement (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998).114 Many 
cannot afford to buy enough food to eat, send their children to 
school, buy clothes to wear outside the house, and –a problem faced 
                                                
113 According to figures presented by Ahmad and Saxena, in Uttar Pradesh 
untouchables typically cultivate the smallest plots. More than 80 per cent of the 
smallest landholdings in the state –those between 0 and 2.5 acres- belong to 
untouchables. Even though the UP untouchables own 15 per cent of all 
landholdings in UP (indicating that few, indeed, are totally landless), they only 
hold 9.5 per cent of the area under cultivation (as against their share of 21 per cent 
in the state’s population) (Ahmad and Saxena 1994: 190-1).  
 114 Sharecropping is a system of agricultural production where a 
landowner allows a tenant, or sharecropper, to use the land in return for a 
predetermined share of the crop produced on it. Though declining, 
sharecropping still occurs extensively in India (cf. Chaudhuri and Maitra 2000). 
In Sitapur, farmers call it batai (from the verb bătna, to split). 
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by millions of rural poor- to pay off their debts (cf. Krishna 2004: 
123).115 
 The untouchables in Uttar Pradesh are in no way better off 
than those in other Indian states. By the end of the 1980s, almost half 
of the state’s population was living under the poverty line. Uttar 
Pradesh lags behind much of the rest of India: it occupies the bottom 
rank on the Human Development Index and has exceptionally high 
levels of mortality, fertility, morbidity, undernutrition, illiteracy, 
social inequality and a slow pace of poverty decline (Drèze and 
Gazdar 1996: 33; Hasan 1998: 44). For much of its population, “life in 
Uttar Pradesh is short and precarious” (Drèze and Gazdar 1996: 
39).116 Besides, Uttar Pradesh is still very much a caste society in 
which “high” castes, by and large, continue to combine the 
privileges of land ownership and ritual status with dominant 
positions in the agrarian social structure (Drèze and Gazdar 1996: 
33).  
 Poverty makes most untouchables, by definition, permanently 
short of cash. Since they effectively supply such cash, the programs 
executed and co-ordinated by the dust-level rural development 
bureaucracy are of immediate interest to rural untouchables. This 
cash is, furthermore, supplied in the forms of low interest loans (as 
in the IRDP), non-repayable subsidies (as in IRDP and IAY) or as 
wages in exchange for labour (JRY and EAS), all of which would 
seem to be far more attractive than their main alternative: high-
interest loans from private credit suppliers (money lenders). Adding 
to the attractiveness of rural development programs is the sheer size 
of the funds allocated through them. The annual budget for the 
poverty alleviation programs executed by the rural development 
machinery is roughly Rs. 35,000 crores, amounting to more than six 
per cent of the Indian government’s total budgetary expenditure 
(Pradhan et al. 2002: 4; Saxena 2001).  
                                                
 115 Note that these are common problems faced by all Indian poor, 
regardless of their caste or creed. Untouchables, however, face them more often, 
simply because they are more often poor than any other category of Indians. 
 116 According to Drèze and Gazdar, writing in 1996, female life 
expectancy is below 55 years, the under-five mortality rate 141 per thousand, 
and the number of maternal deaths 931 per 100,00 live births (Drèze and Gazdar 
1996: 39). 
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 What should also positively affect untouchables’ demand for 
the rural development bureaucracy’s services is the fact that it tends 
to act as a de facto monopolistic service provider. Though there are 
private and public credit suppliers other than the rural development 
bureaucracy in every locality, these credit sources –moneylenders, 
rural banks, cooperative societies- have a marked tendency to 
favour rich, high status borrowers over poor, illiterate, low status 
ones. Resultantly, the latter are far more likely to be charged 
usurious interest rates and bribes, fall prey to fraudulent accounting 
practices or to be unable to get a loan at all. Relatives and friends, 
moreover, are often not in a position to lend money to rural poor 
because they, themselves, are also often poor (Drèze et al. 1997: 
34).117 Poor villagers in desperate need of a new shelter, for example, 
thus would seem to have few realistic alternatives other than to 
solicit funding from the dust-level rural development bureaucracy.  
 Finally, there is likely to be a large, latent untouchable demand 
for the rural development bureaucracy’s services. According to N.C. 
Saxena, a former high-ranking official of the Planning Commission, 
the Rs. 35,000 crore spent annually on poverty alleviation programs, 
if directly transferred to the poor, could buy 3 kilograms of 
foodgrain from the market every day for every poor household and 
thus completely eliminate poverty (or, at least, endemic hunger) in 
India (Saxena 2001: 107). As is commonly accepted, however, 
poverty alleviation measures, despite their large outlays, have not 
been able to make a significant dent in rural poverty, let alone 
eliminate it (Gaiha 1995: 867). On the contrary, they have tended to 
suffer from various deficiencies that make the elimination of 
poverty in India a distant ideal rather than a realistic short-term 
possibility.  
 Evaluation studies routinely report a steady flow of program 
benefits to non-poor, even well-off, villagers to the neglect of the 
deserving poor targeted by the programs. Drèze, for instance, in a 
sobering assessment of IRDP in Palanpur village in Uttar Pradesh, 
found that some of the most vulnerable groups -the landless and 
households without an adult male- had practically no involvement 
                                                
 117 Interest-free lending, in fact, tends to be most restricted among the most 
deprived and vulnerable social groups (Drèze et al. 1997: 34). 
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in IRDP, while affluent households who failed to meet the 
program’s eligibility requirements were nevertheless liberally 
included in the program. IRDP in Palanpur largely failed to 
discriminate in favour of the poor, to the extent that beneficiaries 
belonged to all classes except the “very poor”. Even Palanpur’s only 
landless beneficiary turned out to belong to an affluent family 
(Drèze 1988; Drèze 1990). Lieten and Srivastava, in a more recent 
assessment of IRDP in six other UP villages, estimated the 
proportion of “non-poor and ineligible households” at a more 
reassuring 20 to 25 per cent of the total number of beneficiaries. 
They also found, however, that there were a few beneficiaries who 
had benefited from more than one instalment, indicating that “there 
are a small number of individuals who are the principal 
beneficiaries of such schemes” (Lieten and Srivastava 1999: 211).  
  Wage employment programs have also attracted widespread 
adverse publicity for poor targeting. Pant and Gupta, evaluating the 
RLEGP in two Uttar Pradesh districts, estimated that 30 to 40 per 
cent of the beneficiaries of this program came from better off-groups 
(Pant and Gupta 1991: 43). Gaiha et al., analysing all-India data 
collected by the Ministry of Rural Development, concluded that 
JRY’s targeting of the acutely poor was “dismal”. JRY-targeting in 
Uttar Pradesh, where less than half of JRY beneficiaries were 
recruited from among the poor or very poor, was even worse than 
in most other states (Gaiha et al. 1998: 930-1). Poverty alleviation 
schemes, in short, seem to be severely prone to what Cornia and 
Stewart have called F-mistakes (failures to reach the targeted 
population) and E-mistakes (interventions predominantly reach 
non-targeted population) (see Ambirajan 1999: 816). 
 Another oft-mentioned deficiency of poverty alleviation 
programs is their “corruption”. The term tends to be rather 
indiscriminately used and may refer to a variety of distinct practices 
with varying, deleterious effects on program performance. One form 
of corruption is what is also called the “siphoning off” of 
development budgets. This happens when officials skim off part of 
the budgets earmarked for allocation to beneficiaries. Siphoning off 
is commonly accepted as being quite prevalent in the Indian civil 
service though, to my knowledge, it has not been systematically 
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studied in the context of the rural development bureaucracy. 
Another, well-established form of corruption is when officials with 
discretionary power accept bribes to make decisions favouring bribe 
givers (or, as also happens, in exchange for a promise to try and do 
so). In the villages studied by Lieten and Srivastava, for example, 
IRDP beneficiaries paid on average 12 per cent of the loan amount in 
graft to sanctioning officials, though very poor beneficiaries paid 
substantially more (25 per cent) than the richest ones (8 per cent) 
(Lieten and Srivastava 1999; see also Lawania 1992).  
 A third form of corruption is when officials sell off subsidised 
material benefits –e.g. water pumps, latrines- on the market instead 
of distributing them to target groups. Also usually categorized as 
corruption are those cases in which officials –in exchange for a cut of 
the profits- allow outside contractors to effectively run employment 
generation cum rural infrastructure projects. Contractor 
involvement, which is illegal, is usually regarded as a sure indicator 
of corruption because it is felt to invite poor targeting –when 
contractors, as they are apt to, are more interested in employing 
their “own” workers than in complying with official recruitment 
guidelines- as well as abuses of funds –as when, in the absence of 
official controls, contractors overreport on the work executed and 
manpower utilised (cf. Chathukulam and Kurien 1995; Gaiha et al. 
1998: 938; Sharma 1985).  
Though evidence on the forms and extent of corruption 
remains quite patchy and circumstantial, most observers assume 
corruption to be a major cause of the substantial underachievement 
of poverty alleviation programs. Well-known rural development 
expert and public administration scholar S. R. Maheswari, for 
instance, estimated a decade ago that “up to four-fifths and more of 
public funds meant for rural development” ended up in the private 
pockets of bureaucrats, local politicians, contractors “and others of 
that ilk” (Maheswari 1995: 220, 265). And according to Hasan, 
commenting on the particularly lacklustre performance of poverty 
alleviation schemes in Uttar Pradesh, “most programmes, such as 
the IRDP, were systematically neglected and abused”, thus 
contributing to “endemic deprivation, low per capita income and 
slow economic growth” (Hasan 1998: 46).  
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 Poor targeting and corruption set aside, sometimes schemes 
are not implemented at all, leaving substantial proportions of 
budget outlays unspent. According to Gaiha et al., shortfalls of 5 to 
15 per cent in expenditure relative to budgets have been “not 
uncommon” in JRY and IRDP, for instance (Gaiha et al. 2001: 310). 
And Drèze and Gazdar, doing fieldwork in Uttar Pradesh, failed to 
observe “any sign of serious activity” under the Integrated Child 
Development Scheme.118 Other deficiencies of rural development 
programs include the often poor quality and maintenance of 
infrastructural assets created under employment generation projects 
(as exemplified by the proverbial “roads that get washed away” in 
the next monsoon) and a low level of knowledge among the poor of 
the very existence of programs meant to improve their life chances, 
automatically limiting the actual demand for the benefits they might 
bestow.  
 To conclude, the benefits allocated by the rural development 
bureaucracy are, in principle, of immediate interest to most rural 
untouchables. The fact that, in actual practice, many of these benefits 
do not seem to trickle down to them, makes the rural development 
bureaucracy an interesting and possibly very fruitful arena for a test 
of representative bureaucracy theory: it would be hard to think of 
another Indian policy area where both scope and expected demand 
for active representation might be as large as in this very case.  
 
 
4 Critical mass  
 
Bureaucrats who engage in the active representation of ingroup 
interests risk provoking opposition, hostility and counter pressures 
from outgroup colleagues, superiors, and agency clients. In such 
                                                
 118 This program, locally better known as the anganwadi program, is 
headed by the district’s Program Officer and funds so-called anganwadis, centres 
that provide day care, nutrition, and inoculations to children, and 
supplementary nutrition and health care to pregnant women and mothers of 
infants. The lack of serious activity reported by Drèze and Gazdar is all the 
more distressing because it is one of the social welfare programs to have 
received increased funding since the Indian government started cutting the 
budgets of other social welfare programs in 1991 (see Gupta 2001a).  
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circumstances it may matter a lot whether or not they can count on 
the help, protection and moral support of ingroup-colleagues. 
Preferably, there should be a considerable number –or critical mass- 
of such ingroup colleagues: the more “security in numbers”, the 
greater the likelihood of effective ingroup support (Herbert 1974: 
561). Critical mass would seem to constitute almost a precondition for 
the occurrence of active representation by ethnic minority 
bureaucrats. Since they are likely to find themselves caught between 
ingroup pressures for active representation and counter pressures 
applied by representatives of more powerful outgroups, ethnic 
minority bureaucrats may need strong numerical support from 
ingroup colleagues to be able to effectively engage and persevere in 
active representation at all.119 In present-day India, a substantial 
mass of untouchable bureaucrats is in place but whether it is also a 
critical mass remains to be seen. 
 Until, say, six decades ago, the question of untouchable active 
representation would have been a non-issue, simply because at that 
time there hardly were any untouchable officials who might do the 
active representing. Though British colonial bureaucracies 
employed large numbers of native clerks, soldiers, judges, 
policemen, informants and collaborators, they hardly recruited any 
untouchables.120 Illiteracy, of course, disqualified the vast majority 
                                                
 119 Hindera and Young provide some empirical evidence for this 
proposition. Examining the interaction effect between black and white passive 
representations in district offices of the US Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, they found white bureaucrats to be more responsive to blacks 
when black bureaucrats became the “largest plurality” (Hindera and Young 
1998). A substantial critical mass may thus weaken outgroup resistance to 
minority active representation. Some theorists emphasize that a critical mass 
need not consist solely of colleagues within the same agency. External, but close, 
minority actors –e.g. politicians, top-administrators, community leaders- in the 
agency’s environment may also provide sympathetic support (cf. Keiser et al. 
2002: 557; Meier 1993a: 398; Thompson 1976). 
 120 From 1757 to 1947, most of the Indian subcontinent, including present-
day Pakistan and Bangladesh, was ruled by the British. However, because it was 
much cheaper to hire natives than to import “Europeans”, most of the people who 
did the actual work of the British colonial state in India were not British but 
Indians. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the over-all ratio of British 
to Indians in the Madras Government, for instance, was never less than 1 to 4.4. 
Discounting military personnel, this ratio was roughly 1 to 100. And if only civil 
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of untouchables for clerical occupations.121 But even in subordinate 
posts in the army and the constabulary –for which literacy was not a 
requirement- untouchables, with few exceptions, were quite rare.122  
Though relatively little is known about how, exactly, the 
colonial state recruited its subordinate personnel, from what has 
been written about it a number of reasons for the absence of 
untouchables may be distilled. First, even if native personnel were 
formally recruited by British officers, the recruitment process itself 
could be decisively manipulated by native bureaucrats in influential 
positions. Often, these influential natives used their “silent 
influence” to recruit relatives to new or vacant posts, thus creating 
caste-bound “service monopolies” in the various echelons and posts 
of local, subordinate colonial bureaucracies (Bayly 1975; Frykenberg 
1965). Most often, such service monopolies involved upper caste 
families, particularly Brahmins and scribal status groups, like the 
Kayasths in north India.123 Due to their illiteracy, positions of silent 
                                                                                                                                          
servants are considered, the ratio was roughly one European for every 170 to 190 
Indians (Frykenberg 1965: 7). According to one estimate, by the time of Indian 
independence, three million Indians were employed in the colonial bureaucracy 
(Potter 1996).  
 121 For the greatest part of British colonial rule, schools appear to have 
been by and large off-limits to untouchable pupils. Tradition has it that, in 1856, 
a boy from Dharwar, in Bombay Presidency, was the first untouchable ever to be 
enrolled in a school (Van Gool 1996). In Madras Presidency, where 
untouchables constituted roughly 20 percent of the population, they made up 
only 0,8 per cent of the total population under instruction in 1880 
(Radhakrishnan 1990: 510). In 1911, a mere 0,13 per cent of the UP untouchables 
was literate, as compared to 1 per cent of the intermediate (Shudra) castes and 11 
per cent of the “twice-born” upper castes (Chaudhury 2004: 1989).  
122 Notable exceptions were the Bombay regiments of the Indian Army, 
which recruited large numbers of Mahar soldiers in the first half of the 19th 
century. Though mostly employed as footsoldiers, some Mahars even made it 
to the rank of officer and non-commissioned officer. Mahar soldiers played a 
crucial role in the fight at Koregaon on the 1st of January 1818, when the 
Maratha regiment of the colonial army –consisting of 600 Mahar soldiers, two 
dozen European gunners and a few European officers- defeated the Peshwa’s 
army after long and heavy “hand to hand conflict” (Robertson 1938: 62).  
123 In a fascinating study of colonial administration in the south Indian 
district of Guntur between 1788-1848, Robert Frykenberg has traced how local 
networks of Brahmin officers succeeded in capturing the district’s bureaucracy 
from the nominal control of a handful of British officials. “These officers”, 
writes Frykenberg, “became free from supervision and acquired the perquisites 
4 Favourable conditions 124
influence were well out of grasp of the untouchables. Their marginal 
presence in colonial bureaucracies therefore depended in large part 
on the benevolence and patronage of local, native, largely upper 
caste service groups.124 
 Second, untouchables were sometimes excluded even from 
lowly, non-clerical posts because they were untouchables. The 
Madras constabulary, for instance, from the 1860s onwards, 
expressly excluded untouchables. Since they were “pariahs” and 
therefore severely handicapped in “mixing with the people”, 
colonial recruiters considered them unable to carry out basic police 
duties like conducting searches, making arrests and patrolling caste-
Hindu areas of towns and villages (Arnold 1985: 6).  
What further decreased untouchables’ chances for government 
employment was that colonial recruiters sometimes let themselves 
be guided by the new “knowledge” of Indian caste society which 
became available in the wake of census operations and ethnographic 
surveys. Over time, colonial officials and scholars became 
increasingly engrossed in the ranking, standardising and cross-
referencing of caste listings on principles derived from Western 
zoology and botanical classification. The caste classifications arising 
from these exercises purportedly established who was superior to 
                                                                                                                                          
and dignities of power. The aura of divinity, the borrowed glow of the Huzur 
[the royal presence; the presence of superior authority], so clung to them that 
they could walk like giants” (Frykenberg 1965: 230). In the colonial 
administration of the north Indian district of Allahabad -not too far from field 
district Sitapur-, posts in the tehsil (sub-district) offices were monopolised by 
members of the old service communities, particularly Kayasths and Muslims, as 
well as Brahmins. In the district and higher offices, a wider range of service 
communities including domiciled Anglo-Indians and Eurasians, occupied 
posts. The police establishment, on the other hand, remained a preserve of 
Muslims and, among Hindus, of Rajput families. The vast majority of patwaris 
and kanungos (village accountants and their supervisors, respectively) were 
either Kayasth or Muslim (Bayly 1975: 24-5). 
 124 The lack of such benevolence and patronage apparently caused the 
drying up of Mahar (west Indian untouchable caste, bvg) recruitment to the 
Bombay army regiments, where Mahars had once been numerous. According to 
Robertson, “after the defeat of the Peshwa the Bombay army came more and 
more into touch with the northern regiments. In the Hindustani regiments the 
men put caste before the regiment [which effected] a change of devotion from 
the corps to the caste” (Robertson 1938: 65). 
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whom by virtue of their supposed purity, occupational origins and 
collective moral worth. Those who built these classifications were 
often inspired by the logic of the varna system and considered every 
jati as a fixed unit possessing a known place and status which could 
be measured against that of any other caste (Bayly 1999: 125;  cf. also 
Dirks 2001: 14).  
What thus evolved were convenient hierarchical orderings of 
indigenous society picturing India’s population as composed of self-
contained entities called castes, each with its own distinctive 
characteristics (Arnold 1985: 7). To colonial administrators, the 
knowledge and way of thinking of the classificatory exercises could, 
obviously, seem quite useful. They reassuringly gave the illusion of 
knowing the people and made it unnecessary to differentiate too 
much among individual Indians: “A man was a Brahmin, and 
Brahmins had certain characteristics” (Cohn, cited in Arnold 1985: 
7).125  
To untouchables, however, the characteristics imputed to them 
by colonial ethnographers were sometimes far from flattering. 
Informed by a growing conviction that they were “habitual 
criminals”, untouchables sometimes ended up being categorized by 
such unfavourable labels as the “lawless Maravan”, the “thievish 
Kallar”, or the “restless Kuravan” (Arnold 1985; Bayly 1999: 123-
124).126 Where this happened, their prospects of being hired as 
                                                
125 It should be stressed that the value and accuracy of these 
classifications were not commonly accepted in colonial circles. Many scholar-
officials criticized the idea that castes could be identified in terms of botanical or 
zoological specimens, and regarded the ensuing classifications as caricatures of 
the complex and multi-faceted reality of caste (Bayly 1999: 125). Bayly discusses 
the work of such scholar-officials as Ibbetson, Crooke, Blunt and Nesfield who 
developed much more flexible and context-sensitive (and, hence, less rigidly 
essentializing and stereotypical) interpretations of caste as “fluid 
representation[s] of status as claimed by men of power” (Bayly 1999: 139). 
William Crooke, for example, who authored an elaborate ethnographic study of 
the tribes and castes in north western India (including present-day Awadh), 
saw caste as “rather a matter of sociology than of religion” and claimed that 
“the primitive so-called division of the people into Brahmans, Kshatriyas, 
Vasiyas and Sudras does not agree with existing facts” (Crooke 1974 (1896): 
xxvi) . 
 126 Colonial preoccupations with the innate criminality of certain castes 
were often informed by propositions and ideas from ethnology -the science of 
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servants of the British raj, of course, drastically diminished.127 In the 
Madras constabulary studied by Arnold, for example, it was their 
supposed criminal nature –apart from their pariahness- which made 
untouchables unsuitable for enrolment in the police. By the mid-
1880s, Madras police recruiters acted on the principle “that ‘low 
                                                                                                                                          
race- which acquired the status of an authoritative scholarly discipline in the 
second half of the 19th century. Also in India, for some time, ethnologists 
successfully advocated the idea that humanity was composed of peoples whose 
essential characteristics -weakness or strength, subjugation or dominance, 
slavishness or freedom-loving individualism- were racially, that is 
physiologically, determined (Bayly 1999: 132-3). Ideas about the racially 
endowed, innate criminality of untouchables (and other castes) gained wide 
currency through district manuals and gazetteers, census reports and 
ethnographical compilations (Arnold 1985: 7-8). Ethnological applications to 
Indian society also became codified in law. In 1871, the colonial government 
introduced the first of a series of Criminal Tribes Acts which contained lists of 
the “tribes, gangs, or classes” it declared as being “addicted to the systematic 
commission of non-bailable offences”. Members of the listed tribes were obliged 
to register with the local magistrate and be preferably –and forcibly- removed 
to “permanent reformatory settlements” (labour camps). Though initially 
mainly comprising of wandering minstrels, fakirs, petty traders, rustic 
transporters and disbanded groups of soldiers, over time the category of 
criminal tribes became increasingly open-ended to also include castes. The Pasis, 
one of the two large untouchable castes in fieldwork district Sitapur, for 
instance, used to be a “criminal tribe” (Government of the United Provinces and 
Oudh 1920).  
127 Whereas untouchables and other castes, like Bengali Brahmins and 
“parasitic” Rajputs, fell from grace as a result of ethnologically informed 
stereotyping, others, like the “sturdy” Jats and the “manly”, comparatively 
“casteless”, “martial” Sikhs and Gurkhas from the Punjab and Nepal, gained 
official esteem. Punjab and Nepal became, in effect, important recruitment 
grounds for the Indian army. 
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caste men’ were to be chosen only in areas where recruits were 
otherwise difficult to obtain” (Arnold 1985: 6).128 
 A combination of illiteracy, adverse selection by upper caste 
civil service monopolies, pariahness and official pejorative labelling 
thus conspired to prevent the untouchables from building up any 
kind of significant presence in the vast complex of colonial 
subordinate administrative agencies. For the better part of colonial 
rule, untouchables did not feature as employees of the colonial state, 
except perhaps as in their caste-prescribed semi-official roles of 
sweepers and village watchmen (Arnold 1985; Bayly 1975). It was 
not before 1934, for instance, that untouchables started being 
recruited to the subordinate ranks of the police force -as opposed to 
“employment” as village watchmen- in the United Provinces 
(present-day Uttar Pradesh) (Gooptu 1993: 279-80). 
If untouchable representation in the subordinate services was 
virtually negligible, it was almost totally absent at the apex of 
colonial bureaucracy, the renowned Indian Civil Service (ICS).129 In 
Britain, after 1750, positions in the East India Company and, later 
on, the ICS became highly sought after (Cohn 1966; De Zwart 
1994).130 But since entrance to the Company was, initially, regulated 
                                                
128 The relatively sparse scholarly attention paid to colonial recruitment 
of subordinate, native personnel also means that little is known about the scale 
and geography of such ethnologically informed hiring. There is, for instance, 
reason to assume, as Susan Bayly has suggested, that the credibility of 
ethnological stereotypes may have varied with British officers’ experiences of 
particular regions: “[I]t seems likely that the ideas of the ethnologists about 
human actions as expressions of immutable scientific laws and race essences 
would have sounded more persuasive to officials with experience of Bengal and 
the far south, rather than other provinces” (Bayly 1999: 140). Such and related 
hypotheses would seem to be fascinating questions for administrative 
historians to explore.  
129 ICS officers manned almost all the important administrative positions 
in British India, as well as most of the higher judicial offices: the ICS supplied 
the Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners, the chief administrators in 
the provinces and the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, and the District 
Magistrates. Besides, ICS officers served as District and Sessions Judges and 
held a portion of seats in all the provincial High Courts (Spangenberg 1976: xii). 
130 The principal reason for the popularity of employment in the East 
India Company was that it could be turned into a very profitable affair. Huge 
fortunes could be amassed by deploying the Company’s financial and military 
means and commercial rights to private purposes through moneylending, 
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through patronage, the pool from which the early senior colonial 
officials were recruited was fairly small: essentially London-based 
banking and commercial families and landed groups from Scotland 
and the southeast of England (Cohn 1966: 110-11).131 The 
replacement, in 1855, of patronage by selection through open 
competition appreciably widened the social base of British colonial 
elite administrators. “Aristocrats” –holding more than a quarter of 
ICS positions in the five years prior to the introduction of 
competitive examinations- quickly lost ground to individuals from 
the “lower middle classes”: the sons of accountants, farmers, millers, 
druggists, and railway workers (Spangenberg 1976: 19).132 
Though the new system of open competition also opened up 
the possibility for Indians to join the ICS, for quite some time only 
very few managed to do so.133 The practical barriers for Indians 
seeking entrance -examinations held only in London, low age limits 
preventing sufficient mastery of English- reflected a stubborn and 
widespread opposition among British officers against the 
“Indianization” of the ICS, despite continuous pressure from 
“Indian educated classes” and British politicians with “advanced” 
or “moderate” opinions. Anti-Indianization lobbyists often opposed 
the recruitment of Indians on the grounds that they, unlike British 
officers, would be incapable of impartiality. The many religious and 
social divisions of India, they argued, simply made it unwise to rely 
on “native discretion” (Spangenberg 1976: 5).134 
                                                                                                                                          
bribe-taking, private trade activities and the supply of troops to Indian princes. 
Company servants who had returned to Britain after having become rich in 
India were commonly called “nabobs” (after the governors under the Mughal 
empire which preceded British rule) (Cohn 1966; De Zwart 1994).  
131 According to Bernard Cohn, between 1840 and 1860 the vast majority 
of the civil servants who governed India may have been drawn from a 
restricted recruitment pool of “fifty or sixty interconnected families” (Cohn 
1966: 110-11).  
132 Remember how J. Donald Kingsley appropriately referred to the reform 
of 1855 and the ensuing widening of British bureaucracy’s social base as the 
middle class’s “move on the civil service” (chapter 2). 
133 By 1888, more than three decades after the introduction of competitive 
examinations, only twelve Indians had secured access to the ICS (Spangenberg 
1976: x). And out of the 538 men recruited to the ICS between 1904 and 1913, only 
37 were Indians (see Potter 1996: 83). 
134 The bureau-politics of anti-Indianization is vividly described in 
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 From 1922 onwards the representation of Indians in the ICS 
rapidly increased. Not only had it become much easier for Indians to 
enter the competition -examinations were now also held in 
Allahabad- the interests of British individuals in taking the ICS 
examination simultaneously and drastically declined. Besides, there 
was the necessity to meet the recommendations of the Lee 
Commission on Indianization, which required that 40 per cent of the 
direct recruits to the ICS were to be Indians (Potter 1996: 90). In the 
period 1915-1924, Indians accounted for 44 per cent of all ICS recruits, 
increasing to almost 55 per cent between 1925 and 1935. Between 1936 
and 1943 -when all ICS recruitment was stopped- more than half of 
ICS recruits (roughly 52 per cent) were Indians (calculated from Potter 
1996: 97). Indianization of the ICS largely followed the pattern of 
passive representation in the subordinate ranks. Indian ICS officials 
overwhelmingly came from comfortable, professional, and service-
class family backgrounds. They had typically been educated in 
English language schools and universities. Some of them had 
attended British universities. The large majority –around 70 per cent, 
or 400 to 500 individuals in the 1930s- of Indian ICS officials were 
Hindus, among whom Brahmins and Kayasths predominated. In 
contrast, not more than two untouchables made it to the ICS.135 
 Even if they did not employ many untouchables themselves, 
the British can be credited with triggering the rapid growth of 
untouchable public employment after Indian independence. 
Beginning in the 1920s, the British faced increasingly forceful 
demands for self-rule by the Gandhi-led Congress. Though they 
were happy to contemplate and introduce limited forms of native 
political participation, for as long as this seemed a realistic 
                                                                                                                                          
Spangenberg’s study of the behind-the-scene manipulations surrounding the 
installation and functioning of the Public Service Commission of 1886-1887. This 
commission, better known as the Aitchison commission (after its chairman), was 
asked to evaluate the possibilities of enhancing the proportion of native officers in 
the ICS and suffered considerable sabotage from anti-Indianization lobbyists 
(Spangenberg 1977). 
 135 Potter mentions the nomination, in 1940, of the single untouchable ICS 
recruit (Potter 1996: 118). Ross Mallick, however, claims two untouchable 
brothers from the Bengali Namasudra caste secured access to the ICS (Mallick 
1997: 351).  
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possibility they were not willing to give up their rule. In breaking 
up the unity of nationalist purpose, the British’ preferred strategy 
was to foster disagreements and rifts among native leaders and to 
facilitate the mobilization of minority groups that were willing to 
oppose Congress and its claim of speaking on behalf of the entire 
Indian nation. A commonly used device was to lure and reward 
dissenting groups with benefits (nominated seats in representative 
bodies, separate electorates, reservations) that they could only avail 
by asserting their separateness from the Indian nation which 
Congress claimed to represent. 
 For many decades, Indian Muslims were the primary targets 
of this colonial divide and rule strategy but the untouchables, also, 
were urged to play their part. The British cherished dissenting 
untouchables because there were, as Secretary of State L.S. Amery 
explained, “politically very considerable advantages in having two 
substantial minorities to whom consideration has to be paid, and 
not to be put in the position of being merely labelled pro-Muslim 
and anti-Hindu” (cited in Shourie 1997: 85-6).136 The untouchables, 
led by Ambedkar, repeatedly proved more than willing to raise 
their own, dissenting voice in anticipation of special consideration 
by the colonial leadership (Galanter 1984;  see e.g. Gupta 1985; 
                                                
136 Amery wrote this in a 1942 letter to Viceroy Linlithgow. In the same 
letter, Amery argued for giving the untouchables “a substantial leg-up”, and for 
“assimilating their position increasingly to that of the Muslims”. Amery 
realized, however, that rewarding dissenting untouchables was likely to be 
more complicated than placating co-operating Muslim leaders. Reservations in 
the services, he feared, were of doubtful use because the untouchables might 
“not be able to produce a sufficient number of educated candidates”. 
Linlithgow, responding a month later, shared Amery’s point “as to the political 
importance of recognizing so great a minority as the Depresses Classes actually 
are”. Like Amery he also regretted the “trouble” that the untouchables were so 
“extraordinarily short of personnel of any quality”: “Ambedkar himself is 
outstanding. Little Rajah from Madras is not bad but not striking. Siva Raj, 
whom we have sent to America, has a good deal of edge to him and might 
come on very well. But there are precious few others whom one has heard of in 
the community” (Shourie 1997: 85-6).  
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Shourie 1997).137 In fact, a simplistic but quite accurate way of 
understanding Indian independence would be to see it as a 
distributive solution to British manufactured group antagonism 
whereby “Hindus got India, Muslims got Pakistan and the 
scheduled castes and tribes got reservations” (Sandanshiva, quoted 
in Shah 1991: 606). 
Of course, nothing would have prevented India’s new leaders 
to abolish the ascription-based policies and benefits instituted by the 
British after they had wrested independence from them. By the time 
the Constituent Assembly (1946-1950) came round to discussing the 
question of reservations in the services for untouchables, however, 
the issue turned out to be surprisingly non-controversial. Though, 
after prolonged debate, members of the assembly did decide to 
eliminate the reserved seats and separate electorates for Muslims, 
Sikhs, Christians, and other minorities (which had been provided 
for in the last colonial constitution, the Act of 1935), they retained, 
without much discussion, the quotas for untouchables and tribals 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 40).138 Most participants in these 
debates straight out accepted that the untouchables had a rightful 
claim to special treatment by the new Indian state as a compensation 
for the historical maltreatment meted out to them by Hindu society. 
Some also expected reservations to act as a guarantee against any 
future maltreatment of untouchables by the state. Untouchable 
officers, they emphasized, would surely act as watchdogs over 
                                                
 137 A famous clash between Ambedkar and Gandhi occurred in 1932. In 
the consultations preceding the drafting of a new constitution for India, 
Ambedkar –like other minority leaders had done for their groups- had claimed 
separate electorates for untouchables, a claim that chimed in perfectly with 
overall British strategy. Gandhi, however, claiming to represent the “vast mass 
of the untouchables” in his “own person”, vowed to resist such separate 
electorates for untouchables with his life and started fasting “unto death” 
(Galanter 1984: 31; Gupta 1985: 291). In the end, Ambedkar saved Gandhi’s life 
by dropping his claim of a separate electorate in exchange for more reserved 
seats in the provincial assemblies. The deal between Gandhi and Ambedkar 
became known as the Poona Pact.  
138 How undisputed reservations for untouchables were at the time is 
illustrated by the low attendance of the sessions during which they were 
discussed. Only 103 out of 324 members participated in the sessions, most of 
whom spoke only once or twice (Saksena 1981: xviii). 
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untouchable interests, something which could, arguably, not be 
expected from the “machinery of the old pattern” operated by 
“officers belonging to Brahmin and allied castes” (Chanchreek 1991: 
127-8; Saksena 1981: 373).139 
 Since their retention at independence, reservations have been 
instrumental in fostering a substantial untouchable bureaucracy. In 
the central services, as table 1 shows, the increase of untouchable 
representation has been most notable in the three highest classes, 
covering senior administrative (Class I), other administrative (Class 
II) and clerical (Class III) positions.  
 
Table 1. Representation of untouchables in central services,  
1953-1995 
Year Class I Class II Class III Class IV Pop.  
 N % N % N % N % % 
1953 20 0.4 113 1.3 24.819 4.5 161.958 20.5  
1960  1.2  2.5  7.2  17.2 14,7 
1963 250 1.8 707 3.0 84.714 9.3 151.176 17.2  
1965  1.6  2.8  8.9  17.8  
1970  2.3  3.8  9.9  18.1 14,8 
1974 1.094 3.2 2.401 4.6 161.775 10.3 230.864 18.6  
1975  3.4  5.0  10.7  18.6  
1980  5.0  8.5  13.4  19.5  
1984  6.9  10.4  14.0  20.2 15.6 
1987 4.746 8.2 7.847 10.5 307.980 14.5 234.614 20.1  
1995 6.637 10.2 13.797 12.7 378.172 16.2 221.380 21.3  
Sources: Galanter 1984: 88-9; Kumar 1994; Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 135; 
NCSCST 1998: 176; Radhakrishnan 1991: 1920. 
                                                
 139 “In the circumstances”, as Prof. Yashwant Rai, an assembly member 
from East Punjab, phrased this expectation, “I cannot believe that the Federal 
Public Service Commission or other Commissions will not be injustice (sic) in 
the case of Harijans. I believe there will certainly be injustice in their case. We 
see that in the subordinate services the principle of providing friends and 
relatives alone is followed. Recommendations are made for relations. I have 
seen that even the Ministers speak to the Members on the phone in regard to 
their candidates and secure interviews for them . . . I want to impress that there 
should be some representatives of the Harijans on the Federal Public Service 
Commission and the Commission which are (sic) formed in the States and 
provinces so that they may watch over the interests of the candidates who apply for 
different posts and who may prevent any injustice being done to Harijans” (cited in 
Saksena 1981: 431, emphasis mine). 
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Untouchable representation in Class IV –comprising such positions 
as peon (office-bearer), sweeper and other menial occupations 
traditionally associated with impurity and low caste status- has 
remained more or less stable since the early 1950s. The percentual 
increases cover very large increases in absolute numbers. The total 
number of Class I and Class II untouchable bureaucrats in the 
central services rose from 133 in 1953 to 20,434 in 1995. In class I, 
where the percentual representation of untouchable bureaucrats 
multiplied with a factor 29, their absolute numbers rose no less than 
331-fold. For class II, these figures were 9.83 and 122 respectively. 
Figures on untouchable representation in the state 
bureaucracies are notoriously scarce, incomplete and unreliable. In 
Uttar Pradesh, where untouchables constitute a larger percentage of 
the population than in India as a whole (21 per cent versus 15 per 
cent)- untouchable representation in the two highest administrative 
groups hovered around 10 percent in 1996 (Table 2). In groups C 
and D, the untouchables’ percentual shares in civil service positions 
roughly tripled between 1970 and 1996.140 
 
Table 2. Representation of untouchables in UP state bureaucracy, 
1970-1996 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D Pop.% 
 N % N % N % N %  
1970 <2.0> - 6.0 - 6.8 21.0 
1985 - 6.8 - 7.5 - 13.6 - 17.8 21.2 
1995* 634 9.4 2110 12.1 45575 15.5 27666 18.6 21.1 
1996** 852 9.0 3209 10.9 76858 16.4 30020 20.6 21.1 
*  Data with respect to 42 Departments 
** Data with respect to 50 Departments  
Sources: NCSCST, Third Report; Fourth Report; Radhakrishnan 1991: 1921 
 
Though untouchable passive representation in the UP state 
bureaucracy has drastically increased both proportionally and 
absolutely since independence, it has not yet reached the -officially 
intended- level of proportional representation, except in the lowliest 
group D.141 Another exception (not mentioned in table 2) is the 
                                                
 140 “Groups” are equivalent to “classes”.   
 141 Proportional representation, of course, is reached when the proportion 
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Indian Administrative Service (IAS), the successor of the colonial 
ICS. In this most prestigious cadre, untouchable representation has 
also reached a proportional level. In 1999, approximately 114 (or 21 
per cent) out of the 541 officers of the Uttar Pradesh IAS cadre were 
untouchables (Appointment Department 1999).142  
Even if, with two exceptions, untouchable passive 
representation in the Uttar Pradesh bureaucracy is still falling 
somewhat short of officially intended levels, there is no denying that 
untouchables have built up, almost from scratch, a substantial 
presence in the post-independence Uttar Pradesh bureaucracy. 
Untouchable bureaucrats are present in all echelons, in all 
departments and, quite probably, in every single agency or office. An 
untouchable IAS officer has occupied the highest administrative 
position in the state bureaucracy, that of chief secretary, untouchable 
officers have headed important departments like Appointments, 
Public Works, Energy, and Excise and served as hand-picked 
secretaries to various chief ministers. In Uttar Pradesh, the 
untouchables now form the second-largest caste block of officials, 
after the upper castes, whose numerical predominance continues to 
be formidable.143 In the dust-level rural development bureaucracy in 
                                                                                                                                          
of group-identified bureaucrats in a given bureaucracy equals the proportion of 
that group in society. Given fully efficient implementation and an adequate 
supply of untouchables meeting the minimum recruitment criteria, this level 
should have been reached by the mid-1980s (cf. Galanter 1984). 
 142 IAS officers, like their ICS forerunners, man the most important 
positions in India’s civil bureaucracy, both in the central government and the 
respective state governments. Though the IAS is a national, “all-India” cadre, IAS-
officers are assigned to a specific state cadre from which, at various points in their 
careers, they may be deputed to the centre in New Delhi. The number of 
untouchable IAS officers in Uttar Pradesh (114) is an estimate. It was arrived at 
with the help of a retired senior officer of the UP government and an active 
member of the IAS who were kind enough to supply me with what they knew or 
thought to be the caste of all 541 IAS officers in the gradation list (both wished to 
remain anonymous).  
 143 Between 1984 and 1990 upper castes –notably Brahmins, Kayasths, 
Rajputs, Banias and Khatris- predominated in all important group 1 and 2 
positions in the UP bureaucracy, supplying never less than two-thirds of 
principal secretaries and secretaries (the senior most positions in government 
departments), 80 per cent of the heads of department, 72 per cent of special 
secretaries, 90 per cent of joint secretaries, 80 per cent of district magistrates, 75 
per cent of deputy and under secretaries, 84 per cent of class 1 secretariat 
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Sitapur, also, untouchables are, largely due to reservations, well 
represented among the officials entrusted with the allocation of 
program benefits to the rural poor. Five of the nineteen block 
development officers (BDOs) are untouchables, as well as 58 of the 
263 village level officers.144 The question which remains to be 
answered, of course, is whether this substantial presence is also 
critical, in the sense that it allows untouchable bureaucrats to act as 
active representatives in the face of likely efforts of outgroup 
representatives to prevent them from doing so.  
 
 
5 Dust-level discretion 
 
Though discretion is inherent to bureaucratic organization, some 
bureaucracies and administrative roles clearly possess more of it 
than others. Since their work is highly routinized through standard 
operating procedures, bureaucrats inhabiting the middle and lower 
levels of machine bureaucracies, for instance, typically have far less 
discretion in influencing organizations’ outcomes than their 
managers at the top or than employees working at hierarchically 
similar echelons in professional bureaucracies (cf. Mintzberg 1979: 
322, 371-4).145 Similarly, clerical and maintenance personnel do not 
                                                                                                                                          
officers and 79 per cent of the section officers. Similarly, between 1985 and 1990, 
upper castes held most of the senior positions in the UP police force, providing 
at least 79 per cent of director generals and inspector generals, 88 per cent of the 
deputy inspector generals, directors and joint directors, and 80 per cent of 
divisional officers (Verma et al. 1993). And in 1999, 353 (or 65 per cent) out of 
the 541 UP IAS officers were upper castes.  
 144 The large extent to which the substantial presence of untouchables in 
the dust-level rural development bureaucracy is due to reservations is borne 
out by data that I collected in a survey on forty village-level officers in seven 
blocks in Sitapur district. Among these forty VLOs there were thirteen 
untouchables, ten of whom admitted to occupying reserved posts. Of the 
remaining three, one claimed to have gotten his job through open competition, 
while the other two declined to answer the question. Since securing service 
employment without the help of reservations tends to be a matter of pride, it is 
likely that these two also occupied reserved posts. 
 145 Machine bureaucracies, as described by Mintzberg, are characterized 
by highly rationalized workflows; standardized workprocesses; formalization 
of behaviour; narrowly defined, vertically and horizontally specialized jobs; 
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usually possess the kind of discretion that might enable them to 
further the interests of ingroup members outside the organization 
(Meier 1993a: 397).  
 Because they typically bestow high levels of discretion to 
individual employees in supplying important services, 
representative bureaucracy theorists consider street-level 
bureaucracies particularly hospitable to the occurrence of active 
representation (Meier 1975: 542; Peters 1989: 99-105; Thompson 
1976: 208-9). Even if its employees roam dusty roads rather than 
paved streets, the Indian dust-level rural development bureaucracy 
grants its workers quite a bit of room to manoeuvre and ample 
opportunities to intervene on behalf of clients as well as to 
discriminate among them (Lipsky 1980). In fact, such opportunities 
would seem to be even greater in the dust-level rural development 
bureaucracy than in many of its street-level counterparts in western 
political systems.  
 As mentioned earlier, for purposes of rural development 
administration, each district –there were 83 of them in Uttar Pradesh 
in 1999- has been divided into geographical units known as blocks. In 
Uttar Pradesh there are, on average, a little over 14 blocks in each 
district (Pradesh 1995: 52). The average population and number of 
villages in each block differ across states. In Uttar Pradesh, each block 
comprises on average 83 villages, or gram panchayats, with an 
average population of roughly 1230 each.146 The typical block in Uttar 
                                                                                                                                          
and the engagement of operating echelons in simple and repetitive tasks that 
require little skill, training and judgement. Both power and discretion in 
machine bureaucracies rest with the managers of the strategic apex, leaving 
hardly any discretionary room to manoeuvre to middle managers and -
discounting its power to disrupt or sabotage operations- virtually none at all to 
the “operating core” (Mintzberg 1979: 322). Professional bureaucracies, by 
contrast, disseminate their power directly to their workers; provide them with 
extensive autonomy; command little close coordination with peers; and require 
the exercise of considerable judgement.  
 146 What I refer to as villages are officially known as gram panchayats. A 
gram panchayat, literally, is a village council. Its jurisdiction may coincide with 
the boundaries of a single village, but often it is a little larger than that. In Uttar 
Pradesh, each gram panchayat consists on average of 1.5 villages (Government 
of Uttar Pradesh 1995: 52). Since it may be confusing to use the term gram 
panchayat to refer to both the area of jurisdiction of a village council and to the 
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Pradesh thus has a population of around 120,000.  
The Block office, generally simply called “block” (in English) 
by both staff and villagers, is usually housed in a small cluster of 
buildings just outside or at the edge of a small town or bigger 
village. A block is headed by the Block Development Officer (BDO). 
The BDO is responsible for co-ordinating the efficient 
implementation of development programs, the guidance and 
supervision of the block functionaries under his control, ensuring 
compliance with government orders and instructions and the proper 
utilisation of funds, and the maintenance of accounts and records. 
Besides, the BDO also acts as the secretary and chief executive 
officer of the kshetra panchayat, the elective political body at block 
level chaired by the pramukh (Bhambhri 1969: 136; Maheswari 1995: 
222). The BDO is assisted by a variable number of Assistant 
Development Officers (ADOs) who specialize in functions like 
agriculture, village governance (panchayats), cooperatives, and 
statistics, and by clerical and non-clerical staff (driver of BDO’s jeep, 
sweeper). The block staff is complemented by a contingent of 
Village Level Officers (VLOs). Supervised by the BDO, VLOs are 
frontline workers entrusted with the implementation of rural 
development programs in clusters of 5 to 10 villages.147 At the start 
of my fieldwork, in the winter of 1999, an average block office had 
25 to 30 employees, VLOs included. 
 Of all block employees, VLOs would appear to be the best 
placed to engage in active representation. As the rural development 
machinery’s lowest, “multipurpose” representative it is the VLO’s 
job to explain the benefits and procedures of rural development 
programs to villagers, prepare shortlists of potential beneficiaries, 
assist eligible villagers in securing rural development benefits, 
prepare village development plans, report on the progress of rural 
development programs, and to refer difficult problems to senior 
staff in the block office. Besides, he is expected to “specially help 
                                                                                                                                          
village council itself, throughout the remainder of this study I will use the term 
“village” to refer to the former. 
 147 Rural development officials refer to these village clusters as nyay 
panchayats. Nyay panchayats (literally justice councils) used to be geographical 
units for justice administration but, as such, have now become defunct. 
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sections needing special assistance”, act as “the principal and 
effective channel of communication” between villagers and the 
development authorities higher up and, generally, to be a “friendly 
guide”. In taking care of all this, the VLO –locals simply call him the 
“secretary”- can directly influence the selection of beneficiaries of 
rural development programs (Maheswari 1995). 
 The VLO’s job involves a lot of discretion.148 To begin with, 
there is the discretion springing from the vague mandates in his job 
description. It is in large part up to individual VLOs to interpret and 
decide as to which villagers, exactly, are in need of information 
about rural development programs’ procedures, benefits, and 
eligibility requirements; who needs assistance in securing benefits 
and who can manage on his or her own; what issues and actions 
should be given priority in the village development plan; which 
problems are difficult or pressing enough so as to be referred to 
their superiors in the block offices; which are the sections of 
villagers that need special help, as well as who can be said to belong 
to these sections and who cannot.  
 VLOs, of course, need not only rely on vague mandates to 
know what is expected of them. Vague mandates are 
operationalized in more detailed prescriptive rules laid down in 
service manuals and program implementation guidelines. More 
often than not, however, these more detailed rules increase rather 
than curb VLOs’ discretion. They are, in effect, so numerous, 
detailed and complex as to make them quite impractical. A good –
and by no means extraordinary- example are the astonishingly 
complex rules prescribing VLOs how to draw up a list of 
prospective beneficiaries from among villagers living below the 
poverty line (BPLs, in officialese) for a housing subsidy under the 
Indira housing scheme (IAY).  
 The IAY implementation guidelines stipulate that VLOs, in 
assessing the eligibility of candidate beneficiaries, should take into 
account various criteria according to a fixed order of preference: 
homeless people are to be considered first, followed by families with 
                                                
 148 The data on dust-level discretion in the Sitapur development 
bureaucracy were collected during fieldtrips to the district in September and 
October 1998 and February and March 1999. 
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thatched-roof houses, families with mud-walled houses and, finally, 
families living in mud houses. In applying this preference order 
VLOs should also take into account candidates’ castes: at least 60 
per cent of the beneficiaries are to be recruited from among the 
untouchables. Not all untouchables, however, are equally eligible. In 
order to assess the eligibility of untouchable candidates within the 
60 per cent quota, VLOs should apply a second order of preference: 
bonded labourers are to be given priority, followed by victims of 
upper caste atrocities, families without a male breadwinner, victims 
of “national calamities”, villagers whose huts were burnt and, 
finally, ordinary poor untouchables (BPLs).  
 VLOs who would somehow manage to comply with the above 
rules would still not have fully complied with all the rules, however. 
To determine the eligibility of poor, non-untouchable candidates 
aspiring to a subsidy from within the remaining 40 per cent quota, 
VLOs are to apply a third order of precedence: retired army persons 
or their widows or family members take priority, followed by 
disabled persons and, lastly, ordinary non-untouchable poor. 
Besides, in ranking non-untouchable candidates, VLOs should take 
care not to exclude all disabled persons from the list (even if this 
meant bypassing candidates from among retired army persons or 
their widows or family members), as 3 per cent of the subsidies from 
the 40 per cent quota are reserved for them.  
 These rules are, as VLOs themselves are quick to emphasize, 
eminently unworkable. The biggest problem is that, apart from 
poorly updated lists of BPLs and sketchy census data on 
untouchable village populations, there are no available official 
registrations that categorize villagers according to the numerous 
criteria covered by the three orders of preference. Even apart from 
assuming the impossible -that all candidates could actually be neatly 
categorized into one of the various categories- full compliance with 
the IAY rules would practically require VLOs to launch detailed and 
time-consuming ethnographic enquiries in all villages earmarked 
for IAY implementation. Given the multitude of other programs to 
be implemented this is hardly a realistic proposition. As a result, 
VLOs are called upon to rely in large part on their experience, 
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accumulated knowledge and intuition, rather than on formal rules, 
to get their jobs done.  
 Further contributing to the discretion of VLOs is the fact that 
their activities and decisions are, as street-level decisions always are, 
hard to monitor by their superiors. The latter are plagued by the 
same dearth of basic demographic information needed to accurately 
select, sort and process clients according to official rules as the VLOs 
are. As a result, they cannot verify whether eligibility decisions 
made by VLOs are compliant with or made in the spirit of official 
implementation rules. Furthermore, it is difficult for VLO’s 
superiors, situated as they are in the block and district offices, to get 
an independent, unmediated grip on the factual assessments of 
dust-level situations that VLOs –in the absence of such data- do 
make to reach their decisions.  
 Suppose a BDO, the VLO’s direct superior, wanted to monitor 
the decision-making behaviour of his subordinates in all the villages 
in his jurisdiction and decided to visit a single village every day of 
his working week. Even with such a strict personal inspection 
regime this BDO could, at best, visit every village only every four 
months. In theory, BDOs get assistance from other superiors in 
gathering feedback information about VLOs’ dust-level decision-
making behaviour. JRY rules, for example, prescribe relatively high 
ranking district level officials like the District Magistrate (DM), 
Chief Development Officer (CDO) and the Project Director (PD) to 
make a fixed, minimum number of field trips to monitor program 
implementation every month. But even if they were to fully comply 
with these guidelines, it would take all of these officers no less than 
eight months to visit every village in the district once.149  
 If it is assumed, furthermore, that superiors could only spend 
a few hours on each visit, it is doubtful that they could actually learn 
very much about VLOs’ activities. Many villages are not so easily 
“visited”. Though some villages are quite compact and consist of a 
well-defined centre and a few streets, many comprise two or more 
larger villages, apart from a handful to as many as two dozen 
                                                
 149 Taken together, district-level officers are expected to make a total 
number of 165 field trips to monitor JRY implementation every month. There 
are roughly 1300 villages in the district.  
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smaller hamlets (or bastis).150 When doing fieldwork, it often took 
me a few full days to visit a single “village” and get a rough idea of 
the various development activities (being) carried out in it. Villages 
may not only be big, however. The fact that they are often situated 
at a considerable distance from block and district offices and can 
sometimes only be reached over hardly passable roads, especially 
during the monsoon, further diminishes BDOs’ possibilities for 
meaningful personal inspections. Besides, more mundane reasons 
sometimes prevent BDOs from making spot checks. The jeeps used 
for field visits regularly break down and it often takes quite some 
time before they are repaired. In such cases, BDOs may have to 
share a jeep with other BDOs, as was the arrangement in one of my 
fieldwork blocks.151  
 As a result of the rather constrained possibilities for spot 
checks and field visits, BDOs and other superiors must largely rely 
on the information supplied by VLOs themselves. This, however, is 
also no sinecure since VLOs are notoriously hard to contact. Though 
assigned to a cluster of villages, VLOs do not enjoy the luxury of an 
office or field post in their area where they might be found or 
telephoned at regular times. In practice, therefore, interaction 
between VLOs and their BDO, in Sitapur at least, remains largely 
restricted to Wednesday mornings, when BDOs chair a weekly 
meeting in the block. At the time of my field research, a large-scale 
administrative reform initiated by the state government had set in 
motion a rapid swelling of the number of VLOs attached to the 
block -from around fifteen to as many as sixty to one hundred- and, 
thus, further weakened BDOs’ span of control. 
 Not only VLOs are well placed to act as active representatives. 
The high discretion situation of VLOs is by and large replicated for 
their superiors, the BDOs. BDOs also operate under vague mandates 
(co-ordination, guidance, supervision, control). And also in the 
                                                
 150 Remember that the term village, when used in the context of 
development administration, refers to the jurisdictional area of a gram panchayat 
which, in Uttar Pradesh, tends to be a little bigger than what ordinary villagers 
would call a village. 
 151 This example concerned the BDO of Reusa, who could borrow the jeep 
of Sakran block for one week per month, and during the rest of the time relied on 
lifts.  
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BDOs’ case, the abundance and complexity of the rules that 
purportedly operationalize their vague mandates tend to increase 
rather than curb their discretion. The manual containing the 
“directive principles” that BDOs are to follow in supervising and co-
ordinating the implementation of poverty alleviation programs 
alone contains no less than 206 pages. And just as VLOs operate at 
quite a physical distance from their direct superiors -the BDOs-, so 
do BDOs operate at quite a distance from their superiors in the 
district headquarters. Besides, the span of control of superior 
officers in the district headquarters is typically larger than that of 
the average BDO vis-à-vis his VLOs. Whereas BDOs -under the 
“old” system- control between ten and fifteen VLOs, his direct 
nominal superior, the Chief Development Officer (CDO), in Sitapur 
at least, has 19 BDOs to look after.  
 The span of control of the District Magistrate (DM), the CDO’s 
direct superior and head of the district’s rural development 
apparatus, is, again, much larger than that of both BDO and CDO. 
Even though present-day DMs are no longer, as in British days, 
“rule incarnate”, their authority and responsibilities remain 
extremely extensive.152 The DM continues to head the district’s 
revenue bureaucracy which extends all the way from the district 
down to the villages and employs a large number of patwaris (village 
accountants record keepers), kanungos (overseers) and a handful or 
more tehsildars (revenue officers in charge of the geographical unit of 
administration called the tehsil, or sub-division). Besides, as the 
district’s highest administrative functionary, the DM also exercises 
authority, though in varying degrees, over most state officials 
                                                
 152 The office of the District Magistrate (DM), or Deputy Commissioner or 
District Collector as he is also variously called, dates back to the early days of 
British colonial rule. In 1772, the Board of Directors of the East India Company 
decided to introduce the office of the collector to “stand forth as diwan and to 
take upon themselves, by the agency of their own servants, the entire care and 
administration of the revenues” (Maheswari 1995 (1968): 546). Though his exact 
duties always remained rather vaguely defined, the collector’s authority and 
power rapidly increased and he soon became the “pivot of district 
administration, representing the State Government in its totality” (ibid.). After 
independence, the collector lost quite a bit of his power and authority to newly 
elected state and local politicians.  
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posted in the district headquarters.153 Apart from the CDO and the 
Program Director (PD) these may include, allowing for state wise 
variations, the Superintendent of Police, the Assistant Registrar of 
Cooperative Societies, the District Agricultural Officer, the District 
Medical Officer, the Superintendent of Excise, the Civil Surgeon, the 
Forest Officer, the District Inspector of Schools, the District 
Veterinary Officer, the District Industries Officer, the District 
Information Officer, the Backward Classes Welfare Officer, the 
District Planning Officer and the District Judge.  
 Apart from these extensive monitoring duties, the DM, 
personally, has a great many tasks and responsibilities assigned to 
him, including the appointment of the punishing authority in 
respect of ministerial and inferior servants of collectorate and tehsil 
staff and other allied services; dealing with pension cases of district 
staff; submitting annual budget estimates; acting as the protocol 
officer in the district; arranging for stay of VIPs at circuit houses or 
other inspection houses; making enquiries relating to the issue of 
certificates to homeopaths; training junior officers in official 
procedures and administrative work, personal conduct and 
behaviour; the collection of canal dues; the relief of fire sufferers; the 
payment of Zamindari Abolition Compensation and Rehabilitation 
Grant; taking relief measures in case of scarcity conditions caused 
by natural calamities like fire, drought, flood, waterlogging and 
excessive rains; enforcement of the stamp act; the inspection of 
police stations; dealing with mercy petitions from prisoners; 
recovery of cane cess; making of reception orders for lunatics; 
making recommendations of schemes for the development of 
forests, appointment and training of census enumerators; liaison 
with military authorities, and ensuring the welfare of members of 
the armed forces, both serving and retired. 
 Given his extraordinarily extensive and diverse set of 
monitoring and substantive duties, it is no wonder that the DM 
tends to be an “overworked official” (Maheswari 1995 (1968): 559). 
                                                
 153 Many state departments are represented at the district level by their 
own officers. The authority of the DM over these officials varies, though 
generally it is administrative and/or disciplinary. The authority over technical 
matters usually remains with the departmental line hierarchy. 
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As a result, his formal authority is in practice readily undermined. 
Nominally subordinate officials may easily escape his control, 
especially so when they can appeal to the line authority of their 
technical departments. In such cases, the opportunities for the DM 
to impose his will upon the recalcitrant may turn out to be 
extremely limited: he might, as a government enquiry committee 
once put it, “cajole and persuade” but cannot “compel”.154 And even 
though, in Uttar Pradesh, some of the DM’s authority is 
decentralized to other officials -the Additional District Magistrate 
(ADM) at the district-level and the Subdivisional Magistrates 
(SDMs) in the subdivisions or tehsil headquarters- these officials do 
not tend to be of much help when it comes to controlling their 
subordinates.155 Further decreasing the DM’s capacity for control is 
the fact that he is often much younger –in his thirties- and far less 
experienced than most of his nominal, direct subordinates.156 It is 
evident that a DM, if he is to make any impact, must carefully 
prioritize his activities. In practice, this usually means that DMs are 
heavily preoccupied with “law and order” and “revenue” issues, 
while the monitoring of rural development bureaucrats’ behaviour 
and poverty alleviation interventions takes a back seat (Maheswari 
                                                
 154 “Because each technical department, today, functions under a 
popularly elected Minister accountable to the legislature, there is a deep-seated 
reverence for the chair [sic] of command with consequent resistance to 
accepting instruction from other lateral or diagonal authorities, such as the 
District Collector (Maheswari 1995 (1968): 566-7). The quote is from the Report 
of the Bengal Administration Enquiry Committee, 1944-45, para 65, cited in 
Maheswari (Maheswari 1995 (1968): 567).  
 155 SDM positions are often filled by young, new IAS recruits who, 
according to Maheswari, tend to regard the SDM-posting “as a mere training 
post, and a stop-gap arrangement”. Also, they usually do not tend to live in 
their sub-divisions, but in the district headquarters (Maheswari 1995 (1968): 
562-3). 
 156 As a rule, the DM is a member of the IAS and either a “direct recruit” 
or a “promotee”. It is the direct recruits, that is those who have entered the IAS 
through competitive examinations, who are relatively young and 
inexperienced: they are usually appointed to a DM post four or five years after 
joining the IAS. “Promotees”, who are indirectly recruited through promotion 
from the State (or, as it is called in Uttar Pradesh, the Provincial) Civil Service, 
are, in contrast, not young and inexperienced at all. They are typically 
promoted to the IAS late in their careers: to them, a DM appointment is 
typically the crown on their careers (Maheswari 1995 (1968): 549-551). 
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1995 (1968): 552). As a result, the BDOs’ job -like that of their 
subordinates the VLOs- is invested with a lot of discretion. 
 Even if street-level bureaucrats’ nominal superiors are unable 
or unwilling to control their subordinates’ behaviour, they might 
still be controlled to some extent by actors external to their 
organizations. If, for example, a bureaucracy’s clients are well 
versed in the rules and procedures that street-level bureaucrats 
must apply in particular situations, this in itself may curb the latters’ 
tendency to pursue centrally undesired courses of action or make 
officially uncalled-for interventions on behalf of particular (groups 
of) clients. Similarly, elected politicians with an active interest in 
street-level issues may put pressure on street-level bureaucrats to do 
what is expected of them. 
 Though the operation of such forms of external control cannot 
be ruled out on the Indian dust-level, it is probably not very 
prevalent. Illiteracy prevents most clients from building up the kind 
of bureaucratic competence which might egg VLOs on towards 
compliance. Villagers, in fact, are generally unaware of the 
programs executed by the development bureaucracy. Besides, even 
if literacy is a precondition for bureaucratic competence it does not 
guarantee it. The vocabulary of administrative manuals and official 
correspondence is heavily sanskritised and therefore hardly 
comprehensible even to well-educated Indians (I myself had a lot of 
trouble in finding someone who could translate the manual on rural 
development programs for me).  
 Illiteracy and incomprehensibility of sanskritised 
bureaucratese are also likely to negatively affect many dust-level 
politicians’ capacity for effective control. Many poverty alleviation 
programs prescribe the involvement of gram and kshetra 
panchayats. Officially, these bodies, as well as the gram sabha (open 
meeting of all villagers), are accorded co-decision-making powers in 
beneficiary-selection, though the final sanction of loans and 
subsidies is done by VLOs and BDOs. Since panches (members of the 
gram panchayat) and kshetra panchayat members are often illiterate, 
many of them must rely on VLOs and other officials to explain the 
rules and procedures of rural development administration to them.  
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 Also restricting the likelihood of political control over the 
dust-level rural development bureaucracy is the fact that the 
panchayats in Uttar Pradesh have never really developed into the 
kind of effective bodies of local self-governance and rural 
development that their many advocates, among whom Mahatma 
Gandhi, have typically envisaged them to be. Though pradhans 
(village mayors) have generally gained a reputation as powerful 
local political figures, the pramukhs (chairmen of the kshetra 
panchayats) have not.157 Besides, the gram and kshetra panchayats, 
as political bodies, have tended to remain somewhat marginal, 
resource-poor actors in rural politics and administration, certainly 
so in Uttar Pradesh (cf. Lieten and Srivastava 1999).158 In 
consequence, the policies, activities and interventions that have 
emerged in India under the label of rural development have tended 
to be largely bureaucratic affairs, designed, undertaken and 
“controlled” by bureaucrats rather than elected politicians. 
 To conclude, VLOs and BDOs are relatively free from the 
organizational authority of their nominal superiors. The discretion 
they can exercise in providing access to and allocation of 
development benefits, provides excellent opportunities for actively 
representing the interests of some over those of others. Along with 
its sympathetic mission, the salience of its policies and the 
substantial mass of untouchable employees, this dust-level 
discretion completed the four favourable conditions for active 
representation in India’s dust-level rural development bureaucracy. 
Before I will turn to discuss how and why these conditions generally 
                                                
157 The pramukhs are probably even less capable of controlling BDOs 
than pradhans are of controlling VLOs: MLAs, fearing their potential power, 
have tended to usurp the pramukhs’ role [find reference]. 
 158 The Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act of 1992 represents central 
government’s latest effort to revitalize the panchayat system. The Act, which 
came into force in April 1993, recognises panchayats as the lowest rung of self-
government, with gram panchayats forming the base of a three-tier panchayat 
structure (panchayat bodies are also created or revitalized at the block and 
district levels). The Act aims to give the PRIs (panchayat raj institutions) a 
viable share of financial resources, creates possibilities for the delegation of 
hitherto administrative tasks and responsibilities and assures wide 
representation to women, untouchables and tribals, both as panches and 
pradhans (Lieten and Srivastava 1999: 14). 
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fail to translate into the active representation of untouchables’ 
interests, I will first explain how my forthcoming analysis came 
about.  
 
 
6 Fieldwork in Sitapur district 
 
In the Indian dust-level development bureaucracy, actively 
representative untouchable VLOs and BDOs might benefit 
untouchable clients in various ways (when some particular 
representative act may be performed by both VLOs and BDOs, I will 
group the two functionaries together under the by now familiar 
label of dust-level bureaucrats, or DLBs). Though most of the 
programs executed by the dust-level bureaucracy contain 
substantial reserved quota for untouchables, many program 
benefits, as we have seen, do not reach their intended beneficiaries. 
Untouchable DLBs might thus benefit untouchable clients a great 
deal by simply, and “neutrally”, following implementation rules to 
the letter. Untouchable DLBs might benefit their ingroup clients 
even more if they were to show partiality, by pushing for the 
selection of more untouchable beneficiaries than prescribed by the 
quotas, for example.159 
 Given villagers’ widespread ignorance about rural 
development programs, untouchable DLBs might also actively 
represent ingroup interests by being informative to untouchable 
villagers about the existence, rules and procedures of programs, by 
teaching them how to navigate the bureaucratic maze and, more 
generally, by showing them the ropes of effective client behaviour 
                                                
 159 Indian rural development programs do not allow for such -neutral or 
partisan- implementational active representation in equal measure. Whereas in 
some programs, like IAY, the officially defined role of DLBs in beneficiary 
selection is quite prominent, in others it is far less so. Beneficiary and project 
selection in JRY, to take the most extreme example, is, in theory, fully delegated 
to the gram panchayats. Even such delegated programs would still seem to 
present opportunities for implementational active representation. VLOs still 
need to sign for the release of JRY monies, for instance. This leaves room for 
actively representative VLOs to make their signs conditional; upon, for 
example, the gram panchayat’s respecting JRY’s special provision that at least 
60 per cent of the benefits of this program be reserved for untouchables. 
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(cf. Katz and Eisenstadt 1973; Selden 1997a: 14). They could also 
tone down their demand for bribes in case of untouchable clients or 
try and check corrupt or discriminatory behaviour by non-
untouchable DLBs. Still another way in which untouchable DLBs 
could benefit the untouchable population in their jurisdiction would 
be through deploying their knowledge and expertise to assist local 
movements, organizations and leaders that seek to improve the 
plight of rural untouchables.  
 All the above representative acts may be performed by VLOs 
and BDOs alike, though their nearness to villagers and closer 
involvement in actual beneficiary-selection would seem to make 
them more plausible and feasible for VLOs to undertake. BDOs, on 
their part, might use their formal authority to perform 
representative acts that VLOs, as bottommost functionaries, cannot. 
They might support actively representative VLOs, by protecting 
them (or -in the case of partial VLOs- by providing cover) against 
non-untouchable DLBs or clients who may consider such behaviour 
to be damaging to their interests or normative principles. 
Untouchable BDOs might stress the importance of rural 
development programs’ special provisions for untouchables and 
insist on their scrupulous implementation. They might also use their 
authority to press for sanctions against those VLOs they find failing 
to do so. Most programs’ guidelines require BDOs to personally 
conduct an enquiry whenever villagers object to or complain about 
alleged irregularities in program implementation. Untouchable 
BDOs might utilize these prescriptions to closely follow up any 
incident that appears to have harmed untouchable villagers. Finally, 
untouchable BDOs might also seek to activate “dormant” programs, 
referred to earlier, that could be of benefit to untouchables but are 
not being implemented.  
  
Sitapur 
 
The central argument developed in this book directly stems from the 
insights and experiences gained through prolonged qualitative 
fieldwork –six weeks in the autumn of 1998, and fifteen months 
between February 1999 and May 2000- in the UP district of Sitapur. 
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Within Sitapur, most research was carried out in an area comprising 
of five coterminous blocks in central and eastern part of Sitapur: 
Kasmanda, Biswan, Parsendi, Pahla, and Reusa. Sitapur district is 
situated in the Lucknow division of Uttar Pradesh, in an area 
historically known as Oudh or Awadh. The district capital, also 
called Sitapur, lies around 85 kilometres north from the state capital, 
Lucknow.  
 Like other areas on the Gangetic plain, Sitapur is very densely 
populated. Almost 2.9 million people live on its 5743 km² large area; 
an average of 497 people per km². In the west, the Gomati river 
forms the border with Hardoi district, while in the east the wild 
river Ghagra separates Sitapur from neighbouring Bahraich district. 
Sitapur’s other neighbours are Kheri-Lakhimpur in the north, and 
Lucknow and Bara Banki in the south. Topographically, the district 
consists of two main parts: the upland plain, comprising roughly 
two-thirds of the district area, and the eastern lowlands, locally 
known as the gaanjar. The district has no forests, hills or valleys of 
importance, and is for the better part extensively cultivated. The 
population speaks Awadhi, a dialect of Hindi. 
 Sitapur is in many respects a typical UP district. The large 
majority of its inhabitants live in the district’s 1326 villages and earn 
their living as agriculturalists. Sugarcane, rice and wheat are the 
most popular crops, followed by mustard, lentils, and vegetables 
like carrots and potatoes. Upper castes, particularly Thakurs, and, in 
certain pockets, prominent Muslim families own much of the land. 
Some members of the middle peasant castes of Yadavs and Kurmis 
also own sizeable plots, though many of them, like most 
untouchables and many Muslims, are poor. As in the rest of UP, few 
untouchables are totally landless. Their plots tend to be very small, 
however, often not bigger than a few bighas.160 Apart from a few 
large sugarmills and some brick kilns and bhels, there is little 
industrial activity in Sitapur.161  
                                                
 160 A bigha is a local measure. I am told that its usage varies across the 
various regions of Uttar Pradesh. In Sitapur, a bigha equals one-fifth of an acre, or 
approximately 800 m². 
161 Bhels are privately owned factories where gur (molasses) is produced 
from sugarcanes.  
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 Sitapur has a relatively large untouchable population. The 
district’s 920,000 untouchable inhabitants make up nearly a third 
(32,2 per cent) of its population. Only one other district in UP has a 
higher proportion of untouchables. Almost ninety per cent of 
Sitapur’s untouchables belong to any one of two large untouchable 
jatis, the Pasis (47 per cent) or the Chamars (42 per cent). The Pasis, 
traditionally associated with a variety of professions including 
village watchman, thief, and swineherd, are reputed to have once 
held a part of Oudh before the Rajputs began establishing their 
dominance in the region in the early thirteenth century. In 
(pre)colonial times, Pasis were often employed as mercenaries and 
lathaits (bodyguards armed with stout bamboo sticks) by the 
taluqdars (large landowners) of the area. Later they also started to 
cultivate areas of land as tenants. In the 1930s and 1940s, Pasis tried, 
in vain, to raise their status by claiming to be Rajpasis of Rajput 
descent and entitlement to wearing the sacred threat (Kolff 1990: 
118; Metcalf 1979: 4; Narayan 2001: 71, n. 35; Nevill 1923: 52; Singh 
1999: 1072).162 In Sitapur, the Pasis are still popularly associated with 
pig rearing, though most of them are agricultural day labourers and 
small cultivators.  
 The Chamars are one of the most populous castes in India and 
particularly numerous in northern India. They are the single largest 
untouchable caste in Uttar Pradesh, numbering almost 13 million 
according to 1981 census. Chamars are traditionally associated with 
leatherwork and have tended to occupy very low positions in the 
social scale.163 To this day, villagers usually rank them lower than 
the Pasis. Sitapur’s Chamars, like the Pasis, are usually agricultural 
labourers or small cultivators. In Sitapur, Chamars, in order to avoid 
the “polluted” epithet Chamar, sometimes call themselves Raidas, 
after a Chamar saint.164 The term Harijan –meaning children of God, 
                                                
 162 The sacred threat (yajnopavita) is worn by Brahmins, Kshatriyas and 
Vaishyas to signify their “twice-born” status. The Pasis’ attempted social mobility 
failed when social ostracization by which it was followed forced them to drop 
their claims. 
 163 The name Chamar is said to be derived from the Sanskrit word 
charmakara, meaning leatherworker (Singh 1999). 
 164 Raidas was a Chamar shoemaker disciple of Ramananda. Raidas’ stories 
and sayings have been preserved in the seventeenth-century Bhakta-Mala and in 
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the name Mahatma Gandhi gave to the untouchables- is also 
sometimes used to refer to untouchables in general. In Sitapur, the 
untouchable jatis other than Pasis and Chamars are quite small. 
Largest among them are the Dhobis (5,4 per cent) and Koris (1,9 per 
cent). 
 According to the 1991 census, in the five development blocks 
that I studied most intensively, more than 95 per cent of 
untouchables tried to earn a living in agriculture. At the time of my 
fieldwork, unrelenting land-hunger and a slackening demand for 
day labour continued to push untouchables to temporarily or 
permanently leave their villages in search for work as labourers in 
nearby brick-factories, sugarmills and bhels, or as construction 
workers and rikshawpullers in the city. They often seemed to be 
exchanging one situation of economic uncertainty for another. 
White collar employment remained out of reach to all but a very 
tiny few, if only because more than two-thirds of Sitapur’s 
untouchables fail to meet the basic requirement –literacy- for such 
employment.165 
 In Sitapur, the combined outlay for the four major poverty 
alleviation programs -IRDP, JRY, EAS and IAY- executed by the 
dust-level rural development bureaucracy was almost 37 crores in 
1998, most of it (more than 80 per cent) in the form of non-repayable 
subsidies or wages.166 Though far from sufficient to eliminate 
untouchable poverty in the short term, full allocation of this amount 
to the untouchable poor would have added up to a non-negligible, 
additional income of Rs. 1200 –or roughly 40 days’ worth of 
                                                                                                                                          
the Sikh holy book, the Granth Sahab (Cohn 1987 (1955): 262).  
 165 According to the 1991 census, only 31.4 per cent of Sitapur’s 
untouchables are literate, putting them among the least literate untouchable 
populations in the entire state (ranked 54th rank out of 63 districts). 
 166 The program-wise outlays were as follows: IRDP: 7.34 crores, JRY: 10 
crores, EAS: 9.5 crores, IAY: approximately 9.59 crores. The figures for IRDP, JRY 
and EAS were obtained from the district’s Program Director. The figure for IAY is 
my own estimate based on the IAY outlays in Pahla and Biswan development 
blocks in the years 1997 and 1998 (obtained from the blocks’ clerks). On average, 
dust-level bureaucrats in these blocks allocated a little over 252 IAY subsidies per 
year in this two-year period. Multiplied by 19 –the total number of blocks in the 
district- this amounts to an estimated yearly number of 4792 IAY subsidies of Rs. 
20,000 each, totalling 9.59 crores. 
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agricultural wages- for every member of the district’s untouchable 
workforce in that year.167 At the time of my fieldwork there were 19 
BDOs, among whom there were five untouchables. Out of the 263 
VLOs working in the district’s 19 blocks, 58 were untouchables. 
 
Fieldwork 
 
Other empirical enquiries into representative bureaucracy have 
typically sought to establish the occurrence of active representation 
indirectly. A first string of studies, carried out in the 1970s, used 
attitudes as surrogate measures of active representation (Hindera 
1993a). Assuming that bureaucrats’ behaviour would follow upon 
their attitudes, these studies looked for relationships between 
bureaucrats’ group identities and ingroup-friendly attitudes (Meier 
and Nigro 1976; Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh 2003; 
Thompson 1978).168 Since the early 1990s, another body of empirical 
research has tried to infer the occurrence of active representation 
from variations in policy output allocations. Assuming that active 
representation may be believed to be occurring when groups obtain 
significantly larger allocations of outputs as their passive 
representation increases, these more recent studies have sought to 
establish whether variations in the passive representation of group-
identified bureaucrats systematically affect the allocation of policy 
outputs (or “benefits”) to ingroup members (cf. e.g. Hindera 1993a; 
Selden 1997a). Studies using this approach have typically involved 
                                                
 167 The scheduled caste working population in Sitapur was 288.726 
according to the 1991 census (Census Directorate 1991). In calculating the 
potential average impact of the four major poverty alleviation schemes 
implemented in Sitapur I have divided their total outlay of Rs. 37 crore by 300,000, 
that is, my estimated volume of the untouchable workforce in 1998. 
 168 These studies largely failed, in the sense that they did not find the 
expected (or hoped for) relationship between ingroup identity and ingroup-
friendly attitudes. And even if they would have, it is highly doubtful whether 
these connections could have been interpreted as reliable indicators of active 
representation. The relationship between attitude and behaviour is, as 
Klandermans says, “the classic social psychological problem”: “Countless 
laboratory and field studies have investigated the predictive power of attitudes, 
and arrived time and again at the conclusion that attitudes are poor predictors 
of behaviour (Klandermans 1997: 7; see also Hindera 1993a: 20). 
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relatively large samples and the use of multiple regression analysis 
to control for factors other than passive representation that might 
produce groupwise variations in policy output allocations (Lim 
2006: 198; Meier 1993b). 
 Obvious drawbacks of inferential studies are that they cannot 
actually prove the occurrence of active representation (they can 
merely suggest or indicate it)169; fail to illuminate the practice of 
active representation; and, by essentially treating bureaucracies as 
black boxes, cannot provide explanations as to why and when 
individual bureaucrats behave, or fail to behave, as active 
representatives of ingroup interests (cf. Lim 2006: 199; Saltzstein 
1979: 467; Selden 1997a: 116). To avoid these weaknesses for my own 
study I chose to rely on qualitative fieldwork. Through a 
combination of direct, participant observation, personal interviews 
and the consultation of official documents I set out to develop an 
explicitly descriptive and explanatory account of active 
representation by untouchable dust-level bureaucrats.  
 The resulting grounded theory was to clarify the if, how, why 
and when of active representation in Sitapur and, in so doing, to 
provide new insights and clues for elaborating, specifying and 
modifying existing representative bureaucracy theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967).170 More concretely, my aim was to develop an analysis 
which would give centre stage to the individual bureaucrats, 
ingroup clients and relevant others who figure so prominently in 
theories of representative bureaucracy, but about whose actual 
                                                
 169 Though policy output studies may be quite helpful in establishing that 
passive representation has substantive effects, they do not allow for the 
conclusive attribution of these effects to active representation. Even if such 
studies could be so designed that the effects of factors other than passive 
representation could be controlled for or effectively ruled out, one could still 
not be sure as to whether observed substantive effects must be attributed to 
active representation or to other, passive representation-related sources of 
substantive effects like restraint-inducement or resocialization. “Strictly 
speaking”, Lim observes, “the inference of active representation [from observed 
substantive effects] remains a non sequitur — possible, even likely, but not 
necessary” (Lim 2006: 198-200). 
 170 “[F]ieldwork in the empirical mode”, as Fortes has argued, “remains 
the sine qua non both for the testing of theory and, what is more important, for 
making new discoveries” (Fortes 1978: 24). 
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motives and representative behaviour in real-life situations 
practically nothing was known when I started my project.  
 Practically, my fieldwork has consisted of three separate, but 
interconnected activities: shadowing DLBs, village visits and the 
collection of official data. To gain a “deep” understanding of active 
representation, I “shadowed” untouchable DLBs as they went about 
doing their jobs. I spent much time in trying to find out about the 
various concrete activities and issues that kept them busy, the places 
they visited, the time they spent in the villages and with whom, how 
they decided about the selection of beneficiaries and the allocation 
of benefits, the problems they encountered and the ambitions they 
had. To establish whether and how untouchable bureaucrats saw 
and approached things, clients and situations differently from non-
untouchable DLBs, I also shadowed and interviewed many of the 
district’s non-untouchable DLBs. In the course of my fieldwork I 
had conversations with most BDOs in the district and with dozens 
of VLOs.  
 For both substantive and practical reasons most of my 
shadowing and other fieldwork activities were carried out in a 
coterminous area comprising of five blocks in the central-eastern 
part of Sitapur district. Since the area had a relatively substantial 
mass of untouchable VLOs -25 out of the entire district’s 58 
untouchable VLOs were employed here- I could theoretically expect 
active representation to be more likely in my research area than in 
other areas in the district with fewer VLOs. By focusing on a 
relatively small and coterminous area rather than a loose collection 
of research sites I also increased the chances for gaining “collateral” 
data and insights. DLBs might have something interesting to tell me 
about colleagues of theirs in neighbouring blocks; or clients in a 
particular village might be able to provide information on DLBs’ 
activities in other, nearby villages. An additional advantage of 
focusing on a relatively small area was that it allowed me to keep 
time-consuming travelling to a minimum. 
 On arriving in the field, it soon became obvious that the topic I 
had come to explore was very sensitive and that many bureaucrats 
would be very much on their guards when discussing such issues as 
reservations, caste identity and untouchability, client relations and 
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bureaucratic performance with me. Not to arouse suspicions, I 
usually felt obliged to be less than wholly candid about the aims of 
my research. I do not think I ever told any of my informants about 
my specific hypotheses, background assumptions or my special 
interest in untouchable bureaucrats. When officials asked me about 
the purpose of my research, I usually simply told them that I had 
come to study the practice of rural development and panchayati raj 
(local government). I also often found myself applying what Craig 
Jeffrey has called the method of the crab (Jeffrey 2000: 1022), 
beginning by asking a few general, decoy questions that I guessed 
or knew would not raise suspicions, to then gradually moving on to 
the issues in which I was most interested. Depending on the 
situation and my familiarity with officials I would also often switch 
between different roles, from naïve foreigner to clued up observer of 
local life (cf. ibid.).  
 If I were to have solely relied on (untouchable) bureaucrats’ 
stories and interpretations of events and on observing people and 
situations through their lenses, my interpretive account of 
representative bureaucracy in Sitapur might have been prone to 
serious distortions. No matter how cleverly I approached my issues, 
I could never be quite sure as to whether what bureaucrats told me 
was what they felt to be true, what they thought they should say, or 
what they thought I would like to hear. As far as untouchable active 
representation was concerned, it could not be ruled out that 
untouchable bureaucrats might routinely be engaged in various 
forms of active representation but not admit to it –whether verbally 
or behaviourally- in my presence. Bureaucrats routinely displaying 
discreditable partiality towards untouchable clients, for instance, 
might not want me to know about it for obvious reasons. Another 
possibility was that untouchable bureaucrats who might not 
generally or occasionally act as active representatives would 
nevertheless claim to be doing so; because they felt that that was 
what I would want to hear, or because they genuinely aspired to be 
active representatives but had somehow not yet gotten around or 
managed to become one.171 Strict reliance on untouchable 
                                                
 171 A number of representative bureaucracy theorists have dwelt upon 
the possibility that would-be active representatives may stop short of becoming 
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bureaucrats’ opinions, interpretations and observed actions thus 
carried a danger of both overreporting and underreporting of active 
representation, without providing a way to correct this bias either 
way.  
 To diminish the likelihood of such biases creeping into my 
analysis I independently –that is, in the absence of dust-level 
bureaucrats- solicited information from those who would have 
stood to gain from untouchable VLOs’ active representation: poor 
untouchable villagers. By approaching and talking to them alone I 
tried to learn more about their experiences in dealing with ingroup 
bureaucrats, and about the benefits they tended, expected or hoped 
to derive from untouchable VLOs’ presence in their villages. As in 
the case of untouchable bureaucrats, I put in much effort to cross-
check and compare whatever untouchable clients told me with the 
information I gathered by talking to non-untouchable clients in the 
same villages.  
 In talking to villagers, I ended up spending most of my time in 
the hamlets and central villages of ten gram panchayats that in 
recent years -the three years prior to my fieldwork (1996-1999)- had 
been adopted as so-called Ambedkar villages by the UP 
government. These Ambedkar villages promised to be attractive 
research sites because they had been eligible for intensified flows of 
program benefits. As such, they could be expected to have offered 
increased opportunities for active representation to the VLOs who 
were posted there. Also, the fact that Ambedkar villages, by 
definition, had large untouchable populations –in some they made 
up more than half of the population- promised to guarantee a ready 
demand for active representation.172 
                                                                                                                                          
actual active representatives. They have suggested two possible explanations 
for it. The first, which I discussed before, is that would-be bureaucrats are 
prevented from engaging in active representation by strict superiors or more 
powerful outgroup colleagues and clients. The second explanation projects non-
representation as the outcome of the “role-conflict” that (would-be) active 
representatives may experience between ingroup members’ demand for special 
consideration on the one hand and professional norms of impartiality and 
neutrality on the other (Herbert 1974: 563; Selden 1997a: 118). 
 172 A high proportion of untouchables was the primary criterion used by 
the Uttar Pradesh government in designating villages as Ambedkar villages. 
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 The villages that I selected were so chosen that they allowed 
for making comparative observations of untouchable and non-
untouchable VLOs’ behaviour. As I discuss in appendix I, to be able 
to speak of untouchable bureaucrats’ behaviour as active 
representation requires that this behaviour be more responsive to 
untouchables’ interests than that of non-untouchable bureaucrats in 
comparable circumstances. Many of the villages that I visited 
approximated the ceteris paribus condition for this kind of 
comparative observations, as they had simultaneously been 
assigned two VLOs of different castes. At the time of my fieldwork 
there were, technically speaking, two different types of VLOs. The 
first was formally known as the gram vikas adhikari, or village 
development officer (VDO). The VDO was a regular employee of 
the rural development department and his job description fitted the 
one I described above as being that of “the” VLO. The second type 
of VLO was called the gram panchayat adhikari, or village panchayat 
officer (VPO). VPOs acted as secretaries to the gram panchayat but 
also performed developmental activities. These were quite similar to 
those carried out by VDOs, except that they were restricted to 
programs that had been delegated to the gram panchayat rather 
than to the block machinery.  
 Most of the villages that I selected for my visits had, or had 
recently seen, VDOs and VPOs of different castes simultaneously 
assigned to them; an untouchable VDO and a non-untouchable 
VPO, or vice versa. Untouchable clients in such villages could thus 
relate their comparative experiences with VLOs of different castes but 
with highly similar job descriptions to me. The fact that VLOs are 
quite regularly –roughly every three or four years- transferred to 
other postings supplied another proximate ceteris paribus condition 
for comparing untouchable and non-untouchable VLOs’ behaviour. 
Villagers did not have to dig deep in their memories to compare 
“the work” done by the various VLOs who had been posted in the 
village in recent years. 
 The villages were also so selected that I might have learned 
more about the conditions for (the “when” of) active representation. 
One of the criteria that guided my selection of the ten Ambedkar 
villages was that they differed in two respects that might plausibly 
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be expected to have a bearing on VLOs’ opportunities and motives 
for active representation. Five villages had had an untouchable 
pradhan since 1993, while the pradhans in the remaining five 
villages had been non-untouchables. A few among the latter had 
had upper caste pradhans for as long as villagers could remember. 
Such differences allowed me to explore the importance of ingroup 
political functionaries as enablers or, perhaps, catalysers of active 
representation. The selected villages also differed quite substantially 
in the relative strength of their untouchable populations, ranging 
from 28 to 64 per cent. These appreciable differences in untouchable 
population strengths across the selected villages allowed for 
appraising the relative importance of “security in numbers” of 
ingroup clients to their demands for, or expectations of, active 
representation. 
 Altogether I visited 41 hamlets and bigger villages in 20 gram 
panchayats, some of them once, others repeatedly. As in the case of 
the DLBs, the issues I was most interested in could not usually be 
approached head on. I would often start the conversation by asking 
villagers to tell me more about the “changes” in village life they had 
witnessed over the years. Once one or a few of them had warmed 
up to the topic other villagers, more often than not, would soon join 
in and discuss, in varying degrees of detail, the work they did, their 
relations with other castes in the village, village politics, their voting 
behaviour, local labour relations, their pass-times and material 
conditions. For reasons that will become apparent later on, villagers 
often displayed a marked reluctance to discuss in any detail their 
dealings with DLBs, however.  
 Most of the interviews with officials, villagers and other 
informants in Sitapur were conducted in Hindi or Awadhi. Though 
I was sufficiently proficient in Hindi to approach people, make 
general conversation and could usually understand the gist of what 
was being said, throughout my stay in the district I relied a lot on 
the language and people skills of my interpreter cum assistant, Sunil 
Gupta. I would usually conduct the interviews myself for as far as 
my mastery of Hindi allowed. Sunil usually quickly sensed 
whenever I had lost the thread of what officials or villagers were 
trying to tell me, and I could always count on him to fill me in 
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during lulls in the conversation or to bring the discussion back to 
the issues we had come to explore. The fact that Sunil was a recent 
public administration graduate turned out to be a great advantage. 
Being conversant with popular public administration theories and 
the organization and policies of the rural development bureaucracy, 
it did not take long for him to grasp what sort of information I was 
after and what I needed it for. I benefited a great deal from Sunil’s 
help in explaining and interpreting the things we saw and heard. If 
there is any merit in the analysis presented here, a large part of the 
credit must go to Sunil. 
 Throughout my stay in Sitapur I tried (largely in vain) to 
collect official figures on program achievements and the proportions 
of untouchables among program beneficiaries in my sample 
villages. I had initially decided to collect such information in the 
expectation of using it as supplementary evidence for the patterns of 
active representation that I was going to find. Even if, as gradually 
became clear, there was little if any active representation to be 
documented, I nevertheless continued my official data gathering 
trips right to the very end as they could be made to serve a very 
useful purpose: they always gave me a good excuse for popping up 
in block and district offices of the rural development administration, 
and provided ample opportunities for meeting new people and 
starting conversations on the issues I had come to explore. These 
offices, especially, were the places to be, not only to get in touch 
with DLBs or their nominal clients but also with a special class of 
individuals -variously called social workers, dalaals, or netas- who 
tend to play a significant role in determining who gets what, when 
and how on the Indian dust-level.  
 Looking back, I think I can safely say that with some luck and 
determined efforts I managed to gain “access” to the dust-level 
Sitapur development bureaucracy. In due course, my face -our faces, 
rather- and spontaneous appearances became familiar to many 
DLBs in the research area. Though the access gained sometimes 
amounted to little more than DLBs’ visibly reluctant tolerance of my 
presence, this was compensated for by the enthusiastic reception 
and expansiveness of others. Quite a few DLBs eventually led their 
guards down to the extent that they invited me to their houses for 
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dinner or to celebrate special occasions. In a number of cases, I may 
also have managed to “win over” initially reluctant DLBs through 
sheer obstinacy.173 None of this is to say that, at any time, I was at 
risk of “going native” or becoming one of the boys (there were no 
female DLBs), nor of winning DLBs’ complete confidence; far from 
it. To most DLBs, I probably remained what I must have seemed to 
them from the outset, a complete, if rather funny, outsider. All 
things considered, it may, in fact, have been my outsider status, 
more than anything else, which has helped me get, if only a little, 
inside the rural development bureaucracy. As Sunil once reminded 
me, it was only because of my being a foreigner that I had managed 
to gain the kind of access that I did. “An Indian would never have 
succeeded”. 
 
Though I initially envisaged my fieldwork to result in a grounded 
theory of active representation by untouchable DLBs, I ended up 
with quite the opposite: a descriptive and explanatory account of an 
unrepresentative bureaucracy. In the following two chapters I will 
try and show that untouchable DLBs hardly if ever engage in the 
active representation of untouchable clients’ interests and provide 
explanations as to why this is so. As this story unfolds, the reader 
will be introduced to a complex and vibrant local universe in which 
an array of actors, factors and considerations conspire to 
simultaneously limit untouchable VLOs’ opportunities and 
motivations for acting as active representatives and constrain 
untouchable clients’ possibilities for claiming special treatment. The 
interrupted supply of active representation is the topic of the next 
chapter; the absence of a demand for active representation will be 
discussed in chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 173 At the closing stages of my fieldwork, some DLBs -though they did 
not exactly give the impression of minding my leaving- confided that they had 
been quite “amused” by my stubborn and unrelenting attempts to learn more 
about their work. One even went as far as saying that he “respected” me for it.  
 5 Interrupted Supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I adopt the perspective of Sitapur’s untouchable 
DLBs and analyze their apparent lack of supply of active 
representation. I observe DLBs’ –both untouchable and non-
untouchable- widespread inclination to abandon the frontline and 
try to account for this inclination by pointing out the internal and 
environmental pressures under which they must operate. Frontline 
abandonment, as I will argue, is best (and almost literally) 
understood as a survival strategy which, if successfully pursued, 
provides DLBs with relative ease of mind, an attractive posting and 
a steady additional income in the form of development rents. In the 
second part of this chapter, I illustrate and explain untouchable 
DLBs’ tendency to pass, that is to make themselves invisible as 
untouchables to outsiders in an effort to cope with the problem of 
stigmatized identity. Frontline abandonment and passing, I 
conclude, are so pervasive as to make active representation by 
untouchable DLBs highly unlikely, if not non-existent.  
 
 
1 Frontline abandonment 
 
One of the first DLBs I met while in Sitapur was BDO Singh of 
Kasmanda block. Meeting him early on in my fieldwork proved a 
lucky coincidence. Unlike most other BDOs, Singh had not spent his 
entire administrative career within the rural development hierarchy. 
Before becoming the BDO of Kasmanda, he had served as a deputy 
director in the Uttar Pradesh government in Lucknow, where he 
had been entrusted with working out proposals for providing rural 
panchayat bodies with more viable shares of financial resources. In 
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that capacity, Singh had developed a more than strictly professional 
interest in the issue of panchayat raj reform. Not long before we 
met, as he proudly told me, he had been invited to attend a national 
conference on new developments in Indian local government, held 
in the southern city of Hyderabad. He had also written one or two 
scholarly articles on the subject and was enthusiastically developing 
ideas for more. When I told him about my own interest in rural 
development and panchayati raj, it did not take him long to invite 
me to stay for some time in his bungalow in the village of Kamlapur, 
Kasmanda block’s headquarters.  
Singh seemed genuinely happy to have someone like me 
around with whom he could discuss and share his ideas. I spent 
many hours sitting at the side of his desk, watching him sign a 
never-ending stream of files -brought in by respectful clerks 
dutifully pointing their fingers to the spot where BDO sahab should 
sign- and deal with the many clients and local politicians who came 
to see him for some or other kam (“work”)174; to get their paperwork 
done, lodge a complaint or ask a question. During intervals, Singh 
would patiently explain to me the details of the programs he 
supervised or, in outspoken moods, digress on who his visitors 
were, why they had come to visit him, and speculate on their 
motives for asking particular favours of him. Singh let me sit in at 
the weekly general meetings with the VLOs, which he chaired. 
Whenever the opportunity arose, I also accompanied Singh in his 
jeep on trips outside the block, to inspect ongoing development 
works, attend some official or social function, or meet with other 
officials in the district headquarters Sitapur. 
BDO Singh’s work did not seem to involve a lot of interaction 
with his nominal subordinates, the VLOs, in whose activities I was 
specially interested and whom I had hoped to contact while staying 
in the block. The weekly block meetings were usually short and had 
a rather ritualistic feel to them; Singh told the VLOs what he had to 
say, the VLOs quietly, and rather passively, listened. As soon as the 
meeting ended, most VLOs would quickly leave the block 
compound and drive off on their motorbikes. Being new to the place 
                                                
174 Kam, conventionally translated as “work”, is a sanskrit based word 
used for activities that require effort (De Zwart 1995b: 10). 
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and work environment, I simply assumed that the VLOs must be 
busy in their villages and apparently did not need that much 
guidance.  
After a few weeks in Kasmanda block I asked Singh whether it 
would be possible to see how his VLOs were doing in the villages. 
Though seeming a little perturbed by my request, Singh, after one of 
the Wednesday block meetings, called out to one of the VLOs, a 
man named Ram Vilas, and instructed him to show me around in 
his village. Vilas, clearly puzzled, got on his motorbike (a Suzuki, 
quite popular at the time among Sitapur’s VLOs) with some 
unidentified young man riding pillion. Vilas beckoned us (Sunil was 
with me) to follow him and set off. Patara Kalan, the village where 
Vilas was posted, turned out to be situated quite close to the block 
office, some three kilometres northwest from Kamlapur, just off the 
highway that connects the state capital Lucknow to Sitapur.  
Having arrived in the village, Vilas, who appeared to take 
directions from the man behind him, manoeuvred his motorbike 
straight to what turned out to be the pradhan’s house. Entering the 
house, Vilas and the pillion rider asked us to wait outside for a 
moment. We quickly attracted the attention of a small crowd of 
spectators who did not speak to us, but seemed quite happy to just 
watch the scene, quietly murmuring among themselves. I caught the 
word jaj (official enquiry, investigation). After a few minutes, the 
pradhan himself appeared; a man, estimatedly in his mid-forties 
and wearing the traditional dhoti favoured by ordinary village folk 
and politicians.175 (Ram Vilas and his companion, by contrast, wore 
“western-style” pants and shirts, the usual attire of Indian civil 
servants and other white collar workers176).  
The pradhan, who introduced himself as Shyam Lal, ushered 
us into a small room which gave the impression of serving as a 
reception room for guests. It was sparsely furnished with a small tea 
table and a few steel chairs with plastic mattings, of the type 
                                                
175 A dhoti is a rectangular piece of unstitched cloth, usually between 4 
and 5 meters long, wrapped about the waist and the legs, and knotted at the 
waist. 
176 Lowly, 4th class government workers such as sweepers and, sometimes, 
drivers are an exception in this regard. They usually wear the traditional dhoti. 
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characteristically found in government offices. A young girl brought 
in a plate of fruits and tea and quickly disappeared. Lal told us he 
had won the last two pradhani elections and had served as Patara 
Kalan’s pradhan for the past thirteen years. In so doing he had 
continued the family “tradition”; his father, namely, had also been 
pradhan, way back in the seventies. What was evidently a matter of 
great pride to Lal was that he, and his father before him, had 
managed to secure the pradhani as SCs (untouchables), in a village 
numerically dominated by BCs (backward castes).  
Then Lal, unsolicited and excitedly, started dwelling at length 
on the various ways in which untruthful “people” could thwart fair 
elections. Principally, he explained, there were three foul ways in 
which candidates could be kept from winning: “Powerful” people 
could obstruct the nominations of rival candidates; candidates could 
be “obstructed” to contact their voters, and voters could be 
“influenced” by way of threats. The “kidnapping” of candidates, 
said Lal, also belonged to this category. It was all too clear that Lal 
himself, also, had had to overcome a fair share of said obstructions 
and influencing by his rivals.  
All the while that pradhan Lal was suggestively painting us a 
picture of local electoral politics, Vilas and his companion had kept 
mostly quiet, now and then making concurring noises and gestures. 
Only when Lal digressed on the prevalence of “verbal threats” in 
village politics, did Vilas interrupt the pradhan’s monologue. 
Politicians, he emphasized, were not the only ones on the receiving 
end of such abuses; adhikaris (officers) like himself also often had to 
deal with them when carrying out their development programs in 
the villages. Though I tried repeatedly to bring the chatting around 
to the development activities being undertaken in the village, this 
did not seem to arouse much conversational interest.  
After finishing our teas and fruits, we all got up to leave. I 
asked Vilas, who seemed to be getting ready to leave the village on 
his motorbike, whether he could perhaps find a little more time to 
walk us around the village and show us some of the development 
projects. Annoyed, Vilas conferred for a moment with his 
companion, out of our earshot. Then, at a brisk pace, he started 
walking along the village’s main road. It soon became evident, 
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however, that Vilas did not really know his way around the village. 
Apparently he and his companion, finally introduced by Vilas as 
“some friend” who “sometimes helps me out”, had decided to give 
me a tour of the recently constructed colonies (as locals refer to 
houses built with IAY subsidies) in the village, but Vilas more than 
once lost his way, to be quickly put on the right track by his 
“helper”. Lal, who was walking alongside Sunil and me, could not 
suppress a smile. Vilas sensed we were becoming aware of his 
ignorance and, as if to correct this impression, “instructed” the 
pradhan, in what was clearly intended as an authoritative voice, to 
make sure that a few unfinished (but already paid-for) colonies 
would be completed as quickly as possible. After this hurried tour, 
Vilas and his friend quickly got on their bike and drove off. 
 
As I came to realize in the following weeks and months, my short 
visit to Patara Kalan had revealed a very common, even typical, 
feature of Sitapur’s rural development bureaucracy. Almost as a 
rule, the DLBs working in the district are quite ignorant about the 
villages they are supposed to be working in. Apart from the 
pradhan or some other “powerful” people they usually hardly know 
any of the ordinary villagers –who are, after all, their nominal 
clients- personally. Though they usually know –perhaps with a little 
help of some friend- where to find the residences of their villages’ 
influential people, they are typically not conversant with the names 
and layouts of the various hamlets in their jurisdiction. And more 
often than not, they are even quite unaware of the development 
projects being purportedly executed under their own guidance and 
supervision.  
For one who might have had visions of rural development 
administration involving DLBs moving at frantic speed through the 
countryside to bring the fruits of modernity to the most backward 
areas of the country, an acquaintance with Sitapur’s DLBs is thus a 
sobering up experience. DLBs like Ram Vilas, in fact, seldom visit 
their villages and, hence, tend to see very little dust. If they are 
ignorant about the villages and their own developmental activities it 
is because they have, for most intents and purposes, abandoned the 
frontline of rural development program implementation (cf. Hood 
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1998: 31-4). They usually need a good reason to pay a visit to their 
villages, keep their touring to an absolute minimum and, like Ram 
Vilas, restrict their visits to where the locally influential people 
reside.  
From the point of view of ordinary villagers, like the curious 
spectators in Patara Kalan, a village appearance by the VLO is a 
noteworthy phenomenon, at least in the five blocks in my fieldwork 
area and even more so in the poor and low-caste settlements 
surrounding the main villages there. The large majority of the rural 
development bureaucracy’s prospective clients in the more than 40 
villages and hamlets that I visited claimed to have never spoken to 
the DLB assigned to their area or village. The inhabitants of the 
untouchable hamlet Ghaura, for instance, claimed to have picked up 
whatever information they possessed about rural development 
programs from watching the hamlet’s single TV owned by a 
relatively well-off inhabitant. Secretary Daya Ram, however, -like the 
inhabitants of Ghaura a Chamar by jati- had never been spotted in 
the hamlet, ever since he had been posted in Maholi five years ago.  
The people in the untouchable hamlet Pasinpurva 
(Chandraseni), acknowledged that the secretary did come once in a 
while, “but he only halts at the school in Chandraseni”. According 
to the inhabitants of Mahuwapurva, a mixed caste settlement with 
backward and untouchable castes, “nobody from the block, neither 
village level officers, nor the BDO or other officials, have ever 
visited our hamlet. Whenever we have some work, we have to ferret 
them out”. Likewise, the name of Babu Ram, the untouchable VLO 
posted in their gram panchayat, did not ring a bell among the 
Chamars and Pasis of Bhawania purva: “Nobody”, they concluded 
dryly, “ever comes here”. In short, Sitapur’s VLOs, irrespective of 
their caste identity, have largely abandoned the frontline. They do 
not regularly visit the villages and hamlets in their jurisdiction, let 
alone frequent them.177 
                                                
 177 My findings are remarkably similar to those of Sylvia Marion Hale, 
who reported on the lack of interaction between officials and villagers in five 
villages in eastern Uttar Pradesh two decades ago: “The restricted nature of 
interaction [with officials, bvg] is indicated by the fact that two-thirds of all 
respondents said they had never talked directly with officials. Almost half of 
them did not know who these people were. For others recognition was often 
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2 Netas do the work 
 
The fact that Sitapur’s DLBs have largely abandoned the frontline 
does not mean that (some) rural development benefits such as 
subsidies, temporary employment and rural infrastructure do not 
reach the rural population. On the contrary, in spite of DLBs’ 
absenteeism, beneficiaries are selected and program benefits are 
being allocated. Rather than by the block staff, however, such 
allocative decisions are typically and decisively influenced and 
taken by local politicians or, as they are commonly referred to, local 
netas. In doing so, these netas effectively appropriate whatever de 
iure and de facto discretionary power DLBs might be considered to 
have. Rural development work, in other words, is in practice the 
business of politicians.  
The political appropriation of decisionmaking-power over 
rural development issues is so common that few of those concerned 
–netas, DLBs and clients- deem it worthy of much surprise or 
comment. It is, quite simply, taken as a matter of fact. Remarking on 
the selection of IAY beneficiaries in the village of Bhaira 
Bhaikuntpur, BDO Kasmanda, for instance, noted almost in passing 
that “though the VLO produced a list of prospective beneficiaries 
the actual selection was done by the pradhan”. When I asked an 
assembled group of VLOs in Reusa block how they went about 
selecting deserving candidates for the various programs entrusted 
to them they seemed rather baffled by the ignorance implied in my 
question. “In practice”, they explained, “we hardly make any 
decisions at all. It is the pradhan who decides who will get the 
benefits”.  
Beneficiaries, on their part, typically explain their availing of 
certain benefits as a result of the decisive intervention by the 
pradhan or other powerful netas. Members of an untouchable 
                                                                                                                                          
confined to seeing them in the market or taking tea on the pradhan’s front 
porch. Only fifteen per cent of all respondents claimed frequent contact with 
officials. These comprise respondents mainly from among the pradhan’s 
supporters and neutral higher castes. Other sections of the communities were 
largely ignored. Low caste respondents, in particular, often claimed that 
officials had never entered their street, never stopped to talk to them, and did 
not visit their fields” (Hale 1984: 70). 
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family in the hamlet of Mamarkhapur who managed to get a 
housing subsidy claimed they owed their “luck” to the efforts of the 
block pramukh, “who took pity on us”. In both their own and poor 
villagers’ accounts, DLBs hardly feature as important actors in 
developmental decision-making. If they are perceived to play a role 
at all, this role largely remains restricted to the official sanctioning of 
decisions actually arrived at by other, political, actors. As Samar 
Singh, the VLO of Paisiya, summed up the prevailing situation: 
“The VLO mostly follows whatever plans the village pradhan has 
cooked up”.  
Whence this widespread political appropriation of 
bureaucratic discretion in, what would appear to be, routine 
implementation decision-making? Answering this question requires 
insight in dust-level politicians’ motives for encroaching upon 
formally administrative jurisdictions as well as in DLBs’ motives for 
their apparent toleration of this encroachment. Let me deal with the 
motivations of dust-level netas first. Put roughly, local netas have 
good reasons to appropriate DLBs’ discretion because securing, 
maintaining and extending the capability to supply the sort of 
benefits that DLBs are supposed to make available is what Indian 
politics, and also politics in dust-level Uttar Pradesh, is all, or at 
least largely, about.  
Most politicians in contemporary India act on the assumption 
that the votes and group support needed to satisfy their political 
ambitions can be most successfully garnered by acting as patrons to 
voters. That is to say, they spend much, if not most, of their time and 
energy on locating, capturing and distributing patronage to their 
followers or those whose electoral support they court. In Indian 
politics, virtually any public resource can be, and often is, turned 
into patronage: government jobs, wells, housing, roads, land 
security, schools, telegraph lines, power connections, water, loans, 
hospital beds, police protection, ration cards, university admission, 
business licenses and permits as well as, more indirectly, access to 
political or administrative authorities who can influence or, even 
better, decide on the allocation of these benefits (cf. e.g. Brass 1966; 
Chandra 2004b).  
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According to Paul Brass, a leading scholar of India’s political 
system, Indian politics has become “so oriented to the distribution 
of patronage, favors, appointments, contracts, and the like, that most 
politicians cannot imagine an alternative” (Brass 1997: 55). More 
recently, Kanchan Chandra has typified Indian democracy as a 
patronage democracy in which candidates for political office, 
regardless of the ideological preoccupations or policy issues raised 
by national level leaders on public platforms, typically seek votes 
and office by the simple promise “Vote for me and I will get your 
work done”. Hence, elections may fruitfully be seen as “auctions for 
the sale of government services” (Chandra 2004a). Since politicians 
in India’s patronage democracy treat public goods essentially as 
market goods to be exchanged for popular support, official rules that 
stipulate clients’ entitlements to public benefits do not tend to count 
for much. Access to public benefits and resources, in other words, is 
typically not a matter of administratively codified entitlement but, 
rather, a personal favour to be given (or withheld) by political 
patrons.178 
Brass has traced the rise of patronage politics in Uttar Pradesh 
to the years directly following Indian independence. The political 
leadership that had thus far been exercised by prominent, 
charismatic and ideologically inspired leaders of the nationalist 
movement began to be steadily taken over by “modern virtuoso 
politicians”, men whose positions of new found power were not 
                                                
178 The prevalence of patronage politics is, of course, by no means a 
typically Indian phenomenon. On the contrary, patronage politics permeates, as 
anthropologists and sociologists have shown, political systems around the 
world (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002: 2). What distinguishes India’s 
patronage politics from many other patronage-based systems is its intimate 
linkage with the democratic, electoral process; in many settings where patronage 
permeates the political system, this system is not democratic in the sense that, 
as is the case in India, political leadership is chosen through competitive 
elections. Another distinguishing feature of Indian patronage politics would 
seem to be the sheer scale on which it has tended to be practiced. The Indian 
state long –that is, at least until the early 1990s, when its central leadership 
started moving towards liberalizing the “command economy” of the “license 
raj”- controlled, if not monopolized, most valued things in life, including 
security of life and property and access to education and health facilities (cf. 
Chandra 2004b). 
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built, as those of the earlier generation of leaders, upon personal 
“esteem and awe”, but on their practical understanding of local 
society and their ability to distribute patronage. In the post-
independence period, then, men of power in the districts were 
increasingly those who could “get things done” (Brass 1966: 33, 35, 
219). Nowadays, more than half a century later, little seems to have 
changed. Virtuoso politicians, also in Sitapur, continue to abound. If 
anything, they have become much more numerous than before, 
especially at the dust-level. Whereas the new developmental 
hierarchy –extending all the way down to the villages- has provided 
politicians with an additional and popular source of patronage, also 
the number of elective positions from which this patronage may be 
dispensed has increased, due to the strengthening of the local 
panchayat system.  
Dust-level netas –including pradhans, BDC-members, 
pramukhs as well as individuals seeking political office- are quite a 
visible lot. Distinctively dressed in the traditional kurta-dhoti, the 
more successful or ambitious among them can often be seen 
roaming the countryside on their motorbikes (not the newfangled 
Suzuki’s preferred by VLOs, but sturdy, old-style native brands like 
Rajdoots and Indian Enfields). They flock the district’s block offices, 
their importance and popularity aptly signalled by the number of 
retainers and benefit seekers flocking to them rather than to the 
block staff. The block-pramukh of Reusa, Hasin Ahmad, for 
instance, is evidently a popular and influential man. Every 
Wednesday and Friday, Ahmad, hailing from a Muslim land 
owning family, holds court on the block premises to, as he explains, 
“meet the village people, see work, listen to BDC members and 
attend to pradhans’ problems”. The Kasmanda block office is 
frequented by a handful pradhans of nearby villages. Mostly 
belonging to upper caste, landowning families (whose members, if 
they can afford it, typically do not cultivate their land themselves), 
these dust-level netas are free to spend their days cultivating good 
relations with and leaning on the block staff, hear and exchange 
gossip, check rumours, and take care of some work for their clients: 
disposing of paperwork, speeding up files, securing eligibility for 
5 Interrupted supply 171
development benefits and pressing for the sanctioning of subsidy 
instalments.  
To appreciate the extent to which such netagiri (“politicking”) 
by dust-level politicians may weigh on purportedly technical, 
routine, implementational administrative decision-making in 
Sitapur one needs only observe the sheer number of netas circling 
around dust-level administrative offices in a town like Biswan.179 
Biswan is a busy market town and a locally important road junction. 
It also boasts a large government-operated sugar mill. After the 
sugarcane harvest, peasants from the wider region direct their 
hundreds of bullock and tractor-driven carts to queue up in front of 
the mill, waiting for their turn to offload their produce, heaped up 
meters high, and collect their receipts. Biswan is also a minor 
administrative centre. It does not only host the Biswan block 
headquarters but is also home to a thana (police station) and the 
tehsil offices of the revenue bureaucracy. These offices attract a 
continuous stream of visiting district and state civil and police 
officials and, especially, netas –both big and small-time ones- and 
other influence peddlers. At night time many of them can be found 
having their meals and drinking country liquor at the locally 
popular Gupta restaurant where “namaskar pradhanji” is a very 
frequent form of address.180 To be in the thick of things, quite a few 
pradhans have settled themselves permanently in the town. Others 
operate through family members or close relations residing there.  
Dust-level netas’ preoccupation with securing and providing 
patronage is logical in view of villagers’ expectations of them. Good 
                                                
179 I spent quite a lot of time in Biswan. The room which I had rented 
there was adjacent to the busy telephone booth of mr. Srivastava, himself 
brother to one of the pradhans in the area. Srivastava, with whom I soon 
developed friendly relations, singled out and introduced me to quite a few 
dust-level netas, including his brother. It was through these contacts that I 
learned much of what I now know about the sort of reasons dust-level netas 
have for frequenting administrative offices and about their strategies for 
securing the cooperation of the officials working in them. 
180 Namaskar is a respectful version of the popular greeting “namaste”, 
which Hindus typically utter while folding their hands. The extension ji added to 
pradhan also denotes respect. The exchanges of namaskar pradhanji’s in the Gupta 
hotel –where Sunil and I often had our dinners- were so numerous that it sparked 
Sunil’s comment that “everybody in Biswan seems to be pradhan”. 
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politicians, by the latters’ definition, are politicians who can be 
counted on to deliver benefits and get things done; bad politicians, 
on the other hand, are those who humbly spread their angaucha, 
make attractive promises but fail to do any work.181 The reason why 
a group of villagers in Haibatpur, for instance, were so happy with 
their pradhan was evidently because he, as they pointed out in 
considerable detail, was doing something for them: “Our pradhan”, 
they said, “really takes care of the poor. Earlier the roads were not 
good, but now they are good enough. All colonies have been 
properly built. The pradhan has seen to it that they are even bigger 
than normal, and he has paid for this from his own pocket”. In 
further praise of their pradhan they also credited him with 
arranging for loans for buffaloes, weaving-machines and with 
securing seasonal employment opportunities against very attractive 
conditions: “We got 35 to 40 rupees for a day’s work, with tea, bidis, 
matches, sweets and meals provided for. Even if we had asked jalebi 
[a popular type of sweet] for breakfast”, they boasted, “the pradhan 
would surely have given us”.  
The untouchable villagers in Karaundi, on the other hand, 
were obviously very dissatisfied with their pradhan “You can see, 
sir, there is nothing here: no proper roads or lanes, no drains. You 
can see this high voltage electricity line just crossing in front of the 
village, but what use is it to us? Our village is still not connected to 
it. Last year only a handpump was installed here thanks to BDC 
member Ramji but the pradhan has done nothing here. Go and see 
Newada, a neighbouring village. The pradhan there has done 
excellent work”. What the villagers in Haibatpur and Karaundi, 
despite their different evaluations of their pradhans’ effectiveness, 
have in common is that they employ the same yardstick for 
evaluating politicians’ performance: getting concrete and material 
things done. No wonder, then, that many netas, who depend on 
villagers for votes and re-election, so eagerly seek and dispense 
                                                
181 An angaucha is a multipurpose scarf. Peasants wrap it around their 
heads in protection against dust and heat and use it as a handkerchief and 
towel. The angaucha has also become part of the standard attire of an Indian 
neta, signifying, as Sunil explained to me, the hard labour and sweat 
purportedly involved in their work.  
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patronage and spend most of their days, as the villagers of 
Haibatpur described their pradhan’s activities, “doing all kinds of 
work, such as arranging pensions for widows and old people and 
help for pregnant ladies”.182 
 
 
3 Leasing out discretion 
  
To say that netas “do the work” does not mean that DLBs are not 
involved in the allocation of development benefits. But what it does 
mean is that DLBs somehow allow netas to appropriate the 
decision-making discretion invested in their own roles. The 
implication of the fact that DLBs tend to eschew the exercise of 
discretion is that it makes the operation of representative 
bureaucracy in terms of caste on the Sitapur dust-level highly 
unlikely. If DLBs, regardless of their caste identities, refrain from 
making allocative decisions, it does not really matter of what caste 
they are. The reason why DLBs, almost routinely, go along with the 
appropriation of their discretion by local netas is basically twofold: 
The first reason is that DLBs fear the punishments that local netas 
can dole out when they find DLBs to be uncooperative, the second 
that cooperation with netas may actually be turned into quite a 
lucrative affair. 
 As we have seen, local netas typically act under a compulsion 
of patronage. To make such patronage available to their clients they 
are heavily dependent on the cooperation and complicity of DLBs. 
First of all, netas depend upon officials for reliable information on the 
                                                
182 Note that rural voters employ this yardstick for all netas, irrespective 
of the level at which they operate: the better and more his work, the better the 
politician. One man in Biswan, for instance, argued that Amar Rizvi –a “big” 
politician in the area and former MLA, MP and Minister- had been a good 
politician because he had “done so many things in Mahmoodabad” [the town 
from where Rizvi was elected]: “He arranged the arrival of a cooperative sugar 
mill, a polytechnic, a spinning mill, a TV tower, the Rampur-Mathura road and 
the bridge between Sitapur district and Bahraich”. Similarly, this same man was 
also happy with Padma Seth, a former urban development minister from 
Biswan because she, also, had “done good work”: “She has the road dividers at 
the central crossing of Biswan to her credit, as well as 5 tubewells, three tanks 
and other road development works”.  
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kind and amount of benefits available for “allocation” in their blocks 
and villages. Before it can be secured and dispensed, patronage 
must namely first be identified. Rural development programs are 
not equally intensively implemented in all localities, and some 
programs –like the UP government’s Ambedkar village program- 
are even exclusively implemented in limited numbers of specially 
designated localities for centrally specified periods of time. 
Decisions regarding the activation and funding of rural 
development programs in specific areas, blocks and villages and the 
quantity of development benefits involved are typically made by 
higher authorities –on federal, state, divisional and district level- 
and then relayed to the blocks. DLBs therefore possess, or have 
relatively easy access to, the kind of information that is vital to 
netas’ success as patrons.  
 Secondly, netas depend on DLBs for observing secrecy. 
Obviously, effective patronage politics presupposes a fair share of 
ignorance among the patron’s clientele. If clients had full knowledge 
about the existence, content, procedures, and eligibility criteria of 
development programs they would not need netas to act as 
intermediaries between themselves and the block machinery; they 
could simply approach the development bureaucracy directly to 
claim the development benefits to which they are formally entitled. 
Since villagers’ continued ignorance is essential to their survival as 
political patrons, netas have a vested interest in making sure that 
DLBs actively restrict the spread of relevant information among 
potential clients. An added advantage of securing DLBs’ secrecy and 
interrupting the information supply to target groups, is that it 
denies clients the opportunity to evaluate the generosity of their 
netas and, hence, the latter’s worthiness of their electoral support. In 
other words, client ignorance about the extent of development 
patronage available from the block allows netas to create favourable 
impressions of themselves as big-hearted, influential and efficient 
patrons even if they are, in fact, nothing of the kind.  
During my village visits I often had the opportunity to 
experience first hand how jealously village netas tend to guard 
information on rural development programs and how desperate 
ordinary villagers are to gain whatever knowledge they can. On 
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several occasions when I brought up the issue of local program 
outlays, village politicians became visibly uncomfortable or 
nervous. In Majhiya, a close associate of the pradhan bluntly 
ordered curious by-standers to back off when I asked him about the 
development outlays in the village. The pradhan of Haibatpur was 
apparently not in a position to simply dismiss a dozen of interested 
spectators. When asked about the JRY activities undertaken in his 
village, he therefore decided –to the obvious hilarity and scorn of 
the spectators- to continue our conversation inside his house. Netas’ 
reticence to openly discuss program information stood in shrill 
contrast with the eagerness with which many villagers absorbed 
every piece of information they could lay their hands on. When I 
showed a few men in Arro Khamajatpur a file with the village’s 
program outlays given to me by a block clerk, I was in no time 
surrounded by three dozen men. When they grasped how much 
money should, in theory, have reached their village over the past 
few years, a few of them became so agitated that Sunil and I had a 
hard time calming them down.183  
 Thirdly, netas depend on DLBs for getting the necessary 
paperwork in order. As in all bureaucracies, the implementation of 
development programs involves a lot of paperwork. Applications 
must be filled out, signatures or thumb-impressions collected, caste 
certificates produced, project monies sanctioned, development 
progress mapped and authorised, subsidy instalments approved, 
village development plans written. In other words, what may 
broadly be referred to as the “allocation” of development benefits is 
typically not a single, clear-cut event but a chain of small and 
                                                
183 Sitapur’s dust-level netas’ preoccupation with information control 
accords well with a key insight developed in Lee Komito’s account of patron-
client politics in Dublin, Ireland. The patron’s power, as Komito observed, does 
not so much rest in his control over public resources –as most scholarly 
accounts of this kind of politics have it- as well as in his control over and access 
to information about those resources. “Dublin politicians’ claim to power or 
influence rested on their ability to monopolise and then market their specialist 
knowledge of state resources and their access to bureaucrats who allocated such 
resources . . . Politicians used their special access and knowledge to create a 
reputation in the community . . . . Politicians’ often exaggerated claims of 
influence could not be disputed because knowledge of administrative 
procedures was severely restricted” (Komito 1984: 174, 175). 
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discrete administrative actions. This chain typically requires the 
alternating involvement of several DLBs –VLOs, ADOs, clerks and 
the BDO- and, at each and every juncture, the production of paper 
documents to serve as proof that centrally ordained procedures 
have been scrupulously followed to the letter.  
Netas are well aware that their trading of access to 
development benefits for votes and group support is not exactly 
legal and might land them into trouble. One of the first questions I 
would typically be asked by village politicians was whether I had 
come for some jaj. Clearly, netas are quite concerned that higher and 
vigilance authorities might learn about their patronage transactions. 
Making sure that the official paperwork documents and reflects 
centrally desired procedures and outcomes rather than ground 
realities is crucial if netas, as they feel they must, are to cover up 
patronage transactions. But since most netas lack the necessary 
expertise or literacy (according to one BDO, “at least forty per cent” 
of the pradhans in his block were illiterate), they must rely on 
cooperative DLBs for doing the job.184  
 
Punishment-based cooperation  
 
The large majority of DLBs in Sitapur see no good reasons why they 
should withhold their cooperation from the important netas in their 
jurisdictions. To start with, unlike bureaucrats in many other 
political systems, Indian bureaucrats, DLBs included, may be rather 
easily disciplined or punished by politicians if the latter somehow 
find them to be uncooperative. Undoubtedly the most important 
and commonly used tool of control that Indian politicians have over 
salaried government employees is the power to transfer bureaucrats 
from one post to another. The right to transfer senior civil servants, 
most notably IAS officials, formally rests with the chief minister, the 
highest political functionary in the state. Civil servants in the lower 
                                                
184 In a program such as JRY, the implementation of which has in theory 
been fully delegated to the gram panchayats, village netas’ dependence on DLBs 
for “properly” taking care of the paperwork is less than in most other schemes, 
which are still nominally executed by the block staff. But also in JRY, netas 
continue to depend on DLBs –VLOs in this case- since their sign is still needed for 
the release of funds to the villages. 
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echelons, including BDOs (class 1 officials) and VLOs (class 3 
officials) may, in turn, be transferred by the senior officials whose 
transfers are subject to the chief minister’s control. All this is largely 
theory, however. In practice, chief ministers, to preserve and 
buttress the support of their allies in the state government, often feel 
obliged to farm out their power to transfer senior officials to MLAs. 
MLAs, on their part, may likewise choose to further delegate the 
transfer power bestowed to them to influential dust-level politicians 
to whom they feel obligated or whose support they court.185 As a 
result, political control over the bureaucracy is widely dispersed: 
“Politicians exert a chain of influence that runs down to the lowliest 
employee at the local level” (Chandra 2004b: 129-130). 
Netas in Sitapur also try, and regularly manage, to transfer 
uncooperative officials. (“The former two BDOs?”, replied the 
pramukh of Parsendi matter-of-factly when I asked him about his 
relations with them, “I had them transferred”). In itself, a transfer to 
another post or place does not need to constitute a punishment to 
the concerned official. On the contrary, it may provide an 
opportunity to escape the grind or unpleasant atmosphere of one’s 
former posting, make new friends and see new places, or to live 
nearer to one’s native place and close relations. Moreover, 
bureaucrats know in advance that regular transfers come with the 
job and therefore expect to find themselves in another locality every 
                                                
185 Part of the reason why politicians higher up can expect to increase 
their political support by granting transfer power to politicians lower down the 
line is that transfer power is a marketable commodity. Politicians who wield 
transfer power can, and often do, sell administrative posts under their control 
to the highest bidder. The money thus earned is an important political asset 
since political parties preferably field candidates who have the financial means 
to win elections. Another reason why politicians are willing to exchange 
political support for transfer power is that transfers can also be used to fill 
important, that is patronage-rich, posts with bureaucrats who are prepared to 
assist in channelling benefits to local constituencies (De Zwart 1994: 81; Wade 
1982: 319). The willingness of a “big” politician to farm out transfer power to a 
“smaller” politician thus constitutes a politically very important favour. The 
office of former (and present) UP chief minister Mulayam Singh Yadav, at one 
time, had as many as 2,500 letters from MPs and MLAs requesting transfers or 
postings (Saxena 1999: 97). 
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once in a while. A transfer only becomes a punishment whenever 
the new posting does not live up to one’s wishes.  
In Sitapur, most VLOs especially dislike and fear a posting in 
the blocks of Reusa, Sakran, Rampur and Behta. These blocks are 
situated in the infertile and poor lowland plain in the eastern part of 
the district also known as the gaanjar. Hemmed in, as it is, by two 
large rivers, the gaanjar until quite recently was virtually an island 
for some parts of the year, as frequent and heavy floods would 
make boat crossing difficult. Nowadays the area is more easily 
accessible thanks to the newly constructed bridges that connect it 
with the larger tehsil towns on the district’s “mainland” and with 
neighbouring Bahraich district. Despite these improvements the 
gaanjar continues to offer few attractions to VLOs. Its public 
infrastructure is still relatively poorly developed and the quality of 
the drinking water is poor (officials derisively call the area kalapani, 
meaning “black water”). The larger towns that serve as block 
headquarters lack good schools, medical facilities, shops, restaurants 
and lodging opportunities, making them quite unsuitable places to 
settle down in with one’s family.  
VLOs also detest the “feudal culture” of gaanjar society where 
they find local notables overly concerned with the scrupulous 
guarding of their status. Some VLOs especially resent, as they are 
sometimes expected or made to, touching local big people’s feet as a 
token of traditional respect. Taken together, the blocks in the gaanjar 
present all those features that make a locality “backward” in the 
eyes of VLOs and that, hence, complicate “work culture”. As such, 
nobody really likes to be posted there and those who are invariably 
perceive and experience it as a “punishment posting”. In practice, 
this means that VLOs are usually willing to go to great lengths to 
avoid ending up in the gaanjar. If cooperation with local netas is the 
price to be paid for preventing a transfer to a place like this, most 
VLOs are quite prepared to pay it. 
The posting preferences of BDOs slightly differ from those of 
VLOs. Unlike VLOs who, as relatively lowly class 3 officers, can 
only be shuffled around within the district, BDOs, as class 1 officers, 
may be transferred to any district in the entire state. Hence, BDOs’ 
first priority is usually to make sure that they do not end up in any 
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of the backward areas of the state, rather than those of a particular 
district. The BDO of Biswan, presently a man in his fifties, told me 
with horror how, as a young ADO, he had started his career in the 
early 1970s in distant Uttarkashi, a Himalayan district, where he had 
been forced to move about on foot and where there had been 
nothing in the way of modern facilities.186 Given their general 
aversion to jangli (jungly) and backward areas and their marked 
preference for a posting in the direct vicinity of a large city, BDOs 
could do much worse than securing a posting in Sitapur district, 
situated, as it is, nearby the state capital Lucknow.  
This is not to say that the BDOs in Sitapur do not strongly 
prefer postings in certain blocks over those in others. Most coveted 
are postings in the southern part of the district. These allow for 
relatively comfortable daily commuting from and living in 
Lucknow, and for enjoying the city’s excellent facilities. Like VLOs, 
BDOs generally try to avoid being posted to the gaanjar, not so 
much on account of its poor living conditions (they would not 
contemplate residing there anyway) as for its being situated quite 
far away from both Lucknow and the district capital Sitapur, the 
second best residential alternative. And again like VLOs, BDOs are 
quite ready to do what it takes to satisfy the wishes of powerful 
patronage politicians if by so doing they can prevent an 
unfavourable transfer. As BDO Kasmanda put it: “An officer simply 
cannot survive by following the rules. If he does not give in to netas’ 
pressures, he will surely be posted for two weeks in Pittoragarh 
[another Himalayan district, bvg], then for one week in Basti [a 
district in “backward” eastern Uttar Pradesh, bvg] and so on”. 
Transfers, or the threat of transfers, are thus a powerful, as well as 
frequently used, disciplining and punishing device in the hands of 
politicians.187  
                                                
186 The BDO described Uttarkashi as “the district of the three P’s: 
punishment, first posting and promotions” (officers may sometimes be seduced 
to accept postings in otherwise unattractive localities if they are simultaneously 
promoted to a higher rank). Uttarkashi, by the way, is now no longer part of 
Uttar Pradesh. It has become part of the newly created hill state of Uttaranchal.  
 187 Transfers occur with steady frequency. On average, BDOs in Sitapur 
do not manage to stay posted in any particular block for longer than 18 months. 
VLOs tend to survive a bit longer, but typically not more than four years 
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Netas need not only rely on transfers, however. Another well-
established method of exacting compliance is the discrediting or 
smearing of DLBs’ reputations. A common, and rather ironic, form 
of discrediting is accusing DLBs of “corruption” (cf. e.g. Bayley 
1978: 528). BDO Pahla, for instance, quite recently got into 
difficulties when the District Magistrate had made an inspection 
visit to one of the villages in his block. Though the BDO himself had 
not been informed of the DM’s impending surprise jaj, the pradhan 
of the concerned village nevertheless blamed the BDO for having 
“organised” it. The pradhan had then approached a number of state 
ministers, other influential politicians and senior officials –including 
the DM. He accused the BDO of accepting a huge, ten lakhs bribe 
and pressed for charges. To the BDO’s relief, the DM managed to 
avert further complications by convincing the pradhan and his allies 
that he had acted on his own impulse. He also pointed out that the 
BDO –given his inexperience and incomplete knowledge of the 
“requisite procedures”- could never have raised such a huge bribe 
even if he had wanted to.  
What makes allegations of corruption such as the one 
discussed above harmful to DLBs is not so much the fact that they 
are allegations of corruption but that they are allegations. (As I will 
point out later on, most DLBs and their superiors are in fact 
“corrupt” in the sense that they usually accept bribes or (help) skim 
                                                                                                                                          
(figures calculated on the basis of information obtained from seven blocks and 
from personally collected transfer histories of 25 VLOs). Note, however, that not 
all transfers are to be considered punishments meted out by netas for 
uncooperative administrative behaviour. Politicians and administrative 
superiors may also effectuate transfers for other reasons. Powerful netas may 
expressly appoint “difficult” officials –that is, officials who incline towards rule-
bound behaviour- to certain posts to keep rival or rebel politicians in check. 
Besides, just like netas may use transfers to punish and get rid of bad, rigid 
officials, they can also utilize them to attract good, pliable ones. State 
governments, for instance, often start shuffling officers around whenever they 
feel fresh elections can no longer be avoided. Having sympathetic officials to 
oversee the polling and voting may go a long way, so it is assumed, in securing 
victory. In Uttar Pradesh, mass transfers right after elections have become a 
routine practice of establishing fresh political control over the bureaucracy 
(Banik 2001). Administrative superiors, moreover, may also regularly transfer 
subordinates, because they are looking for work, find it a healthy routine, or 
simply to show off their power (cf. De Zwart 1994).  
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off development monies). The damage that allegations can do to 
DLBs’ reputations is that they create the impression among their 
colleagues and superiors that they cannot handle their jobs very 
well. The ability to please, pacify and “butter” netas (as well as to 
collect side-income without sparking controversy) are considered 
practical requirements integral to the DLB’s job. DLBs who are 
repeatedly found to arouse the wrath of local netas, have their 
reputations smeared and charges pressed against them therefore 
run a real risk of becoming seen as clumsy and incompetent by 
colleagues and superiors. In other words, those who get into trouble 
once too often can expect but little sympathy.  
This is precisely what happened to Vijay Mishra, one of the 
DLBs in Biswan Block. Mishra had been posted in the village of 
Sukhawankalan a few months before I met him. As Mishra 
explained to me, one of the first works that the pradhan, a man 
named Bhargav, had wanted him to do was to sanction a TRYSEM 
scholarship to a local boy proposed by Bhargav. Mishra, however, 
had refused to cooperate, arguing that the boy was a “fake” (that is, 
formally ineligible) applicant. Bhargav had retaliated by refusing to 
sign Mishra’s “joining letter”, an official document required for the 
payment of VLOs’ salaries. Every time Mishra showed up in the 
village to meet Bhargav and get him to sign the letter, Bhargav 
happened to have left the village for “some work”. With the 
pradhan glibly avoiding face-to-face contact, the conflict between 
Bhargav and Mishra soon took the form of an arduous and drawn 
out correspondence between Mishra, the BDO and pradhan 
Bhargav. On Mishra’s prompting, the BDO sent a string of letters to 
Bhargav, requesting and directing Bhargav (“as per CDO’s 
instructions”) to sign Mishra’s joining letter. Initially, Bhargav did 
not seem much impressed. In his communications he stubbornly 
kept instigating the BDO to retain the former VLO, a man called 
Hari Pal, in his post, arguing he had found Pal’s work to be 
“extremely satisfactory”. After more than two months of fruitless 
paper debate Bhargav finally decided to give in, however, and duly 
signed the joining letter. 
Though he now, at last, received his salary, Mishra’s problems 
in Sukhawankalan continued unabated. Only six weeks after having 
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officially joined he was, so he claimed, beaten up (marpit) by Rakesh 
and Ramesh, both sons of the pradhan, and Bachu Lal, one of the 
latter’s henchmen (chamcha). These men had also begun to threaten 
him with “framing” him under the “Harijan Act” if he would not 
mend his ways. Mishra, an upper caste brahmin, took this threat 
quite seriously and understandably so. In the period preceding my 
fieldwork, the state government led by the untouchable, BSP chief 
minister Mayawati had started to pursue a stringent 
implementation of the “Harijan Act”.188 The police had been 
instructed to conduct fast-track investigation of any claims of abuse 
and to jail the accused while the case was under investigation. 
Besides, the alleged victims of caste-based crimes were also to be 
provided with Rs. 6,000 as assistance with legal expenses (see Jeffrey 
and Lerche 2001: 105-6). To untouchables, these new measures had 
suddenly made an appeal to the Act a very attractive course of 
action, since it could be used to kill two birds with one stone. Not 
only was it bound to make the accused –whether convicted or not- 
end up in jail, it also had the added advantage of generating a 
substantial sum of money. Several of my informants –both upper 
castes and untouchables- acknowledged that Mayawati’s measures 
had sparked an explosion of litigation under the Act, much of it 
“phoney” in the sense that untouchable claimants took recourse to 
the Act even when the alleged “crime” had nothing to do at all with 
caste-based atrocities.189 In short, if pradhan Bhargav, himself an 
untouchable, was to carry out his threat Mishra might in no time 
find himself in jail. 
                                                
188 What Sitapuri informants usually call the “Harijan Act” is officially 
known as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act 
of 1989 (also see chapter 3). 
189 Indra Pal Singh, a Yadav resident of Mahuwa purva (Haibatpur), 
claimed that “at least 60 percent” of the cases registered under the Act since the 
start of its stringent implementation had been false (pharzi). Others have also 
observed abuse of the Harijan Act. Jeffrey and Lerche found low caste 
individuals in Deogaon village in Jaunpur district in eastern Uttar Pradesh to be 
openly boasting about exaggerating Thakur violence against them in 
complaints to the police (Jeffrey and Lerche 2001: 107). 
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When I met him some four months after the entire affair had 
started, Mishra seemed at his wit’s end.190 Intimidated and scared, 
he had requested the BDO for a transfer and written a letter to the 
DM to ask for “justice and security”. For the moment, however, both 
superior officials seemed unwilling to intervene in the matter. This 
did not surprise Mishra’s colleague VLOs and the block clerks. “Mr. 
Mishra”, so the block’s junior clerk explained, “has a different type 
of nature that nobody can understand. That is why it is not easy for 
any pradhan to settle with him”. In other words, because of his 
unwillingness to strike a reasonable deal with his pradhan and his 
lack of agility in handling such routine manipulations as exercised 
by pradhan Bhargav and his supporters, Mishra was felt to be 
needlessly “difficult”. No wonder he had it coming to him.  
At the same time, DLBs also recognize that it is far from easy 
to effectively deal with “autocratic” pradhans such as Bhargav. In 
the course of their careers many DLBs have found themselves at the 
receiving end of netas’ unsettling threats of physical violence, 
manhandling and intimidation. “In my village”, said a VLO posted 
in a village in Khairabad block, “political power is so much 
contested that every day bullets are fired”. VLOs, especially, are 
acutely aware of the fact that they, as lone operators, present easily 
visible, accessible, and blameable targets (cf. Lipsky 1980: 10) and 
cite threats of physical harm and “danger” in the villages as the 
most important reasons for the infrequency of their village visits. 
But VLOs are not alone in fearing the political use of force. Even 
such a high-ranking and seemingly well-surrounded development 
official as the Project Director, who works from a large office in the 
district headquarters, said he regularly found himself confronted by 
small groups of strongmen barging into his office “with pointed 
guns and revolvers to show their strength”. 
In Sitapur, as in the rest of rural Uttar Pradesh, politics and the 
use of force and violence are, in fact, routinely and inextricably 
                                                
190 Mishra’s desperation was in fact the reason for my learning about his 
predicament. Mishra initially approached me, rather than the other way 
around, with a thick file of correspondence and “evidence” relating to his 
problems in Sukhawankalan in the hope that I could help him out by using my 
(largely presumed) connections with higher authorities. 
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intertwined. Here, the crafting of political careers typically goes 
hand in hand with the building up and deployment of muscle and 
fire power. Big netas such as MLAs and MLCs invariably move 
around in the company of dangerous-looking, rifle-wielding 
henchmen, who are often themselves local politicians. Going by the 
accounts of Sitapur DLBs, almost every block seems to have its share 
of “local mafias” whose ability to capture local political office and 
control patronage flows is said to primarily derive from their 
coercive power. The pradhan of the village of Bhaira Bhaikuntpur in 
Kasmanda block, for instance, was often pointed out to me as a 
notorious figure known for his strong-armed tactics (he was jailed at 
the time of my fieldwork). And the Thakurs of village Ulra, in 
Biswan block, are also known and feared for their goondagiri 
(hoodlumism, political gangsterism). Since they are well aware that 
local goondas (criminals, gangsters) often receive police protection in 
exchange for their occasional services to big politicians, most DLBs 
know better than to risk antagonizing them by withholding their 
cooperation. After all, “since there is”, as the BDO of Biswan 
explained, “no boundary between politics and goonda elements, 
there is also no shelter against them”.191  
Note that the existence of goonda elements and the threats of 
physical harm that come with them increase the effectiveness of the 
power over transfers as a weapon of political control. 
Understandably, officials are willing to go to great lengths to avoid 
                                                
191 The existence and operation, in the north Indian countryside, of 
“networks of power relations among police, criminals, and politicians in which 
the use of force and violence is, if not routine, at least not something 
unexpected or exceptional” receives ample attention in the work of Paul Brass 
(Brass 1997: 275) (See also Jeffrey’s recent work on the political strategies of Jats 
in western UP (Jeffrey 2000; Jeffrey 2001) and Véron et al.’s analysis of the 
everyday state in village Bihar, UP’s eastern neighbour state (Véron et al. 2003)). 
Brass’ conceptualization of some of such networks as “institutionalized riot 
systems” operating under the “loose control” of party leaders points at the 
prevalence and importance of these networks in the conduct of political affairs 
(ibid.). Historically speaking, there is nothing exceptional about Indian 
politicians’ use of and reliance on specialists of violence, however. “Over the 
long run of human history indeed”, writes Charles Tilly, “most important 
political figures have combined [political] entrepreneurship with control over 
coercive means. Only during the last few centuries has the unarmed power-
holder become a common political actor” (Tilly 2001: 11, 12). 
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being posted to a jurisdiction where they must operate under 
conditions of goondagiri. The BDO of Kasmanda, for example, spent 
many weeks frantically –and, as it turned out, successfully- 
mobilising his network of political and official friends in high places 
in Lucknow to get his transfer orders for Etawah district reversed. 
Not only would a transfer to Etawah –located in the western part of 
the state- have upset his family life in Lucknow, where he had just 
bought and moved into a new house; even more importantly, it 
would have meant being posted in the home district of Mulayam 
Singh Yadav, leader of the Samajwadi Party, former chief minister 
and, as such, a very powerful politician. Since he himself was 
known to be close with politicians of a rival party, the BDO had 
anticipated a very rough time in getting to terms with Mulayam’s 
goondas. Similarly, among VLOs, the villages of Bhaira Bhaikuntpur 
and Ulra –home villages to local mafia leaders- enjoy reputations as 
punishment postings despite the fact that they are not situated in 
the gaanjar. 
 
Reward-based cooperation 
 
DLBs’ fear of punishment may suffice to push them towards 
cooperation with local netas. The lurking threats of unfavourable 
transfers, reputation damage and violence are often reason enough 
for DLBs to be exceptionally sensitive to netas’ demands and 
interests and to take appropriate care of whom they deal with, 
which information they release and to whom, which proposed 
allocations they agree to sanction, and of what they entrust to 
official documents. The inclination of many DLBs to transfer their 
discretion to and cooperate with local netas does not only follow 
from their fear of sanctions, however. What also draws them towards 
cooperation are the financial rewards they can expect to reap in 
exchange for it. Cooperative officials are usually amply 
compensated for their services with a share of the development 
rents that netas routinely collect in the process of distributing 
patronage. Frontline abandonment and shunning of discretion are 
thus not unilaterally imposed upon DLBs. Rather, DLBs may be said 
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to, more or less voluntarily, lease out their discretion in return for a 
fraction of the development rents.  
To say that many local netas are heavily preoccupied with 
doing the work of their clients is not the same as saying that their 
motives are wholly, or even remotely, altruistic. Most netas 
obviously and proudly relish their power over public resources, and 
the client deference and social status that typically come with it.192 
Moreover, involvement in patronage politics provides plenty of 
opportunities to make money. As far as rural development policy 
implementation is concerned, netas may, and usually do, employ 
any of the following rent-seeking strategies.193 First of all, netas tend 
to charge or accept bribes from villagers for getting the latter’s work 
done or for trying to do so. Though the amounts of bribe money 
seem to vary from case to case and work to work, the sheer number 
of villagers who told me of having paid bribes to netas as part of 
their efforts to avail of development benefits suggests indeed that, as 
a Haibatpur villager put it, “without bribery (ghus) nobody does any 
work”.  
A second rent-seeking strategy is to skim off proportions of 
development subsidies. This strategy also seems to be quite 
prevalent. For example, throughout my research area almost all 
beneficiaries of the Indira Housing Scheme (IAY) claimed to have 
received anything between Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 17,000 as against the 
official subsidy amount of Rs. 20,000. Similarly, villagers who 
secured temporary employment under JRY were often being paid a 
bit or substantially less than the stipulated minimum amount of Rs. 
47 per day. Whereas in programs like IAY, JRY, EAS and IRDP at 
least some, or even a large, part of the involved benefits did reach 
                                                
192 As Kanchan Chandra has suggested, this very capacity of patronage 
politics to give personal satisfaction to politicians may go a long way in 
explaining its persistence: “Patronage politics is a unique way to keep 
individuals in power. The credit for the collective provision of goods through 
policy legislation goes to the leader, or to the leadership of the ruling party, and 
to a party as an institution, rather than to individual MPs, and MLAs. But the 
credit for the goods delivered through patronage accrues to individuals” 
(Chandra 2004a: 5). 
193 Rent-seeking involves actions by individuals and groups to alter 
public policy and procedures in ways that will generate more income for 
themselves (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002: 12). 
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rural clients (whether eligible or non-eligible ones), quite a few netas 
and officials, including a high ranking divisional official, freely 
admitted that the monies available under a number of other 
programs were being routinely “gobbled up” even before they 
reached the implementation stage. DWACRA and TRYSEM, 
particularly, were often pointed out to me as “bogus” or “paper” 
schemes.  
Thirdly, some development programs allow for making quite 
substantial savings on the ground. IAY again presents a fine 
example. According to the official guidelines prevailing at the time, 
IAY beneficiaries were to collect the cash subsidy in person from a 
rural bank, use the subsidy for the purchase of building materials 
and build the house themselves. In actual practice it was quite 
common for pradhans to accompany groups of beneficiaries to the 
bank, pocket their subsidies, purchase building materials from a 
friendly supplier against quantity rebates and keep the savings thus 
made. Another saving occurred in the implementation of JRY which, 
in Sitapur at least, seemed to involve mostly road building activities. 
Pradhans or other local netas acting -against official regulations- as 
contractors in this program would often save costs by having the 
bricks laid the broad side up (paranja) instead of having them placed 
on their narrow side (kharanja), which would have required far more 
bricks. Finally, netas, according to locally stubborn rumours, were 
also selling government-subsidised benefits such as boring sets, 
handpumps and smokeless stoves on the free market rather than 
channelling them to eligible clients. 
Netas’ rent-seeking activities do not remain confined to rural 
development administration. In Sitapur, local netas also collect 
bribes, often at standardized rates, for such varying works as 
arranging old age and widow pensions, parchis (“slips” representing 
the right to sell a specified amount of sugarcane to a sugarmill), 
patta (landownership titles), electricity, civil service jobs, 
hospitalization and educational scholarships, for instance. Besides, 
substantial skimming of public resources is said to routinely occur 
in the execution of public works.194 The desire to augment personal 
                                                
194 In India, to be sure, rent-seeking is not strictly, or even primarily, a 
local affair. Given the traditionally extensive state controls over the economy –
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fortune and material comfort is undoubtedly an important motive 
for rent-seeking. In fact, together with a desire to be of service (seva), 
the opportunity to exercise power and the promise of commanding 
respect, the possibility to make money is often openly cited by local 
politicians as an important reason for their involvement in 
politics.195  
At the same time, however, rent-seeking also seems to be a 
conditio sine qua non for starting and furthering a political career (cf. 
Jenkins 1999; Wade 1982). Even at the dust-level, the rupee price for 
successfully fighting elections is quite high. Contestants for the 
pradhani of their village may easily find themselves spending Rs. 
10,000 and more, while aspiring pramukhs may have to spend at 
least five times this amount. The pramukh of Parsendi, for example, 
spent Rs. 65,000 on his election campaign, the pramukh of Reusa 
around 1.5 lakhs. The costs involved in securing a highly coveted 
legislative assembly seat may run into millions of rupees.196 There is 
                                                                                                                                          
including controls on investment, capacity creation, expansion, diversification, 
choice of technology, location, pricing, distribution, imports, foreign 
collaboration, private foreign investment, use of foreign exchange and credit 
supply (cf. Rajan 1988)- politicians at all levels and in most policy sectors can 
collect rents, even if recent policy reforms have dismantled some particularly 
successful and widespread skimming opportunities such as those involved in 
industrial licensing and import regulations on gold and silver (Jenkins 1999: 
108).  
195 In Sitapur, the idea that netas are in politics for the money is 
conventional wisdom. To prove their point, informants often cited the example 
of Ram Lal Rahi, a poor man who made it rich through politics. In the words of 
a gathering of villagers in Ahmedabad: “Ram Lal Rahi had nothing and used to 
dance on huduk (the beat of a drum) to earn a livelihood. Then Sankata Prasad 
(a former MP, bvg) introduced him to politics and made him an MLA. After 
Prasad’s death Rahi became MP and Minister at the Centre. Now he owns three 
petrol pumps, several agencies and his wife has been made chairwoman of the 
zilla panchayat”. 
196 What electioneering netas spend their money on varies somewhat 
with the kind of seat they contest. Pradhani-contestants probably spend most of 
their budgets on gifts and gratuities –sweetboxes, clothes, jewellery, blankets 
etc.- for prospective voters, while pramukhs and, particularly, MLAs must also 
reserve significant amounts of money to obtain a party ticket; purchase and hire 
campaigning materials (loudspeakers, handbills, posters, banners), cover 
transportation costs (vehicle-hire, petrol); maintain campaign workers (pocket 
allowances, food, drinks and shelter); buy support of local notables, and 
organise rallies and pay “supporters” to attend them in large numbers (cf. esp. 
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thus quite a bit of truth in the assessment of a close observer of 
block-politics in Sakran that “only paisewale (people with money) 
can fight elections”. Elections apart, netas also need money to nurse 
their constituencies between elections. Followers need to be 
periodically compensated for their support and services,197 guests 
hospitably received, election-related debts repaid, good relations 
with officialdom and netas higher-up maintained. Most local netas, 
in other words, would probably not be able to pursue political 
careers without the availability of surplus, “number two” income 
generated through rent-seeking.198 
Given the importance of number two-income to most netas, 
DLBs who are willing to assist netas in the collection of 
development rents –by supplying information on rent-seeking 
opportunities and covering up skimming activities in official 
paperwork- can expect to be rewarded with a share of the profits. 
Sometimes DLBs get a standard, given cut of a routinely skimmed-
off amount. In one of Sitapur’s gaanjar blocks, for instance, VLOs 
received Rs. 500 for every IAY subsidy doled out in their 
jurisdiction. By common agreement, the BDO and the block clerks 
pocketed another Rs. 2000 per colony, to be shared among them. In 
another block, politicians allowed the block staff to “swallow” five 
per cent of sanctioned JRY budgets. Apart from allowing DLBs to 
pocket agreed upon shares of rentseeking income, netas may also 
give DLBs free reign to do a bit of rent-seeking, notably bribe-
collection, on their own. According to a high ranking divisional 
development official, the average VLO may “eat” around rupees 
60.000 to 70.000 per year to supplement his official yearly salary of 
around Rs. 50,000, while an average BDO may be expected to pocket 
                                                                                                                                          
Singh 1996: 125). To increase their chances of winning, contestants may also, as 
one of my informants pointed out, contemplate “bringing in” a friendly official 
to preside over the voting procedures. The transfer needed for doing this of 
course also comes at a price. 
197 Barakke, a resident of Arro Khamajatpur, maintained that the pradhan 
regularly gives “two to four hundred rupees to each panch [member of the 
village panchayat, bvg] so that they will not complain and keep on supporting 
him”. 
198 Unlike MLAs and MPs, pradhans and pramukhs do not even receive 
official remunerations and are thus implicitly expected to fend for themselves. 
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an additional Rs. 200,000 to 400,000 on top of his salary of around 
Rs. 120,000. These estimated averages may disguise considerable 
interpersonal variations, however. As one BDO admitted: “For 
BDOs who ask money for everything, there is no limit. Money for 
schemes such as JRY does not go through the banks, so these are 
most easily corrupted. But even in case of schemes such as IRDP 
[which do go through the banks, bvg] nexuses can be forged 
between the BDO, pradhans and the bankpeople. Anything is 
possible”.  
On the one hand, the promise of substantial surplus income 
makes cooperation with patronage-dispensing and rent-seeking 
netas an attractive proposition. All the more so because having some 
extra money to spend is an important asset in influencing the course 
of one’s career. Money is a very useful resource in cultivating 
connections with big netas and superior officials, whose protection 
or help may come in handy in managing various sorts of problems. 
In exchange for financial compensation, netas or superior officials 
are generally willing to reconsider unfavourable transfers or, 
conversely, to extend help in arranging a choice posting, for 
example.199 On the other hand, providing assistance in the collection 
of number two income is, as DLBs are inclined to see it, hardly an 
option, since failure to provide such assistance tends to backed up by 
the punitive sanctions discussed above. Many VLOs and BDOs 
maintained that they were more or less forced to collect bribes and 
skim off development monies not only by rent-seeking netas but 
also by rapacious superiors demanding their cut.200 
                                                
199 According to VLOs in different blocks, the District Panchayat Raj 
Officer, “takes” five to seven thousand rupees for a transfer. 
200 Several BDOs admitted to dreading the “inspection visits” of a certain 
divisional official who, so they claimed, was known for expecting lavish 
entertainment by the block staff (which, in the absence of an official budget, BDOs 
had to pay out of their own pockets) and for using the opportunity to collect 
thousands of rupees from “his” BDOs. Evidence like this may indicate the 
operation in Sitapur’s rural development administration of a system of bottom-to-
top corruption, quite like the one described by Wade for canal irrigation in South 
India (Wade 1982; Wade 1985). In such a system, officials buy themselves into 
lucrative posts by bribing political and administrative superiors. Once in position, 
officials are allowed to use their discretion to extract rents in order to earn back 
their investment and save for a new one, while also sending part of the collected 
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4 The problem of factionalism  
 
To notice that DLBs have good reasons, and therefore are inclined, 
to cooperate with local netas by abandoning the frontline and 
transferring their discretion, is not to say that such cooperation, once 
established, is a guarantee against trouble. Political power on the 
Sitapur dust-level is hotly contested and seldom goes unchallenged 
for long. Dust-level netas tend to be locked into continuous and 
usually bitter battles with political enemies. These battles usually 
appear in the guise of factionalism and typically revolve around 
access to patronage vested in administrative agencies such as the 
rural development bureaucracy. As a result, DLBs are often drawn 
into political conflicts whereby several rivalling netas or factions 
mount pressure on them. Wriggling out of such situations is 
probably one of the most taxing challenges of the DLB’s job. Since 
they are usually outsiders to the political arenas in which they work, 
DLBs’ knowledge about the intricacies of local power configurations 
and factional alignments is inherently limited. It is this very 
ignorance of local politics, as the following short case study of 
factionalism in Ulra village illustrates, which may readily land them 
into big trouble. Factionalism, in other words, represents a big 
problem to DLBs and most of them try to cope with it by staying as 
far away from it as possible.  
 
Getting into trouble anyhow: Ram Sahare in Ulra 
 
In the course of 1996, BDO Jai Ram of Biswan block fell short of 
staff. Having too few VLOs to cover all the nyay panchayats in the 
block, Ram decided to solve his problem by giving one of his VLOs 
                                                                                                                                          
rents upwards to satisfy the financial demands of superiors and big netas. If 
indeed such a system were to be operative in UP’s rural development 
administration, I doubt whether it has the extremely “systematic” qualities of 
Wade’s system, in which the costs of positions as well as the amounts to be sent 
upwards were largely fixed and predetermined. The constant change and 
adaptation of rural development policies and benefits, as well as the often 
selective implementation of programs in certain localities would seem to leave 
more incentives and room for adhoc bargaining among netas and officials than 
canal irrigation administration in which the public benefit itself –water- remains 
unchanged. 
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a double charge. His eye fell on Ram Sahare, who had been working 
quite satisfactorily in nyay panchayat Sukhawankalan (the very 
locality where VLO Mishra was to get into big trouble with pradhan 
Bhargav a few years later). Though to be given a double charge is 
usually considered a token of appreciation for one’s “good work” 
and cause for professional pride, Sahare had rather mixed feelings 
about this particular additional charge: Ulra nyay panchayat. The 
reason was the presence, in Ulra village, of a dominant family of 
Thakurs with a notorious reputation for goondagiri. Widely thought 
to be teaming up with a gang in neighbouring Hardoi district, 
Sahare feared the Thakurs might mean big trouble. He therefore 
tried to decline BDO Ram’s offer. But when Ram remained insistent 
and a few of his colleagues started taunting him (saying that “now 
Ram Sahare will know how tough this job really is”), Sahare decided 
to acquiesce and, as he put it, “accept the challenge”. 
 Already on his first visit to village Ulra, Sahare realized that 
the Thakurs were indeed a force to be reckoned with. When he 
stopped by at the residence of the village pradhan for an 
introductory visit, he learned that the pradhan –an old, illiterate 
untouchable man called Ashirvadi- was not at home. Some villagers 
advised Sahare to go and see the Thakurs. And sure enough, Sahare, 
on arriving at the Thakur’s house, found Ashirvadi present there. 
The Thakurs –a local synonym for two brothers, Nagendra and 
Bhupendra Singh- invited Sahare inside and offered him aniseeds as 
a token of their hospitality. But the atmosphere soon turned more 
hostile when the Thakurs silently started showing Sahare their guns 
and rifles. Sahare was not very impressed, however. Hailing himself 
from a “very notorious area where feared dacoits (robbers, criminals) 
such as Munna Pasi have their operations” and where “these dacoits 
walk daringly in front of the police station carrying their guns”, 
Sahare had seen “so many of such type of people” that it took more 
than the mere flouting of firearms to intimidate him. Moreover, as 
he pointed out to me, he was not “by nature” the kind of man to be 
easily scared by anyone. “I simply do not like to work under the 
pressure of others”. 
 If Sahare did not like to work under the pressure of others, 
Ulra’s pradhan Ashirvadi did not seem to have much choice. It soon 
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became clear to Sahare, as it already was to Ulra’s inhabitants, that 
Ashirvadi wielded little power in the village. In fact, by Ashirvadi’s 
own admission, the Thakurs were the “real”, “acting pradhans”. 
The only reason why he, Ashirvadi, had contested the pradhani that 
same year was because the state government had reserved it for a 
scheduled caste candidate. The upper caste Thakurs, barred from 
electoral competition, had therefore approached Ashirvadi to act as 
“their” candidate. Ashirvadi, whose family had served the Thakurs 
for generations as agricultural labourers, had not had the courage to 
refuse. The Thakurs had even made him “swear on his own sons” 
that he would give them free reign in case he won the elections. 
Pradhan Ashirvadi was, thus, hardly in a position to act 
independently, let alone act against the Thakurs’ best interests; he 
was, as everybody knew, “bound” to them and only “pradhan in 
name”.  
Grasping whom he was up against, Sahare decided to move 
cautiously. Though part of him was eager “to liberate the pradhan 
from the clutches of the Thakurs”, another part advised him to be 
very careful lest he provoke what would certainly be a violent 
retaliation by the Thakurs. For some time, this strategy seemed to 
work out quite well. While some of his colleagues had to tap all of 
their skills to avoid being trapped in the middle of IAY-related 
tensions, Sahare in Ulra experienced no such difficulties.201 Though 
the Thakurs did try to “change the list” a few times, Sahare deftly 
warned them that if they kept on doing so, there was a real chance 
that the BDO would “smell” their manipulations and obstruct the 
release of Ulra’s allotment altogether. Convinced, the Thakurs 
agreed with Sahare to allocate all available twenty-five colonies to 
inhabitants of Chamaranpurva; a hamlet, as its name implies, 
                                                
201 Among Sitapur’s DLBs, IAY had the reputation of being notoriously 
difficult to implement. (1) IAY benefits were in high demand because they were 
subsidies –and not, as in some other programs, repayable loans- and very 
generous subsidies at that. (2) IAY subsidies were also very scarce: in every 
village, the number of available subsidies typically fell far short of the number of 
people formally eligible for them and, more importantly, much more short of the 
number of people feeling eligible for them. The result was that IAY 
implementation, i.e. beneficiary selection, often triggered fierce, sometimes violent 
contests among (groups of) villagers vying for IAY benefits.  
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inhabited exclusively by members of the untouchable Chamar jati 
and situated at a stone’s throw from the main settlement Ulra. 
Trouble for Sahare was not long in coming, however. It all 
started when, a few months after they pocketed the village’s 
allotment of IAY subsidies, the inhabitants of Chamaranpurva also 
somehow managed to secure an electricity connection for their 
hamlet. However, by the time the electricity materials arrived, the 
Thakurs, putting their influence with a couple of senior electricity 
officials to good use, had the electricity line diverted to their own 
premises. Outraged but fearing “the bullets of Thakurs” the 
Chamars had not dared to stop the theft. The Chamars’ leader, a 
man called Chote Lal, decided to seek help from higher authorities. 
Lal, himself a small-time neta and BSP activist, had some friends in 
high places. Besides, the Chamar-dominated BSP happened to 
control the state government at the time. If ever there was a chance 
to expect the government (sarkaar) to take a stand against upper 
caste Thakur exploiters (dabang) it had to be now, Lal reckoned, with 
their own people in power.202 With the help of his neta friends Lal 
managed to meet with the minister for minorities and even with 
chief minister Mayawati herself, who immediately ordered an 
enquiry into the matter. Though investigating officials duly arrived 
in the village some time later, things then abruptly came to a halt. 
The DM, to whom the follow-up had been delegated, remained 
apathetic, even after repeated requests by the Chamars to take 
action. Both officialdom and netas appeared to have lost interest in 
the case. The Thakurs, so it seemed, had gotten away with theft and 
the Chamars were left empty-handed.  
 But then Mahendra Tripathi, an influential Brahmin from 
nearby hamlet Dafra (also part of Ulra), offered the Chamars his 
help and urged them to stage a dharna in front of the DM’s office in 
                                                
202 That Chote Lal was justified in hoping for effective intervention by the 
Mayawati government is suggested by the impressions that her two short-lived 
governments apparently made on UP bureaucrats. Even two years after her 
latest rule, bureaucrats still vividly remembered the “fear-psychosis”, as they 
called it, that Mayawati had instilled among them by personally and 
unexpectedly attending and chairing dust-level official meetings and by 
verbally abusing, transferring and even firing negligent and ineffective officials 
on the spot. 
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Sitapur. A dharna is a common form of protest whereby (fasting) 
participants sit constantly at the door of an offender or person 
whose attention is demanded.203 Though some Chamars gave 
Tripathi’s plan a lukewarm response, Chote Lal’s decision to 
introduce a fifty rupee “fine” for those who would fail to join in the 
dharna sufficed to win them over. Tripathi made himself useful by 
providing a tractor with trolley to transport the protestors to the 
district capital.  
The eight day long dharna did not have the hoped for success. 
Though the Chamars were given some vague reassurances, it 
became clear that the district administration remained determined 
not to burn its hands on the affair. Still, the dharna did provide the 
Chamars with a break. A journalist who was covering their protest 
for a local newspaper told one of the Chamars that IAY subsidies -
which many of the protesting Chamars had availed of a year before- 
were supposed to be “absolutely free”. This was news to the 
Chamars, most of whom had paid what they had been made to 
believe was “security money” of up to Rs. 1000 to Nagendra 
Singh.204 Though most of the Chamars present at the dharna were 
not overly bothered by the journalist’s revelation (being more 
concerned about retrieving their electricity than about reclaiming 
money they had never owned in the first place) Chote Lal and 
Tripathi immediately saw the political use to which it could be put.  
 Back in Chamaranpurva, Lal and Tripathi organised a meeting 
at Lal’s house and asked the villagers whether they had paid some 
money to the Thakurs at the time of beneficiary selection for IAY. 
All of them admitted to having done so. Lal and Tripathi then 
decided to change their tactic and purpose. Obviously, the Thakurs 
                                                
203 A dharna is one of a large repertoire of typically Indian forms of 
protest or ways of attracting attention to issues that fail to find access to existing 
institutional channels. This repertoire also includes bandhs (general strikes in 
whole cities or states) and gheraos (condoning of men in authority). What these 
forms of voice have in common is that they are usually employed to demand 
justice for specific grievances such as low receipt of food rations, low wages, or 
bad conditions of work in offices, colleges, or industries (Kothari 1970: 219). 
204 At the time, the levy of security money had not aroused the suspicion of 
the Chamars. Even after deduction of the levy, the remaining subsidy amount had 
still been many times higher than the only other subsidy they had ever known 
about -a Rs. 2000 subsidy under an old housing program called Nirbal Awas Yojna. 
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had covered their tracks well and put their pahunch (access, 
influence) to the district administration to good use. Judged by the 
fact that they had been able to successfully thwart even the chief 
minister’s intervention in the matter (by evidently putting pressure 
on the DM), the chances for the Chamars to effectively get their 
electricity back looked very slim indeed. But all this did not mean 
that the Thakurs could not be made to pay, if only symbolically, for 
their theft.  
 Lal and Tripathi jotted down the names of all IAY beneficiaries 
from the hamlet and the exact amounts of security money each of 
them had been made to pay. Thus armed, they went to the thana and 
had an FIR (first information report) lodged under the Anti 
Corruption Act, in which they accused Nagendra Singh Thakur as 
well as pradhan Ashirvadi and Ram Sahare of corruption in IAY. 
Though Chote Lal and his Chamars had first only wanted to accuse 
Nagendra Singh, Tripathi, for some reason of his own, had insisted 
that also Ashirvadi be implicated in the affair. Chote Lal, anxious to 
keep Tripathi on his side, had consented. Tripathi and Lal then 
decided that it would look awkward if they did not also include 
Ram Sahare’s name in the FIR. After all, who would believe that a 
seasoned official like him had not eaten a piece of the IAY-pie if 
even an illiterate and inexperienced “puppet pradhan” had 
managed to do so? 
When he heard about the inclusion of his name in the FIR, 
Sahare was perplexed. He had of course heard about the Thakurs’ 
theft of electricity and the Chamars’ attempts to retrieve it. But since 
rural electrification is not among the concerns of the rural 
development administration he had so far been able to keep a safe 
distance from the conflict. It was beyond his comprehension how he 
had now come to be dragged into the affair. Sahare was also furious. 
How did Chote Lal and his people dare implicate him? Had it not 
been for his adept handling of the Thakurs, the Chamars might not 
have benefited from IAY at all, certainly not to the extent that they 
had now (after all, all but three of the hamlet’s households had 
received a colony). The Thakurs, through their various sources, and 
Sahare himself, through the BDO and a friend in the constabulary, 
put a lot of pressure on the police to stall any investigation. Though 
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it did buy them some time -the case remained cold for more than a 
year- they could not, in the end, prevent the police from taking steps 
to arrest them. 
When the police finally made their move, Sahare was just 
having tea with pradhan Ansari of village Haibatpur (to which he 
had been transferred in the meantime) in a restaurant near the 
Biswan railway station. A police party on motorbikes was searching 
for him and had brought a person who would be able to identify 
him. As chance would have it, this person was a friend of Sahare’s. 
When this friend spotted Sahare sipping tea he managed, without 
alarming the policemen, to signal to Sahare that he should flee right 
away. Sahare, with Ansari’s help, hurried to relatives of his in a 
nearby village from where he sent a son of the household to collect 
his motorbike. When night had fallen, Sahare rode to his residence 
in Sitapur, taking a detour in case the police were guarding the main 
roads. The next day, he applied for, and was promptly granted, 
medical leave. Having narrowly escaped arrest and temporarily 
relieved from his official duties, Sahare put in all his energy, 
ingenuity, influence and money to extricate himself from the affair 
by getting his name deleted from the FIR. In spite of his efforts, 
however, he could not avoid spending two nights in jail (Nagendra 
and Ashirvadi also ended up in jail, for five and nineteen days 
respectively). When I first met Sahare in 1999, the case, on which he 
claimed to have already spent sixty to seventy thousand rupees, was 
still pending in court.  
 
Getting caught in the middle 
 
Given the patronage political incentive structure in which DLBs are 
expected to operate, it can scarcely be argued that Ram Sahare 
somehow deserved what happened to him in Ulra. On the contrary, 
by the looks of it he seems to have followed the pragmatic rules of 
the game quite admirably. On the basis of the information that was 
available to him, he identified the village’s biggest netas and 
established, as far as circumstances permitted, a co-operative 
working relationship with them. What is more, he even managed to 
make his mark on the selection of beneficiaries and, through his 
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cautious sponsoring of pradhan Ashirvadi’s autonomy, perhaps 
brought rural development implementation in Ulra slightly more in 
consonance with the normative rules of the implementation 
manuals.205 Sahare may indeed have made a little money out of the 
distribution of IAY colonies, but even if he did, the amount he 
raised (some cut out of around Rs. 28,000 allegedly collected as 
security money in IAY) is sure to have been quite modest by local 
standards. Sahare nevertheless got into big trouble. The question is: 
what went wrong?  
Even if local knowledge and the bureaucratic grapevine had it 
that Ulra was firmly under Thakur rule when Sahare entered the 
scene, beneath this surface of apparently stable and uncontested 
Thakur power things had actually started changing fast. The seeds 
for the crumbling of Thakur rule in Ulra were planted in the 
aftermath of the 1996 pradhan elections won by Ashirvadi with the 
help, and on behalf, of the Thakurs. What Sahare did not know was 
that the Thakurs’ adoption and subsequent grooming of Ashirvadi 
had stirred up evil blood in the Brahmin Mahendra Tripathi. With 
his father a retired lekhpal (or patwari; village accountant), his brother 
in the Indian army, and his wife gainfully employed as a teacher in 
a private school, Tripathi belonged to a family of well-off village 
notables. Tripathi himself looked after the family’s relatively small 
landholdings and owned a shop of automobile spare parts in 
Biswan. But, at least until the 1996 elections, the better part of the 
Tripathi family’s income came from Mahendra Tripathi’s activities 
as a dalaal, or broker. Whenever there was some work to be done in 
the village, whether public or private, Tripathi would offer or be 
approached to act as the middleman, arranging the execution of 
work –e.g. road and drainage works, house construction, litigation, 
the procurement of rural development benefits- in return for a 
commission or a slice of the profits. In the course of his dalaali 
career, Tripathi had built himself an extensive network of friends 
                                                
205 The distinction between pragmatic and normative rules is Bailey’s. A 
pragmatic rule recommends “tactics and manoeuvres as likely to be the most 
efficient”. A pragmatic rule is not a statement about whether a particular line of 
conduct is just or unjust, right or wrong; this is what Bailey calls a normative 
rule. ‘One must be honest’ is a normative rule, for example, while ‘It pays to be 
honest’ is a pragmatic one (Bailey 1970: 3-7). 
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and good relations and he boasted pahunch to some very senior 
netas –MLAs and MPs- of various political parties.  
The Thakurs had had no problems with Tripathi’s mediator 
business. Accustomed to a life of leisurely landlordism, 
moneylending and occasional goondagiri, the idea of personally 
involving themselves in the busy, time and energy sapping nitty 
gritty of dalaali did not appeal to them at all. Therefore, as long as 
Tripathi continued to show his allegiance to them, refrained from 
challenging their power position in the village and let them share in 
the spoils of his brokerage, they had been quite content to allow 
Tripathi do his thing. The election of Ashirvadi put an end to this 
cosy arrangement, however. With an easy to manipulate pradhan of 
their own to take care of the footwork, the Thakurs had now gained 
rather direct access to the development benefits flowing into the 
village. As a result, they no longer felt much need for Tripathi’s 
services and, before long, the latter saw himself cut out of some 
major deals, including the Rs. 28,000 allegedly raised by Nagendra 
Singh Thakur as security money in the distribution of colonies. 
When, around the same time, the Thakurs also helped Ashirvadi 
reclaim possession of a plot of land cultivated by Tripathi’s father, 
Mahendra clearly saw the writing on the wall: evidently, the 
Thakurs had found themselves a new man.  
Abruptly cut off from his most important source of income, 
Tripathi had to think of ways to get back into business. He first tried 
to win Ashirvadi’s confidence and bring him under his own control. 
But in the early days after the election Ashirvadi was still firmly 
bound to the Thakurs and could not be easily weaned away. And 
even though Ashirvadi had once or twice shown his willingness to 
confide in Tripathi, the relations between the two men gradually 
turned sour when, after a few nasty incidents, Ashirvadi concluded 
that Tripathi could not be trusted.206 With Ashirvadi declining his 
                                                
206 The incident that seems to have sealed Ashirvadi’s resolve to stay 
away from Tripathi occurred shortly after the 1998 lok sabha elections. During 
these elections, Ashirvadi had helped BJP candidate Janardan Prasad Misra by 
“giving” him a thousand of the Ulra votes, in return for Misra’s promise to 
arrange for Ulra’s electrification from his personal development budget (all 
MPs and MLAs have such budgets). However, when, after Misra’s victory, the 
time of reaping the promised reward had come, Ashirvadi had fallen ill with 
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favours and his own financial situation becoming increasingly sticky 
(according to local rumours, his shop in Biswan was heading 
towards bankruptcy), Tripathi desperately needed new allies to 
break up the patronage monopoly of the Thakur-Ashirvadi 
combine. So, when he noticed that Chote Lal and his people were 
serious in their attempt to retrieve their electricity and, in the 
process, seemed to have gathered enough courage to stand up 
against the Thakurs, Tripathi took his chance and decided to offer 
his help and “shelter” to his old schoolmate Chote Lal.  
Chote Lal, on his part, jumped at Tripathi’s offer. Not only 
would Tripathi’s connections, political acumen and material 
resources certainly come in handy in the battle over electricity with 
the Thakurs, they might also help further his long-cherished 
political ambitions. An early dalit activist, Chote Lal had joined DS4, 
a forerunner of the BSP, in the early 1980s and had been a party 
worker ever since. After a stay of twelve years in Lucknow, during 
which he had saved a handsome sum working as a fourth class 
worker in a medical school, Chote Lal had returned to his native 
Chamaranpurva where he bought himself forty bighas of land and 
soon established himself as the hamlet’s natural and uncontested 
leader. By the time Ram Sahare arrived in Ulra, Chote Lal had 
climbed the local BSP hierarchy to become sector adhyaksh 
(president), overseeing the party’s electioneering in an area 
encompassing 44 polling booths in two dozen gram panchayats. 
Even if Ashirvadi (that is, the Thakurs) had beaten him in the past 
pradhan elections, Chote Lal still had high hopes that his recent 
good work for the party and his close relations with some powerful 
                                                                                                                                          
fileria (a disease caused by the qulex mosquito, causing swellings and fever) 
and was bed-ridden. Without intimating Ashirvadi, Tripathi, claiming to act in 
the pradhan’s name, had then approached Misra and managed to get the MP 
sign the commendation letter. When the electricity materials arrived some time 
later, Tripathi claimed credit for the electrification. Ashirvadi also came to 
strongly suspect Tripathi of having gobbled up the village’s contribution to the 
Kargil fund, a national fund meant to support the surviving relatives of the 
Indian soldiers who died in the 1999 Kargil war between India and Pakistan. 
Ashirvadi, who had larded the Ulra donation from the sale of a village orchard, 
had passed the money to Tripathi to deposit it at the DM’s office in Sitapur. 
When, some time later, the recovered Ashirvadi stopped by at the DM’s office, 
the clerks told him that the money had never arrived there.  
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BSP stalwarts might eventually land him a ticket for one of the 
bigger elections.207 If anything, his alliance with village notable 
Tripathi was sure to give a boost to his political stature. It proved 
that he was moving up in the world and could no longer be seen as 
the minor Chamar ward leader he used to be. 
Bound by personal ties of friendship, a common interest in 
hurting the Thakurs, and the promise of further, long-term private 
rewards, Tripathi and Chote Lal wasted no opportunity or method 
in getting the better of the Thakurs in the electricity conflict. When 
the Thakurs and Ram Sahare tried to counter their FIR-move by 
putting pressure on the police, Lal and Tripathi responded by 
feeding a string of discrediting stories to the popular local press, 
piling fresh accusations on top of the old one mentioned in the 
FIR.208 They also managed to get the overt backing of BSP city 
president Naeem Ansari who led the Chamars on a few more 
dharnas in front of government offices in Sitapur and Biswan.  
In the end, all their clever manoeuvring brought Lal and 
Tripathi a comprehensive victory. They humiliated the Thakurs and 
Ashirvadi (by having them sent to jail), added injury to insult by 
also having the Thakurs return the stolen electricity to the Chamars 
(after putting some unrelenting pressure on the electricity 
administration) and, in doing so, probably dealt a severe blow to the 
Thakurs’ future capacity to unilaterally control village politics. If, as 
                                                
207 Chote Lal claimed to have raised 133,000 rupees for the BSP party-fund 
during the last election campaign. Among his “good friends” in the BSP, he cited 
Biswan city president Naeem Ansari, Sitapur MP Rajesh Verma, Laharpur MLA 
and one time state government minister Bunyad Ahmad Ansari, and Lucknow 
division president Ram Het Bharti. 
208 Just like involving the police under false pretences, feeding 
discrediting stories to the press is a popular and -in the absence of a culture of 
investigative journalism- easily applied weapon in factional conflict. In the 
series of stories planted by Tripathi and Lal in the daily Pratidin, Nagendra, 
Ashirvadi and Sahare were accused –together or individually- of such corrupt 
acts as pocketing block money meant for road and drainage construction, the 
collection of bribes from pensioners, cutting down and selling village neem trees 
for private profit, banderbant (“fifty-fifty deals”) and the use of old (instead of 
new) bricks for road construction. Ulra was portrayed as “the headquarter of 
corruption and bribery” while Ram Sahare was depicted in such unflattering 
terms as “worshipper of money”, kamau-khau adhikari (officer who earns and 
eats a lot), and as one who had “completely crushed the system”. 
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had now been amply demonstrated, the once all-powerful Thakurs 
could be defied even by a group of lowly Chamars, other hitherto 
latent political groupings might also start asserting themselves. The 
undisputed victory furthermore helped cement Chote Lal’s 
reputation as an increasingly formidable (if still rather small-time) 
neta and provided Tripathi with some useful additional political 
capital (in the form of pahunch to Chote Lal’s BSP friends). Besides, 
by offering his help to Chote Lal at a difficult moment, Tripathi had 
obligated the neta to him, an important asset to any dalaal.  
 
The kind of conflict described here will be quite familiar to students 
of Indian politics since it is almost a textbook example of what the 
literature on the subject refers to as factionalism. Factionalism 
involves very loose coalitions of faction leaders, tied together partly 
by friendship, caste loyalty or patron–client ties but most 
importantly by political interest. It often arises out of strong (and 
not seldom lasting) enmities between prominent leaders.209 Though 
fought out over particular, material issues, what tends to be really at 
stake in factional conflict are such personal interests as power, 
patronage, prestige, money, revenge or a combination of these. Also 
typical of factionalism is the unimportance or absence of matters of 
principle or ideology, the unscrupulousness of its methods 
(including, quite prominently, the creation of incidents which cause 
enemies to lose money or property) and what Raymond Firth has 
called the “devious exercise of pressure” on the machinery of 
government (Brass 1966; Firth 1957; Mayer 1977; Nicholas 1977: 58; 
Pocock 1957). 
The reason why an outsider like Ram Sahare with no vested 
interests in the village could become entangled (and get hurt) in 
Ulra’s factional politics was precisely because he was an outsider. 
Sahare was largely unaware of the factional realignments which had 
started taking shape in the aftermath of the pradhani elections; he 
did not know about the reasons for Tripathi’s fall out with the 
Thakurs, or about the strong antipathy which soon developed 
between Tripathi and Ashirvadi. Nor was he aware of Chote Lal’s 
                                                
209 Factional politics, as Paul Brass has aptly put it, “is personal politics 
with a vengeance” (Brass 1966: 55). 
5 Interrupted supply 203
political ambitions and his political influence in BSP circles. Had he 
known about these things and about the threats they posed to the 
Thakurs’ power position, Sahare might have thought twice before 
seeking cooperation with and, as it must have appeared to Lal and 
Tripathi, allying himself to the Thakur-Ashirvadi group. Instead, 
and to his own disbelief, ignorant Sahare soon found himself 
reduced to canonfodder on the wrong side of an increasingly bitter 
factional game.  
 
Coping with factionalism 
 
On the Sitapur dust-level, as elsewhere in Uttar Pradesh, 
factionalism is pervasive. The type of local village factions that 
Sahare encountered in Ulra -built up from two or more narrowly 
circumscribed “cliques” consisting of a leader (e.g. Chote Lal) and 
his henchmen (e.g. “his” Chamars)- typically branch out to higher 
political levels through transactional relationships between village 
faction leaders and bigger politicians with supra-local followings 
such as pramukhs and MLAs. These transactional ties are often 
forged at the time of general elections, when local faction leaders 
exchange the votes they control in their villages for a share in the 
patronage available to bigger faction leaders. Pramukhs and MLAs, 
on their part, tend to rally around even bigger politicians such as the 
leaders of political parties or their rivals, for much the same reasons. 
Factions, or coalitions of factions, thus function as the basic units of 
action in Indian politics and, by way of various intermediate 
connections, may stretch out from the village political arena to the 
state parliaments and vice versa (Brass 1966; De Zwart 1994; De 
Zwart 1995a; Firth 1957; Mayer 1977; Nicholas 1977; Srinivas 
1959).210 Since dust-level politics is almost by definition factional 
politics, all DLBs must somehow or other come to terms and deal 
with it. 
 As Sahare’s fortunes in Ulra demonstrate, this is easier said 
than done. Since Indian civil service rules prescribe that bureaucrats 
                                                
210 This pyramidical structure of factional alignments is by no means 
typical for Indian factionalism. It has also been observed in South-East Asia and 
Latin America: see, for instance, Scott (1972) and Powell (1977). 
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are not to be posted in their native areas, DLBs are almost by 
definition outsiders to the political arenas in which they work. Like 
Ram Sahare, they therefore typically lack the local knowledge 
required to accurately map factional allegiances or to anticipate and 
influence factional conflict as well as locals can. “Reading” 
factionalism is far from easy at any rate. First of all, factions tend to 
be unstable. Though a small inner core of faction members may stay 
with a faction leader through thick and thin on account of the warm 
affection they feel for him as a person, most members of factions 
only continue to support a leader as long as he can provide material 
benefits to them (or, at least, the likelihood of material benefits in the 
near future) (Brass 1966: 56). Factions, as constellations of largely 
instrumental relationships between leaders and followers, are 
therefore quite vulnerable to anything that disrupts, or is believed to 
disrupt, the flow of benefits (ibid.). As a result, factional alignments 
shift continuously. For example, when I frequented Ulra village a 
year after the provisional end of the electricity affair, political 
control over the village had come to be contested by three separate 
factions, instead of the earlier two. Pradhan Ashirvadi with his Pasi 
following had gone over to the Dixits, another notable Brahmin 
family which controlled the village kota (shop where poor villagers 
can buy essential foodstuffs against subsidised rates) to form a third 
faction, apart from and in opposition to the Tripathi-Lal faction and 
the struggling Thakur clique.211  
Secondly, factions tend to be temporary, ad-hoc coalitions. 
Factions usually lack permanence. They may lay dormant for a 
while only to reveal themselves as political conflict units on specific 
occasions. Factions, irrespective of whether they are active in village 
settings or in the high politics context of the state legislative 
assembly, are thus determined by the precise circumstances of their 
occurrence and, unlike political parties, possess little or no formal 
organization (Mayer 1977: 52; Pocock 1957: 296). In fact, they can 
scarcely be called groups.212 In consequence, factions often seem to 
                                                
 211 Factional realignments such as this one often follow the principle “the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend” (Carter 1972: 424).  
212 Mayer categorizes factions as interactive quasi-groups. What 
distinguishes the interactive quasi-group from the group and the association is 
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lack a substantial reality. “It appears”, as Paul Brass writes, “that 
there are no persistent conflicts and no permanent alliances, that all 
is perpetually in flux” (Brass 1966: 55). Thirdly, there is the tenuous 
connection between social identity and factional allegiance. That is 
to say, the membership of factions is usually quite diverse in that its 
members tend to belong to different castes, classes and localities 
(Brass 1966; Carter 1972: 442). People’s factional allegiances can 
therefore not commonly be deduced from their most easily 
ascertainable attributes.  
Seen from DLBs’ point of view, factionalism thus makes for a 
highly uncertain and unpredictable work environment. In their 
interaction with “clients”, DLBs can never really be sure as to whom 
they are actually dealing with in terms of the factions they side with, 
the political clout they enjoy, and the goals they pursue. Neither are 
they in a good position to predict what dangers might lie in store for 
them when they decide to extend their cooperation to certain clients 
and, in doing so, deny it to others. One VLO nicely captured this 
high degree of uncertainty involved in DLBs’ work by describing his 
job as “being busy in puzzling works”. The DLBs’ environment is 
thus, in Pfeffer and Salancik’s sense of the term, a turbulent one, in 
that it does not allow for the correct perception of all the external 
groups they depend on and of the relative importance or potency of 
each (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 (1978): 79).  
 Their relative outsider status coupled with the relatively short 
durations of their assignments prevents most DLBs from becoming 
effective players in their own right in faction political games. As 
passing birds, they simply lack the time to get fully acquainted with 
the local political arena.213 Most DLBs therefore try to insulate 
                                                                                                                                          
its ego-centeredness (it depends on a specific person for its survival) and in the 
single-strandedness of relevant membership actions (the only actions that count 
are the one’s between any member and ego or ego’s intermediary) (Mayer 1977: 
43). 
213 The problem of factionalism may have been more acute for VLOs at the 
time of my fieldwork than it is now. Starting in 1999, a large scale reorganization 
of the rural development delivery system was to result in an all-round change of 
VLOs’ jurisdiction from the nyay panchayat (a collection of five to eight villages) 
to the gram panchayat, a single village. Assuming that this reform has been 
successfully pushed through, this would mean that VLOs no longer have to deal 
with the fluid and capricious factional systems of several villages but only with 
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themselves against unwanted consequences of devious factional 
pressures by establishing and cultivating good relations with those -
their superiors in the departmental line hierarchy; police officials- 
who might be able to help them when things threaten to get out of 
control. Many DLBs also actively seek the protection of what they 
often call “godfathers”: preferably “big” politicians who occupy, or 
have pahunch to the occupants of, important positions in the state 
government and who may thus be powerful enough to check and 
restrain troublemongering local faction leaders. 
 On a day to day basis, most DLBs try to stay out of factional 
trouble by studiously avoiding the impression of siding with any 
faction while at the same time not seeming to be uncooperative. In 
the case of VLOs this usually means –again- that they only visit the 
villages when they cannot avoid doing so. Frontline abandonment 
reduces the risk of offending factional sensibilities and, thus, of 
inviting uncomfortable accusations and pressures. Quite a few 
VLOs in the research area, including Ram Vilas (see § 5.1) and Ram 
Sahare, had perfected this strategy by employing informally 
appointed “helpers” to take care of the more routine chores, such as 
inspection visits and the time-consuming paperwork that comes 
with them.  
 For BDOs, wriggling out of factional trouble is often a bit more 
difficult. Their frontline is the block office which cannot be so easily 
abandoned. Hence, they must largely rely on their verbal and social 
skills to defuse potentially explosive situations. A short interaction 
that I witnessed between BDO Pahla and Kamlesh Paswan, a 
member of the zilla (district) panchayat, nicely illustrates how BDOs 
may go about handling such situations. When he saw Paswan 
entering his office, the BDO (with whom I had been discussing the 
problem of loan recovery) at once became very friendly and 
smilingly gave Paswan an elaborate commendation for his “good 
work” in rural development. Paswan, delighted, replied that BDO 
sahab was not the only officer who held him in high esteem; only just 
now, the DM and the CDO had also been praising his efforts. The 
BDO then enquired how he could be of service to Paswan. Perhaps 
                                                                                                                                          
that of a single one. This should of course have increased their capability to “read” 
the factional politics in their jurisdictions. 
5 Interrupted supply 207
he would appreciate something in the way of road construction in 
his village? Paswan thanked the BDO for his kindness but explained 
that he had actually come for some other matter. He happened to 
have heard that some vacancies were going to be filled up in the 
CDPO (child development project office) and was wondering if 
perhaps BDO sahab could tell him just how many vacancies might 
be involved? The BDO, apparently a little surprised by this news, 
promised to enquire into the matter and to let Paswan know what 
he had learned.  
After Paswan had left, the BDO explained the situation to me. 
Kamlesh Paswan, he pointed out, was a neta who should be kept in 
good humour. Considered very close to the zilla panchayat 
chairwoman Sundari Rahi, herself wife to the powerful former 
Congress MP Ram Lal Rahi (see § 5.3, note 195), Paswan was much 
more influential than his relatively modest kursi (chair; elective 
office) might lead one to expect. The vacancies mentioned by 
Paswan concerned the posts of kindergarten workers and 
kindergarten assistants. These had been opened up almost two years 
ago. But just before the newly recruited employees could assume 
their duties, some netas, angry that their “own” candidates had lost 
out in the selection, had made allegations about irregularities in the 
recruitment process. The CDO had been put under pressure to issue 
an enquiry into the matter and the posts, as had been the 
complaining netas’ intention all along, had remained vacant ever 
since (after all, as Paul Brass has observed, in patronage politics 
denying patronage to one’s rivals is as important as dispensing it to 
one’s followers (Brass 1966)). 
Though he had feigned surprise in Paswan’s presence, the 
BDO was perfectly aware that, just as Paswan had heard, the 
recruitment of new employees for the long vacant posts had indeed 
finally been completed. What is more, he also knew exactly who the 
new recruits were. The reason why he had not told Paswan was 
because he was suspicious about Paswan’s motives for finding out 
more about them. In all likelihood, the BDO pointed out, also 
Paswan himself knew more than he had admitted, namely that 
among the new recruits there was none of his own people. 
Therefore, the real purpose of Paswan’s visit must have been to 
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obtain a list with the names of the new recruits. Such a list would 
enable him to verify whether the rumours he had heard were in fact 
true and, if so, to start collecting incriminating “evidence” about the 
new recruits belonging to rival factions. By discrediting some of the 
new recruits Paswan might still try and manage to push some of his 
own people forward. 
As the BDO explained to me, he was very anxious not to get 
involved in this factional struggle. He had himself been in 
(additional) charge of the CDPO at the time of the initial recruitment 
of kindergarten personnel and had, as such, ended up in the middle 
of the political turmoil over the alleged irregularities. Fearing that 
the Paswan-Rahi group would not hesitate to implicate him –again- 
in this foul struggle for patronage if they reckoned it would help 
their cause, he had tried his best to keep Paswan in good humour by 
alerting him to the availability of road-building funds and by 
generally giving a cooperative impression. To his own relief, he 
seemed to have successfully wriggled out of the tricky situation, for 
the moment at least. 
No matter how skilfully, glibly or cleverly DLBs may try to 
“escape from the thorny bushes of groupism”, as one VLO 
evocatively put it, a “mistake” is easily made. With around eighty 
pradhans and hundreds of panches, a pramukh and dozens of BDC-
members, an MP and one or two MLAs and their respective 
followings, as well as countless aspiring officeholders and dalaals in 
each and every block competing for the patronage vested in the 
rural development machinery, it is simply impossible for DLBs to 
keep track of who is who, let alone who is allied, connected or has 
pahunch to whom (for the moment), and to keep in the good books 
of all of them. Almost inevitably, DLBs regularly end up scapegoats 
in factional conflicts and get punished for actions or omissions they 
could not possibly have avoided. Experiences of such unjust 
punishments increase DLBs’ suspicion of the motives of those who 
approach them and reinforce their inclination towards frontline 
abandonment and other, functionally equivalent, forms of 
distancing themselves from their immediate environment and 
clientele. Many DLBs are in fact so caught up in interpreting, 
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navigating and surviving the factional pressures that are brought to 
bear upon them that they often seem to be busy with little else. 
 
 
5 Untouchable disidentification 
 
The regular abuse, discrediting and unjust punishments leave most 
DLBs quite demoralized. In my interviews with them, almost all 
DLBs testified to feeling “helpless”, “exposed”, “insecure”, 
“powerless”, “unprotected”, or “dependent”. Many also stressed the 
great discomfort they experienced at having to behave in the way 
they did to “save” themselves. The “wrong jobs” exacted from them 
by “cunning”, “cruel”, “wicked”, “evil”, “naughty”, “self-
interested”, “greedy”, “manipulating”, “resourceful”, 
“exploitative”, “powerful”, “lying”, “bribing”, “lure-giving”, 
“illiterate”, “characterless”, “threatening”, “dangerous” and 
“cheating” netas, mediators, dalaals and villagers caused them to 
feel “sad”, “disturbed”, “corrupted”, “ineffective” and 
“remorseful”. Many also strongly felt that whatever little “prestige” 
and “respect” their posts might have commanded earlier had now 
wholly evaporated.214 Their jobs, in other words, had lost all their 
“dignity” and they themselves had become “defamed”, deprived of 
“praise” and “pride”, reduced to mere “labourers”.215  
                                                
214 In comparison to other departments with a dust-level presence like 
the police, the electricity department, and the revenue administration, the rural 
development machinery has traditionally enjoyed relatively low public esteem, 
partly because its senior employees (BDOs and higher) are recruited from 
among the “lower merit ranks” (those who secured relatively low marks in the 
civil service entrance examinations), partly because it does not have the power 
“to force and coerce people” (Brass 1966: 213). For example, although the CDO 
occupies a comparatively higher rank than an SDM, the latter enjoys far more 
esteem because SDMs are recruited from among the higher merit ranks and 
because they are much more powerful than CDOs (this example was given to 
me by the BDO of Parsendi). 
215 Many VLOs like to take pride in the fact that they are “officers” 
(adhikaris) rather than “workers” (sevaks), as they were called until a few 
decades ago. By describing themselves as mere labourers VLOs therefore 
convey their hurt pride, their sense of being degraded.  
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The few who had purposively chosen a career in rural 
development work, to “help” and “be of service” to the rural poor, 
had largely given up hope of fulfilling their “ideas” and “desires”.216 
For this, they did not only blame the actions and manipulations of 
netas and their clients, however, but also the programs they were 
supposed to implement. What DLBs considered the most 
problematic features of rural development programs was that they 
were limited-availability (rather than open-ended, universal 
entitlement) programs and that the benefits available under the 
most ambitious programs were disproportionally desirable to large 
segments of the village population. These twin features made that 
the demand for many benefits under the nominal control of the 
rural development bureaucracy far exceeded the available supply 
and that program implementation therefore required the selection of 
a relatively limited number of beneficiaries from a much larger pool 
of (more or less) equally deserving candidates. (The BDO of 
Parsendi estimated for instance that for any twenty IAY colonies 
there were “at least two hundred” aspirants). The very design of 
poverty alleviation programs, DLBs observed, thus invited fierce 
competition and jealous tensions in the villages. It was therefore 
only “logical” and “inevitable”, they argued, that the “rule-
abiding”, “eligible”, “honest”, “helpless” and “poorest of the poor” 
tended to loose out in the ensuing polarized, “groupist” 
                                                
216 Though all of them had purposively tried to get into “service” (that is, 
secure public employment), most DLBs I met –whether BDOs or VLOs- had not 
exactly chosen a career in the development bureaucracy. On the contrary, BDOs 
had typically aspired to a career in revenue administration or in the police. The 
only reason why they had ended up development officials was because they 
had been assigned to the rural development cadre on account of their relatively 
poor marks in the civil service examinations (some still severely regretted they 
had not done better in the exams). A few urbanized BDOs (like the BDO of 
Parsendi, who held a PhD in philosophy) indeed gave the impression of being 
awkwardly out of place in the rather boisterous and rowdy atmosphere of the 
block. Many VLOs also explained their career choice as a coincidence. It had 
simply been the only service job they had been able to secure. VLO Khusi Ram 
of Biswan block, for example, like many of his colleagues explained his 
becoming a VLO as a result of not being able to become something else. “I 
became a VLO because my appointment as a junior clerk did not get through”. 
More than anything else, DLBs had thus ended up doing what they did. 
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atmospheres to those who are most “closely touched” to the netas 
and, hence, manage to “take all convenience”.217  
Another major flaw of rural development programs, according 
to some DLBs, was that the benefits to be doled out under them 
testified to central policy-makers’ poor grasp of rural people’s real 
wants and aspirations. It was simply too tempting for poor people 
with hardly if any discretionary income to use financial benefits 
such as subsidies, stipends and soft loans for other than the officially 
intended purposes, to cover immediate subsistence needs, for 
example, or to pay for such emergency expenses as dowries, 
medical treatments, debt repayments, or “drinking bouts”. Simply 
put, the large majority of target clients were “only interested in the 
money” and had no “attachment” to the idea of rural 
developmental, only in their own. As a result, the programs’ long 
term goals of providing the rural poor with structural ways out of 
poverty usually came to nothing. On the contrary, the “free money” 
made available under the programs only served to “corrupt” the 
people and, by implication, themselves. “To give money”, as one 
BDO articulated the opinion of many of his colleagues, “is to cause 
ruin”.  
A few older DLBs nostalgically, and without doubt 
romantically, remembered the good old days when “panchayats 
were exactly following the path”, “development officials were 
selflessly doing the work according to Bapu’s (Mahatma Gandhi’s) 
principles” and “villagers helped enthusiastically in the work”. 
They lamented today’s “degradation of morals and character”, 
people’s “lack of fear” (bhay) for the consequences of their “wrong 
work”, and the prevailing “blaming culture”. As one veteran BDO 
explained (to the obvious hilarity of a local neta waiting for the 
                                                
217 The inherently divisive character of many poverty alleviation programs 
has not received the scholarly attention that it would seem to deserve. 
Conventional explanations of poor program performance typically highlight 
official and political neglect and abuse. They tend to ignore, however, the very 
plausible possibility that such neglect and abuse may themselves be stimulated by 
the selection principle according to which these programs are designed to operate. 
After all, as Maheswari has put it, “when only ten people in a village are included 
in the list of beneficiaries, the eleventh fellow is apt to feel sore, for he, too, is 
poor” (Maheswari 1995: 263). 
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sanctioning of “his” road-building funds): “I have no honest (sharif) 
man in my office. I really mean it when I say that never a honest 
man enters here, they all have a guilty conscience . . . Everybody is 
complaining that the pradhan takes money, whether he actually 
takes or not. It is the blame and accusations which really are the 
constant, to put it in chemistry terms. Everybody has a guilty 
conscience, so blame is all that results”. 
The large majority of DLBs thus testified to feeling very 
dissatisfied with their “troublesome”, “bothersome”, “burdensome” 
and “useless” work and work environment. What added to their 
distress was a widespread feeling among them that they could do 
little to improve things. Some DLBs, for whom their involvement in 
political corruption was, or had become, a considerable mental 
burden, tried to appease their conscience by limiting their collection 
of bribes and other forms of number two income. Often, however, 
such efforts made life even more difficult as colleagues would sneer 
at them (“my colleagues say I’m a fool, living hand to mouth like 
that, with only a fixed income and a large family to support”) and 
impatient wives would strongly complain about the loss of income 
brought about by their “sudden fits of honesty”. 
Many, at some point in their careers, had seriously entertained 
the idea of leaving the rural development organization.218 If hardly 
any of them had actually done so, it was only because alternative, 
equally remunerative and secure public employment had not been 
available.219 “A drowning man will grasp a straw”, as one DLB 
                                                
218 If an, admittedly rather dated, study by Haragopal and Murali 
Manohar is anything to go by, low job satisfaction and exit considerations seem 
to be far from typical for dust-level rural development bureaucrats. These 
authors found more than ninety per cent of the 230 bureaucrats in their sample 
(recruited from a variety of departments and from all hierarchical levels, age 
groups, service groups and educational levels) to be uninterested in the nature 
of their work. Two-thirds of them had a desire to quit the organisation 
(Haragopal and Murali Manohar 1976: 728-9). 
219 None of the DLBs seemed to have contemplated finding a job in the 
private sector, probably because, in India more generally, leaving service 
employment for a private sector job is not done. Service employment is far 
more highly valued, secure and respectable. Bureaucrats’ families have often 
spent much time and money (bribery to gain entrance into the civil service, at 
least in Uttar Pradesh, is very common) to get their son in. “During his whole 
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explained his continued presence in the rural development set-up. 
DLBs’ inclination towards frontline abandonment can thus in part 
be understood as the result of their gradual disidentification from 
their organization’s mission and its clientele. It is a form of 
“neglect”, a way of staying in the organization and receiving the 
appreciable benefits this bestows, while spending as little physical 
and mental energy as possible in doing so (cf. Martino Golden 1992: 
34; Rusbult et al. 1988: 601).  
Unsurprisingly, in a context in which heavily demoralized and 
disillusioned DLBs are so preoccupied with personal survival, active 
representation of caste interests is hardly an issue. I scarcely came 
across any DLBs –whether touchable or untouchable- who seemed 
to have seriously entertained the idea of using their official position in 
the rural development delivery system to facilitate the flow of policy 
benefits to co-caste clients. Perhaps more tellingly, in my talks with 
ordinary villagers, politicians and bureaucrats I never picked up any 
gossip or rumours about DLBs who were arguably partially 
disposed towards clients of their own castes. In fact, both netas and 
ordinary villagers seemed to be firmly agreed as to the general 
irrelevance of DLBs’ caste identities for the way they approach their 
jobs and handle their clients.  
“If a person becomes an officer”, as the pramukh of Parsendi 
summarized a widely held opinion, “he forgets about his caste”. 
Essentially the same point was made by Baba Mahant, an old 
Chamar from Loniapurva, with a claim to fame as one of the 
founding fathers of the Sitapur BSP. Mahant resolutely discarded 
my suggestion that his hamlet should perhaps have benefited more 
than it had from the Ambedkar village program. After all, the 
                                                                                                                                          
life”, as a secretariat official in Lucknow explained to me, “a middle-class boy is 
brought up with the idea that he gets into service. That is the only clear goal in 
his life”. Or, as BDO Parsendi put it, “every youth educated today wants to 
become IAS or PCS”. Service employment is therefore still widely regarded “the 
best deal” (cf. Taub 1969: 79). The incentives for untouchable DLBs to stay in 
service are probably even stronger than for non-untouchable officials because of 
the prevailing closed recruitment pattern in the private sector. Private 
employers tend to prefer network recommendees and but rarely openly 
advertise vacancies for white collar positions. This excludes many 
untouchables, a traditionally poorly networked category, from “any active job 
consideration in such [private] organisations” (Gupta 2005b: 4).  
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hamlet had been served by a Chamar VLO at the time of the 
program’s implementation: “This fellow had to do a government 
job”, he reasoned, “so what could he do? A Chamar officer may do 
us some good but it is equally likely that he will do us no good at 
all. It all depends upon a person’s mind (dimag)”. 
Untouchable DLBs were usually quick to accept the 
suggestion that they did not do “anything special” for their biraderi 
(“community”). But, as they pointed out, their failure to act as active 
representatives was far less a matter of unwillingness on their part, 
as implied by the likes of Baba Mahant, than of sheer “inability”. 
Even apart from netas’ general tendency to “check and curb” them 
and to prevent them from doing their work as VLOs “according to 
rule”, there was also the fall-out of the stiff upper caste resentment 
of official privileges for untouchables to deal with.220 Many 
untouchable DLBs (as well as many other untouchable officials I met 
in the course of my fieldwork) were convinced that resentful upper 
caste actors –both within and outside bureaucracy- were actively 
preventing them from building up the clout deemed necessary to 
serve their caste constituencies. 
Even if reservations had secured them a sizeable bureaucratic 
presence, they still formed only a small and insignificant numerical 
minority in a bureaucratic and political environment 
overwhelmingly dominated by upper caste representatives. 
Untouchable DLBs believed that upper castes were routinely 
sabotaging the implementation of reservations for untouchables and 
backward classes. One VLO, for example, was adamant that 
“whatever they [upper caste informants, bvg] may have told you, 
SCs make up only 1,5 per cent of the IAS, 2,5 per cent of the PCS and 
                                                
220 Upper caste resentment of reservations is widespread in India and 
also quite palpable (though seldom expressed openly) among the upper caste 
DLBs in the Sitapur rural development bureaucracy. Many considered 
reservations “unfair” (because “they benefit candidates who have no merit”) 
and were “anxious to know when they will stop”. What particularly aggravated 
these general bureaucrats was their impression that SC bureaucrats were getting 
“earlier promotions” than them. Untouchable officials who were thought to 
have jumped the queue, like a former colleague BDO who had speedily made it 
to the rank of Assistant Development Commissioner, were viewed with a 
mixture of pent-up jealousy, suspicion and malicious hostility by those who felt 
unfairly bypassed.  
5 Interrupted supply 215
3 per cent of those in group III. Likewise, OBC representation in the 
services is only 4,5 per cent, even though there is a quota of 27 per 
cent for them”. A few outspoken untouchable DLBs maintained that 
upper caste actors were deliberately preventing them from building 
up their own “channels” of influence, by denying them 
discretionary positions and by making sure that untouchable 
officials were always placed under the direct control of upper caste 
political or administrative superiors. “You will always find”, so one 
VLO claimed, “that if there is an SC officer, the pradhan will be of 
general [upper, bvg] caste. If only the whole channel were SC, then 
something could be done”.221 
In the present circumstances, with a lacking security in 
numbers and the absence of effective ingroup channels, most 
untouchable officials felt it was simply too dangerous to extend 
special help, however surreptitiously, to ingroup clients, even if they 
felt a moral obligation to do so: they would surely be “held down”, 
“harassed”, “intimidated” and “crushed” by “upper caste 
lobbies”.222 It was because of their “fear” of such punishments, they 
explained, that most among them took such good care to avoid any 
overly apparent impressions of themselves as caste-identified 
officers. Some mentioned their deliberate efforts not to be seen as 
                                                
221 Untouchable DLBs’ stressing of the importance of “channels” suggests 
that representative bureaucracy theorists should not be content with spelling out 
critical mass as an active representation-facilitative attribute of bureaucracies. As 
Greene et al. have plausibly suggested, not only a group’s presence per se  (or 
“penetration”) is likely to be an important factor conditioning the possibilities for 
active representation. The distribution of its presence over the administrative 
hierarchy (“stratification”) may be equally relevant (Greene et al. 2000: 2000).  
222 On several occasions, untouchable informants stressed this point by 
referring to what had happened to Mata Prasad. Prasad was an untouchable 
IAS officer (1962 batch), who climbed the ranks to become UP’s chief secretary, 
the highest administrative position in the state. At one point, Prasad was 
nominated to become the first untouchable chief secretary at the centre in New 
Delhi but his appointment was cancelled at the last moment. It was widely 
believed in untouchable administrative circles that upper caste lobbies had 
obstructed Prasad’s appointment because of his openly sympathetic attitude 
towards the untouchable cause. One of Prasad’s well-known “representative” 
acts had been his summoning of SC officers to make donations to the 
untouchable public employees’ union BAMCEF, a forerunner of the BSP, in the 
1970s. 
5 Interrupted supply 216
forming “little groups of our own”. It was only by downplaying 
their identity, avoiding advocacy roles and by stimulating upper 
caste perceptions of themselves as “ordinary” officers, so they 
believed, that they could hope “to take care” of themselves now 
and, hopefully, of their caste fellows in the future. For the moment, 
however, they were still too “weak” to be able to fight for their 
“rights” in the way “general people” could. As an untouchable, they 
claimed, “you do not get any sympathy, you cannot expect any 
sympathy”. Even if poor and untouchable villagers suffered from 
untouchable officers’ forced self-centeredness, for the moment there 
was little they could do about it. “We do not want to raise money 
from the poor”, as one VLO summarised the untouchable DLBs’ 
predicament, “but we will have to do so”. 
Untouchable administrators’ tendency to rule out the existence 
of opportunities for the display of active representation may also 
have something to do with their strong sense of obligation towards 
their families as opposed to their “communities”. Some untouchable 
officers hinted at the great “sacrifices” their poor and illiterate 
family members had had to make in allowing them to educate 
themselves and secure service employment. For these officials, the 
choice between downplaying their identities with all its likely 
rewards –a relatively successful career, secure income, the 
possibility to bring one’s family ahead- and “staying with our 
people” through active representation, with all its likely costs –
stalled careers, frequent transfers and suspensions, unsteady 
incomes- must have been easily made. 223 
But untouchable DLBs’ disidentification from untouchable 
clienteles often extends far beyond the more or less forced practices 
of frontline abandonment and defensive cowering. While climbing 
the social ladder, many untouchable bureaucrats have continued to 
                                                
223 As one upwardly mobile untouchable in Azamgarh district in Eastern 
UP justified the reasonableness of the first, appeasement, option to Roy and 
Singh: “Having a place to live, food to feed your children, and clothes to cover 
all of us with are the things we want foremost. If it is difficult for the caste 
Hindu, who run the society, to manage these minimum requirement, it is not 
going to be easier for us particularly if we challenge the Hindu outright . . . We 
actually have to encounter, appease and cajole the caste Hindus in a hundred 
different ways to secure our share” (Roy and Singh 1987: 19). 
5 Interrupted supply 217
experience their untouchability as a stigma, that is, as something 
deeply discrediting that disqualifies them from full social 
acceptance (Goffman 1963: 11, 13). A general point made by many 
untouchable officials with whom I discussed the issue -both in rural 
Sitapur as well as in urban Lucknow and Delhi- was that their 
untouchability had never really gone away, that it was “still there”, 
even if its outward manifestations had changed dramatically in the 
course of their lives. Some told me about their childhood days in the 
village, where traditional practices of untouchability had been 
manifest, common, even taken-for-granted parts of their lives. Some 
vividly remembered how the village school teacher had made them 
sit outside the class-room, how they and their family members had 
been provided with separate utensils at festive occasions, how they 
had been scolded for being a “dirty Chamar”, or how upper caste 
boys would not play with them.  
After leaving the village to pursue higher education in town or 
city, untouchability had typically become less blatant but 
nevertheless palpable. Some reported having had great trouble in 
finding suitable hostel accommodation as landlords, after having 
enquired about their caste, would find any pretext not to let their 
rooms out to them. Others had stories to tell about the subtle and 
not so subtle forms of discrimination they had been subjected to by 
fellow boarders and students –derogatory remarks, spiteful 
innuendo, sudden break-ups of friendships- once their caste 
identities had been revealed. Even after they had secured highly 
coveted public employment and become, at least in the eyes of the 
general public, successful careerists, the operation of stigma had not 
ceased.  
What always remained, indeed, were the countless little, 
nasty, unobtrusive but hard to ignore ways in which upper caste 
colleagues or superiors managed to express or reveal their apparent 
hostility, disapproval, distrust, unease or discomfort: courteous and 
evasive but firm refusals to have tea or meals together, “dirty” jokes, 
or the grieving withholding of sociability. One high-ranking class 1 
officer was still visibly pained when he told me about a particularly 
bad experience he had had in one of his earlier postings, in 
Gorakhpur district, where he had become “rather friendly” with an 
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upper caste subordinate officer of class 2 rank. When this friend 
celebrated the birthday of one of his children, all colleagues had 
been invited except himself. The incident, the officer told me, had 
taught him the valuable but painful lesson that “scheduled caste 
officers may be tolerated, but they will not be accepted”.  
To many untouchable officials, then, their untouchability is 
not a mere accident of birth from which they have long since 
escaped by gaining entrance to bureaucracy and society’s elite. As 
they see it, they continue to pay a hefty price for being (considered) 
untouchable by being made to feel, whether regularly or on 
occasion, uncomfortable, uncertain, anxious, looked down upon, 
disrespected, inferior, loathed, insulted, unaccepted, excluded, or 
outrightly discriminated against. Untouchability, in short, 
apparently still creates spoiled identities, to use Goffman’s term, 
even for its most fortunate bearers.224 
As the copious literature on the subject bears out, defensive 
cowering and trying to act “normally” are by no means the only 
coping, or “management”, strategies available to individuals 
afflicted by stigma. Depending on, among other things, the 
psychological costs associated with particular strategies, the type of 
                                                
224 Since stigmatized individuals are often all too ready, as Erving 
Goffman has observed, to read “unintended meanings” in the actions of 
“normals” (Goffman 1963: 29), it is hard to say whether upper caste 
discrimination is as real, strong and all-pervasive as some untouchable officials 
claimed. In the dust-level development bureaucracy it was, in any case, seldom 
openly expressed. Most upper caste bureaucrats clearly avoided being drawn 
into discussions of such touchy subjects as untouchability and reservations. 
Those who did venture a comment usually were at pains, as might have been 
expected, to deny that “caste feelings” were in any way a significant element in 
interpersonal relations within the organization. One upper caste BDO noticed 
that untouchable officials did not “mix easily” and sometimes exuded a “sense 
of insecurity”. But he did not think these phenomena could be attributed to the 
operation of “casteism”. “Differences and personal antagonisms exist between 
all bureaucrats, also between upper caste and untouchable ones. But they are 
based more on personal preferences and dislikes than anything else”. The lack of 
overt and deliberate caste discrimination does not, of course, preclude the 
operation of covert or unintended stigmatization. “The high caste language”, 
for example, as Aggarwal has noted, “is full of insulting expressions for the 
Harijans to which the high caste themselves have become quite deaf but which 
the Harijans have not become accustomed to (Aggarwal 1983: 6-8, check). 
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audience, the length of stigma awareness, the nature of the stigma 
and the extent of (perceived) ingroup support, stigmatized 
individuals may try to deal with their negative identity by way of 
such widely varying techniques as the acknowledgement, denial, 
concealment, selective or gradual disclosure, positive 
reinterpretation, celebration or flaunting of their stigma; retreat and 
withdrawal from interaction with normals (or “self-segregation”), 
blaming the discreditors, or collective “fighting-back” strategies like 
self-organization, public (re-)education and identity politics (cf. e.g. 
Adkins and Ozanne 2005; Anspach 1979; Goffman 1963; Kando 
1972: 479; Letkemann 2002: 512; Siegel et al. 1998).225 
 Probably the most commonly employed strategy by 
individuals who fear stigmatization is to try and conceal their 
stigma from outsiders in order to “pass” as normal. Untouchable 
officials turned out to be no exception in this regard. Most tellingly, 
many DLBs had adopted surnames which did not immediately give 
away their untouchable jati identities or which suggested upper caste 
status. Some, for example, had started using the surname Singh; a 
particularly unobtrusive surname, traditionally used by upper caste 
Rajputs and a host of middling jatis (as well as Sikhs) all over north 
India. Others called themselves Rawat, a name also used by Rajputs 
in the Himalayan region, or Verma, a surname associated with 
upper caste Kayasths and, more importantly, with the Kurmis, a 
rather populous and respected middle, landowning caste in Sitapur 
and the rest of central UP.  
 Besides, in my dealings with them I was struck by the tenacity 
with which many untouchable officials perceptibly refused to 
identify themselves as or with untouchables. Almost typically, they 
would shy away from discussing their or their ingroup clients’ 
problems in relation to untouchability. In fact, whenever the issue of 
                                                
225 These techniques need not be, and in fact often are not, mutually 
exclusive. What warrants their categorization as stigma management strategies is 
that they all are, or can be interpreted to be, aimed at avoiding, minimizing or 
changing one or more of the three necessary conditions for the operation of 
stigma: “(1) audience members actually perceive and take note of the 
discrediting condition, (2) audiences consider the condition to be threatening or 
unpleasant, and (3) audiences deem the stigma and those afflicted by it to be at 
least somewhat responsible for the condition” (Nelsen 2005: 1).  
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caste and untouchability sprang up in conversation, untouchable 
officials would try and steer away the conversation to other, less 
touchy or painful issues. Most of them took obvious care not to refer 
to other untouchables –whether colleagues or clients- in such a way 
as to signal that these were somehow seen, considered or felt by 
them to be members of some ingroup to which also they themselves 
belonged. I do not think I ever came across an untouchable official 
who spontaneously spoke of untouchable clients as “my people” or 
some such label or referred to himself and purported fellow 
untouchable colleagues in “we”-terms.  
Untouchable officials who apparently felt that I came too 
“close” would often avoid talking to me. Those who could somehow 
be persuaded to reflect upon the untouchable aspects of 
bureaucratic operations and interpersonal relations, often did so in 
awkward, objectivist, distancing terms, speaking for example about 
“majority” and “minority communities” in the third person singular 
or plural. Even then, such conversations would usually occur in the 
safe confines of officials’ homes, rather than in public or official 
contexts where there was always the danger of strangers or 
outsiders listening in and finding out. Many untouchable officials, 
then, routinely deployed an array of passing strategies, making 
them, for most intents and purposes, unrecognizable as untouchables 
to outsiders, including their purported ingroup clients.226 This 
successful passing on the part of untouchable bureaucrats prevents 
“their” clients from knowing whether they are in fact represented by 
one of their own in the bureaucracy and, thus, from effectively 
claiming preferential treatment on the basis of primordial affinity.  
 
                                                
226 To say that many untouchable officials pass does not amount to 
saying that all of them always try to pass. Passing, for example, is no option when 
others know about one’s caste. One’s immediate colleagues, for instance, are 
almost invariably “in the know” because of their high alertness to the operation 
and occupancy of reservations. Many untouchables, furthermore, experience 
passing as a highly stressful activity; some passers eventually prefer outing 
over concealment. It is my impression, however, that untouchable officials 
almost routinely pass vis-à-vis outsiders, that is, people who may be assumed to 
be ignorant about one’s jati identity including most ordinary villagers 
(potentially) eligible for rural development benefits. 
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To sum up the main argument developed in this chapter: the 
survival strategies of frontline abandonment, defensive cowering 
and passing that untouchable DLBs routinely deploy in their efforts 
to cope with the problems of patronage politics, goondagiri, 
factionalism and stigma conspire to make the active representation 
of ingroup policy interests on the part of untouchable DLBs a virtual 
non-issue in the Sitapur rural development bureaucracy. In the 
ordinary course of their official lives, untouchable DLBs lack both 
opportunities and good reasons to act as untouchable clients’ 
representatives. The inevitable result is an almost routine 
interruption of the supply of active representation.  
 
 
 
 
 6 Absent Demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter the perspective shifts from the DLBs to their intended 
clients, the untouchable villagers. I will illustrate that, whereas DLBs 
see little reason or opportunity to supply active representation, 
untouchable clients rarely, if ever, demand DLBs to do so. The 
apparent absence of an untouchable demand for active 
representation is an important finding because it further detracts 
from the likelihood of supply of active representation by DLBs: if 
ingroup clients do not even ask, claim or pressurize for special 
treatment why would DLBs run the considerable personal risks 
involved in extending it? The absence of a demand for active 
representation is not only important, it is also puzzling. Even if 
untouchable DLBs tend to be busy coping with netagiri, factionalism 
and stigmatized identity, there would seem to be no reason why 
untouchable clients should not try and get in touch with them to 
demonstrate their eligibility for highly valued program benefits or 
to claim special treatment on the basis of caste-affinity. Here, I 
account for the absent demand for active representation by 
discussing and explaining untouchable (as well as other poor and 
low caste) villagers’ overwhelming preference for indirect, 
“political” methods, such as voting and brokerage, to secure policy 
benefits. These methods are typically considered much more 
feasible, effective and, also, far less dangerous than the direct 
approach of bureaucrats which, therefore, hardly figures among 
poor clients’ benefit-seeking strategies. 
 
 
1 Benefit-seeking through voting 
 
Going by the accounts of untouchable villagers in Sitapur, over the 
past few decades “traditional” untouchability (chuachut) –which 
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considerably complicated physical movement and implied severe 
handicaps in dealing with people from non-untouchable castes- has 
waned considerably. A few older Chamars of Chamaranpurva in 
Thaura still remembered the days when they were not allowed to 
fully cover their bodies with clothes, and that the clothes they were 
allowed to wear were not “good” clothes such as dhotis, qamiz and 
shoes. Neither could they sit on a charpay in the presence of Thakurs 
and Brahmins. Until quite recently, the Chamars in Arro’s 
Chamarbasti had “no right to drink water” and were expected to 
stand up whenever a savarna passed by. The Chamars of Chitauni, a 
mixed caste settlement of Chamars and Brahmins, claimed that 
“earlier” they were often “scolded and beaten”. In many villages, 
forced labour was very common. “Earlier”, said a Chamar from 
Chamaranpurva (Thaura), “even sleeping was not safe because a 
Brahmin might steal our thumb impression to prove that we were 
indebted to him so that we had to work for him”. 
But now, Sitapur’s untouchables claimed, things had changed 
“quite a lot”, had generally become “much better” or even “hundred 
per cent improved”.227 The catchword used by many to describe 
their new situation was “free”. “Now we can do what we like”, said 
some Pasis from Pasinpurva in Chandraseni, “we are free to decide 
for whom we will work, nobody can force us”. “In zamindari there 
was begar”, concurred Kallu Pasi from Akbarpur, “but now we are 
free. We can sit right beside you [i.e. bvg]. Since Mahatmaji freed us, 
we can sit beside you and talk to you”. Or as a group of Pasi men in 
Amaura asserted their new found freedom with obvious relish: 
“Now we are free. Now, if a savarna passes by, we can decide to get 
up to pay respect, or to remain seated. Earlier we had to touch their 
feet. Now they have to touch our feet to get work from us”. Another 
new freedom is the possibility, for those who can afford to do so, to 
have and share meals, snacks, and tea in local roadside hotels 
(restaurants) and tea stalls and to smoke tembaku (tobacco) with non-
untouchables.  
                                                
227 Untouchable villagers typically were not able to tell very precisely just 
when things had started to change for the better. Some mentioned the time of 
zamindari or the “change of rule” (from British to Indian hands), which means the 
1950s; many others simply spoke of “earlier” (pahle). 
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The opportunities to be able to choose one’s employer and to 
interact –that is, “talk” and “sit”- with others on a more equal 
footing, were usually the first points to be mentioned by 
untouchables when asked to explain why they thought their 
situation had changed for the better. In addition, many also stressed 
that their poverty –an inherent attribute of traditional 
untouchability- was no longer as bad and pressing as before. 
“Earlier we worked a whole month for two man of grains”, said 
some Chamars from Thaura, “but now things have changed for the 
better. Life in this purva is not all that bad, everybody earns 
something”. The most important effect of poverty decline on the 
lives of untouchables is that many can now buy and grow more and 
better food than ever before.228 Poverty decline has also had a huge 
impact on untouchables’ ability to move around. Almost all 
untouchable families now own bicycles, for example, providing 
them with a greatly increased access to other places, people and 
information, including the various agencies of the local state. 
“Now”, many untouchables pointed out, “we can go wherever we 
want”.229 
                                                
228 This does not mean that untouchables have plenty, or even enough, to 
eat, though. Many are still starving. 
229 All this is not to say that untouchability has fully disappeared from 
rural Sitapur. Residential segregation is still the norm. Upper castes still do not 
commonly visit the houses of untouchables. Interdining across the pollution 
line is still very rare, at least in people’s private homes. “Pasis and Chamars 
have their own lutiapatra (cutlery)”, as a, middling caste, Kurmi from Ghaila put 
it. I was told that in some villages in “the interior”, begar was still sometimes 
enforced on highly indebted families. Scolding was also said to be still quite 
common (“you are dirty, you rear pigs”). Some Chamars in Arro Khamajatpur 
who, in an effort to improve their status, had given up pig rearing five or six 
years ago claimed they were still “hated”, adding that “even if we stop eating 
meat and drinking alcohol, still we are not accepted”. It should also be noted 
that not all new freedoms and opportunities that have come to present 
themselves with the fading of traditional untouchability are equally cherished. 
Even if temple entry restrictions seem to have been largely lifted, quite a few 
untouchables claimed they could not care less. “Temple, temple”, said some 
Chamars from Lonia purva, “that is all useless. People should use their own 
minds”. Chamars from Chamaranpurva (Thaura) said they hardly ever visited 
the nearby temple in Thangaon: “In the mornings we take bath and give water 
to the sun (jal cadhate hain). This is what we do by way of praying”. 
Untouchables from the mixed Chamar and Pasi hamlet Bhawania purva told 
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 The newly acquired freedoms of interaction, interdining, 
spending and mobility make that untouchability –as a personal 
attribute, or “identity”- no longer represents a significant barrier for 
most rural untouchables to approach the bureaucracy for valued 
resources. Rural untouchables, in other words, are no longer kept 
away from visiting government offices and meeting officials because 
they are untouchables. Nevertheless, the direct approach of 
bureaucrats is one of the least popular ways in which rural clients 
vie for policy benefits. In fact, on the Sitapur dust-level, clients’ 
claims for, and expectations of any, let alone special, help by ingroup 
bureaucrats are notable by their almost complete absence.  
By far the most popular and widely practiced benefit-seeking 
strategy employed by poor villagers, almost irrespective of caste, is 
voting. By voting their “own” man or party in office, they have, or 
so they assume, the biggest chance of landing benefits. Politicians, in 
other words, are expected to nurse their constituencies, not 
necessarily their villages, through the allocation of patronage. To the 
villagers it is obvious that roads, subsidised housing, a new school 
or community hall (panchayat ghar) will be built in the quarters of 
pradhan supporters. “The pradhan”, said the Chamars in Bhawania 
purva, “provides kharanja roads only to those who are close to him”. 
According to the Pasis of Pasinpurva in Chandraseni, the pradhan 
(also, incidentally, a Pasi, though living in another hamlet) and 
panches “only do some work in their own wards. Because we voted 
for Munni Lal’s uncle, a man from this hamlet, in the last elections, 
nothing much has been done here, except for some twenty or forty 
metres of kharanja”. In the mixed caste settlement Rahika only Pasis 
had managed to get IAY colonies. Since the Chamars of the hamlet 
had not supported the incumbent pradhan in the past elections, they 
had not been able to induce him to do work for them (even if they 
were, by common consent, much poorer and far more needful than 
the Pasi beneficiaries).230 To most poor villagers, therefore, voting is 
                                                                                                                                          
me that there was no temple in the village but that they did not regret this at all. 
“You’ll only find phoney worshippers here”. 
230 Incumbents can use election results to determine to whom they will 
channel benefits because voting, despite the existence of a vast formal state 
machinery to safeguard the secret ballot, is in practice seldom secret. The 
people who staff and guard the polling booths are usually petty government 
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not so much an expressive act as an instrumental one. They vote for 
the candidate or party whom they believe can win the elections and 
deliver the goods to them.231  
Note that, above, I use the term “poor villagers” deliberately. 
Especially in village panchayat elections, well-off villagers may vote 
(far) less instrumentally than poor ones: because they can get the 
things they need in the private economy (cf. Chandra 2004b: 135-6) 
or because they have already established access to decision makers 
and therefore do not need a particular incumbent’s favourable 
intervention. An example can illustrate this point. When I visited the 
mansion of the Thakur landlord of Chandraseni, his sons had just 
returned from Sitapur town, where they had been trying to have the 
DM grant them a gun license. They were now contemplating 
whether they should back up their request with some political 
pressure through a big neta friend of theirs in Biswan. These rich 
Thakurs had no need for the small-time rural development benefits 
trickling in through the panchayat system and therefore did not 
need the village’s pradhan to secure these for them (they, in fact, 
remote-controlled the incumbent pradhan anyway). And for the 
things they did want, such as a gun licence, they had far better access 
and connections than which could be provided by anyone elected 
pradhan in their village. In village elections it will therefore in all 
likelihood be poor and low caste voters, particularly, who “tend to 
                                                                                                                                          
officials (clerks, teachers, postmen, watchmen) who tend to be quite vulnerable 
to attempts at intimidation or bribery from the locally powerful. As a result, 
incumbents and party activists usually know perfectly well who has voted for 
whom in any particular locality (Chandra 2004b: 141, 2). 
231 As Kanchan Chandra has aptly pointed out, the intentions with which 
poor and low caste individuals cast their votes, make that much of Indian 
voting cannot fruitfully be seen as a variant of the collective action problem: 
“The collective action problem applies to voting only in cases in which the 
payoff from voting accrues to all individuals collectively, or to large groups. In 
patronage-democracies, however, the act of voting carries with it substantial, 
individualized benefits, and the act of not voting carries with it substantial, 
individualized costs. In patronage-democracies, where the value of the vote is 
so high, the problem is not explaining why individuals vote, but explaining 
why some do not” (Chandra 2004b: 54). Though, I am sure, Chandra overstates 
the inevitability of the link between voting and individualized benefits –many 
voters, I will argue further on, certainly hope for but do not necessarily expect or 
get rewards in exchange for their vote- her point is well taken.  
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vote according to a calculus of material gain” (Wade, cited in 
Chandra 2004b: 135-6).  
Since poor villagers use their vote primarily as a way of 
improving their chances to secure highly valued benefits, a 
candidate vying for their votes must of course have the, preferably 
previously demonstrated, capability -clout, power, influence, 
connections- to win the elections and secure patronage over the 
resources vested in administrative agencies. An incumbent who 
lacks –or is perceived to lack- this capability simply is not 
considered of much use (cf. Ruud 2001: 128). But electoral prowess 
and access to patronage are not the only qualities that matter to poor 
voters. They also look for guarantees that netas will direct patronage 
flows to them rather than to anyone else. They look, in other words, 
for netas whom they feel can be trusted to live up to their promises 
made at election time.  
In village elections poor villagers therefore prefer to vote for 
one of their own, that is, a candidate of their own jati, hamlet or 
ward (the three often coincide). Such persons are generally well-
known and not seldom related to them; a better guarantee for a 
share in the spoils of political office than such “closeness” cannot 
easily be imagined. Voting for a jati fellow is not always possible, 
however, because pradhanis are, by rotation, reserved for particular 
caste-clusters: for general, OBC and SC candidates respectively. 
When the pradhani is reserved for an outgroup candidate, villagers 
tend to give their support to a candidate with whom they are or feel 
somehow connected, by ties of friendship or clientage, for instance. 
Starting in earnest in the late 1980s, in the bigger elections for 
the state and national assemblies, villagers in Sitapur –as well as in 
the rest of UP- have increasingly given their votes to political parties 
of their own. In UP, the caste competition among the three caste 
blocks described in chapter three, has found expression in the 
development of what Chandra refers to as an “ethnitized” party 
system, in which each of the three major political parties overtly 
pictures itself, and has quickly come to be identified by most voters, 
as the champion of the interests of a more or less well-defined 
collection of jatis of roughly similar social status.  
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The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been trying to build an 
electoral coalition of the superordinate Hindu castes; the savarnas, as 
Sitapuri villagers tend to call them. The Samajwadi Party (SP) has 
come to be strongly identified with the middling Shudra jatis, or 
OBCs (as well as with the Muslims), while the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP) has primarily courted –through jati-specific mobilization and 
fierce anti-upper caste rhetoric- the electoral support of the 
untouchables and other jatis hovering around the traditional 
pollution line.232 By the end of the 1990s, the three major UP parties 
had largely succeeded in securing their respective caste-identified 
vote-banks, dividing 86 percent of the votes among them in the 1998 
parliamentary elections (Chandra 1999: 56-9).233  
                                                
232 Kanshi Ram, founder of the BSP, projected himself as the “agent” of 
what he called the bahujan samaj (the 85 or 90 percent of Indians who make up 
the “common people”) and defined his party’s “single point-programme” as 
that of bringing political power to the untouchables and the rest of the bahujan 
samaj. The BSP of the 1990s meticulously advertised its candidates’ jati 
identities to convince explicitly targeted, caste-identified voters –e.g. 
“Chamars”, “Mahashahs”, “Satnamis”, “Balmikis” and “Pasis”- that they were 
to receive their due share in power (Chandra 1999: 70). At least until the end of 
the 1990s, the BSP drew a clear line separating the untouchable and other low 
castes from the upper castes (the brahminwadi or manuwadi forces, in BSP 
jargon), whom it portrayed as outside and opposed and hostile to the bahujan 
samaj. The BSP also made furore with confrontational and biting anti upper 
caste slogans like “Brahmin, Bania, Thakur Chor, Baki Sab Hein DS-Four” 
(Brahmins, Banias and Rajputs are thieves; the rest are their victims); “Tilak, 
Taraju, Talwar. Maaro Unko Joote Char” (Beat those bloody Brahmins, Banias and 
Rajputs four times with a shoe) and “Vote hamara, raj tumhara. Nahin chalega, 
nahin chalega” (We vote, you govern. Not any more, not anymore) (Chandra 
2004b: 151-157; Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 223, 264; Pai 2004: 1142). 
233 The transformation towards a tripartite ethnitized party system in UP 
coincided with the precipitous electoral demise of Congress (the long dominant 
catch-all party) since the late 1980s. With only 6 per cent of the vote in 1998 
Congress had practically ceased to be a factor in the UP political arena in the 
late 1990s. What warrants characterization of the transformation of the UP party 
system as one of “ethnification” is that the BJP, SP and BSP (unlike Congress) 
make open appeals to ethnic identity and do so to the virtual exclusion of other 
issues (unlike Congress’ strategy of blending coded appeals with other issues) 
(Chandra 1999: 57-9). V.B. Singh’s close analysis of the 1993 state assembly 
electioneering in Atraulia constituency (in eastern Azamgarh district) nicely 
illustrates the extent of its ethnitization. He observed all main contenders for 
the Atraulia seat to have “decided to use caste” as their “major rallying point”, 
recruiting campaigners from their own castes, forming “caste-teams” with 
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Also Sitapuri villagers, with few exceptions, appeared to have 
largely ended up voting along the above ethnic lines in the vidhan 
sabha and lok sabha elections. As a Thakur notable (and long-time 
Congress leader) in Chandraseni summarized the current electoral 
situation in the district: “Now the Pandits (Brahmins) and most 
Thakurs are with the BJP, though a few Thakurs are still with 
Congress. The Chamars and Pasis are with the BSP. The Muslims 
[quite numerous in Sitapur, bvg] never returned to the Congress 
and are now mostly with the SP, along with the Yadavs”. Or, as the 
villagers in Ahmedabad put it even more succinctly: “This is the era 
of ‘Jai jati, jai parti’” (Long live caste, long live party).  
Most untouchables with whom I discussed their party 
preferences indeed readily revealed they had supported the BSP in 
recent elections. The Chamars of Chamarbasti, for instance, had 
voted for the BSP en bloc and had felt proud when its leader 
Mayawati –“she is one of us”- became chief minister. Likewise, 
almost all Chamars in Lonia purva had given their support to the 
BSP, as had the Pasis in Pasinpurva (Chandraseni), Akbarpur, 
Mahuwapurva, and the Koris in Korinpurva. The fact that almost all 
untouchables in Sitapur voted for the BSP (even despite its 
occasional fielding of upper caste candidates in an effort to expand 
its electoral appeal) illustrates the extent to which the BSP 
leadership had managed to convince untouchable voters that it was 
“their” party. “We vote for the party”, the Chamars of Arro 
Khamajatpur’s Chamarbasti explained, “not the leader nor the 
candidate”.  
Though voting is the primary way in which poor villagers try 
to influence public benefit allocations, it carries few guarantees. First 
                                                                                                                                          
“clear-cut mandates to canvass among their own communities”, providing their 
teams with lists of specific castes whose votes they were to court, and striving 
hard for the support of castes of whose electoral preferences they were not yet 
sure (Singh 1996: 126). The term “ethnitization” also conveniently captures the 
“horizontal” dimensions of contemporary caste politics. Traditionally ranked 
castes now increasingly find themselves opposed to each other in the political 
arena on more or less equal terms (much like politically organized ethnic 
groups in unranked systems). As Baba Mahant, a long time BSP-worker from 
Lonia purva, put it: “Earlier, when we went canvassing for the BSP, we would 
be abused like ‘there goes the Chamar party’, but now this has changed”. 
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of all, voting in UP is not always free. Chandra, who studied the 
BSP’s electioneering in rural Uttar Pradesh in the late 1990s, found 
that the security of the voting rights of many untouchable voters 
depended on their willingness to strike a bargain with politicians 
from dominant castes through an umbrella party or an umbrella 
alliance. She quotes an upper caste politician from a rival party as 
saying: “In previous elections, Harijans told everyone ‘we are with 
you’. But when Mayawati became strong, they opened up. Now in 
the next election, we know how they will vote, and no one will let 
them vote. Harijans here can still be intimidated and with Mayawati 
not in power, no one can help them” (Chandra 2004a: 2).  
Apart from outright intimidation and physically barring 
certain sections from voting, elections may also be more subtly 
rigged. V.B. Singh, in a study of the grass roots electoral process in 
the eastern UP constituency of Atraulia, mentions (allegations of) 
the deployment of manipulations like the deliberate exclusion of 
certain age groups from the voters’ list, the enlisting of ineligible 
voters and impersonation, for instance (Singh 1996: 122). I myself 
also heard many allegations of physical obstruction, intimidation, 
booth capturing and ballot stuffing.234 Remember, for instance, 
Patara Kalan’s Pasi pradhan’s spontaneous listing of tactics used by 
his opponents to thwart fair elections in the previous chapter. 
Allegations such as these should probably often be taken with a 
pinch of salt; they are, after all, the sort of discrediting allegations 
standard of the faction political repertoire. At the same time, it is 
hard to imagine elections in Sitapur as being entirely free and fair. 
But even free and fair elections in themselves do not guarantee 
the trickling down of promised benefit flows to voters. If the 
candidate they voted for fails to win, poor and low caste voters 
cannot and, usually, do not expect benefits to trickle down to them. 
My Yadav and Pasi informants in Mahuwapurva, for instance, had 
                                                
234 According to Ramesh Thakur, “’booth-capturing’ is particularly 
notorious in Bihar, and to a lesser extent UP. Mercenary thugs are available to the 
highest bidder for forcible capture of election booths, at the point of a gun if need 
be. Ballot boxes are then stuffed in favour of the paymaster candidate. The 
security officers standing guard to ensure the sanctity of the voting process are 
either bribed into active connivance or intimidated into passive acquiescence” 
(Thakur 1995: 260).  
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been genuinely and pleasantly surprised when their pradhan, the 
Muslim Munna, had decided to have a road built in their hamlet 
even though “he did not get a single vote” from their purva (the 
whole hamlet had rallied behind a local Yadav). And in elections for 
the state and national assemblies there is always the risk that the 
party of one’s victorious candidate does not make it to the 
governing coalition.235 The Chamars of Chitauni, for instance, had 
voted for the winning BSP candidate Rajesh Verma in the last lok 
sabha elections; a victory which had turned out to be of little use to 
them, however. “Verma can’t do much”, the Chamars explained, 
“because his party is not in power”. 
Most poor and low caste villagers thus understand, accept and 
act upon the patronage logic of Indian politics. They use their vote 
to get their own man, woman or party in office and hope to be 
rewarded if their candidate manages to capture an office from 
which favours may be distributed. Likewise, they do not really 
blame an incumbent who did not get their support at election time 
for channelling benefits to his or her own supporters. Nor do they 
tend to carry a grudge against an MLA or MP, whom they did help 
win the elections, for not living up to his promises when his party is 
not in power. But an incumbent who secures office and patronage 
with the help of their votes and still does not deliver is considered a 
cheater and becomes a ready target of harsh criticism and spite.  
The main problem with voting as a benefit-seeking strategy, 
according to many of my informants, is that most of the politicians 
who occupy and compete for political office in Sitapur are, in fact, 
such cheaters. “Those people who are politicians around here”, 
claimed the untouchables in Bhawania purva, “are first class 
cheaters” (nambari thag vidya wale). Many other poor and low caste 
voters also viewed their local netas as self-serving, unscrupulous, 
corrupt, crooked and unprincipled individuals with an 
overwhelming concern for their “own development” (apna vikaas) 
                                                
235 Seats in the national and state parliaments are contested in more than 
500 lok sabha and over 3000 vidhan sabha constituencies, which return MPs and 
MLAs according to the first-past-the post system. With the gradual demise of 
virtual one party Congress rule since the late 1960s, state and national 
governments are by necessity coalition governments. 
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rather than that of their voters (cf. Ruud 2001: 116).236 “They only 
come here to get the votes. And if they win, the first thing they do is 
to try and recover their election expenses and make something for 
their own. Then, if we are lucky enough, we people are left with the 
crumbs”, roughly sums up how many poor voters feel about their 
netas. 
“We know that money is coming for the public”, said the Pasis 
in Karaundi, “but those netas make their own. For every ten 
thousand rupees on paper, they only show a thousand worth on the 
ground (das hazaar kharcha hai, hazaar dikawat hai). “Two lakh comes”, 
according to the Chamars in Fatehpur, “and one lakh is eaten by 
netas and adhikaris”.237 There is no doubt in poor voters’ minds as 
to where this eaten money ends up: in politicians’ own pockets of 
course. “Generally, whoever becomes pradhan, he will only take 
care of himself”, the Karaundi Pasis asserted. “Earlier, the pradhan’s 
family was not well-off”, claimed some assembled Majhiya 
villagers, “but when he got the pradhani he all of a sudden had his 
own house built. He also arranged colonies for his own son and 
daughter in law”.  
It is only when they have filled their own stomachs and almost 
nothing is left, that netas start thinking of delivering benefits to their 
voters. No wonder, then, that their hamlets are “the poorest of all”: 
                                                
236 My Sitapur informants apparently share their commonly held view of 
politicians as corrupt crooks with most of their fellow countrymen. “The axiom 
that politics and politicians are (almost) always corrupt is”, Fuller and Hariss 
note, “ubiquitous in India . . . . [O]rdinary people expect the business of politics 
and government to be thoroughly infected by corruption and cheating” (Fuller 
and Harriss 2001: 19, 20). 
237 Needless to say that voters’ accusations of cheating are not necessarily 
factually accurate. Though most netas certainly and routinely collect rent from 
patronage, it may not be quite as much as villagers often seem to think. Bereft of 
reliable information, villagers often vastly overestimate the magnitude of public 
benefit flows into the villages. Many think that, each year, dozens of lakhs of 
rupees are allocated to their villages and subsequently gobbled up by their 
netas. In practice, officially earmarked village development funds are much 
more modest than that. Ulra gram panchayat, for instance, received as little as 
1.05 lakh in central dotations (roughly Rs. 49,000) and policy-related monies 
(Rs. 56,000) in the administrative year 1999-2000. In none of the gram 
panchayats visited for this study did yearly JRY-outlays exceed one lakh 
between 1996 and 1999. 
6 Absent demand 233
“There has been no electrification of my hamlet, no drainage, no 
handpumps and no roads”, said a Chamar in Lonia purva, “if we 
ask something from them [netas], all they give is assurance. ‘Gam 
khaiye’ (‘have patience’) is their favourite expression”. “Our MP only 
lives 11 kilometres away from here”, a Yadav peasant in Gausapur 
pointed out, “but I am sure if you asked him he couldn’t tell my 
name or the name of this village. These people come here only 
during election time and only give reassurances”. “You take a good 
look at all the work the netas have done here”, remarked the 
untouchables in Bhawania purva sarcastically, “the only thing you’ll 
find here is a single handpump. No hamlet is as dirty a ours”. 
The rural poor and low caste Sitapur public thus tends to see 
most of its leaders as falling far short of what is demanded of them 
(cf. Mayer 1981: 165). Many are, furthermore, convinced that today’s 
countryside is particularly badly infested with self-seeking and 
corrupt netas (and officials). This sentiment is nicely conveyed by a 
little story which was related to me by an untouchable villager in 
Ahmedabad: 
 
Once there was a King who was suffering from leprosy. He 
asked his Minister how he could be cured. The Minister replied: 
“Seek any great man or saint who can tell you”. After the King 
had found a Saint the latter advised him: “Divide half of your 
wealth among the poor”. The King then ordered his Minister to 
do so. But the Minister took half of the money himself and gave 
the rest of the money to a subordinate to distribute. But this 
subordinate also took half of the money and gave the 
remainder to his subordinate. This went on and on so that, in 
the end, only two poor persons each got one rupee. The King 
wondered why he was not cured despite having followed the 
Saint’s advice. But he understood when he learned that only 
two persons had profited.  
 
The story-teller then explained that the poor in the leprous King’s 
era had still been better off than today’s poor. “Nowadays”, he 
argued, “the King himself would first keep half of the money, and 
that is why we are in such a bad situation”.  
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To sum up, voting is the primary way in which poor and low 
caste villagers try to seek access to public benefits, including those 
under the nominal control of the rural development machinery. 
Even if voting is the most popularly used benefit-seeking strategy, 
this does not mean that it always, or even sometimes, works. The, as 
they see it, zero-sum game nature of electoral and alliance politics 
added to the dubious character of today’s netas lead most ordinary 
voters to expect quite little in exchange for their votes. 
 
 
2 Dalaali 
 
When voting does not bring the hoped for results poor and low 
caste villagers may respond in a number of ways. Some feel there is 
nothing one can do about cheating netas. Like it or not, they reason, 
the world is made up of “small” and “big” people, the “weak” and 
the “dominant”, the “oppressed” and the “oppressors” (dabang) and 
there is no way the small can expect, let alone force, the big to show 
kindness to them. On the contrary, it is simply inevitable that the big 
will use the small for their own ends and that the fruits of 
government will make the rich richer and the poor poorer.  
“What can we hope for?”, wondered the Pasis of Pasinpurva 
(Chandraseni) rhetorically, “those who get seats do their own thing 
and the poor are not listened to. They have become kings by our 
vote but still we are dying. Nobody troubles strong people. But we 
are poor, so we are troubled”. “It is like this”, explained Shivnat, a 
Chamar in Chitauni, “a rich man gets a hundred rupees, only by 
sitting beside the road and watching our labour, simply because it is 
his good luck, while we dig and dig and get only thirty rupees. Such 
is our luck”. Or, as people in Mahuwa purva captured the same 
sentiment with a local expression, “wherever the sheep goes, it will 
be shaven”.  
The lesson that life has taught these poor villagers is that it is 
no use trying to defy and change what is apparently undefiable and 
unchangeable. Better let go of ambitions, expectations and hopes for 
a better, juster future, and resign to the fact that the government has 
few benefits in store for them, despite the attractive promises of 
6 Absent demand 235
those sitting nicely in their kursis. Perhaps, their poverty is, as 
Shivnat in Chitauni had come to suspect, god-made and, hence, 
inescapable after all (“The poor man comes from God’s house”, he 
said, “therefore the poor man will remain poor”). There is, in any 
case, little use in letting oneself get bogged down by the whole 
situation. “The poor man”, knew some Pasis in Karaundi, “is wise 
enough not to be bothered about it”.238  
Even if many poor villagers would rather stay away from the 
unsavoury game of politics, few can afford to distance themselves 
completely from it. The benefits -especially subsidies and seasonal 
labour- that might be secured through careful manipulation of the 
political delivery system constitute too good a potential contribution 
to the family income to be lightly forsaken. “Few of them”, as Ruud 
writes, “are independent and self-sufficient enough to be able to live 
wholly apart from the more powerful and to avoid being entangled 
in politics, even locally. They are also too cautious to take the chance 
of doing so. To be entangled means to engage in or derive benefit 
[sic]” (Ruud 2001: 130). The poor, in other words, “know they have 
to play the game and pick up what spoils they can” (Véron et al. 
2003: 18). 
For the few who can afford it, obtaining political office oneself 
is, of course, by far the most secure guarantee of access to valued 
benefits (cf. Chandra 2004a: 4-5). For untouchable and other low 
caste office seekers, this option has been both complicated and 
facilitated by the introduction of reserved seats in the panchayat raj 
                                                
238 These villagers’ outlook on life is an almost perfect illustration of what 
George Foster has called the peasant’s “Image of the Limited Good”. According 
to this image, “all of the desired things in life such as land, wealth, health, 
friendship and love, manliness and honour, respect and status, power and 
influence, security and safety, exist in finite quantity and are always in short 
supply as far as the peasant is concerned. Not only do these and all other ‘good 
things’ exist in finite and limited quantities, but in addition there is no way 
directly within peasant power to increase the available quantities” (Powell 1977: 147, 
emphasis mine). This image may, by the way, have less to do with the fact that 
peasants are agriculturalists as with the fact that they tend to be poor: “General 
studies of opportunity beliefs”, as Weigert observed thirty years ago, “have [. .] 
shown that those in lower social positions tend not to believe in the reality of 
opportunities as much as those occupying higher social positions (Weigert 1974: 
58). 
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system in 1993. Though these reservations guarantee untouchables 
and OBCs a substantial share of pradhanis and pramukhships (the 
only elective positions that really count) they at the same time 
prevent them from competing in any constituency: whereas certain 
constituencies are reserved for them, others are reserved for general 
candidates. 
Rather than by seeking office themselves, many poor villagers 
try and corner public benefits by calling in the services of an 
individual commonly known as the dalaal. A dalaal is a broker, 
middleman or fixer who specializes in dalaali, the approach of 
officials for favours and the exercise of pressure on bureaucracies to 
make them part with the benefits invested in them.239 Dalaals, or 
however they are called in local vernaculars, are ubiquitous in rural 
India.240 In many of the villages I visited in Sitapur, there were one 
or more of such dalaals; Mahendra Tripathi, one of the key players 
in Ulra’s factional conflict described in the previous chapter, was 
only one dalaal out of many in my fieldwork area. “Dalaals”, as 
some Chamars in Chitauni pointed out, “are everywhere”. Some, 
like Tripathi, engage in dalaali only occasionally or intermittently 
while others, like the Pasi Ram Swarup in Thaura, are reportedly 
involved in it “twenty-four hours a day”.  
Though they operate at all levels and distributive policy areas 
of the polity, dalaals have become especially numerous and 
important players in the delivery systems of developmental benefits 
in the rural areas.241 Strictly speaking dalaali is a role rather than a 
                                                
239 In writing up the following discussion I have greatly benefited from 
informative accounts of dalaals and dalaali by especially Reddy and Haragopal 
(1985), as well as by Manor (2000) Krishna and Bailey (1970). 
240 In Karnataka, in South India, fixers are commonly known as 
pyraveekars. The word is derived from the Persian word pyrov, meaning follower 
or one who pursues, and kar, work. A Pyraveekar is thus “one who follows up 
work” (Reddy and Haragopal 1985: 1149). Traditionally, a dalaal was a quality 
inspector (Reddy and Haragopal 1985: 1149, n. 3). 
241 In Sitapur, dalaals were also said to be very active as brokers between 
the government-operated sugar mills and sugar cane farmers. Sugar mills in 
Sitapur operate on the basis of quotas; only those farmers with parchis –a parchi 
is an official document, a “slip”- can sell their sugar cane to the mills. Though 
parchis can be procured from sugar cane inspectors directly in exchange for a 
bribe (rishwat), reportedly at a rate of Rs. 300 to 400 per parchi, many farmers 
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profession and there are therefore no restrictions as to who may ply 
the dalaali trade. In the Indian countryside there are, in fact, 
different kinds of dalaals. In many areas, low level revenue officials 
such as karnams and patels in South India and patwaris and kanungos 
in north India have traditionally functioned as fixers. In 
contemporary India, most holders of elective political positions, like 
the pradhans and pramukhs in UP, may, as we have seen, also be 
said to act as dalaals, or go-betweens between rural clients and 
officialdom. But in rural Sitapur, and quite probably also in the rest 
of north India, the term dalaal is commonly used to refer especially 
to those fixers who engage in dalaali while not occupying any 
formal political or administrative position. 
It is easy to see why poor villagers enlist the help of dalaals in 
their efforts to secure public benefits. Dalaals, if they are any good, 
possess the kind of resources –education, human relations skills, 
contacts, knowledge, experience and mobility- that poor villagers 
typically lack but which are often (deemed) indispensable for 
successfully approaching officials and securing benefits. Unlike 
most poor villagers, dalaals are by definition literate and have 
usually received more than a modicum of education.242 Thus 
endowed, they are far more able than ordinary clients to access, 
collect and elicit information on the existence of development 
programs and the nature of available benefits and to grasp the 
intricacies of cumbersome and complex official procedures.  
Not only are dalaals much better informed than ordinary 
clients (who tend to be quite ignorant about policies and 
procedures), they are also far better equipped to convert this 
knowledge into benefits. In the course of their work of collecting 
information, chasing files, visiting offices and dealing and 
negotiating with officials and politicians, dalaals build up and 
cultivate extensive networks of contacts and connections, both on 
                                                                                                                                          
employ the services of dalaals to obtain the parchis for them against a 
commission. The Thakur Munna Singh from Newrajpur was repeatedly pointed 
out to me as a “big” broker in this line of business in the Biswan area.  
242 James Manor, who studied small-time political fixers’ antecedents and 
activities in seven Indian states –including UP-, found that they had usually 
enjoyed secondary schooling and, occasionally, some post-secondary education 
(Manor 2000: 818). 
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the grass-roots and higher up, on which they can draw to get their 
clients’ work done.243 It is the dalaal’s stock in trade to know about 
whom to approach and lobby for particular favours and how, about 
officials’ idiosyncrasies and soft spots, and about relations, 
friendships and enmities between political and administrative actors 
in their area of operations and expertise. Successful dalaals are 
usually masters in sizing up officials and in shrewdly, tactfully and 
perseveringly working on them with varying doses of ego-tickling, 
flattery, persuasion and threats. They have, as Sitapur villagers call 
it, “access” to the block, tehsil, police or district. 
Apart from their superior knowledge, connections and social 
skills another useful quality of dalaals, seen from poor clients’ 
perspective, is their proximity. Though many dalaals have lived for 
some time in urban centres (usually to pursue higher education) the 
large majority have spent most of their lives and earn their living in 
rural areas, not seldom in and around their native village. As local 
men (very few dalaals are women) they are much easier to approach 
by poor clients than bureaucrats who, after all, tend to stay away 
from the villages. The fact that they are locals and known to them 
also makes that villagers find dalaals much easier to trust and deal 
with than bureaucrats who are, almost by definition, outsiders.  
Poor villagers in Sitapur in fact have little good to say about 
bureaucrats. Villagers not only blame them for being notoriously 
difficult to approach; they also tend to find them quite unhelpful 
and condescending whenever they do manage to establish face-to-
face contact with them. “When some officer comes here and we try 
to gather around him to hear what he is talking about”, as the 
villagers of Nawabpurva voiced a common complaint, “we are sent 
away and told that it is no mela [market, fair] here. Officers often 
scold and rebuke us. They say that we cannot understand what they 
                                                
243 Generally speaking, it is of course difficult to imagine brokers, at least 
not successful ones, without good connections. A broker’s capacity to help 
others is, after all, predicated on his ties with third parties (Scott 1972: 95, n. 20). 
“Brokerage is a business”, as Boissevain has put it, in which “a broker’s capital 
consists of his personal network of relations with people, and his credit of what 
others think this capital to be” (Boissevain, cited in Lemarchand 1972: 80). 
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tell us anyway, because we cannot read or write”.244 I often heard 
poor villagers claim that they felt uncomfortable or even scared 
when dealing with officials. The Chamars in Loniapurva said they 
feared annoying and invoking the wrath of bureaucrats and, 
accordingly, would usually “design smiles” in the presence of 
visiting officials as if to say “we do not know anything, everything 
is okay”.  
Bureaucrats, like politicians, are furthermore considered 
expert cheaters. In poor villagers’ eyes bureaucrats are not much 
different from most netas in that they, also, are suspected of being 
primarily interested in serving their own ends and lining their own 
pockets. Sometimes such suspicions are based on personal 
experience. A year before I met them some Chamars in Chitauni had 
lost quite a bit of money to the Pasi VLO Ram Pal, or so at least they 
claimed. The floods that year had been more severe than normal 
and quite a few villagers had ended up in dire straits. They had 
ruled out seeking the help of pradhan Khan, however. His family 
had been firmly in control of the pradhani for the past forty years by 
keeping the voters divided into pieces (tukre-tukre) and by “helping” 
only the village “big men” who could help them get the votes.  
                                                
244 I had plenty of opportunities to verify statements such as these and 
found them to have more than a bit of substance. Officials often do behave 
haughtily, callously and casually, especially when dealing with low status 
clients. On more than one occasion officials made a point of alerting me to the 
nervous trembling of villagers who had come to see them, something they 
seemed to be finding quite amusing as well as somehow befitting their status. 
Fine ethnographic descriptions by Gupta and Ståhlberg aptly illustrate how 
scrupulously and routinely “court-holding” bureaucrats try to maintain the 
upper hand in interactions with clients and how difficult it is for clients to 
actually demand something from bureaucrats who take such good care not to 
give anyone in their presence their full and undivided attention. Dealing with 
high status and highly status-conscious Indian bureaucrats therefore indeed 
often requires a lot of, as Gupta calls it, performative confidence (Gupta 1995; 
Ståhlberg 2006: 61-2). These and similar observations lend credence to Max 
Weber’s claims that modern officials always strive for a “distinctly elevated 
social esteem vis-à-vis the governed” and that such is especially the case in “old 
civilized countries” where a “strong demand for administration by trained 
experts” tends to go hand in hand with “a strong and stable social 
differentiation” and the predominant recruitment of officials from “socially and 
economically privileged strata” (Weber 1978: 959-60). 
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Since, as things stood, Khan would have been sure to tell them 
to “get out”, some Chamars from the hamlet had approached Ram 
Pal to arrange a colony for them. (They had not been, as they readily 
admitted, so much interested in the colonies themselves as well as in 
the Rs. 20.000 subsidies with which these were to be financed). In 
order to secure his cooperation and get their name on the list they 
had each given Ram Pal a Rs. 500 inducement. In the end, however, 
only two of the Chitauni Chamars were granted a colony, leaving 
the rest of them empty-handed and poorer. Though those who had 
been cheated had asked Ram Pal to return their money, the latter 
had not wanted to hear of it. What is more, he had cheated each of 
the two beneficiaries from the hamlet out of another Rs. 3.100 off 
their subsidies. Though Ram Pal, who had since been transferred to 
another village, had claimed that he had been made to do so by the 
BDO, the Chamars were firmly convinced he had only been smooth-
talking. “He has looted this place”, they concluded, “so now he has 
taken another gram panchayat. A man goes where he can earn 
something”.  
Poor clients are also reluctant to enter into direct transactions 
with bureaucrats because they tend to be very apprehensive about 
possible dire consequences that might suddenly crop up after a 
transaction is made. A young untouchable widow with two small 
children in Patti had applied for and managed to secure a widow 
pension and a colony after paying bribes of Rs. 200 to Rs. 250 to the 
village pradhan and several bureaucrats. Even if she desperately 
needed the money and had had but little choice to approach 
bureaucrats directly (she had not known anyone to turn to because 
she had only very recently moved into the village following her 
marriage to her now-deceased husband245), she now strongly 
doubted whether she had done the right thing. Her fellow villagers 
had no such doubt whatsoever; they kept warning her that the IAY 
                                                
245 In Sitapur, as in many other parts of north India, people strictly 
adhere to the twin rules of patrilocality and village exogamy (Drèze et al. 1997: 
32). Simply put, brides leave their native village and join their husbands’ 
villages after marriage. While these rules, as Drèze has noted, are fine for men, 
they create, as is testified by the predicament of the widow in Patti, “some 
important forms of insecurity and vulnerability for women, especially widows” 
(Drèze et al. 1997: 33, n. 36). 
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subsidy would probably turn out to be a loan after all and that she 
would have to pay dearly to pradhan and officials for years to come. 
The same apprehension about unwanted or unanticipated 
consequences of dealing with bureaucracy was shown by Pasi men 
in Amaura. They were eligible for an agricultural loan and well 
knew it, but none of them had actually decided to apply for one: 
“We know that if you have land, you can get a loan. But we are 
scared to apply for loans because we also have to recover them. But 
what will happen if we do not have the money to recover them? 
Then we will surely lose whatever little we have”. 
Poor clients’ distrust of bureaucrats tends to have little to do 
with bureaucrats’ caste. When asked whether they had not hoped 
for a better treatment by Ram Pal, given the fact that he, like them, 
was also an untouchable, the Chitauni Chamars were quick to 
discard any such fanciful idea. “People like Ram Pal”, they argued, 
“do not have any consideration for biradari. If anything, whenever 
they find someone from their own biradari, they will try to take 
even more”. In other words, dealing with untouchable bureaucrats, 
in these Chamars’ opinion, requires special caution because there is 
always a chance that they may abuse the trust inadvertently placed 
in them by ingroup clients; a sentiment I also heard occasionally 
expressed by untouchables in other bastis. 
Untouchable (as well as other poor and low caste) clients thus 
tend to be sharply distrustful of bureaucrats and generally expect 
little good from them, regardless of what caste they are. They are 
quite appropriately described as “bureautics”, to borrow 
Thompson’s term: they tend have a pronounced distaste for, and 
reluctance to interact with, bureaucracy, feel powerless in the face of 
it and have no confidence in securing justice through it (discussed in 
Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981: 159). Poor clients generally prefer to 
work through local dalaals whom they know and with whom they 
may have some personal relation than through bureaucrats who 
tend to try and keep relations with them as impersonal and 
contractual as possible. They largely rely on fixers to bridge the gap 
6 Absent demand 242
between themselves and those who control the benefits they need or 
want.246 
It is quite conceivable that poor low caste clients on the (north) 
Indian dust-level will be availing of dalaali even more frequently 
and intensively in the near future than they have done until now. 
Several observers of Indian political life have noted the recent rise of 
a new class of political entrepreneurs, or naye neta (new politicians), 
who, apart from providing electoral services to increasingly 
uprooted political parties and acting as quasi-bureaucrats in the 
supervision, on site administration and execution of local 
development projects, also continue to deliver the sort of services to 
rural clients that dalaals have traditionally provided (Krishna; Mitra 
1999).247 Even if these new leaders may not be as “new” as their 
                                                
246 A fair idea of the extent to which rural villagers have come to rely on 
dalaals for lubricating and managing their transactions with public officialdom 
is provided by Krishna’s recent study of dalaals (Krishna calls them “new 
leaders”) in rural Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. In the sixty-nine villages 
studied by him, Krishna documented an overwhelming preference on the part 
of villagers to work through new leaders, rather than through local party 
organizations, traditional landowning patrons, village panchayat members or 
caste leaders.  
 
Demand for Services by Villagers   
Types of Leaders Party Patrons 
(jajmans)  
Panch Caste New 
leaders 
(a) Dealing with the 
police or the tehsil 
114 72 101 372 1,172 
(b) Getting a bank loan 
or an insurance policy 
92 317 166 146 1,118 
(c) Learning about 
agricultural technology 
107 49 313 203 1,149 
(e) Getting wage 
employment 
87 64 274 156 1,431 
Source: Krishna: 30 
 
247 Indian political parties have an increasing need for these new –young 
and educated- “worker-type” persons to aggregate rural demands, allocate 
benefits and bring out the vote. Whereas in the first few decades after 
independence Congress could keep in touch with its constituencies through 
relatively well-developed party organisations in the districts (the so-called 
District Congress Committees) and its ties to local landholding notables, present-
day political parties can no longer do so. They have hardly any presence below 
the district level and even most district-level party organisations are usually 
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discoverers sometimes seem to suggest (the kind of things these 
new leaders reportedly do, including their involvement in electoral 
politics, are strikingly similar to what dalaals have been doing for 
decades), what is certainly new about them is that, unlike before, 
they are increasingly and disproportionally drawn from poor, low 
status, middle- and lower caste groups (Krishna: 23; Manor 2000: 
819).248 With ever more –“own”, “close”, young, educated, low caste 
and untouchable- “Chote Lals” and “Ram Swarups” rather than -
                                                                                                                                          
“bare-boned operations . . . thinly staffed, barely financed, and poorly led (Kohli 
1991; Krishna: 20;  cf. also Manor 2000; Reddy and Haragopal 1985). Besides, 
links with the old landed village notables are increasingly unlikely to generate 
the needed votes, as the traditional jajmani (patronage) ties between these 
notables and rural voters have largely (though not entirely) evaporated. The need 
of dust-level bureaucracies for the services of naye neta follows from the 
simultaneous expansion and fragmentation of rural development budgets. 
Ruling party politicians’ tendency to stretch the available budgets thin in order to 
reach the largest number of constituencies has vastly increased the span of 
administrative supervision over the multitudes of relatively tiny development 
projects. In response, dust-level bureaucracies are turning to educated naye neta 
for on site, informal supervision of the implementation of these projects (Krishna: 
13-20).  
248 There are several reasons for this recent democratization of the fixer 
role. Young, especially male, lower caste individuals are gradually becoming 
educated and, hence, possessive of the skills needed for the kinds of work that 
new leaders are expected to undertake. Rural education has increased greatly in 
the last two decades after a lacklustre spread in the first thirty years after 
independence and untouchables, also in UP, have increasingly enrolled their 
children in formal education (Jeffrey et al. 2004: 965; Krishna: 8). Not only do low 
caste individuals increasingly acquire the literacy and bureaucratic competence 
needed to act as new leaders or dalaals, many also have plenty of time to do so. 
Probably to an even greater extent than upper caste high school and college 
matriculates, educated low caste individuals fail to find the hoped for salaried 
employment in the organised public or, failing this, private sector (estimatedly 
only about one in every twenty-four job seekers in India succeeds in obtaining a 
job in the organised sector). In UP, due to a World Bank-mandated annual cut of 
2 per cent in public sector employment introduced in 1991 and a generally 
sluggish growth of white-collar employment opportunities, the proportion of the 
educated unemployed is probably even bigger than in most other Indian states. 
Even competition for reserved government jobs –which long suffered a lack of 
qualified candidates- has markedly increased (Jeffrey et al. 2005: 8-9). With their 
general aversion to and disdain for manual labour and insignificant jobs, to the 
educated unemployed involvement in politics and dalaali constitutes one of very 
few fall-back, “respectful” and “proper” self-fulfilling and income-generating 
avenues (Jeffrey et al. 2004; Jeffrey et al. 2005). 
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well-established, educated, upper caste, village notable- “Mahendra 
Tripathis” joining the ranks of fixing new leaders, it is quite likely 
that in the near future poor and low caste clients will increasingly 
turn to such people, rather than to dust-level bureaucrats, to provide 
administrative access and policy benefits to them. 
 
 
3 Further barriers to ethnic claim making: dabang and disunity 
 
Even if many poor clients prefer using dalaals over directly dealing 
with bureaucrats, this does not mean that dalaali, also, does not 
have its price and drawbacks. Just like with voting, clients seeking 
benefits through dalaali also have to give something in return for 
the benefits they want or need. Dalaals, after all, do not spend their 
time and energy on spanning the gaps between government 
agencies and their focal clients out of friendship, pity or civic 
duty,249 at least not primarily. They usually want to be paid for their 
services; with money or some other share of the benefits they help 
procure. Employing dalaals thus almost invariably leaves clients 
with less than to which they are officially entitled. 
Besides, dalaals, just like politicians and bureaucrats, often 
have a bad reputation for cheating and manipulation. This 
reputation is probably not wholly undeserved. Dalaals, by 
definition, operate in an untransparent market in which the going 
rates for brokerage services are not fixed. In other words, the height 
of the commission dalaals can charge for their services depends 
directly on the degrees of ignorance and gullibility of their clients. 
Dalaals thus have every reason to manipulate the information they 
release to clients, exaggerate the difficulties involved in obtaining 
public benefits and “sell” benefits to villagers which the latter do not 
really want or need (Reddy and Haragopal 1985: 1161). Dalaals’ 
success critically depends on their ability to convey the impression 
to ordinary villagers that they alone have the requisite connections 
                                                
249 “They are mostly rough and ready types”, writes Manor, “who 
scarcely reflect on the meaning either of their role or of democratic 
government” (Manor 2000: 820). “They are mercenaries”, says Bailey, “without 
political principles or conviction” (Bailey 1963: 111-2). 
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and know-how to deal effectively with officialdom.250 The very term 
dalaal is far from flattering and, like the term neta, often carries the 
negative connotation of a morally dubious person who makes 
money by indulging in unhealthy and manipulative practices (cf. 
Reddy and Haragopal 1985: 1149, n. 3) (many fixers, in fact, engage 
in dalaali in the hope of a future political career251). Those who 
employ dalaals thus risk being cheated and may even end up poorer 
than they were. 
Still, many clients are prepared to deal with dalaals, rather than 
with bureaucrats, despite the drawbacks of doing so, because the 
returns on investment are often quite acceptable to them. In other 
words, many clients do not care about a little bit of cheating as long 
as their work gets done. Clients themselves, furthermore, take their 
precautions. Their deals with fixers often are, as Bailey has observed, 
devoid of any moral connotations. “Questions of right and wrong, of 
cheating and fair play, do not arise. The test is efficacy and all 
judgements are pragmatic: the measurement of success is profit and 
the relationship is not at all altruistic. The clients feel “beholden” . . . 
to the broker, but they do so in the sense that a man feels bound to 
someone from whom he expects to borrow money next week. If they 
can cheat the broker [. .] and not suffer from it, they cheat: and they 
expect to be cheated. Indeed, they would hardly think the word 
”cheating” appropriate, any more than a man who snares a partridge 
can be said to have cheated the partridge (Bailey 1970: 42).  
Also, many clients seem to assume, and perhaps justifiably so, 
that dalaals’ cheating may be less blatant and severe than the 
                                                
250 Such impression-management involves, among other things, the 
ostentatious display of intimacy with visiting officials and the rendering of 
“authoritative, if mystifying and unhelpful” lectures on administrative 
procedures to potential clients (Bailey 1970: 76-7;  cf. also Reddy and Haragopal 
1985: 1153).  
251 Needless to say that such hopes are not always fulfilled. The fixers 
and higher-level netas interviewed by James Manor estimated that “less than 
10%” of political fixers ever became legislators, that is MPs or MLAs (Manor 
2000: 819). As far as the UP context is concerned, 10 per cent seems to be an 
incredibly optimistic estimate. If the fixer density in Sitapur is roughly 
indicative of that of the rest of rural UP, I think even 1 per cent would be quite 
an unrealistic estimate. On the other hand, it is quite likely that in UP a fair 
proportion of dalaals find their way into local, panchayat, politics. 
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cheating by netas and officials. Many dalaals, after all, live in the 
villages where their clients reside; dalaals thus do not only live off 
their clients, they also live with them, a fact which may deter them 
somewhat from the extravagant kinds of cheating that netas and 
officials are generally believed to indulge in (Krishna: 17-8; Manor 
2000: 822). Looking back, the Chamars in Chitauni who had been 
cheated by VLO Ram Pal severely regretted they had not 
approached the local dalaal Ram Swarup to arrange the colonies for 
them. He probably would have given them a better deal and could 
certainly not have hoped to get away as easily with cheating as Ram 
Pal had. 252 
Clients’ preference for dalaali rather than for the direct 
approach of bureaucrats is thus partly explained by the relatively 
higher trust they have in dalaals. But there is also another reason 
why poor low caste clients do not tend to pressurize bureaucrats for 
benefits, let alone for the active representation of ingroup interests. 
By approaching bureaucrats directly, they often risk antagonizing 
whom they usually call the dabang. With dabang, ordinary villagers 
refer to whom the anthropologist M.N. Srinivas once described as 
“dominant castes”: those (usually higher) castes who, in a village or 
wider area, preponderate numerically over the other castes and also 
“wield preponderant economic and political power” (Srinivas 1955, 
discussed in Srinivas 1959: 1). In the Sitapur countryside, such single 
strong landowning dominant castes continue to be a central reality 
in rural village life (cf. Mendelsohn 1993: 806-7); they still wield 
considerable political and economic power over ordinary low caste 
and poor villagers. To maintain this power, dabang have 
                                                
252 Fixers, as James Manor has pointed out, would also seem to have no 
long term interest in raking off (or in helping maintain a system which rakes 
off) more than modest amounts from the benefits intended for their clients: 
“When a state government becomes decidedly corrupt, its net effect on fixers 
eventually becomes negative. It clearly creates opportunities for them to rake 
off substantial sums. But it also tends to undermine the orderly implementation 
of development policies and the predictable distribution of goods and services 
on which fixers mainly focus. When massive corruption sets in, the people who 
profit most are those at higher levels in the political system. Fixers lower down 
usually gain far too little to compensate for implementation process disruptions 
that undermine their effectiveness. They, therefore, tend not to welcome severe 
corruption” (Manor 2000: 821). 
6 Absent demand 247
increasingly come to rely on access to and control over public 
resources and benefits (rather than on their landed property). They 
thus have a strong interest (as well as the means) in preventing poor 
low caste villagers from establishing direct access to bureaucracy. 
Untouchable clients, on their part, continue to fear the might of the 
dabang and often lack the resources and, especially, the unity to 
defy dabang’ attempts at monopolization of access to public 
resources.  
 
Dabang dominance 
 
In large parts of rural UP, including Oudh and Sitapur, the highly 
ranked, “martial”, landowning caste of Thakurs has traditionally 
been particularly dominant. Thakur ascendancy in Oudh started as 
far back as the early thirteenth century when the present-day 
Thakurs’ forefathers migrated to this region from other areas in the 
wake of the consolidation of Muslim rule. They gradually came to 
control the bulk of the land. The region’s rulers, from the Mughals 
to the Nawabs and the British, came to depend heavily on the 
Thakur zamindars and taluqdars for the maintenance of order and, 
most importantly, the collection of revenues. The Thakurs, not so 
much a homogenous caste as well as a collection of dozens of 
mutually hostile “clans” (none of which ever succeeded in claiming 
distinct territories), also became very dominant in Sitapur (Metcalf 
1979; Nevill 1923). Thakurs have not been the only dominant castes 
in the district, however. In some pockets, prominent Muslim 
families and Brahmins, particularly, have also played the part.253  
                                                
253 The high ritual ranking of most dominant castes in UP contrasts with 
the situation in much of south India and Maharastra, where dominant 
landowning groups have traditionally been drawn from castes much lower in 
the ritual hierarchy, often from jatis in the shudra varna (Drèze and Gazdar 
1996: 103). Also in contrast to south India, dominant castes in UP have not 
tended to preponderate numerically. The Thakurs account for only four per 
cent of Sitapur’s population, for instance (Nevill 1923: 54). In UP as a whole, 
Thakurs, Brahmins, Jats, Bhumihars and Tyagis –the most important dominant 
castes in the state- together account for just 18.5 per cent of the state’s 
population. Also within the villages, UP’s dominant castes seldom constitute 
numerical majorities. In an average village of 150 to 300 households there may 
be as many as fifteen to twenty-five castes represented in its population 
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Despite the legal abolition of zamindari in the early 1950s -
which stripped landlords of much of their lands and allowed 
erstwhile tenants to become owners of the plots they cultivated- and 
the concomitant erosion of rural jajmani (patron-client) relations, the 
dominance of single strong upper caste landowning jatis or families 
in quite a few fieldwork villages –among them Chandraseni, 
Thaura, Majhiya, Rikhauna and Arro Khamajatpur- has continued 
seemingly unabated to this day. In these villages one or a few 
powerful upper caste Thakur, Muslim or Brahmin families still 
control most of the land and local political offices and are the main 
suppliers of local wage labour opportunities.  
The Rathor Thakurs of Chandraseni, for instance, still own 
most of the land in the village (estimates range from 300 to 1000 
bighas).254 The zamindari abolition of half a century ago did not 
affect them too much because, as pater familias Lallu Singh Thakur 
explained, they managed to save all of their land by dividing it up 
and having it registered in the names of family members and 
servants.255 If there had been a downside to zamindari abolition for 
the Thakurs it had been that they could no longer rely on tenants or 
lessees to work their lands and generate their income; the Thakurs, 
used to a life of idle landlordism of “sitting around and eat”, were 
now forced to start cultivating their lands themselves (or, at least, 
                                                                                                                                          
(Ahmad and Saxena 1994: 174). In Sitapur, the numerically strongest castes are 
not the dominant castes but the untouchable jatis of Chamars and Pasis. 
254 Rathor is the clan name. According to Lallu Singh Thakur, my main 
Thakur informant in the village, the Rathor clan ranks “6th or 7th” in the hierarchy 
of “basically 36 Thakur clans”. 
255 Many zamindars, putting their extra-legal powers over the revenue 
bureaucracy to good use, employed this strategy at the time. The corrupt 
reputation of patwaris –on whose complicity zamindars relied for tampering 
with the accounts and land titles- among rural folk in large measure dates back 
to the time of zamindari abolition. “One cannot go to a Uttar Pradesh village 
today”, write Ahmad and Saxena, “without hearing from ryots [farmers, bvg] 
about land over which they should have sirdari [ownership, bvg] rights but 
which went to the former landlord as bhumihari land [land for self-cultivation], 
courtesy of the Patwari” (Ahmad and Saxena 1994: 185). Zamindari politics and 
manipulative attempts to thwart ceiling legislation receive beautiful treatment 
in Vikram Seth’s monumental novel A Suitable Boy, set partly in the countryside 
of eastern UP.  
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actively supervising their cultivation by locally hired labourers) 
which had been “taboo” until then.256 
Like many other Thakur zamindars, the Chandraseni Thakurs 
have sought to counterbalance the “shame” and loss of income and 
social status accompanying the forced shift from landlordism to 
cultivation by branching out into other economic pursuits. In 
another breach with tradition, they started educating their sons, 
who have gradually found their way into modern sectors of the 
economy, especially bureaucracy.257 Lallu’s eldest son, for instance, 
now works as an engineer in the Public Works Department, his 
                                                
256 Abolition legislation prohibited zamindars to lease out their 
agricultural land to tenants. It did permit them, however, to keep in their 
private possession all so-called sir and khudkasht (personally supervised or 
“home farm”) land and all groves. Like the Chandraseni Thakurs, many 
zamindars exploited this loophole by shifting their cultivated lands into mango 
groves and converting their tenant holdings to sir cultivated by hired labour 
before the legislation came into effect (Metcalf 1967: 12-3). 
257 For the Chandraseni Thakurs, the pursuit of higher education and 
service jobs had initially been far from self-evident. “In those days”, explained 
Lallu Singh, “it was not customary for a Thakur’s son to be educated. People 
would say ‘what is the use of it? You want to become a babu?’”. Anti-education 
sentiments, in fact, were quite common among Thakur zamindars, as a result of 
which “their representation at the middle and top levels of administration 
continued to be low till about 1965” (Ahmad and Saxena 1994: 187). Nowadays, 
Thakurs are well represented in bureaucracy, also in the highest echelons. In 
1999, 51 out of 541 of UP IAS officers were Thakurs. The extent to which 
dominant castes have increasingly been branching out into non-agricultural 
employment is also well illustrated by Jens Lerche’s fieldwork in two UP 
villages, the one situated in the western Muzaffarnagar district, the other in 
eastern Jaunpur district. In the Muzaffarnagar village the proportion of Jat (the 
dominant landowning group of the village, bvg) households who had one or 
more members employed as government servants or in business rose from two-
thirds in 1992-3 to “around three-quarters” in 1998. In the Jaunpur village, 
dominant Thakur households’ shift away from agriculture was even more 
pronounced. Whereas in 1992-3, 90 per cent of the Thakur households had 
members employed as government servants or in business, by 1998 all Thakur 
households had members in public service or business (Lerche 1999: 187, 227 
note 11, 228 n. 14). Jeffrey’s recent study of Jats in western Meerut district 
documents similar trends (Jeffrey and Lerche 2001: 96-97). Though my own 
evidence is much more sketchy, it is perhaps telling enough that I did not hear 
of any traditionally dominant family in my fieldwork area which did not have 
sons in government service, whether as teachers, postal officials, revenue or 
police officers.  
6 Absent demand 250
younger sons are lawyers. Again like many other ex-zamindars, the 
Chandraseni Thakurs have become actively involved in party and 
local politics. Apart from acting as the village’s pradhan for more 
than four decades after independence (he had to give up his 
pradhani due to reservations), Lallu has been a locally influential 
member of the Congress (his mansion still boasts a hoisted Congress 
flag). The new pradhan, the Pasi Kanhai Lal, is still firmly under the 
Thakurs’ control.258 Hence, with their considerable landholdings, 
control over the village agricultural labour market, extensive 
political networks and influence in and over local bureaucracy (as 
well as access to the patronage invested in it), old proprietary 
families and castes like the Chandraseni Thakurs often still carry a 
great deal of authority in Sitapur, as they do in other areas of UP 
and especially in Oudh.259  
                                                
258 UP’s landlords have traditionally been very active in state and local 
politics. Throughout the so-called dyarchy period of shared colonial-native rule 
in the 1920s and 1930s, UP’s legislature as well as, for most of the time, its 
executive was dominated by landlords (making UP the only major Indian 
province where landlords were so pre-eminent) (Low 1968: 8). After 
independence, all major political parties, with an eye to reaping political 
advantage from their traditional local influence and large purses, eagerly 
sought the landlords’ allegiance. In the first three UP assemblies, about thirty 
per cent of the MLAs came from zamindari or taluqdari families. Though they 
could be found in all political parties, UP’s landlords were especially dominant 
in the right-wing Jan Sangh and Swatantra (Ahmad and Saxena 1994: 195; 
Metcalf 1967: 13-4). Until as recently as the mid-1980s, the “Thakur-lobby” in 
the Congress, consisting of more than 100 MLAs, was a major force in UP 
politics; its leader, Vir Bahadur Singh, was chief minister from 1985-1988 (Stone 
1988: 1020). Landlords have also been actively involved in local level politics. 
Especially in Oudh and eastern UP they have been quite successful in 
contesting indirect block pramukh elections, where money power is important. 
Even today, after the demise of Congress, Thakur MLAs still occasionally act en 
bloc across party boundaries to protect their landed interests. As Lallu Singh 
pointed out to me, Thakurs of all major parties had recently succeeded in 
blocking chief minister Mayawati’s proposal to reduce the official “land ceiling” 
from 18 to 12 acres. 
259 Some of UP’s most influential landlord politicians have come from 
Sitapur. Amar Rizvi, belonging to the family of the erstwhile Muslim Raja of 
Mahmoodabad, is perhaps the most prominent among them. Rizvi, once very 
close to the late Sanjay Gandhi, served as MLA, MP, and, repeatedly, as state 
and central cabinet minister (even holding the “wet” PWD portfolio for some 
time). 
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The dabang tend to be treated with a mixture of respect and 
fear by poor low caste villagers. The latter usually know better than 
to antagonize the dabang if only because many, especially the 
(virtually) landless and those with high debts, still depend on them 
for regular employment, wage labour or sharecrop land. “Still there 
are people”, as Chamars in Chamaranpurva (Thaura) pointed out, 
“who own no land and take land on batai: they are totally dependent 
upon the higher castes and are still under the same pressure as 
before. If they are told to do some work, they cannot avoid doing it, 
even if they are not paid for it”. “There are quite a few people here”, 
explained some labourers in Mahuwapurva, “who are heavily 
indebted to large landowners. These people have no other choice 
than to work for the dominants, even if they get only Rs. 20 for a 
day’s work”. In Chandraseni, “approximately 10 people”, Chamars 
and Pasis, are permanently employed by the Thakur’s family. 
Though their wages are low (300 to 400 rupees per month) these 
untouchable employees get free meals and are not made to perform 
begar. In Majhiya, Thaura and Rikhauna, also, dominant landowners 
continue to employ farm servants against comparably low wages. 
Because regular employment is extremely scarce, finding 
employment outside the village requires investments (such as 
travelling and lodging expenses) which not all labourers can cough 
up and because the price of land is prohibitively expensive (the 
price for a bigha is around Rs. 15,000), those who depend on local 
labour opportunities are generally anxious to keep in the good 
books of the dabang.  
But land possession and control over labour opportunities are 
no longer the most important bases for dabang’s local dominance 
over poor low castes. Though the numbers of those who remain 
economically tied to the dabang’s lands and their villages remain 
substantial, especially among low caste villagers, the numbers of 
those who continue to rely solely or even primarily on income from 
dabang –either from regular or wage labour or from sharecropping- 
are getting smaller and smaller. Whereas in Chandraseni ten people 
find regular, whole year round employment with “the Thakur”, in 
Majhiya, Thaura and Rikhauna less than a handful villagers 
continue to be likewise employed by the village’s dominant families 
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or jatis. And although in all villages there remain many 
householders whose own landholdings are far too insignificant to 
sustain their families, many no longer solely depend on wage labour 
opportunities proffered by village landowners. 260  
In fact, almost all people with marginal landholdings leave 
their villages, sometimes quasi-permanently, to work in nearby (and 
sometimes far away) towns and brickfields. Half the working 
population of hamlet Chitauni, for instance, goes to Lucknow, 
Sidhauli, Biswan and Sitapur for mazduri while almost all the adult 
men from nearby Pasinpurva, part of the same village, had left the 
hamlet to work in brick kilns in Gonda district at the time of my 
fieldwork. The wages these villagers can earn as construction 
workers, rikshawallahs, or brick makers are one and a half to five 
times as high as those offered by local landowners for agricultural 
wage labour.261 Many villagers, indeed, are no longer much inclined 
to work for the local landlord. “Now the dabang have to beg us to 
work for them”, claimed agricultural labourers in several villages.262  
                                                
260 All fieldwork villages contained sizeable segments of people, 
especially among the low artisan castes and the untouchables, who own little 
more than dwarf holdings (loosely defined as plots of 4 bighas and less) and 
who therefore must rely on wage labour (mazduri) for additional cash income. 
In Majhiya, village informants estimated the proportion of villagers owning 
anything between 2 and 5 bighas at 50 to 60 per cent. In Rahika about 30 
families, or 25 per cent of the hamlet’s population, were said to own less than 4 
bighas. In Akbarpur, no Pasi had more than 4 bighas: “Most of us own around 
2”. In Amaura, around 15 per cent of the villagers owned between 0 and 4 
bighas.  
261 In the fieldwork area, daily wages for agricultural labour varied 
between Rs. 20 and Rs. 30, with the median wage rate at Rs. 25. Depending on 
the employer, agricultural labourers are also provided meals, sharbat and bidis. 
Those who manage to find work as construction workers in towns can earn Rs. 
50 to 60 rupees, while rikshawallas sometimes earn more than Rs. 100 per day. 
Work in the brick fields is hardly more lucrative than wage labour, however. I 
was told that the standard rate paid to brick workers is Rs. 20 per 1000 bricks. 
As labourers cannot ordinarily expect to turn out more than 1.500 bricks a day, 
this puts the maximum wage to be earned in the brick fields at Rs. 30. 
262 Another reason why village labourers are less and less inclined to 
work for local landlords is that the latter are becoming less and less prepared to 
pay daily wages. Some only “give work” on contract basis, that is, they pay a 
fixed amount to a group of labourers for a pre-arranged amount of work. 
Labourers generally regard contract work as a worse deal than wage labour 
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The traditional connection between land and authority is 
further weakened by the current practice among dominant families 
to divide their estates among the family’s sons on the retirement or 
death of their fathers, leaving these heirs with ever smaller and 
economically less viable plots. In some fieldwork villages, the lands 
of sons of erstwhile dominant families are now no bigger than those 
of well to do middle caste Kurmi and Yadav peasants. After the 
division of Thakur Suraj Baksh 150 bigha estate in village Amaura 
Moti Singh, for instance, his four sons have each been left with as 
little as 40 bighas. Landholdings of this size are simply too small to 
serve as a basis for creating labour dependencies among and 
economic dominance over sizeable numbers of villagers. Owners of 
such middling plots in fact often have little choice but to work the 
land themselves, leaving only the remainder to be cultivated by 
sharecroppers or wage labourers. 
With land and authority becoming more and more delinked, 
the dabang in Sitapur, as in most of rural India, have increasingly 
come to rely on their influence over the local state to augment their 
incomes and to protect and retain what is left of their dominance. 
Through their political and public service networks dabang often 
have privileged access to and control over development patronage. 
Poor villagers seeking public benefits -be they subsidies, loans, 
pensions, wells or road connections- thus often continue to depend 
on the benevolence of local dabang. “Whatever benefits reach our 
village”, explained a Chamar in Chitauni, “first reach the dabang”.  
An equally important resource in the maintenance of local 
dominance are dabang’s pahunch to and influence over the police. 
Apart from on their economic preponderance, dabang’s local 
dominance has traditionally been vested on their willingness and 
capability to enforce small people’s respect and compliance by way 
of intimidation and, if need be, physical violence. “Rule in the 
                                                                                                                                          
since it denies them the opportunity to earn more money by working slower. 
Some labourers also said they preferred working for Kurmi landowners rather 
than for the traditional upper caste landlords because Kurmis pay better and 
take better care of their labourers. “In Kurmi areas”, claimed Chamars in 
Fatehpur, “labourers receive juice (sharbat) and a meal, but not here [where the 
dominant landowner is a Brahmin, bvg]. Because Kurmis believe that people 
work better if they eat well”.  
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countryside”, as Paul Brass has aptly observed, “is not based on 
abstractions but on control over resources and safety. It is a 
Hobbesian world, in which security and safety are not provided by 
the state, but are themselves values -that is, valued objects- integral 
to and inseparable from the struggle for power and influence (Brass 
1997: 92-3). Sitapuri villagers, indeed, never tired of impressing 
upon me how dangerous and violent the dabang can be, how they 
“fear the bullets of Thakurs” and how those who do not “accept” or 
“do as dabang say” can expect to “eat shoes” (i.e., be beaten), or 
worse. 
In meeting out such punitive violence dabang can often count 
on the silent or apathetic complicity of the local police or, at times, 
their active cooperation. A Pasi in Mahuwapurva told us about his 
problems in bringing a plot of free village land (which had been 
allotted to him by the local authorities) under his own cultivation. A 
member of one of the village’s dominant families had occupied the 
plot and bluntly refused to relinquish it, threatening that he’d “slice 
up anyone who dares plough my land”. Though the Pasi had 
approached the police (as well as the revenue administration) to 
intervene in the matter, they had not so far taken any steps. “The 
police fear the dabang, that’s why they don’t come”, the Pasi 
explained. Dabang and police may also cooperate more actively in 
keeping small people in their proper place. In Fatehpur, two 
Chamar brothers –Gopilal and Khagesur- had ended up in jail after 
accusing their employer –the dominant Brahmin bhel-owner Vinod 
Pandey- of kidnapping and selling Gopilal’s wife and two children 
to the households of friends of his. When Pandey found out that 
Gopilal and Khagesur had been bold enough to try and lodge a FIR 
against him, he had immediately struck back: he fired the two 
brothers, bribed the police into lodging a string of fabricated FIR’s 
against them, and thus managed to have the Chamar brothers put 
behind bars for months. “The pandits can no longer beat us 
themselves because of the Dalit Act”, explained one of Gopilal’s and 
Khagesur’s co-villagers, “so they do it through the police”.  
For poor and pahunch-lacking villagers like Gopilal and 
Khagesur there is often little they can do about dabang enforcing 
their dominance with the consent of, or through, the police. As the 
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police typically ask for a Rs. 2000 to Rs. 2500 bribe for lodging an 
FIR, poor villagers usually simply lack the money required for 
inducing the police to take any steps at all. Besides, there is always 
the risk of ending up in jail oneself on the basis of fabricated counter 
charges. In such cases, the police usually make matters worse by 
asking the “culprits” to pay a hefty “fine” for their release. Whereas, 
for the dabang, the local state often acts as an ally in times of conflict 
and opposition, to small people it represents a particularly well-
organized robber band (dacoit), acting hand-in-glove with the 
dabang and primarily intent on making some money out of their 
misery and keeping the locally dominant happy. As the Chamars of 
Fatehpur put it: “The police are with the upper castes and they 
commit atrocities (atyacar). The police or any other officer (sahab) go 
where the money is. Only if you have money, they will hear you”.263 
The past decade or so, the dabang have become ever more 
determined to cling to their privileged access to the local state and to 
prevent subordinate rural groups from building up and cultivating 
their own administrative channels. The reason is that now, after 
land possession has gradually ceased to be a determining base for 
local dominance, they acutely sense that also their grip and hold 
over the local state (and, hence, local society) is slipping. Firstly, the 
national government’s extension of reservations of public sector jobs 
to OBCs in 1991, soon followed by the introduction of reserved seats 
for OBCs and SCs in the political councils of the revamped 
panchayati raj in 1993, are quickly forcing the dabang out of 
precisely those positions they have relied on to cement their local 
dominance.264 As Lallu Singh Thakur put it: “Now the son of big 
                                                
263 The police’s inclination to keep on the good side of the locally 
dominant, their agility in making good money in doing so, as well as the almost 
complete lack of trust of subordinate rural groups in the police’s willingness 
and capacity to right wrongs perpetrated against them have also been 
documented by other observers of rural life and politics in UP. For an astute 
analysis of the (mostly political) reasons for the lack of police accountability and 
impartiality vis-à-vis all rural sections and for the difficulties involved in 
instituting central control over rural police forces, see Paul Brass’ Theft of an Idol, 
especially pp. 274-9 (Brass 1997).  
264 The introduction of 27 per cent of public sector jobs for OBCs has not 
only significantly decreased the number and proportion of jobs available for 
“general” individuals, it has also pushed up the prices of whatever posts are still 
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people like Jagjivan Ram and Ram Vilas Paswan [prominent 
untouchable politicians, bvg] will become IAS, not my sons”.  
Secondly, there is the central and state governments’ 
increasingly forceful redistributive policy focus on the special 
assistance of subordinate sections. Since the BSP first came to power 
in 1995 the UP government, especially, has pushed through a string 
of measures and policies that create new benefits for dalits and, 
often, take benefits away from dabang and other upper castes. The 
first Mayawati government, for instance, introduced scholarships 
for untouchable children up to high school; financial assistance to 
untouchable families during sickness, marriage and other 
contingencies; a fourfold increase in the IAY target (IAY, by design, 
primarily benefits untouchables); preferential treatment of 
untouchable farmers in cane supply to sugar mills, and the 
nomination of untouchable farmers to cooperative sugarcane 
committees. Besides, both in 1995 and in 1997, the BSP government 
distributed land to thousands of landless dalit families,265 gave an 
extra impetus to the Ambedkar Village program and stepped up, as 
we have seen, the implementation of the Dalit Act. In order to 
ensure the sympathetic implementation of these pro-dalit measures 
respective BSP governments have replaced considerable numbers of 
                                                                                                                                          
left for them. In UP there is, literally, a market for government jobs in that job 
aspirants are expected to pay substantial amounts to recruiting bodies such as 
the SSC (Staff Selection Commission) at central level and the UP PSC (Public 
Service Commission) at the state level, as well as to individual officials or 
brokers assisting them throughout the recruitment process (Jeffrey and Lerche 
2001: 97-8). Jeffrey’s Jat informants in western Meerut district maintained that 
would-be police constables are expected to cough up between Rs 40,000 and 
75,000, army sepoys between Rs 30,000 to 50,000, bus conductors between Rs 
20,000 and to 60,000, and low-ranking clerks between Rs 40,000 to 70,000 and 
that prices had risen as a result of the national extension of OBC reservations in 
1991 (ibid.). Similar statements about the effect of OBC reservations on job’s 
prices were made by several of my dabang informants in Sitapur.  
265 According to Sudha Pai, the two BSP governments, under “special 
drives”, granted ownership of 52,379 acres of land to 81,500 dalits. 158,000 
dalits were given actual possession of lands which had earlier been officially 
granted to them, while a further 20,000 dalits received about 15,000 acres of 
gaon sabha (village) land. Besides, Mayawati’s governments withdrew all cases 
of illegal occupation of such land against dalits and granted ownership 
(bhumidhari) rights to all tenants of more than 10 years standing (Pai 2004: 1145).  
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upper caste development and police officials at state and district 
levels by untouchable ones and set up special monitoring agencies 
(such as the AVP department) (Pai 2004: 1145). 
Dabang and other upper castes strongly resent and oppose 
these new “pampering” initiatives, in part because they consider 
them unjust, in part because they perceive them (even if they hate to 
admit it) as the unmistakeable signs of a new state of affairs in 
which they, as the traditional dominants, can no longer avoid 
making way for the formerly dominated in the rule of the 
countryside. But until that time has come the dabang seem firmly 
resigned to quell and resist the ascendance of “unmeritorious” and 
increasingly “cheeky”, “haughty”, “respectless” and “lazy” 
untouchables and other low caste groups with all the considerable 
strength they can still muster.  
Many poor low caste villagers related how village dabang 
would try and keep them away from seeking public benefits and 
police protection by way of threats and intimidation and by actively 
preventing government officials from having face-to-face 
conversations with them or from visiting their hamlets. “Whenever 
an officer tries to come to our purva”, pointed out the Chamars of 
Chamaranpurva (Thaura), “he is kept away by the dabang on some 
pretext: ‘Why would you go there?’, they say, ‘there is nothing 
there.’” As if to prove their point, just when the Chamars were 
explaining the mechanics of dabang sabotage of official-client 
contact to me, a local Thakur came up to us and suspiciously 
enquired as to what our work was all about. Apparently taking us 
for touring officials he wanted our names and institutions (“in case 
any trouble will arise”) and made it clearly understood he had 
rather see us leave. “Whenever people like you come to a village like 
ours”, he said, “they are given money and then they go back”. 
 
Untouchable disunity 
 
In theory, untouchables might counter dabang’s efforts at 
monopolization of access to bureaucracy by engaging in collective 
action and mounting organized pressure on local bureaucracies. 
After all, aggressive, articulate and organized clients often have a 
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much better chance of impacting bureaucratic decisionmaking and 
of gaining access to organizational hierarchies than unorganized 
and apathetic ones (Tripi 1984: 40). In Sitapuri dust-level practice, 
however, untouchable villagers often lack the necessary courage, 
power and resources for such endeavours. Another important 
reason for rural untouchables’ disinclination towards collective 
action is that they possess little cohesiveness. The untouchables are a 
category rather than a group, in that they -despite decades of 
categorical treatment by the Indian state- continue to be divided 
along jati lines. Their “lack of unity”, as they themselves call it, often 
prevents rural untouchables from converting their large numbers 
into an effective, organized force and, hence, from bypassing 
dabang’s administrative access and directly claiming the public 
benefits to which they are entitled. 
Despite the fact that, over the past few decades, untouchables 
in Sitapur and elsewhere have become more autonomous, more free 
to pursue their own interests, and less dependent on local big 
people, and despite decades of special government treatment, their 
recent electoral mobilization by an ethnic, dalit party of their own 
and a quick succession of BSP controlled state governments, for the 
large majority of Sitapur’s rural untouchables life does not seem to 
have changed that much. True, many among them have managed to 
take advantage of state-provided benefits and, through this, to 
improve their social status and life chances, if only marginally. But 
to all but a tiny few, life is still what it has always been: a struggle 
for survival. Most untouchables continue to be extremely poor and 
many are still starving. The things that would matter most to rural 
untouchables in the short or long term –affordable and adequate 
health care and primary education, access to land, employment 
opportunities in the organized sector, police protection- are still 
largely absent or out of reach. 
What is more, despite the ongoing changes in rural society and 
continuing preferential state treatment, most of the Sitapuri 
untouchables I met were quite pessimistic about what the future 
might hold in store for them. Many expected their children to be 
leading the same kinds of lives that they were leading or feared that 
they might even be worse off, given the rapidly increasing scarcity 
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of land. Untouchable and low caste villagers in Nawab purva, for 
instance, appeared to be quite sure as to what direction the future 
was headed. “Things will keep on changing for the worse”, they felt, 
“poverty will increase, the population will increase, and the five 
sons of those who have eighteen bighas now will be left with only 
three and a half”. The Chamars in Chitauni felt exactly the same. 
“As things stand now”, they said, “the rich will get richer and the 
poor only poorer”.  
Even if, by their own accounts, their future looked bleak and 
grim, few untouchables seemed to feel called upon to do something 
drastic about it. Many, of course, were involved in efforts to get 
redress for grievances and instances of unjust treatment by powerful 
dabang, corrupt politicians and unresponsive officials. Indeed, 
throughout this and the previous chapter I have made quite a few 
references to such efforts. But what most of these have in common is 
that they are almost always relatively small-time attempts, directed 
at seeking redress for specific, often personal grievances or injustices, 
and typically involve not more than a few, usually geographically 
concentrated, untouchable individuals, often from the same hamlet or 
ward; a far cry from the large scale, ideologically inspired, 
organized protest and collective action which recent scholarly 
claims of dalit “movement” and democratic “upsurge” would lead 
one to expect (cf. e.g. Pai 2000; Yadav 2000). I was particularly struck 
by Sitapuri untouchables’ almost complete ignorance of (and 
disinterest in) the exploits and writings of their former leader Dr. 
B.R. Ambedkar, given the fervour with which the untouchable party 
BSP has drawn upon his life and ideas to construct its ideology of 
dalit empowerment and given the fact that statues of Ambedkar can 
now be found in almost every village and hamlet in the UP 
countryside as a result of BSP governments’ proselytizing efforts.266 
“We have heard his name”, as the Chamars in Chamaranpurva 
(Thaura) phrased a common reply, “and you can find statues of his 
everywhere. But we cannot tell anything more about him”.267 
                                                
266 During its short-lived rule in 1997 alone, the BSP government installed 
15,000 Ambedkar statues all over Uttar Pradesh (Pai 2004: 1146). 
267 I encountered one, exceptional, example of Ambedkarite penetration, 
in Arro Khamajatpur’s Chamarbasti. One of its inhabitants, Mangu Lal, is 
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Upon closer look, reasons for the virtual absence of 
untouchable collective action and open defiance of dabang 
dominance are not hard to find. As students of collective action and 
protest know all too well, collectivities such as India’s rural 
untouchables “will not organize for coordinated action merely 
because, as a group, they have reason for doing so” (Olson 1973: 65). 
Those with an interest in the outcomes of successful collective action 
may still refrain from instigating or participating in it; because they 
count on others to do it for them, because they feel that the expected 
or hoped for outcomes will not outstrip the disadvantages of 
participating, or because they deem successful collective action 
impossible anyway, whether due to a (perceived) dearth of 
necessary resources on their part or to an overabundance of 
resources at the disposal of their targets. They may also simply have 
become cynical from past failures (Klandermans 1997; Olson 1973; 
Scott 1990; Tarrow 1998; Zald and McCarthy 1979).  
With the exception, perhaps, of the first (“free-rider”) 
explanation, all of the above explanations also apply to rural 
untouchables. Firstly, untouchables, as noted above, commonly fear 
the reprisal or violent retaliation of dabang if they were to assert 
themselves too openly and defiantly. They are well aware that “our 
rights are only on paper and not in hand” and that “kanun has not 
arrived” but are usually too afraid of taking their fate into their own 
hands. From untouchables’ point of view, it not only takes a 
pressing cause but also, and especially, a lot of courage to stand up 
against local dominant groups; the kind of courage and disregard of 
painful consequences that only few possess. “If any person raises a 
                                                                                                                                          
member of a troupe which performs dance (natak) and drama on Ambedkar’s 
life. He entertained us a whole afternoon with stories of Ambedkar’s 
memorable exploits, including his stays in “foreign”, his famous attempt to 
open up a pond in Nagpur to members of all castes, his role as drafter of the 
constitution and his conversion to Buddhism at the end of his life. 
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voice”, knew an untouchable informant in Ahmedabad, “it will be 
suppressed by the dabang”.268 
Secondly, untouchables typically lack the external support that 
extremely deprived groups like them usually need to be able to 
translate their grievances into effective and organised collective 
action (Zald and McCarthy 1979: 2). Unlike in Western political 
societies, where well-organized and institutionalised pressure 
groups and lobbies articulate group interests, put pressure on the 
political and administrative system and take up the causes of so far 
unorganised constituencies, on the Indian dust-level such groups 
hardly exist. Though politicians abound on the UP dust-level, 
political parties, for instance, as organizations which may draw on the 
financial resources and expertise of its functionaries to identify 
constituents’ problems and aggregate their demands, scarcely exist. 
Political parties, as several scholars have observed, have hardly any 
presence below the district and, in as far as they do exist at the 
district-level, tend to be bare-boned, thinly staffed, barely financed 
and poorly led outfits (Kohli 1991; Krishna: 20;  cf. also Manor 2000; 
Reddy and Haragopal 1985).  
Though non-governmental development and welfare 
organizations do have a presence in rural areas, also in Sitapur, its 
functionaries do not seem to be very much inclined to meddle into 
low caste politics, dependent as they are for their survival and 
operations on state subsidies and cordial relations with local 
officialdom. Discounting the fledgling Biswan unit of the BSP, there 
were, as far as I am aware, no explicitly dalit grass-roots 
organizations active in my fieldwork area that might help galvanize 
untouchable collective action, pressurize local untouchable officials 
into active representation and “mute the impact of those forces 
which work against the linkage” (Thompson 1976: 214).269 Largely 
                                                
268 A virtually similar point is made by Dipankar Gupta. “In rural India”, 
he writes, “it is still very difficult for poor SCs or STs to politically form 
independent blocs without arousing the wrath of the more affluent 
communities. For this reason the political ambitions of the SCs rarely get off the 
ground” (Gupta 1999: 281).  
269 Whatever dalit organizations exist in UP and the rest of India often 
seem to be aimed at safeguarding and promoting the interests of relatively 
better-off dalit segments. In fact, the best known and probably most prevalent 
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left to their own devices, then, rural Sitapuri untouchables are 
usually simply too afraid, poor and unresourceful to act and agitate 
en bloc, mount collective pressure on dabang and public authorities 
and claim their rightful dues.  
But there is still another important reason why untouchables 
so seldom organize for coordinated action. This reason is their lack 
of cohesiveness as a group or, as untouchables themselves tend to 
call it, their lack of “unity” (ektaa). Within their villages (as well as 
on the Sitapuri dust-level more generally) the various untouchable 
jatis remain firmly divided in significant respects. Interdining of 
different untouchable jatis, for instance, is still very uncommon. The 
Chamars of Chamaranpurva (Thaura) said they could eat “with all 
castes located above us” but not with “Dhobis, Mehtars, Kathik, 
Pasis and Chamars involved in removing dead cattle and 
midwifery”. They considered themselves “the very highest” (sab se 
uparwala) among the untouchables and, as such, could not be 
expected to eat with members of dirty and low jatis (or jati-
subsections) felt to be ranked below them. Likewise, the Chamars of 
nearby Chitauni, were abhorred by the idea of sharing food with 
certain other untouchable castes. “You can cut off my head”, one of 
them claimed, “but I will not take food from Mehtar and Dhobi. 
They are the lowest of the low (sab se niche)”. Though, in Sitapur, the 
castes with whom one can eat and with whom one cannot eat differ 
from place to place, even from hamlet to hamlet within the same 
village, what remains is the fact that, for any untouchable, there are 
always other untouchable jatis or jati-subsections with the members 
of which one cannot interdine. 
                                                                                                                                          
examples of dalit organization are the unions of untouchable public servants 
such as (the various and rival chapters of) BAMCEF (the forerunner of the BSP) 
and the All-India Federation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
Employees. Out of the 100 “Dalit Organisations” listed by the Indian Social 
Institute in New Delhi, 21 are run by and act for untouchable (and tribal) 
government employees: bank employees, teachers, engineers etc (Indian Social 
Institute 1994). Dalit organisations, moreover, seem to be largely active in the 
cities and larger towns. According to Robert Bates, these organizational patterns 
are quite typical for disadvantaged ethnic groups anywhere. Ethnic groups, he 
argues, are often organised in towns by “modern” elite members of 
disadvantaged communities because it is such elites who suffer the most from 
the discrimination involved in belonging to a low status group (Bates 2002: 17).  
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Untouchable jatis also do not intermarry. In every village 
where I brought up the issue, villagers were adamant that inter-jati 
marriages were out of the question. I would invariably be told that 
“a Pasi cannot marry a Chamar” or some other version of the same 
definitive statement. When asked why, I was usually simply told 
that “this is not possible in the villages”. Most untouchables could 
not envisage that inter caste marriages might start taking place some 
time in the near future. “We know that these things are going on in 
cities but they will not happen here”, asserted the Pasis in 
Chandraseni’s Pasinpurva, “not even in twenty years time”. The 
continuing rigid separation of untouchables in social life also 
regularly spills over into electoral politics. In quite a few fieldwork 
villages, the Pasis claimed to vote for a party other than the BSP 
because they considered it a “Chamar party”. In Padariya, for 
instance, the Chamar vote went en bloc to the BSP but the Pasis 
supported the Congress. BSP politicians in Sitapur confessed that 
while Chamars’ support for the party was almost total, that of the 
Pasis still had to be worked on.  
The strong division and separation of different untouchable 
jatis in social and political life is not something peculiar to Sitapur. 
On the contrary, it is a well-documented fact of untouchable life in 
much of rural India. Also elsewhere, untouchable jatis are ranked 
(or rank themselves) in local caste hierarchies, practice 
untouchability among themselves, decline to interdine, refrain from 
inter caste marriages and are often very particular about avoiding 
contact with each other (Deliège 1999: 6; Isaacs 1965: 29-30; Judge 
2003: 2990, 2991; Roy and Singh 1987: 110-1).270 Elsewhere, different 
untouchable jatis, both historically and today, also often unite under 
separate political banners and vote for different parties. Past 
attempts at uniting various untouchable jatis seem to have 
                                                
270 Though perhaps most pronounced among different jatis, ranking and 
separation may also occur within one and the same jati. The untouchable jati of 
Paraiyars studied by Michael Moffatt, for instance, consisted of three, 
hierarchically structured endogamous “groups” called vagaiyaras (Moffatt 1979). 
In Sitapur, the Chamars in Ghaila distinguished between purvia (eastern) 
Chamars and pachawan (western) Chamars. The latter, also called harha 
Chamars, were said to be ranked below the former due to their traditional 
involvement in removing and processing dead cattle. 
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invariably failed, a tendency replicated in many parts of 
contemporary UP where large numbers of Khatiks, Balmiki and Pasi 
voters have supported other parties than the BSP in an effort to 
distinguish themselves from the Chamars (Jaffrelot 1998: 50; 
Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 225).271 The perceived tendency of 
certain untouchable jatis to appropriate the lion’s share of reserved 
public benefits often drives different untouchable castes even 
further apart (cf. e.g. Roy and Singh 1987: 110-1). 
The untouchables in Sitapur and the rest of rural India, despite 
receiving similar degrading historical treatment by clean castes and 
the purported community of interests provided by recent legislation 
and preferential policies, thus remain quite fragmented and “split 
into a myriad of widely dispersed castes” (Deliège 1999: 11). They 
are still a category rather than a cohesive group, community or 
society (Joshi 1980: 197) and, taken together, possess few if any 
distinctive characteristics. They have no language, common name, 
dietary or other cultural practices of their own of which they might 
boast and that could serve as a basis for merging their separate 
identities (Deliège 1999: 89, 104). Inter jati solidarity, hence, remains 
                                                
271 In the literature there are many references to failed historical attempts 
to forge political unity among different untouchable jatis. In pre-independence 
Maharastra, for instance, Ambedkar never succeeded in constructing a political 
alliance of the Mahars (to which he himself belonged) and such other notable 
untouchable jatis as the Chambhars and the Mangs (Zelliot 1992: 108). The so-
called Ad Dharm movement in the 1920s in the Punjab, which had set out to 
unite the region’s untouchables on the basis of a newly invented “original 
religion”, in the end left behind little more than a new caste. Around the same 
time, the Adi Hindu movement in some UP towns was equally unsuccessful in 
endowing the untouchables with a new and separate identity (Jaffrelot 2000b). 
Terms like the suffix Adi in the southern states and the term Harijan, which 
were once brought into use in an effort to bring different untouchable jatis 
together under a single name, have in the long run tended to become names 
used by particular untouchable jatis rather than by the untouchable category as a 
whole (Charsley 1996: 17). Efforts of the caste reformer Sri Narayana (1857-
1928) to include Pulayas and other untouchable castes in his anti-caste 
movement in Kerala also miserably failed due to strong mutual suspicions 
(Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 97, 99). And even if, in contemporary India, 
there are some organizations which bring together two or several castes from 
one state, “their impact is minimal, and none of the large-scale movements [. .] 
has managed such a feat . . . we have no example of fusion or even of a 
significant rapprochement between two untouchable castes” (Deliège 1999: 173). 
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highly limited (Deliège 1999: 11). In sum, as Simon Charsley writes, 
“at the level of rural people’s daily lives, interactions and identities, 
‘the Untouchable’ is not to be found” (Charsley 1996: 17).272 
Ironically, it is fragmentation and disunity which seem to be Indian 
untouchables’ primary characteristics (Deliège 1999: 5, 8-9; 
Mandelbaum 1966: 1537) and, apart from anything else, it is this 
very lack of unity which has rendered them particularly incapable of 
translating their considerable numbers into effective collective 
action, organisation, and political clout (cf. also Deliège 1999: 173). 
Fragmentation, disunity and, even, mutual hostility, repulsion 
and disgust among jatis of fairly similar ritual status in the 
Brahminic ranking and with seemingly common interests are, to be 
sure, not typical for jatis in the untouchable category: it tends to 
affect all jatis, irrespective of their varna.273 As David Mandelbaum 
has pointed out, the fragmentation of close and contiguous jatis in 
rural life follows from the logic of the caste system itself. People 
functioning in such a system see society as a hierarchical order in 
which the relative positions of actors in a social situation are usually 
given, that is, defined in advance of their interaction. Hence, they do 
not tend to feel “particularly impelled” to challenge the superiority 
of those high above them in the hierarchy. But this easy acceptance 
of subordinate status does not concern members of jatis close to 
one’s own. “Subordination to someone in a proximal rank”, says 
Mandelbaum, “is felt to be uncomfortable and something to be 
                                                
272 “There is no question”, he adds, “of individual jaatis being submerged 
into a single Untouchable ‘caste’, any more than there is of a new unified 
identity of caste Hindu. Only studies which, for the sake of political correctness, 
merge jaatis under a single label, either ‘Scheduled Caste’, ‘Harijan’ or ‘Dalit’, 
fail to show this” (Charsley 1996: 16-17). 
273 The Jats and Gujars of UP, both fairly highly ranked Shudra jatis, for 
example “are constantly undermining each other, though on the face of it they 
should, as owner-cultivators, be natural allies” (Gupta 1999: 280). The same 
holds true for the Srivastavas and Patwari Kayasthas of UP, the meccho and helo 
Koibartas of Bengal and the various Brahmin jatis who “quarrel ceaselessly 
among themselves” (ibid.). Similarly, even if there has been some fusion among 
the middle Shudra castes of UP -Ahirs have become Yadavas, Koris and Koeries 
have become Kushwahas-, on the whole, write Ahmad and Saxena, all castes 
remain “extremely conscious of their position in the vertical hierarchy” (Ahmad 
and Saxena 1994: 205, my emphasis). 
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changed as soon as possible”. The narcissism of minor differences so 
prevalent among members of close and contiguous jatis thus largely 
and logically follows from the strong personal motivation of people 
and groups in caste societies to escape subordination to their 
proximate equals (Mandelbaum 1995: 624-6).274  
It is for this reason that members of proximate castes, 
including those of untouchable jatis, so scrupulously and zealously 
guard and assert their higher status within a close bracket of rank, 
are so fiercely competitive about the symbols and substance of caste 
rank and, hence, tend to reproduce the caste system among 
themselves (Deliège 1999: 70; Mandelbaum 1995: 625, 1537; Moffatt 
1979).275 And it is precisely because of untouchable individuals’ 
overriding loyalties towards their jatis -rather than to the broad, 
untidy and amorphous category of “untouchables”- that UP 
untouchables have traditionally found it so hard to develop full-
blown inter-caste, categorical solidarities and to mount common, 
effective challenges to dabang dominance (Gupta 1999: 280). 
Whenever rural untouchables do protest and assert themselves, 
their protest and assertion still tend to be aimed more at the place 
assigned to their own jati within the caste system than at the caste 
system itself and the patterns of rural dominance that sustain it (cf. 
Deliège 1999: 111-2). Most rural untouchables, in other words, still 
                                                
274 The phrase ‘narcissism of minor differences’ is Sigmund Freud’s, who 
coined it to describe the principle which “governs relations between groups 
that are physically close to one another or who have many close connections”. 
“The relations between these groups”, argued Freud, “will be characterised by 
ambivalent feelings. They will become jealous rivals” (Freud (1930), cited in 
Billig 1974: 38). 
275 As Ross Mallick has noted, it is this scrupulous guarding of status (if 
successfully carried out, of course) which “also provides one of the main 
psychological attractions of the caste system: while every [quoting John 
Broomfield] ‘peasant has someone’s boot on his neck, many have the 
concurrent satisfaction of stepping on someone’s else’s face. Inequality, the 
bane of the hierarchical society, is also its chief delight’” (Mallick 1998: 243). As 
Gerald Berreman has argued the same point: “[I]f the caste system were 
abolished a Shudra group or even a Harijan group would get the benefit of 
equality with the Brahmins but would have to pay the price of losing its 
superiority to the lowest Harijans, and this it is not willing to pay” (Berreman 
1968: 81). 
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want “to move up the ladder rather than to eliminate the ladder” 
(Berreman 1968: 81).276  
All this means that also Sitapuri untouchables, qua 
untouchables, are not given much to collective, open defiance of 
dabang dominance. They do not overtly challenge dabang access to 
and control over the local state by seeking direct access and control 
of their own. They prefer, rather, to work the system to their 
minimal disadvantage. To secure valued public benefits they mainly 
rely on indirect methods such as voting and dalaali which are 
available to them and can be used with relative impunity. And of 
course they will not shy away, as testified by the successful efforts of 
Chote Lal and his Chamars in Ulra described in the previous 
chapter, from establishing their own access to the local state if the 
opportunity arises and conditions are felt to be favourable.277 
                                                
276 All this is not to say that caste systems do not allow at all for 
horizontal mobilization of low caste groups and, even, for the effective 
subversion of upper caste dominance. In some of the south Indian states, for 
example, lower castes, from the late nineteenth century onwards, have 
collectively and successfully contested the dominance of upper caste groups 
and, in some instances, effectively wrested control over the state from them. 
According to Ahmad and Saxena, these disparities between north and south 
India may largely be explained by differences in the morphologies of the caste 
systems in both regions. “Caste structure in the north Indian plains”, they note, 
“differs from that of the south in a fundamental respect. In the south, the 
Brahmins were the only representatives of the twice-born castes (there being no 
counterpart of north Indian Rajputs and Banias in the south) which increased 
their social distance from the rest of the Sudra population. On the other hand, 
due to the presence of other groups with high social status in the north, 
Brahminism did not have to be tyrannical . . . [since] a greater continuity in the 
scale of ritual rank of castes in Uttar Pradesh [. .] led to a general sharing of 
social status and political power. Anti-Brahminism seems to have flourished in 
regions characterised by steep and discontinuous traditional social hierarchies. 
Regions with relatively higher proportions of twice-born castes and having 
more gradual and continuous social handicaps seem to be less susceptible to 
horizontal mobilisations from below comprising ritually deprived castes” 
(Ahmad and Saxena 1994: 174). 
277 Jens Lerche describes another successful example of successful 
untouchable defiance of local dabang –in this case in a conflict over agricultural 
wages- in a village in eastern UP. As I did in my analysis of the conflict in Ulra, 
Lerche also emphasises the importance of timing in this regard. The 
untouchables in the eastern UP village, he argues, could organize effectively 
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Otherwise, untouchables’ resistance to and defiance of dabang 
dominance remains largely limited to the deployment of such 
weapons of the weak as the public display of (feigned) helplessness, 
ignorance, meekness and acceptance of authority and private, 
covert, inconspicuous “off-stage” gossiping, making fun and slander 
of upper castes (Berreman 1979: 167; Ruud 1999; Ruud 2001: 131, 
132; Scott 1985; Scott 1990; Sharma 1994: 74-5). As Medhai, a Chamar 
in Haibatpur, explained the wisdom of such an approach: “We go 
along with the rest of the people and by doing this, we can still do 
whatever we want. What is the use of being confrontational? It only 
creates tension”. 
 
Summing up 
 
As I have argued in this chapter, ordinary poor villagers–whether 
untouchable or not- seek policy benefits in various ways, out of 
which directly approaching DLBs –whether outgroup or ingroup 
ones- is probably the least popular. Poor clients prefer to seek public 
benefits through voting and dalaali not only because these methods 
are considered more practical or effective but also because they are 
regarded as less dangerous than their theoretical alternative, the 
direct approach of bureaucrats. Approaching bureaucrats directly 
often implies bypassing locally dominant dabang who may meet out 
uncomfortable and painful punitive treatment in exchange for such 
efforts. Since the direct approach of bureaucrats is something of an 
ultimum remedium, ingroup clients’ demand of active representation 
by ingroup bureaucrats is largely absent. Ordinary clients, including 
untouchable clients, neither demand nor, as I argued in chapter 5, 
receive special treatment from “fellow” untouchable administrators. 
It is to some of the implications of these findings for representative 
bureaucracy theory that I will turn in the following and concluding 
chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
because they, just like Chote Lal cum suis, chose to act collectively at a time 
when their party –the BSP- controlled the state government (Lerche 1998: A-32). 
 7 Conclusion: Towards a Theory of 
Unrepresentative Bureaucracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this final chapter I wrap up, in a few broad strokes, the main 
substantive findings of this study. I will then discuss some of the 
implications of these findings for representative bureaucracy theory. 
Even if the case of the untouchable bureaucracy might seem to be a 
rather extreme one, it has much to teach us or, at the least, raises 
interesting and important questions, about the likelihood of active 
representation in public bureaucracies in patronage democracies 
and multi-ethnic societies. I will pay particular attention to two, 
what I regard as, major flaws in received representative bureaucracy 
theory: its underlying assumptions of bureaucratic discretion-
maximalisation and groupism. Discretion-maximalisation and 
groupism, as the case of India’s untouchable bureaucracy has borne 
out, cannot be taken for granted. By theorizing some of the apparent 
determinants of discretion-maximalisation and groupness -
suggested by the findings from the case study and the larger 
literature- I aim to further specify the conditions under which active 
representation is unlikely to occur. I conclude this study with two 
pleas. The first plea is for appreciably widening up the currently 
dominant operational definition of active representation in terms of 
policy outputs; the second for more ethnographic studies of 
(un)representative bureaucracies. 
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1 Summary: untouchable bureaucracy 
 
The question which has informed this study was whether the 
presence of ingroup members in bureaucracy can be of benefit to an 
ethnic group as a whole. The question is a pertinent one, if only 
because political entrepreneurs in ethnically plural societies tend to 
spend a great deal of energy in securing their group’s access to 
public employment on the presumption that this is so. Besides, a 
forceful current in contemporary political philosophy advocates and 
justifies the accommodation of ethnic group rights in public policy 
and political institutions on the grounds that outgroup 
representatives cannot defend the interests of ingroups, especially 
marginalized ones, very well.  
To find out whether passive representation –the physical 
presence of group-identified bureaucrats- may indeed translate in 
active representation -the pursuit of broader ingroup interests on 
the part of these group-identified bureaucrats- I studied India’s 
untouchable bureaucracy. The case seemed an obvious one: not only 
does India have one of the most elaborate and long-lived systems of 
ethnic preferences premised on the belief that only ingroup 
representatives can represent ingroups, the untouchables –the 
world’s paradigm pariah group- have at the same time been the 
major beneficiaries of this system.  
The mechanism construed by representative bureaucracy 
theorists to account for the expected linkage between passive and 
active representation is quite straightforward. Individual 
bureaucrats almost invariably possess discretion, that is, room to 
make choices as they see fit. Superiors can never fully and 
adequately communicate to bureaucrats what is expected of them; 
and even if they could, they typically lack the means to enforce 
subordinates into compliance with centrally desired ends. Given 
these communication and enforcement problems, bureaucratic 
discretion is virtually inevitable in large bureaucratic organizations: 
orders from above are regularly unintelligible to those who are 
supposed to carry them out while superiors typically lack the 
knowledge, time, manpower, financial and legal resources, will or 
perseverance to detect, monitor and sanction all inappropriate 
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exercise of discretion. As a result, bureaucrats widely exercise 
discretion, in interpreting and translating the meaning of superiors’ 
orders; in deciding with which orders to comply; in deciding how to 
comply with a given order; as well as in deciding whether to comply 
at all with central directives. 
Bureaucratic discretion is not a problem, representative 
bureaucracy theorists argue, as long as bureaucrats are drawn from 
all relevant societal groups. Persons of different backgrounds 
undergo different socialization experiences which tend to be the 
source of a person’s enduring values, preferences and biases. Since 
bureaucrats are susceptible to these biases and preferences when 
they are exercising discretion, bureaucrats recruited from a 
particular group will therefore tend to make administrative 
decisions that reflect the interests, needs and desires of that group. 
Prospective clients of bureaucracy, furthermore, may be more 
inclined to participate in policies intended to benefit them when 
they identify and are comfortable with program administrators. 
What makes the occurrence of active representation especially likely 
in the case of ethnic groups is their proclivity towards high 
“groupness”. They tend to command strong interpersonal loyalties 
and engender a great willingness on the part of groupmembers to 
sacrifice for collective welfare. Ethnic groups, in short, often 
demonstrate a high capability to make their members act in the 
group’s interest.  
Within India, the dust-level rural development bureaucracy 
presented itself as a suitable case for an empirical enquiry into 
untouchable representative bureaucracy because it possessed, on the 
face of it, four features that representative bureaucracy theorists 
associate with a high likelihood of active representation: a 
sympathetic mission, high salience of its policies to poor 
untouchable villagers, the presence of a substantial mass of 
untouchable DLBs, and street-level discretion. To avoid the 
drawbacks of earlier empirical representative bureaucracy studies 
(which, by design, had not been able to prove the occurrence of 
active representation, nor to illuminate and explain its practice) I 
chose to rely on qualitative fieldwork. Through a combination of 
participant observation, personal interviews and the consultation of 
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official documents I set out to develop a grounded theory which 
was to clarify the if, how, why and when of active representation in 
Sitapur and, in so doing, to provide new insights and clues for 
elaborating, specifying and modifying existing representative 
bureaucracy theory. 
 As favourable a recipe for active representation as conditions 
in Sitapur might have seemed in theory, in practice they turned out 
to count for little. Even though the rules informing rural 
development policy implementation accord substantial powers to 
DLBs, very few DLBs use this power. In order to prevent political 
punishment, to keep their jobs and successfully survive in turbulent 
faction political environments, they lease out their discretionary 
freedoms to political brokers in return for a fraction of development 
rents.  
DLBs seldom visit the villages in their jurisdictions and, hence, 
tend to see very little dust. If they are ignorant about the villages 
and their own developmental activities it is because they have, for 
most intents and purposes, abandoned the frontline of rural 
development program implementation. They usually need a good 
reason to pay a visit to their villages, keep their touring to an 
absolute minimum and restrict their visits to where the locally 
influential people reside. In short, Sitapur’s VLOs, irrespective of 
their caste identity, have largely abandoned the frontline. They do 
not regularly visit the villages and hamlets in their jurisdiction, let 
alone frequent them. 
The fact that Sitapur’s DLBs have largely abandoned the 
frontline does not mean that rural development benefits such as 
subsidies, temporary employment and rural infrastructure do not 
reach the rural population. On the contrary, in spite of DLBs’ 
absenteeism, beneficiaries are selected and program benefits are 
being allocated. Rather than by the block staff, however, such 
allocative decisions are typically and decisively influenced by local 
politicians or, as they are commonly referred to, local netas. In doing 
so, these netas effectively appropriate whatever de iure discretionary 
power DLBs might be considered to have. Rural development work, 
in other words, is in practice the business of politicians.  
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Most politicians in contemporary India act on the assumption 
that the votes and group support needed to satisfy their political 
ambitions can be most successfully garnered by acting as patrons to 
voters. They spend most of their time and energy on locating, 
capturing and distributing patronage to their followers or those 
whose electoral support they court. To make such patronage 
available to their clients they are heavily dependent on the 
cooperation and complicity of DLBs. Netas depend upon officials 
for reliable information on the kind and amount of benefits available 
for “allocation” in their blocks and villages. Netas furthermore 
depend on DLBs for observing secrecy. Since villagers’ continued 
ignorance is essential to their survival as political patrons, netas 
have a vested interest in making sure that DLBs actively restrict the 
spread of relevant information among potential clients. Finally, 
netas must also rely on DLBs for getting the necessary paperwork in 
order. Making sure that the official paperwork documents and 
reflects centrally desired procedures and outcomes rather than 
ground realities is crucial if netas are to cover up patronage 
transactions (which are illegal).  
Most DLBs in Sitapur see no good reasons why they should 
withhold their cooperation from the important netas in their 
jurisdictions. To start with, unlike bureaucrats in many other 
political systems, DLBs may be rather easily disciplined or punished 
by politicians if the latter somehow find them to be uncooperative. 
The most important and commonly used instrument of control of 
Indian netas is the power to transfer bureaucrats from one post and 
locality to another. Since DLBs tend to have strong preferences for 
the kind of place they work in –they particularly hate out of the 
way, backward, feudal and mafia-infested places- they are usually 
willing to go to great lengths to avoid ending up in punishment 
postings. If cooperation with local netas is the price to be paid for 
preventing a transfer to such places, most VLOs are quite prepared 
to pay it.  
Another well-established method of exacting compliance is the 
discrediting or smearing of DLBs’ reputations, including accusing 
them of “corruption”. Allegations such as these may be quite 
harmful to DLBs because they create the impression among their 
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colleagues and superiors that they cannot handle their jobs very 
well. DLBs who are repeatedly found to arouse the wrath of local 
netas, have their reputations smeared and charges pressed against 
them can ordinarily expect but little peer sympathy. Allegations are 
often backed up by (threats of) violence. In Sitapur, as in the rest of 
rural Uttar Pradesh, politics and the use of force and violence are 
inextricably intertwined: the crafting of political careers typically 
goes hand in hand with the building up and deployment of muscle 
and fire power against which DLBs, as largely lone operators, have 
no real shelter.  
Punishments aside, DLBs’ co-operation is also exacted by way 
of rewards. Cooperative officials can usually expect to be 
compensated for their services with a share of the development 
rents that netas routinely collect in the process of distributing 
patronage. Netas tend to make good use of the rent-seeking 
opportunities invested in the rural development bureaucracy: they 
charge or accept bribes from villagers for getting the latter’s work 
done or for trying to do so, skim off proportions of development 
subsidies, and make a profit from savings on the ground. Part of the 
money thus generated is used for netas’ personal income; part of it 
is, in the absence of (sufficient) remuneration, required for 
furthering their political careers. Given the importance of rent-
seeking income to most netas, DLBs who are willing to assist netas 
in the collection of development rents –by supplying information on 
rent-seeking opportunities and covering up skimming activities in 
official paperwork- can expect to be rewarded with a share of the 
profits. In fact, those who cooperate can make it rich. 
DLBs’ shunning of discretion and frontline abandonment are 
further explained by the problem of factionalism. Political power on 
the Sitapur dust-level is hotly contested and seldom goes 
unchallenged for long. Dust-level netas tend to be locked into 
continuous and usually bitter battles with political enemies. These 
battles usually appear in the guise of factionalism, a special kind of 
politicking in which loose coalitions of faction leaders fight out 
personal conflicts of interest over concrete issues that often pertain 
to access to patronage vested in administrative agencies such as the 
rural development bureaucracy.  
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Since Indian civil service rules prescribe that bureaucrats are 
not to be posted in their native areas, DLBs are almost by definition 
outsiders to the political arenas in which they work. They therefore 
typically lack the local knowledge required to accurately map 
factional allegiances or to anticipate and influence factional conflict 
as well as locals can. Indian factions, by definition, are unstable, 
temporary, ad-hoc coalitions with fluctuating memberships. As a 
result, DLBs can never really be sure as to whom they are actually 
dealing with in terms of the factions they side with, the political 
clout they enjoy, and the goals they pursue. Neither are they in a 
good position to predict what dangers might lie in store for them 
when they decide to extend their cooperation to certain clients (and, 
in doing so, deny it to others).  
Most DLBs therefore try to insulate themselves against 
unwanted consequences of devious factional pressures by 
establishing and cultivating good relations with politicians and 
administrative superiors who might be able to help them when 
things threaten to get out of control. On a day to day basis, DLBs try 
to stay out of factional trouble by studiously avoiding the 
impression of siding with any one faction while at the same time not 
seeming to be uncooperative. VLOs do so by frontline abandonment 
and the recruitment of informal helpers, while BDOs (shackled, as 
they are, to the block-office) must largely rely on their verbal and 
people skills to defuse potentially explosive situations. Mistakes, 
however, are easily made, and DLBs regularly end up scapegoats in 
factional conflicts and get punished for actions or omissions they 
could barely have avoided.  
These unpleasant working conditions leave many DLBs, 
irrespective of their caste backgrounds, feeling helpless, deprived of 
respect and demoralized. They have, for the most part, given up on 
the idea that they might make some positive contribution to the 
lives of the rural poor. They are very critical of their organization’s 
policies which, they feel, add to factionalism and groupism in the 
villages. If only there were alternative employment opportunities 
available, many DLBs would probably choose to exit the dust-level 
rural development bureaucracy. DLBs’ general disillusionment with 
their organization’s mission and clientele is supplemented by 
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untouchable DLBs’ disidentification from their own stigmatized 
identity and from other ingroup members. Untouchable DLBs 
generally feel they cannot do anything special for their community 
because upper castes in and around the organization prevent them 
from building up the necessary clout to do so. In order to survive, 
untouchable officials typically feel forced to downplay their 
untouchable identity and to avoid assuming advocacy roles. Many 
try to escape identification with untouchability altogether through a 
number of passing strategies such as changing their names and 
dissociating from members of their own castes. Many dust level 
untouchable DLBs have thus largely become “untouchable” to their 
ingroup clienteles.  
Taken together, the survival strategies of frontline 
abandonment, defensive cowering and passing conspire to make the 
active representation of ingroup policy interests on the part of 
untouchable DLBs a virtual non-issue and, therefore, highly 
unlikely in the Sitapur rural development bureaucracy. In the 
ordinary course of their official lives, untouchable DLBs lack both 
opportunities and good reasons to act as untouchable clients’ 
representatives. The inevitable result is an almost routine 
interruption of the supply of active representation.  
Even if untouchable DLBs tend to be busy coping with 
netagiri, goondagiri, factionalism and stigmatized identity, there 
would seem to be no reason why untouchable clients should not try 
and get in touch with them to demonstrate their eligibility for 
program benefits or to claim special treatment on the basis of caste-
affinity. However, in dust-level practice, as it turns out, poor low 
caste and untouchable clients rarely if ever demand ingroup 
bureaucrats for the active representation of their interests. This 
absence of an untouchable demand for active representation further 
detracts from the likelihood of supply of active representation by 
DLBs: after all, if ingroup clients do not even ask, claim or 
pressurize for special treatment why would DLBs run the 
considerable personal risks involved in extending it?  
Even if untouchability no longer prevents untouchable clients 
from physically approaching local officialdom for benefits, 
untouchable (as well as other poor and low caste) villagers display 
7 Conclusion: towards a theory of unrepresentative bureaucracy 277
an overwhelming preference for indirect and informal, “political” 
benefit-seeking methods, notably voting and dalaali. These methods 
are typically considered much more feasible, effective and, also, far 
less dangerous than the direct approach of bureaucrats which, 
therefore, hardly figures among poor clients’ benefit-seeking 
strategies. 
The most popular and widely practiced benefit-seeking 
behaviour displayed by clients is voting. To poor villagers, voting is 
not so much an expressive act as an instrumental one. Poor and low 
caste villagers vote for candidates whom they consider capable of 
winning the elections and whom subsequently may be trusted to 
deliver public benefits to them. As a result, in local elections poor 
villagers preferably vote for candidates from their own jati, hamlet 
or ward, while in the bigger state and national elections they 
increasingly vote for the BSP, a self-confessed dalit party which 
claims to act in all untouchables’ interests. Most poor and low caste 
villagers thus understand, accept and act upon the patronage logic 
of Indian politics. They use their vote to get their own man, woman 
or party in office and hope to be rewarded if their candidate 
manages to capture an office from which favours may be 
distributed. Though popular, voting is a highly unreliable way of 
cornering state benefits. Voting in UP, for one, is not always free. 
Voters are regularly kept from voting, whether by force or through 
manipulation of election procedures. Then, also, there is always the 
risk that one’s candidate loses the election or fails to secure a 
position from which patronage may be dispensed. Besides, many 
netas, as poor villagers see it, are expert cheaters and have no 
qualms about withholding benefits or filling their own stomachs 
whenever they can get away with it.  
When voting does not bring the hoped for results poor and 
low caste villagers may respond in a number of ways. Some feel 
there is nothing one can do about cheating netas and appear 
resigned to the fact that the government has few benefits in store for 
them, despite the attractive promises of netas. For the few who can 
afford it, obtaining political office oneself is also an option. 
Alternatively, clients may also hire the services of a dalaal, a broker, 
middleman, or fixer who specializes in making bureaucracies part 
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with their benefits through the deployment of skill, contacts and 
experience. Dalaals, in fact, are ubiquitous in Sitapur and their 
services are much sought after. One of the reasons that clients find 
dalaals attractive and relatively easy to deal with is that they are 
usually local men with roots in the village or area in which they 
work. This makes them much easier to approach by poor clients 
than bureaucrats who tend to stay away from the villages. It also 
makes them easier to trust than bureaucrats who, after all, tend to be 
outsiders to the jurisdictions in which they work.  
Poor villagers have in effect little good to say about 
bureaucrats. They not only blame them for being notoriously 
difficult to approach, but also for being quite unhelpful and 
condescending whenever they do manage to get hold of them. 
Bureaucrats, like politicians, are furthermore considered expert 
cheaters and suspected of being primarily interested in lining their 
own pockets. Interestingly, poor clients’ distrust of bureaucrats 
tends to have little to do with bureaucrats’ caste. Untouchable and 
other poor and low caste clients are generally distrustful of 
bureaucrats and expect little good from them, regardless of what 
caste they are. Again, as with voting, there are certain risks involved 
in using dalaal as a benefit-seeking strategy. Dalaals must be paid 
for their services and, like politicians and bureaucrats, also have a 
bad reputation for cheating.  
Voting and dalaali are not only considered more effective and 
practical benefit-seeking strategies, they are also less dangerous than 
the direct approach of bureaucrats. By approaching bureaucrats 
directly, namely, clients risk antagonizing local dabang. In the 
Sitapur countryside, such single strong landowning dominant jatis 
or families are a central reality in village life. They wield 
considerable political and economic power over ordinary low caste 
and poor villagers. Many quasi-landless and indebted villagers 
depend on them for regular employment, wage labour or sharecrop 
land. But rather than on their land possessions, dabang have 
increasingly come to rely on access to and control over the local 
state and its resources. They thus have a strong interest in 
preventing poor low caste villagers from establishing direct access 
to bureaucracy and usually possess the means to do so. Dabang’s 
7 Conclusion: towards a theory of unrepresentative bureaucracy 279
pahunch to the local police is an especially powerful instrument of 
domination.  
In theory, poor and untouchable villagers might counter 
monopolizing efforts on the part of dominant individuals and 
groups by engaging in collective action and forming grass-roots 
policy-pressure groups. In practice, however, untouchable clients 
usually lack the necessary power and resources for such 
endeavours. Another important reason for rural untouchables’ 
disinclination towards collective action is that they possess little 
cohesiveness; they are still a category rather than a group and 
continue to be sharply divided along jati lines. Untouchable jatis 
practice untouchability among themselves, do not interdine or 
intermarry or fuse, sometimes positively despise each other and 
scrupulously maintain hierarchy among themselves. The lack of 
unity among different untouchable jatis is largely explained by the 
logic of the caste system, which compels jatis to escape 
subordination to proximate equals by stressing their difference and 
relatively higher status. Untouchable disunity often prevents rural 
untouchables from converting their large numbers into an effective, 
organized force and, hence, from bypassing dabang’s administrative 
access and directly claiming the public benefits to which they are 
entitled. 
 To sum up, villagers have an overwhelming preference for 
employing “political” methods to influence benefit allocation. 
Bureaucrats hardly figure, at least not prominently or directly, in 
their benefit-seeking activities. Contrary to what one might have 
expected, untouchable clients’ demand for active representation is 
almost absent: they consider other alternatives potentially much 
more attractive and, also importantly, less dangerous. 
Untouchability thus plays, at the most, a very limited role as an 
organizing principle within Indian dust level politics and 
bureaucracy. The category of “untouchables” does what Charles 
Tilly calls “boundary work”, or the work of distinction: it defines 
ties and locates distinctions between members of different categories 
more reliably than it creates internal solidarity, homogeneity, or 
connectedness (Tilly 1999: 72). All this is not to say that untouchable 
villagers do not profit from rural development policies –they surely 
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do. What it means is that when they do so, it is quite unlikely to be 
due to ingroup DLBs’ supply of active representation or their own 
demand for it.278 
 
 
2 Implications: towards a formal theory of unrepresentative 
bureaucracy 
 
In chapter 3 I discussed a number of conditions (sympathetic 
mission, policy salience, critical mass and street-level discretion) 
which representative bureaucracy theorists regard as being 
particularly conducive to the occurrence of active representation 
and illustrated how they applied to the dust-level rural 
development bureaucracy in Sitapur. As my subsequent analysis of 
this bureaucracy bore out, however, even if all of these purportedly 
favourable conditions are in place, active representation may still 
fail to occur. The explanation for the non-occurrence of active 
representation arising out of my ethnographic explorations in 
Sitapur is basically an economic one: active representation fails to 
occur because bureaucrats are not ready or able to supply it, and 
because those who need it fail to pressure those who might deliver it 
enough for doing so. There is, in brief, no market for active 
bureaucratic representation on the north Indian dust-level, at least 
not one involving untouchable dust-level development bureaucrats 
and clients.  
The grounded, substantive theory developed in this book 
hopefully “fits” or “works” to provide an intelligible explanation for 
the absence of a market for active representation in this particular 
case. But, as Glaser and Strauss have pointed out, substantive 
theories “may have important implications and relevance, and 
become almost automatically a springboard or stepping stone to the 
development” of what they call “formal” grounded theory (Glaser 
                                                
278 My use of this probabilistic formulation is deliberate. Even if I did not 
find any indications of the occurrence of active representation, this does not 
mean that it might not occasionally occur. After all, one cannot really prove the 
absence of something.  
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and Strauss 1967: 79).279 In this section I explore a number of 
implications of my substantive theory of unrepresentative 
untouchable bureaucracy in Sitapur for formal representative 
bureaucracy. These implications all relate to the question of how to 
make theoretical sense of unrepresentative bureaucracies. In brief, I 
will argue that active representation will vary with type of 
democracy, type of group and the visibility of group attributes. 
Roughly put, I argue that (1) bureaucratic discretion and ingroup 
demand for active representation are likely to be severely hampered 
in patronage democracies and that (2) the groupness of lowly 
ranked ethnic groups, especially stigmatized and invisible ones, will 
tend to be low. Active representation is therefore unlikely to occur 
in the case of patronage democracies and/or lowly ranked ethnic 
groups in vertically stratified societies. I present this argument in 
the form of five sets of hypotheses that could be tested in future 
research.  
 
(1) Bureaucrats in patronage democracies are likely to shun discretion 
 
In order for active representation to occur, not only must 
bureaucrats, as representative bureaucracy theorists have stressed, 
have discretion; they must also be willing to utilize this discretion. 
Whenever bureaucrats do not find the exercise of discretion 
worthwhile –whether because it may hurt their careers, endanger 
their good relations with peers or offends their professional 
standards- passive representation will not likely translate into active 
representation. “Linkage” studies must therefore not assume 
discretion; they must problematize both its existence and bureaucrats’ 
willingness to exercise it.280 If the bureaucracy studied in this book is 
                                                
279 The distinction between these two kinds of theories, explain Glaser 
and Strauss, is that substantive theory is developed for a substantive, or 
empirical, area of scholarly inquiry (e.g. rural development administration) 
whereas formal theory is developed for a formal, conceptual, area of scholarly 
enquiry (e.g. representative bureaucracy) (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 79). 
280 The idea that bureaucrats seek, use and, even, maximize discretion is 
also fairly widely accepted outside the representative bureaucracy literature. It 
is, for instance, implicit in and/or central to Lipsky’s theory of street-level 
bureaucracy (Lipsky 1980), public choice accounts of bureaucracy (Downs 1967; 
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any indication, bureaucrats’ willingness to exercise discretion is 
severely hampered in what I, following Kanchan Chandra, have 
called patronage democracies. In such democracies politics revolves 
largely around providing material and psychic benefits to voters in 
exchange for electoral support. Politicians in such democracies tend 
to have good reasons as well as the means to appropriate 
bureaucrats’ formal and informal discretionary decision-making 
powers. As a result, bureaucrats will feel forced to comply with and 
facilitate politicians’ patronage transactions, in the hope of being 
compensated with a share in the benefits under politicians’ control.  
To put it differently, politico-bureaucratic relations in 
patronage democracies will tend to have a distinctly patrimonial feel. 
That is to say, politicians in patronage democracies will be strongly 
inclined to treat their offices and power as purely personal affairs, as 
their personal properties to be exploited at their own discretion. In 
order to maintain and secure the loyalty of officials on whom they 
must rely to perpetuate themselves in positions of power, politicians 
will be at great pains to influence administrative appointments. 
They will also be willing to grant officials considerable leeway in 
how they take care of their responsibilities (by allowing them to hire 
“more or less proletarian deputies” to do “the real work”, for 
instance (Weber 1978: 1033)) and by providing substantial, usually 
informal and off-the-record opportunities to generate additional 
personal incomes -in the form of fee-benefices, tax-farming 
opportunities and the like.281  
                                                                                                                                          
Niskanen 1971; Tullock 1987) and to principal agent theories of political control 
over bureaucracy (cf. e.g. Balla 1998; Calvert et al. 1989). 
281 What Weber refers to as a fee benefice concerns “the assignment of 
certain fees which the ruler or his representative can expect for official acts” 
(Weber 1978: 1032). The prevalent understanding between Indian officials and 
local netas to divide the spoils skimmed off from development allocations, for 
instance, resembles Weber’s fee benefice in most significant respects. Further 
adding to the Indian dust-level state’s patrimonial features is that the use of 
administrative office for fee benefice purposes is accompanied by the saleability 
of office. Many administrative offices –especially those to which attractive fee 
benefices are attached- tend to be auctioned or granted to contestants willing to 
pay a certain fixed price, just as Weber observed to be the case whenever 
patrimonial rulers have relied on fee benefices to compensate their officials for 
their services. 
7 Conclusion: towards a theory of unrepresentative bureaucracy 283
To reduce the risk of subversion of their power by 
bureaucrats, politicians will tend to make creative use of various 
methods to reduce bureaucrats’ capability to build up independent 
powerbases of their own, possibly including, as in India, regular 
travel through their constituencies to keep an eye on things, the 
creation of competing administrative offices, allowing bureaucrats 
only brief tenures in office and the exclusion of officials from 
districts in which they have strong roots in the form of landed 
property and relatives (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002: 6-8; Dua 
1985: 795-6; Weber 1978: esp. 1028-44).282 
Given the relatively large monetary and status rewards vested 
in patrimonial bureaucratic office, bureaucrats have good reasons to 
act loyally and in the interests of the politicians in their jurisdictions. 
Depending on how cleverly and ingeniously politicians manage to 
manipulate the various loyalty-inducing instruments at their 
disposal, bureaucrats may even feel (as many Sitapuri DLBs said 
they did) wholly dependent on politicians for their positions, incomes 
and survival, much like servants feel dependent on their masters or 
vassals on their feudal lords.283 Because politicians usually are (or 
are felt to be) more powerful than them bureaucrats are not likely to 
have real “jurisdictions”, at least not in the conventional sense of the 
term of clear-cut spheres of competence, purpose and task. Rather, 
the boundaries of bureaucrats’ actual jurisdictions will largely be 
delineated according to politicians’ personal discretion rather than 
by law, rule or precept (Weber 1978: 1028-9).284  
                                                
282 Other methods historically used by patrimonial rulers to protect 
themselves against the disintegration of their hegemony have included the 
“personal guarantee” –Japanese feudal lords would demand officials’ families as 
hostages, for instance-, the appointment of relatives or in-laws to important 
positions and the systematic surveillance of officials through spies (Weber 1978: 
1042-4). Though potentially very effective, the use of these methods is probably 
rather restricted in democracies. 
283 The nature of interpersonal relationships in feudalism and 
patrimonialism is quite similar. According to Weber, feudal relations are more 
ritualized, and stable than patrimonial ones, which are more ad hoc (Brinkerhoff 
and Goldsmith 2002: 6, n. 3). 
284 “Wherever the administration of a large political realm is 
patrimonial”, wrote Weber, “every attempt at identifying ‘jurisdictions’ is lost 
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Besides, bureaucrats, in whatever jurisdictions they may be 
said to have, will be expected to focus their allegiance upwards, to 
the politicians who can reward and punish them, rather than 
downwards, to their nominal clients from whom they have less to 
gain or fear (as long as their relations with politicians are fine). As a 
result, interpersonal relations between bureaucrats and nominal 
clients will be kept to a minimum and, as far as they take place at 
all, be characterised by official disinterest, condescension and 
predatory extraction of resources (Lindberg 1999: 19). “In 
neopatrimonial systems”, as Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith put it, “the 
state exists to serve the rulers, not the ruled. Thus a service 
orientation toward citizens is not simply absent, it is a foreign 
concept” (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002: 8).285 Since their survival 
depends critically on pleasing politicians and maintaining power 
over clients, bureaucrats in patronage democracies, to again borrow 
a phrase from Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, will “tend to opt for 
token implementation of official policies, doing just enough to give 
the appearance of delivering services according to formal 
regulations and procedures while informally trading public 
resources for power, influence and cooperation” (Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith 2002: 19). 
The more political democracies function as patronage 
democracies and the stronger the patrimonial nature of politico-
bureaucratic relations, therefore, the less likely it will be that passive 
representation will translate into active representation. Whereas, 
generally speaking, bureaucrats in modern Weberian bureaucracies 
may often have good reasons to utilize and maximize decision-
making discretion in the implementation of public policy, 
bureaucrats in the patrimonial offices of patronage democracies 
typically have good reasons to shun it. Their main interest and focus 
will be to keep politicians in good humour, by refraining from active 
and intimate dealings with clienteles and from meddling into 
                                                                                                                                          
in a maze of official titles whose meaning seems to change quite arbitrarily” 
(Weber 1978: 1030). 
285 Or, as Weber argued the same point a little more laboriously: “The 
office and the exercise of public authority serve the ruler and the official on 
which the office was bestowed, they do not serve impersonal purposes” (Weber 
1978: 1031). 
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redistributive decisionmaking. Future research could further 
explore these hypothesised connections between patronage 
democracy, patrimonialism and unrepresentative bureaucracy. 
Likely candidates for such research would be other substantive 
policy sectors in the Indian polity such as education, health and 
policing, other patronage-democratic polities in Africa (Nigeria, 
Zambia, Senegal), Latin America (Argentina, Mexico) and the post 
communist world, as well as ethnically plural clientelist post-
industrial polities such as Belgium.286  
 
(2) Client demand for active representation in patronage democracies is 
likely to be low 
 
If democracies function as patronage democracies this will also have 
repercussions for the benefit-seeking strategies of policy clients. As I 
have shown, the most important reason why (untouchable) clients 
in Sitapur do not approach bureaucrats for policy benefits is because 
they do not expect –and rightly so- that bureaucrats can do their 
work as well as politicians can. Since politicians tend to appropriate 
bureaucratic discretion in their quest for patronage, clients have 
good reasons to approach politicians rather than bureaucrats. 
Bureaucrats may also be much more difficult to approach than 
politicians, given their incentive to keep their contacts with clients to 
a bare minimum (see above). Ethnic ties or commonalities may be 
important in benefit-seeking in patronage democracies. However, 
such ties will tend to be important in complicating or galvanizing 
                                                
286 Going by the evidence presented by other students, further research in 
other Indian policy sectors would probably be not very fruitful as far as 
falsification of these hypotheses is concerned, however. According to Paul Brass, 
“the post-Independence structure of political-bureaucratic relationships has [. .] 
been fundamentally transformed in the direction of a patrimonial regime in which 
the political leadership selects officers who are personally loyal, who serve their 
narrow political interests, and who expect reciprocal preferments in return” 
(Brass 1995 (1990): 55, my emphasis). If widespread and systematic frontline 
abandonment by DLBs were to be taken as a fair indicator of patrimonially 
induced discretion shunning, Indian policy sectors such as education and 
health would seem to be very unlikely arenas for the operation of 
representative bureaucracy (see Banerjee and Duflo 2006; Drèze and Gazdar 
1996: 65-6, 79). 
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relations between clients and politicians, not those between clients 
and bureaucrats. Hence, the more political democracies function as 
patronage democracies, the less clients’ demand for active 
representation. 
 Future research on benefit-seeking strategies of clients in 
patronage democracies might focus on the same polities as 
mentioned under (1). In as far as these polities have been described 
in earlier scholarly treatments as examples of the so-called “patron-
client model” of politics, new empirical research should explicitly 
allow for the possibility that clients in these polities need not be the 
“pavlovian agents” that this literature has often taken them to be. 
Like the north Indian dust-level clients discussed in this study, 
clients in other patronage democracies may well act, react and 
engage in many different ways to the realities and logic of patronage 
politics, of which voting in exchange for favours and services is but 
one of the many imaginable ones. They may pursue alternatives to 
voting such as brokerage, office seeking and party militancy, for 
example, or refrain from seeking engagement with state officials and 
public benefits altogether (cf. e.g. Auyero 1999: 300-1; Hilgers 2006). 
 
(3) Categories are not groups. This is likely to negatively affect their 
groupness 
 
As this study has illustrated, passive representation, clearly, cannot 
be expected to translate into active representation for any kind of 
collectivity. Indian untouchables are, for most intents and purposes, 
better understood as a category rather than a group. Though 
differentiating those Indian individuals who possess and share the 
attribute of untouchability from those who do not, may be quite 
useful for various purposes –untouchability, for example, is a fairly 
reliable indicator of poverty, level of education, land possession, 
employment opportunities, calorie intake etc.- it has turned out to 
be of little use in understanding people’s behaviour as bureaucrats 
or clients of administrative programs. Untouchable bureaucrats 
behave much like “general” bureaucrats and untouchable villagers, 
similarly, seek public benefits in much the same way as other poor 
and low caste, though touchable, villagers do.  
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Simply because categories like “the untouchables” are easy to 
think or seem plausible ways to make sense of a complex world, this 
does not mean that they are also necessarily units of social action. 
Even if people have in common such a seemingly bizarre, far-
reaching and all determining attribute as untouchability, this need 
not mean that they are bound to share self-understandings, perceive 
common interests and act collectively to pursue shared objectives. 
Social categories, that is, collections of people sharing a common 
attribute, should therefore not be confused or conflated, at least not 
in principle, with groups, that is, with “mutually interacting, 
mutually recognizing, mutually oriented, effectively 
communicating, bounded [collectivities] with a sense of solidarity, 
corporate identity and capacity for concerted action” (Brubaker 
2002: 169).287 In other words, categorical memberships, as Brubaker 
and Cooper have put it, “imply nothing about the depth, resonance, or 
power of [. .] categories in the lived experience of the persons so 
categorized” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 26-7). They are, at best, a 
potential basis for group formation or groupness (Brubaker 2002: 
169). Since social categories may have low, or altogether lack, 
groupness, this should appropriately temper our expectations of 
active representation in the case of categories. Active representation, 
after all, requires high groupness.  
Distinguishing between categories and groups may not only 
help us account for unrepresentative bureaucracies; it may also help 
account for and alert us to the possibility that levels of active 
representation for sub-categorical segments may be higher than for 
the category as a whole. Categories often comprise of sub segments 
that, unlike the category as a whole, are groups or, at least, have 
more group-like qualities. Each of the different untouchable jatis 
                                                
287 This is, of course, as Brubaker and Cooper admit, a rather exigent 
definition of groups for which only very few real-world groups would seem to 
be able to qualify. Their important point is, however, that for some collectivity 
to qualify as a group its “members” should be bound by more than categorical 
commonality. This “more” is “relational connectedness” (by which I 
understand, with Yamagishi and Kiyonari, “the existence of actual or imaginary 
interactions” (Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000: 116)) supplemented by what 
Weber called a Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl (a feeling of belonging together) 
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 20). 
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discussed in this study, for example, possesses more groupness than 
the category of untouchables as a whole which, as we have seen, is 
primarily characterized by disunity and low groupness (precisely 
because of the higher groupness of and mutual hostility among its 
constituent elements). Even if I myself did not observe active 
representation in the case of jatis, it certainly seems more likely to 
occur in their case than in the case of the composite category of 
untouchables. Sally Selden’s suggestion that the absence of active 
representation for Native Americans observed by her might be 
explained by “crosscutting tribal loyalties” within the broader 
category of Native Americans similarly testifies to a theoretically 
fruitful sensitivity to the importance of distinguishing between 
categories and their constituent groups.288  
 
(4) In vertically stratified societies, the groupness of ethnic groups will 
tend to vary with their social status; the lower a group’s ranking in the 
ethnic hierarchy, the lower its groupness. The groupness of stigmatized 
groups is likely to be specially low.  
 
Even if we single out “real” groups, rather than categories, as units 
of analysis, this still does not mean that we may expect passive 
representation to translate into active representation. Even if group 
identity salience is high, that is, even if group members are willing 
to show solidarity and are desirous of promoting ingroup interests 
and extending preferential treatment to fellow groupmembers, they 
may still fail to do so. The reason is that group members may lack 
the requisite power to pursue ingroup favouritism in the face of 
outgroup efforts to prevent them from doing so. As we have seen, 
such a lack of requisite group power is also partly responsible for 
the absence of active representation on the Sitapuri dust-level. Quite 
                                                
288 Frank Thompson, in an important 1976 article, also asserted that racial 
communities “may, of course, be heterogeneous” and that “behavior which 
actively represents some segments of that community may not represent other 
segments” (Thompson 1976: 220). The suggestion implied in these remarks, that 
active representation may be higher for constituent segments (groups) than for 
whole “communities” (categories) has gone wholly unheeded by representative 
bureaucracy scholars, however: they have continued to prefer categories, 
especially minority categories, over groups in their research designs. 
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a few untouchable DLBs stressed that they wanted to do “something 
special” for their community, but insisted that they could not do so 
because more powerful and resourceful general bureaucrats were 
taking good care to prevent and sabotage such efforts. Likewise, one 
of the reasons that untouchable villagers usually fail to act en bloc is 
because they fear dabang retaliation. 
Indian untouchables’ low groupness thus in large part seems 
to stem from the fact that they find themselves at the bottom of a 
vertically stratified ethnic hierarchy, leaving most of them –even 
those among them who seem a little better-off– relatively 
resourceless and powerless and, therefore, unable to pursue ingroup 
interests, even if they actively resent their lowly status. If the case of 
Indian untouchables is any indication, it seems plausible to expect 
that members of other low status groups in vertically stratified 
systems of group relations, also, will find it difficult to actively 
promote and represent ingroup interests. Conversely, members of 
high status groups in plural societies will find it relatively easy to 
act corporately and display ethnic favouritism (as well as to 
sabotage outgroup active representation), simply because they have 
the power and resources to do so.289  
Other things being equal, in vertically stratified ethnically 
plural societies active representation by ingroup bureaucrats would 
therefore seem to be far less likely to occur for lowly ranked groups 
than for highly ranked ones. This should, moreover, be especially 
true of bureaucratic systems in the developing world where 
majority groups have been known for making special efforts to 
safeguard their hold over bureaucracy to secure their privileged 
social positions (also see chapter 1).290 Especially in these societies, 
                                                
289 Adam Herbert made this very point in a 1974 article with regard to 
minority administrators in the United States. Obviously having black 
administrators in mind, Herbert argued that little was to be expected of 
“minority” administrators in terms of active representation. They were held 
hostage by several powerful forces beyond their control and therefore had to 
overcome insurmountable odds in order to merely survive and advance within 
public bureaucracies (Herbert 1974; Murray et al. 1994: 411-2). 
290 Craig Jeffrey’s research (referred to at various points in chapters 5 and 6) 
on the economic strategies of the Jats in western UP highlights this point 
particularly well for dominant caste groups in India. 
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then, the opportunities for relatively powerless minority 
bureaucrats to impact, through active representation, public 
distribution flows to ingroup advantage may be extremely slight. 
Future research could probe more deeply into the question of the 
extent, modalities and forms of the impact of vertical ethnic 
stratification on groupness and active representation, preferably by 
using comparative research designs. As almost all ethnically 
heterogeneous societies are vertically ranked, at least to some extent, 
opportunities for such research are near endless. 
 Research into the questions of differential levels of groupness 
and active representation in ethnic hierarchies should have special 
consideration for stigmatised groups, a specific species of low status 
groups. Members of stigmatized groups, like members of ordinary 
minority groups, suffer from such concomitants of minority status 
as relative powerlessness and resourcelessness. But what 
distinguishes them from ordinary minority group members is that 
they are furthermore plagued by stigma, or spoiled identity, making 
them into objects of scorn, hatred, fear or -as in the case of Indian 
untouchables- disgust to members of majority outgroups. Given the 
great advantages arising from being considered “normal”, members 
of stigmatized groups, like untouchable bureaucrats in India, have 
good reasons to try and minimize the unwelcome effects of stigma 
by downplaying or concealing their stigmas.291 Members of 
stigmatized groups will thus tend to disidentify from their social 
identity and, by implication, from other “ingroup” members. This 
will be specially true of elite members of such groups, who –like 
untouchable bureaucrats- have more leeway in manipulating their 
social identities than less fortunate ingroup members who –like 
poor untouchable villagers- can be more easily suppressed, treated 
as stigmatised and, on occasion, be forcibly kept in stigmatised 
                                                
291 Frank Thompson already hinted at the debilitating effects of 
stigmatised group membership for active representation three decades ago: 
“[W]hen a racial group lacks pride in its origins, civil servants from that group 
will more readily feel ashamed of their backgrounds. They will be more driven 
internally to play down their racial roots and to assimilate. To this end, civil 
servants may ferret out feelings of sympathy for their racial group and shuck 
off as many accoutrements of their racial origin (e.g. speech patterns, styles of 
dress) as they can” (Thompson 1976: 213).  
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ethnic ghettos by hostile outgroup members. Besides, bureaucratic 
elites among the stigmatized would seem to have little incentive to 
endanger their fickle reputations and hard-won careers by styling 
themselves as ingroup representatives since the stigmatised 
community at large typically has little to give in return for their 
services.292 Other things being equal, the groupness of stigmatized 
groups will thus tend to be lower than that of ordinary low status 
groups, whence a specially low likelihood of active representation for 
such groups.  
 
(5) Groupness is likely to vary with the visibility of groups. 
 
The groupness of groups can vary because group identification 
involves individual choice. Individuals can and do make choices as 
to whether and when they will identify as members of a particular 
group. This also goes for ethnic groups. These are also characterized 
by plasticity; they are not, at least not as a matter of course, 
primordial givens (Barth 1996 (1969); Cohen 1978: 383; Ferdman 
1992: 344-5). As a general rule, individuals will tend to activate those 
social and ethnic identities that are most useful to them (Yamagishi 
and Kiyonari 2000: 127). Untouchable bureaucrats, for instance, will 
more readily identify as bureaucrats than as untouchables because 
identification as a bureaucrat brings social status and prestige, while 
identification as an untouchable invites contempt, abuse, 
discrimination and outgroup members’ withholding of social 
intimacy. 
                                                
292 As Roy and Singh describe the representational dilemmas of elite 
untouchables in a UP district: “[There is an] awareness [among elite Scheduled 
Castes] that in its struggle in retaining its advantages or in moving further in 
life the larger community is of little help. The larger community is still 
resourceless. As such, it is not in a position to render any help to those who are 
not only far ahead in the race of life but also require such assistance as is 
beyond the reach of the larger community . . . . Surely they entertain the idea 
that [. .] they would be able to do something worthwhile for their community. 
However, the very path they have chosen prevents them from effectively 
identifying themselves with the problems of their community and making 
serious attempts to solve them. It puts distance between them and their 
community and arouses suspicion about their intent” (Roy and Singh 1987: 122, 
118). 
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 To say that ethnic identification involves individual choice is 
not to say that such choices are completely free. As I pointed out 
above, it is easier for elite untouchables to disidentify from their 
stigmatised ethnic identity than it is for ordinary untouchables 
because the latter can more easily be forced by outgroups to identify 
as untouchables even if they would rather not do so. Outgroup 
power may thus be an important factor in constraining individuals’ 
identificatory choices. Another such important constraining factor is 
the visibility, ascertainability or “known-aboutness” (Goffman 1963) 
of a particular identity or group membership. An individual’s 
membership in a particular group may be so straightforward to 
outsiders that there is simply no use in trying to hide or suppress 
one’s identity. This is, of course, the case for untouchable villagers 
whose identity is usually known about by fellow villagers, or can 
otherwise be readily ascertained by outsiders by their names and 
the location of their homes (cf. Berreman 1979: 167).  
An untouchable bureaucrat’s identity as an untouchable, on 
the other hand, is far less visible to outsiders. In the cities and 
towns, where most of them live, they can often rather easily 
disappear in the anonymous “white-shirted mass” of other white-
collar workers. Besides, as Isaacs has perceptively noted, “in the 
busy-busy preoccupation of each one with his own concerns, and 
the trivialities that pass for talk between desks or over tea or soft 
drinks in the canteen, the prickly question of one’s caste identity 
might just never arise, especially if one is careful to steer the talk 
away if it ever threatens to wander in that direction. Friendly 
associations can be maintained especially if they stay casual, if they 
are not allowed to carry over too far into the non-working hours, or 
to get too personal. In this way for a considerable time of every day 
and in a considerable area of life, one’s identity as an ex-
Untouchable can be quite largely effaced, or at least kept out of 
sight. It is not so much a matter of hiding one’s caste but more a 
matter [. .] of not announcing it” (Isaacs 1965: 131-2).  
In other words, whether one’s membership in a particular 
ethnic group is readily visible or, rather, may easily be kept hidden 
in the ordinary course of social interaction, is thus bound to have a 
decisive effect on one’s capacity to disidentify from it. Since they are 
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physically indistinguishable from members of other castes, 
untouchable bureaucrats in India, for instance, will find it easier to 
disidentify than African American bureaucrats in the United States, 
most of whom cannot so easily conceal or suppress the skin-colour 
which sets them apart from the rest of the population (as Sylvester 
Murray, a black city manager from San Diego, put it: “I am black. 
There is no doubt about it. I cannot pass for white” (Murray 1988: 
74)).293 Because membership in them provides both strong incentives 
and excellent opportunities for disidentification, groupness is likely 
to be lowest for “groups” like Indian elite untouchables who are 
lowly ranked, stigmatised and possess invisible characteristics.294  
 Even if disidentification by way of capitalizing on invisible 
group characteristics would seem to be preferred strategy of 
members of lowly ranked stigmatized groups, it may equally be 
pursued by “normal” individuals, including those who belong to 
ethnic majority groups. As far as bureaucrats are concerned, such 
passing may occur whenever bureaucrats feel that ingroup demands 
for partiality or advocacy cannot be reconciled with their 
professional role conceptions as neutral and impartial 
administrators, for example (Herbert 1974: 563; Selden 1997a: 118; 
Selden et al. 1998: 720). 
 
Summing up 
 
Though it is quite imaginable that passive representation may have 
its uses as a control on biased bureaucracies, this use is clearly 
conditional. Bureaucrats may shun the discretion required for the 
operation of representative bureaucracy, just as ethnic groups may 
                                                
293 Passing, of course, is possible for (and has been known to be practiced 
by) light-skinned Afro Americans (Béteille 1977: 112; Kando 1972: 476). 
294 Needless to say that passing, however effectively pursued, does not 
somehow “solve” the problem of stigma. In the long run, façade maintenance 
may become “an intolerable psychological burden” (De Vos 1995: 34). Besides, 
it provides “various possibilities for being blackmailed” (cf. Goffman 1963: 96). 
The “humiliation” of passing figures prominently in the autobiographical 
writings of north Indian Dalit writers such as Omprakash Valmiki (Joothan, 
1997) and Surajpal Chauhan (Tiraskrit, 2002) (Wilkerson: 7). 
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fail to induce their members to act in the group’s interest. 
Bureaucrats’ willingness to utilize the discretion invested in their 
roles may be severely hampered in patronage democracies, where 
even street-level bureaucrats will find themselves spending much of 
their time and energy on keeping patrimonial patronage politicians 
in good humour rather than on channelling public benefits to 
nominal clients. Clients in patronage democracies, moreover, will 
not often seek out ingroup bureaucrats for public benefits because 
they have other, purportedly more effective options open to them to 
secure such benefits.  
The capacity of collectivities to induce their members to act 
solidarily in the pursuit of common interests, their groupness in 
short, may vary widely. Sheer categorical commonality is at best a 
basis for groupness, but certainly no guarantee. Bureaucratic 
members of lowly ranked ethnic groups may be willing to pursue 
group interests through active representation but be prevented from 
doing so by their lack of requisite power and other necessary 
resources. Likewise, ethnic minority clients’ efforts to demand active 
representation may be sabotaged by more powerful outgroup 
members. Groupness and active representation will be least likely in 
the case of stigmatised groups whose members have every reason to 
escape identification with their stigmas and, hence, with “their” 
group. Opportunities for successful disidentification are 
significantly improved when group membership is based on 
invisible membership criteria. The use of passive representation as 
an instrument of bureaucratic control is, thus, conditional: upon the 
type of democracy, the type of group and the visibility of group 
attributes.295 Both bureaucrats’ willingness to utilize discretion and 
the groupness of collectivities are themselves variables, not givens. 
                                                
295 Paul Van Riper, almost half a century ago, forefelt that representative 
bureaucracy as a control device might not travel well. “[T]o those at home and 
abroad who might desire to utilize the concept of a representative bureaucracy 
where it has never been in existence before [. .] one must offer a warning. This 
concept carries with it some profound implications for any social system in 
which it is implanted, suggesting –as does any for of representation- at least a 
modest acceptance of pluralism, pragmatism and compromise. These are 
explosive doctrines to nations and societies which are not used to them and not 
prepared to accept their practical implications, political, economic, and above 
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3 Suggestions for future research: two pleas 
 
I conclude this study with two pleas. The first plea is for appreciably 
widening up the currently dominant operational definition of active 
representation in terms of policy outputs; the second for more 
ethnographic studies of (un)representative bureaucracies. 
 
Widening up the concept of active representation 
 
In this study I have used the term active representation to refer to 
behaviour by group-identified bureaucrats through which they -
intentionally or unreflectively; directly or indirectly; by way of 
advocacy, partiality, neutrality or a combination of these; and more 
than outgroup bureaucrats would in similar circumstances- actively 
promote ingroup interests by seeking to supply ingroup members 
with substantive benefits. Bureaucrats might therefore be called 
active representatives whenever they were found to act as 
advocates, defenders and watchdogs of ingroup interests. In line 
with common research practice I put this definition to work in a 
policy implementation context. The assumption was, as it had been in 
other empirical representative bureaucracy research, that active 
representation, were it to occur, would take the guise of bureaucrats 
channelling more and better policy benefits to ingroup clients (or, at 
least, of efforts to do so) within their jurisdictions.  
I am quite sure that the untouchable DLBs whom I studied 
were not involved in such activities, certainly not regularly, 
routinely, let alone systematically. None of them, therefore, 
                                                                                                                                          
all, ethical. Therefore, it may well be that for some the old Federalist semi-
aristocratic civil service system, with its personnel selected through patronage 
but on a basis of relative competence may provide a better preliminary 
procedure. Or for others, some sort of relatively closed system based on an 
indigenous type of examination system may be more appropriate. Nations 
moving slowly toward full representation in legislative matters may find it 
equally appropriate to move slowly in ‘reapportioning’ their civil 
establishment. In details an almost endless number of patterns is possible” (Van 
Riper 1958: 558-9). In view of the findings of this study, Van Riper’s early 
reservations about the uses of representative bureaucracy in “semi-aristocratic” 
civil service systems and conditions of patronage recruitment appear 
remarkably far-sighted.  
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qualified as active representatives as defined above. Nevertheless, in 
and outside Sitapur, I heard about and met up with more than a few 
bureaucrats who could quite appropriately have been branded as 
active representatives, had not the definition I used disqualified 
them. Some of these “pseudo” active representatives, for example, 
were indeed (reputedly) channelling benefits to ingroup members, 
but not necessarily or primarily to ingroup clients in their formal 
jurisdictions. On the contrary, they used (or, depending on the 
informant, were accused or championed for using) their position 
and influence as bureaucrats to arrange jobs, contracts, policy 
benefits, school buildings, bank loans, rifle licenses etc.) for family 
members, other close kin, or jati fellows in their native villages.  
Some bureaucrats distinctly saw themselves, and were seen by 
others, as champions or representatives of the untouchable cause, 
but the way they filled in such roles did not involve the channelling 
of concrete or material benefits to ingroup members outside 
bureaucracy. Some, for example, were busy rewriting and 
reinterpreting Sanskrit texts and inventing glorious caste histories in 
an effort to create positive identities for the untouchables. Some 
were deeply immersed in the Buddhist conversion movement.296 
Others were active in scheduled caste unions to defend, extend and 
monitor the implementation of untouchable employees’ rights. Still 
others were closely allied to the untouchable BSP party and used 
their positions of influence to channel rent-seeking proceeds to the 
party’s war chest. Some untouchable bureaucrats were, in effect, so 
involved in party politics that they had become, for all intents and 
purposes, politicians rather than bureaucrats. I also encountered a 
few retired bureaucrats who were operating private educational 
enterprises to train untouchable youth as skilled labourers. Also, in 
the decade or so preceding my fieldwork, senior untouchable 
officials had more or less managed to “capture” a few entire 
ministries of the state government -including transport, social 
welfare and excise; a considerable resource base from which 
                                                
296 One retired IAS bureaucrat showed me a video of a recent conversion 
ceremony during which, he claimed, “thousands” of UP untouchables had 
adopted Buddhism as their new religion.  
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untouchables as a whole might profit, in terms of employment 
opportunities and patronage transactions.297 
All this is not to say that I found all of the above forms of 
“pseudo” active representation to be very prevalent or effective. 
What I do feel is that there seems to be no good reason to allow such 
forms of active representation to remain below the radar screen of 
representative bureaucracy scholars. They can tell us much about 
what group-identified bureaucrats actually perceive as ingroup 
interests, to which sections, if any, of ingroup members they feel 
morally obligated or psychologically attached, and about what role 
bureaucracies can be made to play in the political economy and 
electoral politics of the societies in which they are embedded. If 
anything, it will prevent representative bureaucracy scholars from 
making the mistake of presuming to know what the interests of a 
given passively represented group really are.  
 
More theory-driven ethnography 
 
What I hope this study has demonstrated is that there is much to 
gain –theoretically, empirically and conceptually- from the sort of 
micro-level, fine-grained, ethnographic analysis attempted here. (By 
ethnography, I mean, such data-gathering methods as participant 
observation, in-depth interviews, conversations, passive observation 
of interaction and covert observation of interaction (Tilly 2006: 410)). 
Zooming in on everyday bureaucratic practice and routines, on the 
beliefs, motives, sentiments and understandings of individual 
bureaucrats and their clients, and on the incentives and constraints 
provided by their wider physical, cultural and moral 
                                                
 297 Untouchable officials provided the large majority of principal 
secretaries and secretaries (the highest and most influential administrative 
functionaries) of said ministries in the 1990s. Out of the eleven IAS officials 
whom I am aware of having served as (principal) secretaries Transport between 
1993 and 2000, nine were untouchables. Likewise, nine out of thirteen IAS 
officers who served as (principal) secretaries Excise between 1990 and 1999, 
were untouchables. Barring the period between July 1995 and April 1997 (for 
which I did not manage to collect data), the highest administrative positions of 
the Social Welfare ministry have strictly been occupied by untouchable IAS 
officials.  
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“environments” can help us greatly in sharpening our theories, fine-
tuning our concepts, and teaching us about things we did not even 
know existed. More than that, it can also generate new theories and 
fresh intriguing questions to explore.  
This is not to say that ethnographers should simply get out 
there and start describing what they (think they) see. Fruitful, that is 
theoretically useful, ethnography should be theory-driven: triggered 
by intelligible answers to why-questions about empirical 
phenomena. And it is precisely to theory, our understandings of 
why the world is as it is, that ethnography can make such an 
important contribution. As Charles Tilly has put it:  
 
If you believe (as I do) that how things happen is why they 
happen, then ethnography has great advantages over most 
other conventional social scientific methods as a way of 
getting at cause-effect relations. Most methods depend on 
correlations and comparative statistics, asking whether 
observed variation corresponds to plausible consequences of 
one condition or another. Ethnography engages the analyst in 
looking at social processes as they unfold rather than 
reasoning chiefly from either the conditions under which they 
occur or the outcomes that correlate with them (Tilly 2006: 
410). 
 
The kind of research I advocate is still in very short supply. Very 
few public administration scholars actually have much first hand 
knowledge and experience of the day-to-day issues and problems 
that keep their objects of study busy. Political scientist have, for the 
most part, not shown much interest in the functioning of 
bureaucracies, nor have anthropologists or, with a few notable 
exceptions, sociologists. “The materiality of files, orders, memos, 
statistics, reports, petitions, inspections, inaugurations, and 
transfers, the humdrum routines of bureaucracies and bureaucrats’ 
encounters with citizens”, as Gupta has rightly remarked, “are 
remarkably under-studied” (Gupta 2005a: 28;  cf. also Jeffrey and 
Lerche 2001: 109; Punch 1986). If this study succeeds in persuading 
some that theory-driven ethnography of everyday bureaucracies is 
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useful, exciting and important it will have more than served its 
purpose. 
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I Defining Active Representation 
 
 
 
 
As is the case for most social science concepts, active representation 
means different things to different theorists. Since the concept is 
central to my study let me try and spell out as clearly as possible 
what, for the purpose of this study, will count as active 
representation and what will not. The term active representation 
was originally coined by Frederick Mosher, who used it to refer to 
behaviour whereby “the individual (or administrator) is expected to 
press for the interests and desires of those whom he is presumed to 
represent” (Mosher 1968: 12). Though Mosher’s original definition is 
obviously a bit nebulous and imprecise, with a little rephrasing and 
clarification it can be crafted into a clear and serviceable concept 
which may be readily operationalized for purposes of empirical 
research.  
 
(1) I use the term active representation to refer to actual behaviour. 
Unlike other forms of representation that involve few or no concrete 
behavioural acts or activities on the part of those “doing” the 
representing, active representation is essentially a behaviour on the 
part of group-identified bureaucrats. This behaviour may comprise 
of various and concrete acts, activities and strategies.  
 
(2) Active representation can be both conscious and unconscious 
behaviour: an active representative may deliberately and 
purposefully act for, or in the benefit of, given others, but he may 
equally do so out of an “unreflective tendency” (Hindera 1993a: 422; 
Stinchcombe 1986: 123).  
 
(3) Active representation refers to behaviour; not –as some scholars 
have used the term- to the real or potential, expected or hoped for 
substantive effects of such behaviour. In my definition, bureaucrats 
may be considered active representatives, even if they do not 
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produce substantive effects. The mere fact of their trying to do so is 
enough for being defined as active representatives. 
 
(4) Active representation is the active promotion of ingroup interests. 
One might think of various ways in which the passive 
representation of some group in the bureaucracy could translate into 
substantive benefits for that group. The very presence of ingroup 
bureaucrats, for instance, may restrain outgroup bureaucrats from 
acting on their biases; because they fear the formers’ disapproval or 
exposure, for example. In the longer run, ingroup bureaucrats might 
even resocialize, that is, change the values and stereotypical beliefs of 
outgroup bureaucrats and thus prevent them from harming ingroup 
interests. Also, the sheer presence of ingroup bureaucrats may 
provoke an increased demand for bureaucratic services and benefits by 
ingroup clients. In meeting such increased demand, bureaucracies 
may produce substantive effects for ingroup clienteles without 
ingroup bureaucrats ever actively engaging in the representation of 
ingroup interests (Lim 2006: 195-7). What sets these sources of 
substantive effects apart from active representation is that they need 
not involve much action on the part of group-identified bureaucrats: 
whatever representation they “do”, they largely do by simply being 
present, by being –in the vocabulary of representative bureaucracy 
theory- passive representatives. Active representation, in contrast, 
occurs when bureaucrats actively (seek to) influence the allocation 
of benefits to ingroup clients.  
 
(5) Active representation may involve advocacy, partiality or 
neutrality or a combination of these. Bureaucrats may actively 
represent their groups’ interests by advocating the discontinuation 
of (real or perceived) outgroup bias or discrimination. When active 
representatives take up advocacy roles they seek to represent 
ingroup interests indirectly, through influencing the behaviour of 
outgroup bureaucrats or other relevant others. Advocacy turns into 
partiality when bureaucrats’ ingroup bias leads them to attempt to 
provide more substantive benefits to ingroup members than to 
equally eligible, worthy or deserving outgroup members (see Lim 
2006: 195). As partial behaviour, active representation may be illegal 
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or otherwise objectionable (because it is felt to violate the norm of 
administrative neutrality, for example) but it is not always, 
necessarily or by definition so.298 Bureaucrats may also prove 
themselves active representatives by being neutral implementors of 
public policy. This form of active representation may occur in 
conditions in which bureaucracy as a whole is partial to specific, 
usually dominant, group interests. In such conditions, bureaucrats 
who belong to bureaucratically neglected groups may benefit 
ingroup clients a great deal by neutrally following implementation 
rules to the letter.  
 
(6) Active representation concerns the representation of ingroup 
interests. Whereas passive representatives represent the attributes of 
their group’s membership, active representatives represent the 
ingroup’s interests. Active representation thus goes beyond the 
sharing of common traits -shared skin colour, language, dresscodes, 
cultural practices, cherished values, religious beliefs and ideological 
convictions- with other ingroup members or feeling sympathy for 
them; it pertains to actual behaviour of officials in the group’s 
interest (cf. Pitkin 1967: 115-6; Thompson 1976: 202-3).  
 
(7) Active representation strictly refers to the representation of 
ingroup interests. Though it is perfectly imaginable that outgroup-
bureaucrats seek to promote ingroup interests, such behaviour does 
not count here as active representation.299  
                                                
298 Mosher himself saw active representation primarily as partial 
behavior and therefore considered it, at least in as far as it would “run 
rampant” in bureaucracy, “a major threat to orderly democratic government” 
(Mosher 1968: 12). 
 299 In a general way, people promoting the interests of groups to which 
they themselves do not belong is, of course, quite a prevalent phenomenon. Many 
whites, for instance, supported the civil rights movement in the US and the anti-
apartheid movement in South-Africa. In India, religious reform movements that 
have historically sought to improve the status and material conditions of low caste 
groups have often, if not typically, been led by high caste individuals. Labour 
movements have usually been led by non-labourers. And likewise, present-day 
movements in western democracies seeking to better the plight of the poor, ethnic 
minority groups, and asylumseekers are often organized by non-poor, ethnic 
majority, national citizens.  
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(8) Active representation is a relative concept. If, in a particular case, 
all bureaucrats, regardless of their respective group identities, were 
somehow to be found equally responsive to the interests of a 
specified group, singling out the responsive behaviour of ingroup 
bureaucrats as active representation would not make any sense. In 
other words, ingroup bureaucrats’ behaviour can only be considered 
as active representation when it tends to be more responsive to 
ingroup interests than outgroup bureaucrats’ behaviour in 
comparable circumstances.  
 
(9) Active representation of ingroup interests concerns the provision 
of substantive benefits. Defining active representation as interest 
representation still leaves room for, at least three, differing 
conceptions of group interests. These might respectively be called the 
formal, the democratic and the substantive conceptions. The formal 
conception holds that an active representative A represents ingroup 
interests whenever he produces outcomes that a passively 
represented ingroup member B would have produced had he been in 
A’s position and circumstance (Meier 1993b: 7-8; Selden 1997a: 42). 
The democratic conception considers active representation to be 
occurring whenever a bureaucrat does what the majority of ingroup 
members want (Thompson 1976). The substantive conception, 
finally, accepts active representation as occurring whenever group-
identified bureaucrats’ behaviour generates substantive benefits to 
ingroup members (Hindera 1993a; Hindera 1993b; Meier 1993b; 
Meier and Stewart 1992; Selden 1997a: 63; Thompson 1976: 203). 
 The formal and democratic conceptions have important 
drawbacks. What makes the formal conception problematic is that it 
does not allow for empirical verification. We simply cannot know 
whether B would have done the same as A. And even if we could, 
who would be the “right” B for establishing whether active 
representation has occurred in a particular instance?300 The main 
                                                
300 Meier and Nigro (1975) have suggested that B may be thought of as 
the congregated ingroup possessing the same expertise and information as 
active representative A (discussed in Thompson 1976: 9). While solving the 
formal conception’s theoretical problem of determining who is B, their 
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problem with the democratic conception is also operational: it is 
usually beyond the practical means and capacity of researchers to 
establish what the majority of some group wants. Besides, there is 
the issue whether what people want is also or by definition (in) their 
interest. Might people not be said to have “real” interests, regardless 
of what they (think or say they) want?  
 In this study I employ a substantive conception of group 
interests because, unlike the other two conceptions, it readily allows 
for empirical operationalization. It is easy to think of the sort of 
benefits that actively representative bureaucrats could provide: they 
might create or help shape policies that address ingroup problems, 
facilitate the allocation of public goods to ingroup members (and 
prevent the allocation of public bads), provide access to 
decisionmakers, reactively check or otherwise express disapproval 
of excesses or discriminatory behaviour by outgroup bureaucrats, 
or, more generally, make the process of governing more congenial to 
ingroup members (Hindera 1993a: 417; Lim 2006: 196; Meier 1993b: 
8; Selden et al. 1998: 727). A substantive conception of group 
interests is also quite appropriate here, since Indian quota seekers 
have typically and explicitly defended reservations as a vehicle for 
making sure that state benefits effectively trickle down to poorly 
represented groups. 
 
(10) The sort of benefits that active representatives can supply to 
ingroup members vary with the positions they occupy in the 
administrative hierarchy and the roles their organizations have 
created for them. High-ranking senior bureaucrats may promote or 
create ingroup-friendly policies, for instance, or use the authority 
and discretion invested in their roles to hire ingroup employees or 
seek out ingroup contractors for agency projects (Meier 1993b: 8). 
Street-level bureaucrats, by contrast, are much more likely to benefit 
ingroup members by supplying them with concrete program 
benefits or offering sympathetic treatment. Active representation is 
                                                                                                                                          
suggestion does not solve the operational problem of verifying the occurrence 
of active representation. To actually bring together even a small number of 
ingroup members with the same information and expertise as A would seem to 
be impossible. 
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thus not a certain, well-defined, characteristic activity (cf. Pitkin 
1967: 112): the concrete acts and activities making up actively 
representative behaviour may vary widely and depend on context.  
 
To sum up, in this study active representation refers to behaviour by 
group-identified bureaucrats through which they -intentionally or 
unreflectively; directly or indirectly; by way of advocacy, partiality, 
neutrality or a combination of these; and more than outgroup 
bureaucrats would in similar circumstances- actively promote 
ingroup interests by seeking to supply ingroup members with 
substantive benefits. Active representatives, in other words, are 
bureaucrats who act as advocates, defenders and watchdogs of 
ingroup interests and who try to provide concrete and tangible, 
context-dependent benefits to ingroup members.  
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II Rural development administration  
and political arenas in UP 
 
 
 
 
Geographical 
Unit 
No. Administration Politics 
State  1 Secretary Rural Development 
Director Rural Development  
Vidhan Sabha: Chief 
Minister (CM) 
Division 6 Commissioner 
Assistant Commissioner 
 
District 83 District Magistrate (DM) 
Chief Development Officer 
(CDO) 
Project Director (PD)  
District Development Officer 
(DDO) 
Zilla Panchayat: Zilla 
Adhyaksh 
Block  901 Block Development Officer 
(BDO) 
Assistant Development 
Officers (ADOs) 
Kshetra Panchayat: 
Block Pramukh 
Nyay 
Panchayat 
- Gram Vikas Adhikari (VDO) 
Gram Panchayat Adhikari 
(VPO) 
Obsolete 
Village  58.605 Gram Panchayat Vikas 
Adhikari (GPVA) 
Gram Panchayat: 
Pradhan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 308 
III Fieldwork hamlets 
 
 
 
 
village/hamlet 
 
gram panchayat 
(block*) 
 
population and caste composition main informants 
Ahmedabad Ahmedabad (B) Mixed caste, main settlement. Around 
2100 inhabitants, roughly 900 SCs. Jatis 
include Brahmins, Kurmis, Pasis and 
Chamars 
Assembled villagers (50), including 
pradhan Guru Bacan Lal (SC), BDC-
member Kaushal Kishore, and visiting 
VLO Khushi Ram (Chamar), Junior 
Engineer of the Public Works 
Department and driver of “touring” 
PCS recruits 
Akbarpur Ghaila (Pah) 25 families. Almost all Pasi, rest Kurmi (2) Hamlet’s biggest landowner Lalji Kurmi 
and around 15 others, both Kurmis and 
Pasis as well as a visiting Lala (Kayasth) 
Amaura Amaura Moti 
Singh (Par) 
Around 100 families: Pasi (30), Chamar 
(30), Kahar (10), Thakur (6), Bhurji (2), 
Tamboli (Chaurasiya) (2), Yadav (3), 
Lohar (1), Balmiki (1), Lala (2), Kurmi (1), 
Brahmin (2), Dhanuk (4), Muslim Nath 
(2) 
Assembled Pasi men 
Arro Arro Khamajatpur Thakurs, Brahmins, Guptas, Nau, Arak, Siraj (Muslim boy), Ram Ashis Pandey 
Appendices 309 
(Par) Bhurji, Badhai, Lohar, Teli, Chamar, 
Kahar, Pasi, Dhobi, Muslim Ansari and 
Sardar (Sikh) 
(Bhurji), Ravindra Singh Thakur 
(“Barakke”) 
Baragaon Baragaon (Par) Chaurasiya (700 persons), Thakur (200), 
Brahmin (300), Gaddi (Ghosi muslims) 
(700), Ahir (250), Pasi and Harijans (200), 
Chamars (150). 
Chaurasiya villagers, IAY beneficiary 
Muni Ram (Pasi)  
Bhaira Bhaira – 
Bhaikuntpur (K) 
Mixed caste village, including Muslims 
and Pasis 
Shahid Khan and Azmal Khan 
(Muslims) 
Bhawania purva Majhiya (Pah) Chamar (4), Pasi (15), Bhanghi (3), 
Pattarkat/Khanjar (probably Koris) (3) 
Untouchable villagers (unidentified 
jatis), visiting Kurmi landowner 
Chamaranpurva 
(1) 
Thaura (R) 30 to 35 families, all Chamars Bahadur and other assembled villagers 
Chamaranpurva 
(2) 
Ulra (B) 35 families, all Chamars Mahabir Prasad, Bhola Nath and ward 
leader Chote Lal 
Chamarbasti Arro Khamajatpur 
(Par) 
Population of around 350, all Chamar Assembled villagers (20-30), including 
Ambedkarite dramatist Mangu Lal 
Chandraseni Chandraseni (R) About 45 families: Thakurs (40), the rest 
Goswamy/Gosains (Brahmin pujaris, 
followers of Lord Krishna), and Chamars 
Village “landlord” Lallu Singh Thakur, 
pradhanpati Kanhai Lal (Pasi) 
Chitauni Thaura (R) 50-60 families: 5 to 7 Brahmin families, 
rest Chamars 
Assembled villagers, including Shivnat 
(Chamar) and a Mehtar man 
Dafra Ulra (B) Kurmi, Brahmin, Kalwar (Jaiswal), 
Chamar, Pasi, Dhobi, Bhurji 
Kota-operating and locally influential 
members of Dixit (Brahmin) family, 
local VLO Ram Naresh (Pasi), pradhan 
Ashirvadi (Pasi), visiting VLO Babu 
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Ram (Chamar)  
Fatehpur 
(Chamaran-
purva)  
Rikhauna (Par) Around 500 people, 25 bakris, all 
Chamars 
Puttu Lal, a licensed dead cattle 
remover; and Fakire, a beggar. 
Gaura Mahauli (K) Predominantly SCs Panch Ram Prasad 
Gausapur Arro  
Khamajatpur (Par) 
25 families, about 200 people. Two jatis: 
Yadav (75%) and Arak (25%) 
Middle peasant (60 bighas) Babu Ram 
Yadav, Neth Ram Vishwakarma 
(visiting Harijan from Arro) 
Ghaila Ghaila (Pah) Mixed caste, main settlement. Around 
135 families. Thakur (3), Pandit (3), Ahir 
(10), Nau (12), Kahar (11), Muslim (35), 
Chamar (13), Gadariya (shepperd) (15), 
Bhurji (12), Chikwa (butchers) (6), Darzi 
(1), Teli (3), Lunia (4) 
Assembled Chamar villagers 
Haibatpur  Haibatpur (B) Muslims (Jhula and Pathan), Chamars Muslim pradhan supporters; Medhai 
(Chamar) 
Karaundi Baragaon (Par) Yadav (35 families), Lodh (35), Pasi (80) Assembled Pasi villagers 
Korinpurva 
(new) 
Majhiya (Pah) Kori Daya Ram -an old man-, and Mewa Lal, 
in his forties 
Loniapurva Haibatpur (B) Around 85 voters; all Chamars Old BSP activist Baba Mahant, various 
by-standers among whom one Sant Lal 
Mahauli Mahauli (K) - Pradhanpati Mishra (Brahmin) 
Mahuwapurva Haibatpur (B) Ahirs, Lunias (saltmakers, probably 
MBC), Mangtas (beggars) and Pasis 
Ahirs (Yadavs) and Pasis, including up-
pradhan Nattha Ram 
Mamarkhapur Ghaila (Pah) Predominantly Kurmi, sprinkling of 
Muslim and Bedhia (landless “beggars” 
Prabhu Mahaut and family (Bedhia), 
assembled Kurmi peasants 
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who raise other people’s cattle; ST) 
Majhiya Majhiya (Pah) Pasi (30 families), Chamar (55), Murao 
(10), Thakur (6), Bhurji (5), Pandit (2), 
(Teli) 1 and others 
Old Thakur man, Nai up-pradhanpati, 
Pasi lekhpal, local VLO Ram Khilawan 
Rawat (Pasi), TRYSEM-trained youth-
weaver 
Nawabpurva Arro  
Khamajatpur (Par) 
50 families, 400 people. Harijan (22), Arak 
(16), Nau (1), Yadav (1), Dhobi (1), 
Pandits (7), and a few others 
Assembled villagers, including IAY 
beneficiary Janki (Harijan woman) and 
two panches from the hamlet 
Padariya Manikapur (B) Predominantly Pasi (50)  Pradhan Satrohan Lal (Pasi) and VLO 
Santosh Kumar 
Paisiya Paisiya (Sidh) Around 1600 people: Thakur (137), 
Brahmin (11), Kahar (95), Nai (70), Yadav 
(141), Bari (8) Muslim (113), Chamar 
(754), Dhanuk (16), Valmiki (6), Pasi 
(145), Dhobi (35), Nath (9), Badhai 
(carpenters) (25), Bhurji (“gram”-heaters) 
(5) 
VLO and local landlord Samar Singh 
(Thakur) 
Pasinpurva (1) Thaura (R) About 100 “houses” and 1000 inhabitants; 
strictly Pasi 
Assembled villagers (mostly youngsters 
and women) 
Pasinpurva (2) Chandraseni (R) About 350 inhabitants, almost all Pasis. 
Also Lala (Kayasth) (2), Lunia (3) 
Assembled villagers, including a 
postman and a panch from the hamlet 
Patara Kalan Patara Kalan (K) Mixed caste, OBC-dominated Pradhan Shyam Lal (SC) 
Patti Mahauli (K) 15 houses Female IAY beneficiary 
Piprakalan Piprakalan (B) Mixed caste hamlet Pyarelal (Dhobi), Rasool Ahmed 
(Muslim) and an old man called 
Maurya 
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Piprasa Haibatpur (B) Raidas (Chamars), Vermas (Kurmis) and 
Bhargavas (Pasis) 
Old Pasi man 
Rahika Ghaila (Pah) Total around 120 families: Pasi (60-70), 
Chamar (6), Nau (2), Darzi (muslim 
taylors) (5), Behna (muslim weavers) (2), 
Kurmi (40) 
Assembled villagers of most jatis in the 
hamlet 
Rikhauna Rikhauna (Par) Large qasbah (market) village. Half of the 
population is Hindu -Pasi and Pandit-, 
the other half Muslim (Ansaris) 
Mr. Shukla (Pandit) 
Ulra Ulra (B) Thakur, Lala, Lohar, Bhurji, Yadav, Mali, 
Kasai (butchers), Darzi and Pattarkatia  
 
Member of “local mafia” Bhupendra 
Singh Thakur, former pradhan Ram 
Yadav, local dalaal Mahendra Tripathi 
Lucknow village [District Lucknow]  Pradhan 
* (B) = Biswan, (Par) = Parsendi, (Pah) = Pahla, (R) = Reusa, (K) = Kasmanda 
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 Samenvatting:  
Onaanraakbare Bureaucratie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Het onderwerp 
 
De vraag die in deze studie centraal staat is of de aanwezigheid van 
groepsgenoten in de bureaucratie tot voordeel kan strekken van een 
etnische groep als geheel. Dit is een belangrijke vraag, al is het alleen 
maar omdat politici in multi-etnische samenlevingen vaak heel wat 
energie steken in het verkrijgen en verzekeren van de toegang van 
hun groep tot banen in de bureaucratie in de kennelijke overtuiging 
dat dit inderdaad het geval is. Daarbij is er momenteel een krachtige 
stroming in de politieke filosofie die de erkenning van etnische 
groeprechten in politieke instituties zoals de bureaucratie bepleit. 
Van niet-groepsgenoten, zo is de idee, kan nu eenmaal niet 
verwacht worden dat zij de belangen van andere groepen zullen 
behartigen, zeker niet als het gemarginaliseerde groepen betreft. 
Om na te gaan of, zoals representatieve bureaucratie theoretici 
het noemen, “passieve representatie” –de fysieke 
vertegenwoordiging van groepsgeïdentificeerde ambtenaren- zich 
inderdaad kan vertalen in “actieve representatie” –het nastreven 
van ruimere groepsbelangen door deze groepsgeïdentificeerde 
ambtenaren- bestudeerde ik de casus van India’s onaanraakbare 
bureaucratie. De term onaanraakbaar verwijst in dit verband naar 
individuen die behoren tot de allerlaagste kasten in het Indiase 
kastenstelsel, een sociale hiërarchie gebaseerd op noties van rituele 
reinheid. Hun aanraking wordt van oudsher als onrein beschouwd 
door leden van hogere Hindoe kasten.  
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Mijn keuze voor India’s onaanraakbare bureaucratie was, 
behalve door mijn persoonlijke fascinatie voor het onderwerp, 
ingegeven door een aantal inhoudelijke overwegingen. Ten eerste 
hebben honderdduizenden, zo niet miljoenen, onaanraakbare 
individuen zich gedurende de afgelopen zestig jaar een baan als 
ambtenaar weten te verwerven. Dit hebben zij vooral te danken aan 
het uitgebreide stelsel van positieve discriminatie dat door de 
Indiase overheid in de jaren vijftig, vlak na de onafhankelijkheid, in 
het leven werd geroepen. Dit stelsel kende tot voor kort  in de 
zogeheten “reserveringen” van banen en promoties in de ambtenarij 
voor onaanraakbaren haar belangrijkste pijler. Reserveringen waren 
ten tijde van hun invoering expliciet bedoeld om actieve representatie 
aan te moedigen: de gedachte was dat onaanraakbare ambtenaren 
als “waakhonden” de belangen van de onaanraakbare bevolking in 
het oog zouden kunnen houden, iets wat bezwaarlijk kon worden 
verwacht van de door hoge kasten gedomineerde “machinery of the 
old pattern”.  
Ten tweede zijn de Indiase onaanraakbaren een pariagroep par 
excellence, wier onbenijdenswaardige positie van oudsher 
gekenmerkt wordt door een opeenstapeling van hardnekkige sociale 
belemmeringen. Onaanraakbaren gaan traditioneel gebukt onder 
talrijke voorschriften (dwangarbeid, onderdanig gedrag, residentiële 
segregatie), verboden (op commensaliteit met leden van hogere 
kasten, op het gebruik van een groot aantal publieke en “luxe” 
goederen en diensten) en sancties (huisverbranding, marteling, 
publieke vernedering, aanranding, vergiftiging) die ervoor moesten 
zorgen dat ze op hun plaats bleven, gepaste afstand van leden van 
hogere kasten hielden en permanent herinnerd werden aan hun 
laagheid. Tot op de dag van vandaag zijn de meesten van de meer 
dan 150 miljoen Indiase onaanraakbaren extreem arm. Te 
onderzoeken of en hoe zij worden beïnvloed door 
overheidspogingen om hun positie te verbeteren leek me op zichzelf 
interessant en belangrijk: het gaat hier immers om een enorme 
bevolkingsgroep, bij elkaar zo’n 2 procent van de wereldbevolking.  
Ten derde leek me de idee dat, in India, onaanraakbare 
ambtenaren iets zouden kunnen betekenen voor hun kastegenoten 
buiten de bureaucratie niet vergezocht. Al sinds de koloniale tijd, 
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toen de zelfbenoemde “guardians” van de Indian Civil Service het 
“steel frame” vormden van gekoloniseerd India, is de Indiase 
bureaucratie bijna een synoniem voor discretie. Na de 
onafhankelijkheid, in 1947, vertaalde de nieuwe overheidskoers van 
centraal geplande economische groei zich in de oprichting van een 
groot aantal ambtelijke hiërarchieën met ruime en verregaande 
regelgevende bevoegdheden en discretie. In het “vergunningenrijk” 
dat in het spoor hiervan snel tot bloei kwam en waarin voor bijna 
alles wel officiële toestemming of een vergunning nodig was, 
verwierven ambtenaren al snel de soort van macht die absoluut 
corrumpeert (Dhavan 1997: 276). Ook tegenwoordig nog genieten 
Indiase ambtenaren een machtige reputatie en een hoge 
maatschappelijke status.  
Tenslotte was mijn keuze voor een studie van India’s 
onaanraakbare bureaucratie ook ingegeven door de wens om de 
grenzen van de representatieve bureaucratie theorie af te tasten. 
Toen ik, nu zo’n tien jaar geleden, met mijn onderzoek begon, had 
nagenoeg al het empirisch onderzoek naar het eventuele verband 
tussen passieve en actieve representatie zich afgespeeld binnen 
ambtenarijen in de Verenigde Staten. Hierdoor had (en heeft) de 
representatieve bureaucratie theorie een nogal parochiaal 
Amerikaans karakter: nieuwe bijdragen aan de theorie bouwden 
voort op bewijs en nadenken over Amerikaanse bureaucratieën en 
werden geformuleerd door Amerikaanse onderzoekers die zich 
voornamelijk richtten tot Amerikaanse collega’s, issues en debatten. 
Ik had het idee dat er wellicht heel wat te leren viel, zowel 
inhoudelijk als theoretisch, door het representatieve bureaucratie 
onderzoek weg te halen uit haar nogal in zichzelf gekeerde 
Amerikaanse omgeving. Ik denk dat ik gelijk heb gekregen.  
 
 
Het onderzoek 
 
De vertaling van passieve in actieve representatie is het centrale 
leerstuk in de zogeheten representatieve bureaucratie theorie. Het 
mechanisme dat volgens representatieve bureaucratie theoretici de 
vertaling van passieve in actieve vertegenwoordiging kan verklaren 
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is tamelijk eenvoudig. Individuele ambtenaren beschikken bijna 
altijd over discretie: de ruimte om keuzes te maken naar eigen 
goeddunken. Superieuren kunnen hun ambtenaren nooit helemaal 
en precies duidelijk maken wat er van hen verwacht wordt; en zelfs 
als ze dat konden ontberen ze meestal de benodigde middelen –
kennis, tijd, mankracht, geld en juridische mogelijkheden- en soms 
ook de wil en het doorzettingsvermogen om eventueel ongewenst 
gebruik van discretie door hun ondergeschikten te detecteren, 
monitoren en sanctioneren. Als gevolg van deze communicatie- en 
controleproblemen is discretie praktisch onvermijdelijk in grote 
bureaucratische organisaties en hebben ambtenaren vaak een grote 
handelingsvrijheid: in het interpreteren en vertalen van de betekenis 
van de opdrachten van hun superieuren, bijvoorbeeld, of in het 
bepalen van welke opdrachten ze zullen uitvoeren en hoe ze dat 
zullen doen.  
Ambtelijke discretie is geen probleem, zo menen 
representatieve bureaucratie theoretici, zo lang ambtenaren maar 
gerekruteerd worden uit, en hiermee een dwarsdoorsnede vormen 
van, alle relevante maatschappelijke groepen. Mensen met 
verschillende achtergronden ondergaan namelijk verschillende 
socialisatie ervaringen en maken zich en passant verschillende 
waarden, voorkeuren en vooringenomenheden eigen die vaak hun 
hele leven belangrijk voor hen blijven. Omdat ook ambtenaren zich 
bij de uitoefening van hun discretie zullen laten leiden door deze 
groepsgerelateerde waarden en opvattingen is het te verwachten dat 
zij beslissingen zullen nemen die de belangen, behoeften en wensen 
van “hun” groep weerspiegelen (of “representeren”). Mogelijke 
klanten van de bureaucratie zullen bovendien meer geneigd zijn om 
gebruik te maken van beleid dat voor hen bedoeld is als zij zich –als 
gevolg van hun groepsverwantschap- gemakkelijker kunnen 
identificeren met, en beter op hun gemak voelen bij, de ambtenaren 
die belast zijn met de uitvoering ervan.  
Doordat etnische groepen neigen naar een zeer sterke 
“groepheid” is actieve representatie in hun geval des te 
waarschijnlijker. Etnisch groepslidmaatschap, zeker in de etnisch 
diverse samenlevingen in Azië, Afrika en het Caribische gebied, 
kenmerkt zich vaak door stevige interpersoonlijke loyaliteiten en 
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door een sterke bereidheid van groepsgenoten om zich opofferingen 
te getroosten voor het belang en het welzijn van de groep als geheel. 
Dit impliceert dat actieve representatie wel eens het verwachte 
rolgedrag van ambtenaren in deze politieke stelsels zou kunnen zijn. 
Niet alleen is de kans groot dat zij speciale verplichtingen voelen 
jegens leden van hun eigen etnische groep; tegelijkertijd zullen zij 
ook beducht zijn voor eventuele groepssancties die hen ten deel 
zouden kunnen vallen als zij zich aan deze verplichtingen 
onttrekken, zeker als zij zich, als ambtenaar, in een prima positie 
bevinden om gunsten aan anderen te verlenen. In samenlevingen 
waar etniciteit sterk gevoeld wordt kan actieve representatie dus 
een heel rationele invulling van ambtelijke discretie zijn. 
Echter, actieve representatie kan, zelfs in het geval van 
etnische groepen, niet altijd en overal worden verwacht. Niet alle 
ambtenaren hebben bijvoorbeeld evenveel discretie. Bovendien 
kunnen zij werkzaam zijn in bureaucratieën die toevallig weinig te 
bieden hebben aan leden van de eigen etnische groep. Volgens 
representatieve bureaucratie theoretici wordt actieve representatie 
waarschijnlijker naarmate aan vier randvoorwaarden is voldaan: 1) 
de betreffende ambtelijke organisatie heeft een welwillende missie 
jegens de te representeren etnische groep; 2) het beleid van de 
organisatie oefent een zekere aantrekkingskracht uit op 
groepsleden; 3) de discretie van ambtenaren betreft discretie op 
“straatniveau”, dat wil zeggen, het concrete niveau waarop 
ambtenaren en burgers in direct, persoonlijk contact met elkaar 
staan, en 4) er is een kritische massa van “eigen” ambtenaren binnen 
de organisatie aanwezig. 
De zogeheten plattelandsontwikkelingsbureaucratie voldoet 
aan al deze randvoorwaarden en leek bij aanvang van het 
onderzoek dus een veelbelovende casus voor een empirische 
toetsing van de representatieve bureaucratie theorie. De 
plattelandsontwikkelingsbureaucratie werd in de vroege jaren 
vijftig van de vorige eeuw in het leven geroepen om handen en 
voeten te geven aan het nieuwe overheidsbeleid van geplande 
economische ontwikkeling van het platteland. Sindsdien is deze 
bureaucratie uitgegroeid tot een ingewikkelde hiërarchie van 
organisaties en functies die zich helemaal uitstrekt van “the center” 
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–de federale overheid in New Delhi- tot aan de ontelbare dorpen op 
het platteland. Wat ik in deze studie de “dust-level” 
plattelandsontwikkelingsbureaucratie noem beslaat de onderste 
twee lagen van deze hiërarchie, de zogeheten “blokken” en het 
legertje van dorpsontwikkelingsambtenaren.  
De “dust-level” bureaucraten (DLBs) die deze twee echelons 
bemannen (er werken geen vrouwen in deze functies) zijn belast 
met de uitvoering van een uitgebreid en steeds wisselend pakket 
van door de centrale- en deelstaatoverheid geformuleerde en 
gesubsidieerde plattelandsontwikkelings- en 
armoedebestrijdingsmaatregelen. Het gaat hierbij ondermeer om de 
introductie en promotie van landbouwinnovaties (nieuwe zaden, 
kunstmest, biogas), de voorziening van basisbehoeften (water, 
behuizing), de verbetering van de lokale infrastructuur (wegen, 
dorpszalen), de creatie van werkgelegenheid en het aanbieden van 
scholingsmogelijkheden. Het werk van DLBs komt in belangrijke 
mate neer op het selecteren van de begunstigden van de vele 
programma’s en, zodoende, op het verdelen van gelden, materiële 
zaken, aandacht, kennis en informatie.  
De “dust-level” plattelandsontwikkelingsbureaucratie 
beschikt, zoals gezegd, over de vier eigenschappen die 
representatieve bureaucratie theoretici associëren met een grote 
kans op actieve representatie.  De welwillende missie van deze 
bureaucratie jegens de onaanraakbare bevolking blijkt vooral uit de 
aanzienlijke quota’s aan beleidsvoordelen die in nagenoeg alle 
belangrijke armoedebestrijdingsprogramma’s voor onaanraakbaren 
worden gereserveerd. Deze beleidsvoordelen zijn bovendien zeer 
gegeerd. Het gaat hierbij namelijk heel vaak om geld, datgene 
waaraan de meeste onaanraakbaren nu juist een groot gebrek 
hebben. De manieren waarop de “dust-level” bureaucratie dit geld 
ter beschikking stelt –in de vorm van leningen met lage rentes, 
inkomen in ruil voor werk en subsidies- zijn bovendien veel 
aantrekkelijker dan hun voornaamste alternatief: het lenen van 
lokale geldschieters of woekeraars.  
 DLBs beschikken, althans op papier, ook over heel wat 
handelingsvrijheid op straatniveau. Zo zijn de formele regels die 
DLBs geacht worden toe te passen bij de uitvoering van het 
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plattelandsontwikkelingsbeleid buitengewoon complex waardoor ze 
veel ruimte laten voor eigen interpretaties en keuzes. Een grote “span 
of control” en de opeenstapeling van verantwoordelijkheden in de 
lagere regionen van de plattelandsontwikkelingshiërarchie beletten 
superieuren normaal gesproken om zich een adequaat beeld te 
vormen van de handel en wandel van hun ondergeschikten. De 
mogelijkheden voor effectieve controle worden verder verzwakt door 
het feit dat de streken en dorpen waar DLBs werken soms moeilijk 
bereikbaar en begaanbaar zijn. Dankzij reserveringen is er, tenslotte, 
binnen de Indiase bureaucratie aan onaanraakbare ambtenaren geen 
gebrek, ook niet binnen de “dust-level” 
plattelandsontwikkelingsbureaucratie.  
Om na te gaan of, hoe, wanneer en waarom deze gunstig 
geachte omstandigheden zich ook inderdaad zouden vertalen in 
actieve representatie verrichte ik tussen 1998 en 2000 zo’n 16 
maanden bestuursantropologisch onderzoek in Sitapur, een district 
in de centraal gelegen Awadh regio van de Noord-Indiase deelstaat 
Uttar Pradesh. Met bijna 140 miljoen mensen is Uttar Pradesh 
India’s meest bevolkingsrijke deelstaat. De sociale structuur 
verraadt er de belangrijkste trekken van een ideaaltypisch 
kastenstelsel. “Hoge” kasten genieten er de gecombineerde 
voorrechten van grootgrondbezit en hoge rituele status en bekleden 
er dominante posities in de landbouw, politiek, bureaucratie, handel 
en industrie. Uttar Pradesh is in veel opzichten een arm en 
achtergebleven gebied: de (kinder)sterfte-, ondervoedings-, 
armoede−, en analfabetismecijfers zijn er ongekend hoog.  
 Het district Sitapur is, net zoals de andere gebieden op de 
Gangesvlakte, zeer dichtbevolkt. Er wonen bijna 3 miljoen mensen 
op een gebied van nog geen 6000 vierkante kilometer; bijna 500 
mensen per vierkante kilometer. Topografisch gezien bestaat het 
gebied uit twee delen: een hogergelegen vlakte die ongeveer 
tweederde van het areaal beslaat en de oostelijke laaglanden die 
lokaal bekend staan als de gaanjar. De bevolking spreekt Awadhi, 
een dialect van het Hindi. Sitapur is in veel opzichten een doorsnee 
Noord-Indiaas district. De grote meerderheid van de bevolking leeft 
er in dorpen en verdient de kost in de landbouw. Er wordt vooral 
suikerriet, rijst en koren verbouwd. Hoge kasten, vooral Thakurs, 
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en, in sommige delen, prominente Moslim families bezitten er het 
leeuwendeel van het land. Behalve een paar grote suikerfabrieken 
en enkele steenovens is er weinig industriële activiteit in Sitapur. 
Een derde van de bevolking is onaanraakbaar en behoort 
grotendeels tot één van de twee grote onaanraakbare kasten in het 
district, de Pasis of de Chamars. Onaanraakbaren in Sitapur bezitten 
vaak kleine stukjes land maar bewerking ervan levert doorgaans 
veel te weinig op om hun families te kunnen voeden. Veel 
onaanraakbaren proberen te overleven met dag- en seizoensarbeid 
in de landbouw. Anderen trekken weg naar omliggende steden 
waar ze hun geluk beproeven als fabrieksarbeiders, bouwvakkers of 
riksjarijders. Veel kansen op beter, geschoold, werk hebben ze niet; 
de meesten zijn analfabeet. 
In Sitapur waren ten tijde van mijn veldwerk in ongeveer 280 
DLBs werkzaam, onder wie ruim 60 onaanraakbaren. In theorie 
hadden deze onaanraakbare ambtenaren talloze mogelijkheden om 
zich te manifesteren als actieve vertegenwoordigers. Zo zouden ze 
de onaanraakbare cliënten in hun blokken en dorpen bijvoorbeeld 
een dienst kunnen bewijzen door, heel neutraal, de 
uitvoeringsregels van de armoedebestrijdingsprogramma’s 
nauwgezet toe te passen (deze reserveren immers vastgelegde 
quota’s van beleidsvoordelen voor onaanraakbare beleidscliënten) 
of, iets partijdiger, zoveel mogelijk onaanraakbare begunstigden te 
selecteren. Of ze zouden kunnen proberen hun kastegenoten zo 
goed mogelijk te informeren over het bestaan, de regels en 
procedures van beleidsprogramma’s (het grote publiek in India 
weet vaak weinig tot niets over overheidsbeleid dat hen 
aanbelangt), eventueel discriminatoir gedrag van niet-
onaanraakbare collega’s intern aan de kaak te stellen of zich wat 
minder veeleisend te betonen wat betreft het vragen van 
steekpenningen in ruil voor hun diensten (een endemisch 
verschijnsel in India).  
 In de tijd die ik in Sitapur doorbracht observeerde, volgde en 
sprak ik -in overheidskantoren, op straat en bij mensen thuis- met 
een groot aantal onaanraakbare en niet-onaanraakbare DLBs en 
dorpelingen, alsook met vele lokale politici en andere bekleders van 
semi-politieke rollen die in India de kloof tussen staat en 
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samenleving overbruggen. Toch was het geen gemakkelijk 
onderzoek. De onderwerpen waarin ik het meest geïnteresseerd was 
-reserveringen, onaanraakbaarheid, kaste-identiteit en het 
functioneren van de bureaucratie- bleken zo gevoelig te liggen dat 
ik deze, om wantrouwen, problemen en ongemak te voorkomen, 
bijna altijd alleen maar met de grootste omzichtigheid kon 
benaderen. Toch denk ik dat het me uiteindelijk, met wat geluk, 
goede hulp en volharding, gelukt is om “toegang” te krijgen tot de 
“dust-level” bureaucratie van Sitapur.  
 
 
Het argument  
 
Hoewel ik naar Sitapur vertrok in de verwachting, en met de 
bedoeling, daar de basis te leggen voor een “grounded theory” van 
actieve representatie door onaanraakbare ambtenaren, hield ik 
uiteindelijk precies het tegenovergestelde over: een beschrijvende en 
verklarende analyse van een onrepresentatieve bureaucratie. 
Ondanks de ogenschijnlijk gunstige voorwaarden voor actieve 
representatie in Sitapur, bleken onaanraakbare DLBs zich namelijk 
zelden of nooit te manifesteren als actieve vertegenwoordigers van 
de belangen van hun onaanraakbare cliënten.  
De meeste DLBs -zowel onaanraakbare als niet-
onaanraakbare- ontvluchten routineus de frontlinie van de 
uitvoering van het plattelandsontwikkelingsbeleid. Om politieke 
straffen te ontlopen, hun banen veilig te stellen en succesvol te 
overleven in turbulente factiepolitieke omgevingen, verpachten zij 
op massale schaal hun discretionaire vrijheden aan politieke 
makelaars. Daarbij hebben onaanraakbare DLBs, in een poging om 
het probleem van hun gestigmatiseerde identiteit enigszins draaglijk 
te maken, de neiging om zichzelf onzichtbaar te maken als 
onaanraakbaren. Frontliniedesertie en identiteitsverhulling zijn zo 
gemeengoed dat ze actieve representatie door onaanraakbare DLBs 
zeer onwaarschijnlijk maken. 
Alhoewel de regels die de implementatie van 
plattelandsontwikkelingsbeleid structureren, in theorie althans, 
aanzienlijke discretionaire macht aan DLBs delegeren, maken maar 
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zeer weinig DLBs gebruik van deze macht. DLBs bezoeken zelden 
de dorpen in hun rayons en zien, dus, maar weinig stof. Ze 
beperken hun rondreizen door hun rayon tot een minimum en 
bezoeken meestal alleen die personen die lokaal invloedrijk zijn. 
DLBs weten dan ook maar weinig te vertellen over de 
ontwikkelingsactiviteiten in “hun” dorpen. DLBs, ongeacht hun 
precieze kaste-identiteit hebben, zo bleek mij al snel, de frontlinie 
van de uitvoering van plattelandsontwikkelingsbeleid grotendeels 
verlaten.  
Het wijdverbreide absenteïsme van de DLBs in Sitapur 
betekent niet dat de vruchten van de 
armoedebestrijdingsprogramma’s de plattelandsbevolking niet 
bereiken. Integendeel, ondanks DLBs’ desertie van de frontlinie, 
worden er wel degelijk begunstigden van beleidsprogramma’s 
geselecteerd en beleidsvoordelen verspreid. Het zijn normaal 
gesproken echter niet de ambtenaren van de 
plattelandsontwikkelingsbureaucratie die deze beslissingen nemen 
maar lokale politici ofwel, zoals ze meestal worden genoemd, lokale 
neta’s. Door selectie- en verdeelbeslissingen voor hun rekening te 
nemen, slokken neta’s in feite de de iure discretionaire macht van 
DLBs op. Plattelandsontwikkeling blijkt, met andere woorden, in de 
praktijk vooral een zaak van politici te zijn.  
De meeste politici in Sitapur (en elders in India) opereren op 
basis van de gedachte dat de stemmen en groepssteun die zij nodig 
hebben om hun politieke ambities te verwezenlijken het best kan 
worden verworven door zich als patroons te gedragen tegenover 
hun kiezers: ze besteden het leeuwendeel van hun tijd en energie 
aan het lokaliseren, bemachtigen en verdelen van patronage. In de 
Indiase politiek kunnen bijna alle publieke goederen en diensten –
denk aan overheidsbanen, waterputten, onderdak, wegen, 
grondeigendom, scholen, telefoon- en elektriciteitsaansluitingen, 
water, politiebescherming, pensioenen en dus ook de subsidies, 
leningen en werkgelegenheid van de 
armoedebestrijdingsprogramma’s- worden omgezet in patronage en 
vaak gebeurt dit ook. 
Om deze patronage beschikbaar te kunnen stellen aan hun 
cliënten zijn neta’s sterk afhankelijk van de samenwerking en 
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medeplichtigheid van DLBs. Zo zijn neta’s afhankelijk van 
ambtenaren voor betrouwbare informatie over de soort en 
hoeveelheid van de beleidsvoordelen die beschikbaar zijn voor 
“allocatie” in hun kieskringen. Neta’s moeten ook op ambtenaren 
vertrouwen voor het bewaren van geheimhouding. Omdat 
(voortdurende) onwetendheid van dorpelingen essentieel is voor 
hun overleving als politieke patroons hebben neta’s er immers alle 
belang bij dat DLBs de verspreiding van relevante informatie over 
beleidsvoordelen onder mogelijke cliënten actief beknotten. 
Daarnaast zijn neta’s meestal ook aangewezen op de hulp van 
ambtenaren voor het in orde brengen van het nodige papierwerk. 
Om narigheid, zoals officiële inspecties van centrale instanties, te 
voorkomen is het namelijk cruciaal dat officiële papieren de door 
centrale beleidsactoren wenselijk geachte procedures en uitkomsten 
documenteren en weerspiegelen, in plaats van de van 
patronagetransacties doorspekte (en hiermee illegale) 
allocatiepraktijk.  
De meeste DLBs in Sitapur zien niet goed in waarom zij de 
belangrijke neta’s in hun werkgebied hun samenwerking zouden 
onthouden. Zo kunnen zij tamelijk gemakkelijk gedisciplineerd en 
gestraft worden door politici die hen onbehulpzaam achten. Het 
belangrijkste en meest gebruikte controle-instrument van Indiase 
neta’s is hun macht om ambtenaren van de ene naar de andere post 
en locatie over te plaatsen. DLBs hebben over het algemeen een 
sterke afkeer van posten in afgelegen, primitieve (“backward”) en 
“feodale” locaties, zeker als het daar ook nog eens wemelt van 
lokale “maffia’s”: netwerken of families die politieke en 
economische macht combineren en het gebruik van fysiek geweld 
tegen hun onwelgevallige elementen niet schuwen. DLBs zijn dan 
ook bereid erg ver te gaan om te voorkomen dat zij overgeplaatst 
worden naar dergelijke “strafposten”: als samenwerking met lokale 
neta’s blijkbaar de prijs is die hiervoor betaald moet worden zijn de 
meesten hiertoe graag bereid. 
Een andere veelgebruikte methode om ambtelijke 
inschikkelijkheid af te dwingen is het in diskrediet brengen of 
besmeuren van de reputaties van DLBs. Heel vaak gaat het hierbij 
om beschuldigingen van corruptie. Zulke beschuldigingen kunnen 
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zeer schadelijk zijn voor DLBs omdat ze bij collega’s en superieuren 
de indruk kunnen wekken dat zij hun werk eigenlijk niet goed 
aankunnen. DLBs die zich herhaaldelijk de woede van lokale neta’s 
op de hals halen, hun reputaties bezoedeld zien, en rechtszaken 
tegen zich aangespannen weten kunnen over het algemeen op niet 
al te veel collegiale sympathie rekenen. Reputatiebeschadigende 
beschuldigen gaan daarbij geregeld gepaard met geweld of 
geweldsbedreigingen. Zoals ook in de rest van Uttar Pradesh, zijn 
politiek en geweld in Sitapur onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden: 
de bloei van politieke carrières gaat er hand in hand met de opbouw 
en inzet van geweldsmiddelen –spierkracht, (vuur)wapens- 
waartegen DLBs, die veelal alleen opereren, eigenlijk geen 
bescherming hebben. 
Behalve door middel van bestraffingen proberen politici 
ambtenaren ook met beloningen tot samenwerking te bewegen. 
Samenwerkingsgezinde ambtenaren weten zich vaak beloond voor 
hun hand- en spandiensten met een deel van de inkomsten (“rents”) 
die politici routinematig genereren met hun patronagetransacties. 
Neta’s hebben een neusje voor de mogelijkheden tot 
inkomensvergaring die de plattelandsontwikkelingsbureaucratie 
biedt: ze vragen of accepteren steekpenningen van dorpelingen in 
ruil voor het “werk” dat zij voor hen (beloven te) verzetten, romen 
ontwikkelingssubsidies af, en maken winsten met ingenieuze 
besparingen op infrastructuurprojecten. Een deel van het geld dat 
neta’s zo weten te verdienen dient als eigen inkomen; de rest is, 
gezien de ontoereikendheid of zelfs het ontbreken van officiële 
salarissen voor lokale politici, benodigd om hun politieke carrières 
uit te bouwen. Gegeven het grote belang van inkomen uit “rents” 
voor de meeste politici kunnen ambtenaren die bereid zijn tot 
assistentie bij het verzamelen ervan rekenen op aanzienlijke 
beloningen; ze kunnen er zelfs rijk mee worden. 
De discretiemijding en frontliniedesertie van DLBs worden 
voorts verklaard door het probleem van factionalisme. Politieke 
macht in “dust-level” Sitapur is zwaar betwist en blijft meestal niet 
lang onuitgedaagd: lokale neta’s zijn in de regel verwikkeld in 
uitgesponnen en meestal bittere gevechten met politieke vijanden. 
Deze gevechten nemen doorgaans de gedaante aan van 
Samenvatting 356
factionalisme: een specifieke vorm van politieke strijd waarbij losse 
coalities van factieleiders persoonlijke conflicten uitvechten over 
concrete issues die, in essentie, vaak gaan over de toegang tot de 
patronage die beschikbaar is bij ambtenarijen als de 
plattelandsontwikkelingsbureaucratie. 
Ook al omdat Indiase ambtenaren volgens geldend recht niet 
gepost mogen worden in hun eigen geboortestreek zijn DLBs bijna 
per definitie buitenstaanders in de politieke arena’s waarin zij 
werken. Hierdoor missen zij meestal de kennis die nodig is om 
factionele banden in kaart te brengen of om even adequaat te 
kunnen anticiperen en reageren op factionele conflicten als lokale 
politici dat kunnen. Indiase facties zijn namelijk per definitie 
buitengewoon instabiele, tijdelijke, ad-hoc coalities met constant 
fluctuerende lidmaatschappen. Dit alles heeft tot gevolg dat DLBs, 
in hun omgang met lokale cliënten en politici, nooit helemaal zeker 
kunnen weten met wie ze nu precies te maken hebben: met welke 
facties deze lieden verbonden zijn, bijvoorbeeld, of wat hun 
politieke invloed is en welke verborgen motieven ze hebben. DLBs 
zijn evenmin goed toegerust om te voorspellen welke risico’s ze 
lopen wanneer ze zouden besluiten om hun medewerking aan 
bepaalde figuren te verlenen (en deze, zodoende, aan anderen te 
onthouden).  
De meeste DLBs proberen zichzelf daarom te beschermen 
tegen de mogelijke, ongewenste gevolgen van factionele 
betrokkenheid –overplaatsing naar strafposten, 
reputatiebeschadiging, bedreigingen- door goede persoonlijke 
contacten te cultiveren met “grote” politici en ambtelijke 
superieuren die hen in geval van nood uit de brand kunnen helpen. 
Op een meer dagelijkse basis proberen DLBs factionele problemen te 
ontvluchten door nauwgezet de indruk weg te nemen dat zij de kant 
zouden hebben gekozen van een specifieke factie zonder hiermee, 
tegelijkertijd, onbehulpzaam te lijken. Dit blijkt maar al te vaak een 
zeer moeilijke evenwichtsoefening die een uitgekiende combinatie 
van frontliniedesertie, uitbesteding van routine taken en sociale 
vaardigheden vereist. DLBs maken dan ook geregeld “fouten” en 
worden zo gestraft voor handelingen of nalatigheden die ze 
eigenlijk nauwelijks hadden kunnen vermijden. 
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Deze onplezierige werkomstandigheden maken dat DLBs, 
ongeacht hun kaste-achtergrond, zich meestal hulpeloos, 
ongerespecteerd en ontmoedigd voelen. Velen hebben zich 
neergelegd bij de idee dat ze weinig kunnen betekenen voor de 
arme plattelandsbevolking. Ook zijn ze vaak uitermate kritisch over 
de beleidsprogramma’s die zij geacht worden uit te voeren omdat 
deze, zo vinden ze, juist factionalisme en “groepisme” in de dorpen 
veroorzaken. Als het niet zo moeilijk was om elders emplooi te 
vinden, zouden veel DLBs er waarschijnlijk voor kiezen om de 
plattelandsontwikelingsbureaucratie te verlaten.  
Bovenop DLBs’ algemene teleurstelling over hun werk, 
organisatie en clientèle komt nog eens de disidentificatie van 
onaanraakbare DLBs met hun eigen gestigmatiseerde identiteit en met 
hun eigen groepsgenoten. Onaanraakbare DLBs zijn er over het 
algemeen van overtuigd dat ze niks speciaals voor hun eigen 
“gemeenschap” kunnen doen omdat hoge kasten in en rondom de 
plattelandsontwikkelingsorganisatie hen beletten de hiervoor 
benodigde macht en eigen “kanalen” op te bouwen. Om hun leven 
binnen de organisatie draaglijk te houden voelen veel 
onaanraakbare ambtenaren zich genoodzaakt om niet te koop te 
lopen met hun onaanraakbare identiteit, laat staan dat ze zich 
zouden profileren als actieve vertegenwoordigers van de 
onaanraakbare zaak. Velen proberen juist om hun associatie met 
onaanraakbaarheid te ontvluchten door middel van een aantal 
zogeheten “passing”-strategieën: strategieën die bij buitenstaanders 
de indruk moeten wekken dat ze eigenlijk helemaal niet 
onaanraakbaar zijn. Nogal wat onaanraakbare DLBs hebben 
bijvoorbeeld hun achternaam –die in India vaak iemands kaste-
identiteit prijsgeeft- veranderd in een naame die hoge(re) kaste-
status suggereert. Ook proberen ze al te intensief contact met 
kastegenoten te vermijden. Het resultaat van dit alles is echter wel 
dat onaanraakbare DLBs praktisch onherkenbaar, en hiermee 
letterlijk “onaanraakbaar”, worden voor kastegenoten in hun 
clientèle. 
Het wijdverbreide gebruik van frontliniedesertie, defensief 
terugdeinzen en identiteitsverhulling als overlevingsstrategieën 
impliceert dat van de actieve representatie van de beleidsbelangen 
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van “ingroep” cliënten door onaanraakbare DLBs nauwelijks sprake 
kan zijn. In de normale, dagelijkse praktijk hebben onaanraakbare 
DLBs noch de mogelijkheden, noch zwaarwegende redenen om zich 
als de zaakwaarnemers van onaanraakbare cliënten op te werpen. 
Het onvermijdelijke gevolg is, dus, een praktisch geroutiniseerde 
onderbreking in het aanbod van actieve representatie. 
Het feit dat onaanraakbare DLBs veelal druk in de weer zijn 
om hun eigen hachje te redden sluit niet uit dat onaanraakbare 
cliënten wellicht toch zouden kunnen proberen om hen te benaderen: 
om hun verkiesbaarheid voor beleidsvoordelen te bepleiten, 
bijvoorbeeld, of een speciale behandeling te eisen in de naam van 
kasteverwantschap. Echter, in de “dust-level” praktijk blijken 
onaanraakbare cliënten onaanraakbare DLBs zelden of nooit om de 
actieve vertegenwoordiging van hun belangen te vragen. Dit 
achterwege blijven van een vraag naar actieve representatie maakt 
het aanbod van actieve representatie door DLBs vanzelfsprekend 
des te onwaarschijnlijker: als onaanraakbare cliënten geen speciale 
behandeling claimen waarom zouden onaanraakbare DLBs dan de 
niet geringe persoonlijke risico’s lopen om deze toch te verlenen? 
In tegenstelling tot enkele decennia geleden worden 
onaanraakbare dorpelingen door hun onaanraakbaarheid an sich 
niet langer belet om de lokale ambtenarij te benaderen voor 
beleidsvoordelen. Hun vrijheid, ook hun bewegingsvrijheid, is fors 
toegenomen. Toch hebben onaanraakbare cliënten (evenals andere 
arme cliënten van lage kaste komaf) een uitgesproken voorkeur 
voor meer indirecte en informele, “politieke” methoden van 
beleidsvoordeelverwerving, met name voor stemmen en 
beleidsmakelaardij (dalaali). Zij vinden deze methoden niet alleen 
veel gemakkelijker en effectiever maar ook minder gevaarlijk dan de 
directe benadering van ambtenaren. Deze laatste methode wordt 
dan ook nauwelijks gebruikt als strategie van 
beleidsvoordeelverwerving. 
 De onder arme dorpelingen van lage kaste komaf (ofwel 
“cliënten”) meest populaire vorm van voordeelverwerving is 
stemmen. Voor hen is stemmen niet zozeer een uiting van hun 
voorkeur als wel een instrumentele handeling: ze stemmen veelal 
voor kandidaten van wie mag worden verwacht dat ze de 
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verkiezingen kunnen winnen en dat ze, eenmaal verkozen, 
beleidsvoordelen naar hen door zullen sluizen. Dit betekent dat 
cliënten in lokale verkiezingen bij voorkeur hun stem geven aan 
kandidaten van hun eigen kaste, gehucht of wijk. In de grotere 
verkiezingen, voor het deelstaatparlement in Lucknow of het 
nationale parlement in New Delhi, geven onaanraakbare cliënten 
hoe langer hoe vaker hun stem aan de BSP, een politieke partij die 
zich expliciet opwerpt als de belangenbehartiger van 
onaanraakbaren en andere “kleine mensen”. Arme dorpelingen 
begrijpen en accepteren dus de patronagelogica van de Indiase 
politiek en handelen er ook naar: ze gebruiken hun stem om hun 
“eigen” man of vrouw op de juiste plek te krijgen en hopen beloond 
te worden in het geval deze persoon er ook daadwerkelijk in slaagt 
om een positie te bemachtigen van waaruit gunsten kunnen worden 
verleend. 
 Hoe populair stemmen ook is, het blijft een erg 
onbetrouwbare manier van beleidsvoordeelverwerving. Zo is 
stemmen in Uttar Pradesh niet altijd vrij. Kiezers worden er, ofwel 
door de inzet van brute kracht of door meer subtiele manipulaties 
van kiesprocedures, geregeld van weerhouden om hun stem uit te 
brengen. Er is ook altijd het risico dat de eigen kandidaat de 
verkiezingen niet weet te winnen of er, ondanks verkiezingswinst, 
niet in slaagt zich een patronagerijke positie te verwerven. 
Bovendien zijn veel neta’s, althans in de ogen van arme dorpelingen, 
getructe oplichters die er niet voor terugdeinzen om 
beleidsvoordelen achter te houden en hun eigen zakken te vullen als 
ze daarmee weg kunnen komen.  
Als stemmen niets oplevert kunnen arme dorpelingen op 
verschillende manieren reageren. Zo menen sommigen dat er 
eigenlijk weinig te doen valt aan politieke oplichters: zij berusten in 
het feit dat de overheid (sarkaar), ondanks de aantrekkelijke beloftes 
van neta’s, weinig voor hen kan betekenen. Degenen die over de 
nodige financiële middelen beschikken kunnen ook proberen om 
zelf een politieke positie te veroveren. Een ander alternatief is om de 
hulp in te roepen van een zogeheten dalaal: een makelaar, 
tussenpersoon of “rommelaar” die gespecialiseerd is in het 
losweken van beleidsvoordelen bij neta’s en ambtenaren. Dergelijke 
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dalaals zijn alomtegenwoordig in Sitapur en de vraag naar hun 
diensten is groot. Ze worden, als lokale mensen met wortels in de 
dorpen, meer vertrouwd dan ambtenaren, die juist meestal 
buitenstaanders zijn (en blijven). Bovendien zijn ze veel 
gemakkelijker te benaderen dan ambtenaren.  
Arme dorpelingen zijn vaak trouwens heel slecht te spreken 
over ambtenaren. Ze verwijten hen niet alleen een slechte 
benaderbaarheid maar ook onbehulpzaam en neerbuigend gedrag. 
Daarbij zien ze ambtenaren, net zoals de meeste neta’s, als 
onverbeterlijke oplichters die voornamelijk uit zijn op persoonlijk 
materieel gewin. Dit wantrouwen van arme dorpelingen jegens 
ambtenaren hangt overigens niet samen met eventuele verschillen of 
overeenkomsten in kaste-achtergrond: onaanraakbare en andere 
arme cliënten vertrouwen ambtenaren eenvoudigweg in het algemeen 
niet, ongeacht hun kaste. Hiermee is niet gezegd dat de inschakeling 
van dalaals wèl een probleemloze aangelegenheid zou zijn: dalaals 
vragen nog altijd wel een, vaak financiële, tegenprestatie voor hun 
diensten en om hen heen hangt, net zoals dat bij neta’s en 
ambtenaren het geval is, ook vaak een schimmige waas van 
oneerlijkheid en dubieuze praktijken. 
Ondanks de problemen en risico’s die ermee gepaard gaan 
beschouwen cliënten stemmen en het inschakelen van dalaals toch 
als de meest effectieve en haalbare strategieën van 
beleidsvoordeelverwerving. Een ander, niet onbelangrijk voordeel 
van deze strategieën is ook dat ze, in hun ogen, minder gevaarlijk zijn 
dan de directe benadering van ambtenaren. Door ambtenaren direct 
te benaderen riskeren ze namelijk lokale “dabang” tegen zich in het 
harnas te jagen. Op het platteland van Sitapur zijn dergelijke sterke, 
grootgrondbezittende kasten of families een centrale realiteit in het 
dorpsleven. De dabang zijn, zowel in politiek als economisch opzicht, 
erg machtig. Zo zijn veel quasi-landloze en in de schulden stekende 
dorpelingen van hen afhankelijk voor werk en pachtgrond. Maar 
meer nog dan op hun grootgrondbezit rust de dominante positie 
van de dabang in toenemende mate op hun toegang tot, en controle 
over, de lokale staat en al hetgeen deze te bieden heeft: subsidies, 
vergunningen, werkgelegenheid, infrastructuur, rechtsbescherming.  
De dabang hebben er dus alle belang bij, en zijn ook vaak simpelweg 
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in staat, om arme dorpelingen te beletten hun eigen toegang 
(pahunch) tot lokale ambtenarijen te bewerkstelligen. Vooral hun 
toegang tot het lokale politieapparaat is een bijzonder machtig 
instrument in dit verband. 
In theorie zouden onaanraakbare en andere arme dorpelingen 
kunnen proberen om zich te weer te stellen tegen deze 
monopoliseringsdrift van de dabang door zich te organiseren. Maar 
in de praktijk missen onaanraakbare cliënten hiervoor echter vaak 
de nodige macht en hulpbronnen. Een andere reden voor het 
grotendeels achterwege blijven van onaanraakbare collectieve actie 
is dat de onaanraakbaren zelf onderling erg verdeeld zijn; ze zijn 
nog altijd eerder een categorie te noemen dan een echte groep, 
verdeeld als ze zijn in verschillende kasten. Zo praktiseren 
onaanraakbare kasten onaanraakbaarheid onder elkaar, eten ze niet 
samen en huwelijken ze hun zonen en dochters ook niet aan elkaar 
uit. Soms is er sprake van sterke wederzijdse verachting, en bijna 
altijd van het nauwgezet koesteren (en betwisten) van onderlinge 
hiërarchie.  
Het gebrek aan eenheid onder de verschillende onaanraakbare 
kasten valt grotendeels te verklaren vanuit de logica van het 
kastenstelsel die kasten als het ware verplicht tot het ontvluchten 
van onderschikking aan juist die kasten die vrijwel even “hoog” of 
“laag” zijn als zijzelf. Hierdoor gaat veel energie zitten in het 
benadrukken van onderlinge verschillen en het kracht bijzetten van 
claims van relatief hogere status. Hun onderlinge fragmentatie en 
naijver zorgt ervoor dat onaanraakbaren op het platteland er maar 
moeilijk in slagen om hun niet geringe numerieke sterkte om te 
zetten in een effectieve en georganiseerde macht. Vandaar ook dat 
het hun maar zelden lukt om direct, achter de rug van lokale dabang 
om, de beleidsvoordelen op te eisen waarop ze feitelijk recht 
hebben. 
Nog eens samengevat: arme dorpelingen hebben een sterke 
voorkeur voor politieke methoden van beleidsvoordeelverwerving. 
Ambtenaren spelen nauwelijks een rol, zeker geen nadrukkelijke of 
directe, in hun voordeelverwervingsactiviteiten. In tegenstelling tot 
wat men misschien zou hebben verwacht, is er onder onaanraakbare 
cliënten dus nauwelijks vraag naar actieve representatie: ze vinden 
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andere alternatieven eenvoudigweg aantrekkelijker en minder 
gevaarlijk. Onaanraakbaarheid, zo blijkt, speelt in het beste geval 
dus slechts een zeer beperkte rol als organiserend principe in het 
functioneren van politiek en ambtenarij in “dust-level” Sitapur. De 
categorie “onaanraakbaren” doet, om met Charles Tilly te spreken 
“grenswerk”, of het werk van distinctie: het is veel betrouwbaarder 
in het definiëren van verbanden en het lokaliseren van verschillen 
tussen leden van verschillende categorieën dan in het creëren van 
interne solidariteit, homogeniteit of verbondenheid (Tilly 1999: 72). 
Dit alles wil niet zeggen dat onaanraakbare dorpelingen niet 
profiteren van het plattelandsontwikkelingsbeleid van de Indiase 
overheid, want dat doen ze zeker. Maar het betekent wel dat àls ze 
dat doen, de kans klein is dat dit te danken is aan het aanbod van 
actieve representatie van “ingroep” DLBs of aan hun eigen vraag 
hiernaar.  
 
 
De implicaties 
 
Mijn verklaring voor de onrepresentatieve onaanraakbare 
bureaucratie is essentie een economische: er doet zich geen actieve 
representatie voor omdat de betreffende ambtenaren niet bereid of 
in staat zijn deze aan te bieden en omdat de betreffende cliënten 
“hun” ambtenaren hierom onvoldoende vragen. Er blijkt, ondanks 
de schijnbaar zeer gunstige omstandigheden, dus geen markt te zijn 
voor actieve representatie op het Noord-Indiase “dust-level”, 
althans niet één waarin vraag en aanbod van onaanraakbare 
ambtenaren en cliënten bij elkaar komen. Het ontbreken van een 
dergelijke markt duidt erop dat twee centrale assumpties van de 
representatieve bureaucratie theorie -die van discretiemaximalisatie 
en “groepisme” (de idee dat verzamelingen van individuen met 
gemeenschappelijke kenmerken zich als groepen zullen gedragen)- 
niet algemeen houdbaar zijn. De door deze studie en de 
vakliteratuur aangereikte theoretische inzichten in de klaarblijkelijke 
determinanten van discretiemaximalisatie en groepisme suggereren 
dat actieve representatie, op zijn minst, varieert met de soort van 
democratie en groep in kwestie en met de zichtbaarheid van 
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groepskenmerken. Onrepresentatieve bureaucratieën, zo lijkt het, 
zijn vooral te verwachten in het geval van patronagedemocratieën 
en/of laag gerangschikte groepen in verticaal gestratificeerde 
samenlevingen.   
 Een voorwaarde voor actieve representatie is niet alleen dat 
ambtenaren, zoals representatieve bureaucratie theoretici 
benadrukken, discretie hebben maar ook dat ze bereid zijn deze te 
gebruiken. Mijn studie van de onaanraakbare bureaucratie 
suggereert dat de bereidheid van ambtenaren om gebruik te maken 
van hun discretie ernstig wordt beperkt in zogeheten 
patronagedemocratieën: democratieën, zoals de Indiase, waarin 
politiek vooral draait om het verschaffen van materiële en 
psychische voordelen aan kiezers in ruil voor electorale steun. 
Politici in zulke democratieën hebben goede redenen, en doorgaans 
ook de mogelijkheden, om de formele en informele discretionaire 
besluitvormingsmacht van ambtenaren voor zich op te eisen. 
Ambtenaren, op hun beurt, zullen zich –gezien de grotere macht 
van politici- gedwongen voelen om mee te werken aan de 
patronagetransacties van politici, in de hoop hiervoor te worden 
gecompenseerd met een deel van de door politici gecontroleerde 
voordelen.  
Ambtenaren in patronagedemocratieën zullen normaal 
gesproken ook meer oog en aandacht hebben voor politici, die hen 
kunnen belonen en straffen, dan voor hun eigenlijke cliënten, van 
wie zij veel minder te verwachten of te vrezen hebben (zolang hun 
relatie met politici goed is, tenminste).  Interpersoonlijke relaties 
tussen ambtenaren en hun cliënten zullen dus tot een minimum 
beperkt worden en, voorzover ze überhaupt bestaan, gekenmerkt 
worden door ambtelijke desinteresse, neerbuigendheid, plundering 
en afpersing. Omdat hun overleven, soms bijna letterlijk, afhangt 
van het behagen van politici en het onder de duim houden van 
cliënten, zullen ambtenaren, zoals de DLBs in Sitapur dat doen, 
vaak kiezen voor een combinatie van schijnuitvoering van beleid en 
een informele uitruil van beleidsvoordelen voor macht, invloed en 
samenwerking (cf. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002: 19). 
 Dus, hoe meer democratieën functioneren als 
patronagedemocratieën, des te onwaarschijnlijker het is dat passieve 
Samenvatting 364
representatie zich zal vertalen in actieve representatie. Daar waar 
ambtenaren in moderne, Weberiaanse bureaucratieën er wellicht 
vaak alle belang bij hebben om hun discretie in de uitvoering van 
beleid te gebruiken, zelfs te maximaliseren, hebben ambtenaren in 
patronagedemocratieën normaal gesproken juist goede redenen om 
discretie te mijden. Hun voornaamste doel zal zijn om politici 
tevreden te stemmen, door zich niet actief in te laten met clientèle’s 
en met redistributieve besluitvorming. 
Als democratieën functioneren als patronagedemocratieën zal 
dit ook gevolgen hebben voor de voordeelverwervingsstrategieën 
van beleidscliënten. De belangrijkste reden waarom 
(onaanraakbare) cliënten ambtenaren niet benaderen voor 
beleidsvoordelen is omdat ze er –waarschijnlijk terecht- geen 
vertrouwen in hebben dat ambtenaren hen even goed kunnen 
bedienen als politici. Bovendien zijn ambtenaren, die hun contacten 
met cliënten tot een minimum beperken, vaak toch al moeilijk te 
benaderen. Etnische verwantschap kan een belangrijke rol spelen in 
de verwerving van beleidsvoordelen in patronagedemocratieën. 
Maar een dergelijke verwantschap zal gewoonlijk van veel groter 
belang zijn bij het smeren of compliceren van verhoudingen tussen 
cliënten en politici dan die tussen cliënten en ambtenaren. Dit 
impliceert dat naarmate democratieën meer functioneren als 
patronagedemocratieën, de vraag van “ingroep” cliënten naar 
actieve representatie kleiner zal zijn. 
 Deze studie suggereert ook dat actieve representatie, behalve 
met de soort van democratie, ook varieert met de soort van “groep” 
in kwestie. Zo zijn Indiase onaanraakbaren in veel opzichten beter te 
begrijpen als een categorie dan als een groep. Het differentiëren van 
Hindoes op basis van onaanraakbaarheid kan best nuttig zijn -het 
levert interessante inzichten op over verschillen in armoede, 
onderwijsniveau, landbezit, werkgelegenheid, en calorieverbruik, 
bijvoorbeeld- maar het leert ons blijkbaar weinig over het gedrag 
van mensen als ambtenaar of beleidscliënt: onaanraakbare 
ambtenaren gedragen zich immers min of meer hetzelfde als 
“gewone” ambtenaren en de manier waarop onaanraakbare 
dorpelingen proberen beleidsvoordelen te bemachtigen verschilt 
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nauwelijks of niet van die van andere arme dorpelingen van lage 
kaste komaf. 
Het feit dat een categorie als “de onaanraakbaren” 
gemakkelijk denkt en nuttig lijkt voor het begrijpen van een 
complexe samenleving als de Indiase, wil dus nog niet zeggen dat 
zulke categorieën ook eenheden van sociaal handelen zijn. Zelfs al 
mensen een zo op het eerste gezicht tamelijk bizar, verreikend en 
allesbepalend attribuut als onaanraakbaarheid gemeenschappelijk 
hebben, betekent dit nog niet dat ze ook hetzelfde tegen de wereld 
aankijken, dezelfde belangen percipiëren of samenwerken om 
gezamenlijke doelen te bereiken. Sociale categorieën, dat wil zeggen: 
verzamelingen van individuen met een gemeenschappelijk 
attribuut, moeten daarom niet verward worden met groepen: 
“elkaar wederzijds beïnvloedende, op elkaar georiënteerde, effectief 
communicerende, begrensde verzamelingen van individuen met 
onderlinge solidariteit, een gemeenschappelijke identiteit en een 
vermogen tot gezamenlijke handelen” (cf. Brubaker 2002: 169). 
Sociale categorieën vormen dus in het beste geval een potentiële basis 
voor groepsvorming of “groepheid”. Dit zou onze verwachtingen 
ten aanzien van actieve representatie in hun geval 
dienovereenkomstig moeten temperen: actieve representatie vereist 
immers een hoge groepheid.  
Maar zelfs in het geval van “echte” groepen hoeft passieve 
representatie nog niet te leiden tot actieve representatie. De casus 
van de onaanraakbare bureaucratie in Sitapur laat zien dat actieve 
representatie achterwege kan blijven zelfs als groepsleden in 
principe bereid zijn tot solidair gedrag en het nastreven van 
gemeenschappelijke belangen: onaanraakbare ambtenaren en 
cliënten ontberen eenvoudigweg de benodigde macht om deze 
bereidheid in “vertegenwoordigende” daden om te zetten. Dit 
gebrek aan macht hangt direct samen met de positie van de 
onaanraakbaren in de sterk hiërarchisch georganiseerde Indiase 
samenleving. Dit doet vermoeden dat ook laaggerangschikte 
etnische groepen in andere verticaal gestratificeerde multi-etnische 
samenlevingen het moeilijk zullen vinden om hun eventuele 
vertegenwoordiging in de bureaucratie tot voordeel te laten 
strekken van de groep als geheel.  
Samenvatting 366
Dit zal zeker het geval zijn voor gestigmatiseerde groepen: 
groepen, zoals de Indiase onaanraakbaren, wier leden niet alleen 
relatief machteloos zijn maar bovendien veracht, gehaat of gevreesd 
worden door de rest van de samenleving. Leden van dergelijke 
groepen zullen de sterke neiging hebben om hun gestigmatiseerde 
identiteit, en hiermee hun banden met andere groepsleden, te 
ontvluchten. De kans op een dergelijke succesvolle disidentificatie 
wordt groter naarmate de zichtbaarheid van stigma’s afneemt: hoe 
moeilijker buitenstaanders kunnen vaststellen of iemand 
daadwerkelijk een stigma heeft, hoe gemakkelijker het voor 
gestigmatiseerde individuen wordt om zich als een “normaal” lid 
van de samenleving te gedragen. De relatieve onzichtbaarheid van 
hun stigma maakt bijvoorbeeld dat onaanraakbare ambtenaren 
relatief eenvoudig kunnen ontsnappen aan hun negatieve identiteit 
en daarmee ook aan eventuele groepsdruk tot actieve representatie.  
 Hoewel het, kort samengevat, dus niet uitgesloten is dat 
passieve representatie zich vertaalt in actieve representatie is dit in 
ieder geval niet meer dan een voorwaardelijk effect. Dit effect lijkt 
nogal onwaarschijnlijk in het geval van patronagedemocratieën 
en/of laaggerangschikte etnische groepen in verticaal 
gestratificeerde samenlevingen. Zowel de bereidheid van 
ambtenaren om hun discretie te gebruiken als de neiging van 
individuen om zich als groepsleden te gedragen zijn, zo is gebleken, 
zèlf variabelen, geen gegevenheden. 
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